By Prof Farakh A Khan

(This is continuation of my last article.. It was felt that this subject requires greater depth since people in Pakistan have distorted view of our Fata issue. The origin and evolution of Jihadi Wahhabi movement has to be put in proper perspective)

Conflict in society is the oldest human response inherited from our evolutionary animal past. As human society graduated from sticks and stones as weapons of aggression to high explosives and air war the level of carnage increased dramatically. We are now entering phase of robotic war lased with nuclear technology where power of destruction has escalated to a new level. The level of misery caused by modern wars is not acceptable anymore. War in Afghanistan either by foreign forces intervention or internal conflict for the last 50 decades has left the nation in state of perpetual war. Since Russian intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 Pakistan still has 1.7 million Afghan refugees. The conflict in Afghanistan has spilled over into Pakistan where since 2004 estimated 35,000 people have been killed and many more disabled. The only winners of war are the manufactures of arms and ammunition. For Pakistan Federally Administrated Areas (Fata) formally called the Tribal Areas has been devastated and there is no end in sight. For Pakistan Balochistan is also an area in turmoil. The Americans are also pointing fingers at our Balochistan human rights record.

Pakistan’s religious and cultural hereditary ties with Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and Middle East have always been strong. Any development in one country has its impact on others including Pakistan. Today we are caught in conflict in Afghanistan tomorrow we may be in a bigger mess if Iran is attacked by Israel/American forces. Attack on Iran will be most unpopular with the people of Pakistan and destabilise its leadership especially the army.

Endgame in Afghanistan

The Nato/American occupation of Afghanistan since 2001 directly impacted on Pakistan especially in Fata. People Pakistan actively volunteered to resist the invading army but was initially overwhelmed by the firepower of the American guns. Historically people of Fata has seen whole host of aggressors from the West and East. Each time aggressors have called people of what are now Fata and of Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa different names at different times of history labelled as terrorists, militants, rebels, religious extremists/fanatics or freedom fighters. The ten-year war in Afghanistan has taken toll of the American purse and its fighters. The French want to pull out by next year. On the other hand the Afghan people are constantly suffering. Both sides are in fatigue mode. The Americans are openly talking to Afghan Taliban leadership since November 2010 to end American occupation of Afghanistan. The talks are at a crucial juncture where a Taliban office is to be opened in Qatar. The Americans are considering release of five Taliban leaders from infamous Guantanamo prison to be stationed in Qatar. Team led by Marc Grossman from the American side and Qari Yousaf Ahmedi from Afghan Taliban side are in discussions (DeYoung, Karen. US links Taliban talks to Karzai’s consent. Dawn/Washington Post/ Bloomberg News Service. January 13, 2012). In Qatar talks the sticking point is release of Guantanamo Taliban commanders and timing of ceasefire. The Americans want ceasefire first before prisoner release but the Taliban want start of American troop withdrawal first (US, Taliban historic talks begin in Qatar. AFP. The News. January 30, 2012). Taliban has denied any talks with the US (Taliban deny talks with ‘puppet’ govt. AFP. The News. February 17, 2012).

The Americans with their many think tanks and experience of Vietnam and Russians bitter Afghan disaster perhaps made no impact on the American leadership. The arrogance of power overrides the long-term reality of war in Afghanistan. The British with long direct experience of wars in Afghanistan were also drawn into the conflict in 2001. Their famous war hero Lord Roberts of Kandahar after the Second Afghan War (1878-80) strongly advised Britain to avoid meddling in Afghan affairs. The Treaty of Gandamak (May 26, 1879) took away foreign affairs from Afghan rulers with fatal results. The right to foreign affairs was given back after the Third Afghan War (1919) following a treaty on November 22, 1921 (Shah, 2000). This was part of the Great Game strategy. But this was long time ago.

Besides American brokered talks with Taliban Afghanistan and Pakistan wants separate talks to be held in Saudi Arabia (Afghanistan seeks Taliban talks in Saudi Arabia: officials. AFP. The News. January 30, 2012). The Americans feel greater threat from Iran and want to windup operations in Afghanistan as early as possible. For Pakistan Fata is the key problem area. If Iran is attacked then the problem shall spread to rest of Pakistan.

In a discussion on at the Karachi Literature festival on ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan: conflict, extremism and Taliban’ Dr Maleeha Lodhi claimed that Pakistan’s stand regarding Afghan solution to be achieved through dialogue was rejected by the US. Ten years later the US is trying to do the same (Ali, Imtiaz. US follows what Pakistan said 10 years ago: Lodhi. The News. February 13, 2012). In 1838 Maharaja Ranjit Singh faced a similar problem with the British intention of attacking Afghanistan. The British tried to persuade Ranjit Singh to join them in the attack. The clever illiterate Sikh ruler understood the people of Fata, then part of Afghanistan, better and politely refused but gave free passage to the British army to attack Afghanistan. The result in 1842 when the proud ‘Army of the Indus’ was annihilated as predicted by the Sikh chief.

In an address to US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence CIA Director David Petraeus claimed that Pakistan was supporting Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan, it was alleged, was supporting Haqqani Network, Commander Nazir Group and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan by providing sanctuaries and war materials. The allegation is not new but may be partly true although this was hotly denied by Pakistan (Iqbal, Anwar. Pakistan not putting sufficient pressure on Afghan Taliban: CIA chief. Dawn. February 2, 2012). On September 22, 2011 Admiral Mike Mullen claimed that ‘Haqqani Network is part of strategic arm of ISI’ (Krasmer, D Stephen, 2012). The report based on prisoner’s interrogation in Afghanistan called ‘State of Taliban’ was ‘leaked’ to the press. It implicated the ISI in helping the Taliban direct attacks against the Isaf forces in Afghanistan. The report admitted that once Nato forces leave Afghanistan the state will collapse and open it to return of Taliban (Secret Nato report accuses Pakistan of helping Taliban. The News. February 2, 2012). For Pakistan a stable Afghanistan is essential for solving Fata problem. Unfortunately its army determines Pakistan foreign policy.

There are reports that US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta is thinking of US forces combat mission to end by mid-2013, a year earlier than previous estimates (US plans to end combat mission by mid-2013. OC. Dawn. February 3, 2012). He has urged Pakistan to help stop IED attacks, which allegedly were manufactured in Pakistan and used in Afghanistan (Iqbal, Anwar. Pakistan urged to help contain IED attacks. Dawn. Dawn. February 16, 2012).

How will withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan impinge on Pakistan? Withdrawal of US forces and handing over security to the Afghans is not as simple as it was seen in Iraq. The cost of US withdrawal would be in billions of dollars every year for decades to come to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan economy (Sehgal, Ikram. Drawdown in Afghanistan. The News. February 9, 2012). It is interesting to note that think tanks all over the world blame America for leaving Afghanistan to its own devices after Russian army withdrawal in 1989. Now that the Americans are in full force in Afghanistan the same think tanks want them out.

Taliban who?

But let us first define what Taliban means? In our language it signifies a student. A movement was triggered by few madrassa students led by Mullah Omar and later joined by the majority of Afghan people against the corrupt warlords of Afghanistan all were later called Taliban including former warlords. In Pakistan Taliban is an ideological group supporting Afghan Taliban in supply of fighters and war material. It is debated whether Taliban are products of madrassas in Pakistan. Nevertheless jihadi literature is common in our madrassas. Poor socioeconomic conditions do promote recruitment to Taliban fold. In Fata the Taliban umbrella includes besides Pashtuns other nationalities as well. They have in their midst Pakistanis mainly from Southern Punjab, Arabs, Chinese Muslims, Uzbeks and Muslims from the West. These ethnic groups are bound by religious ideology of jihad against invading American and Nato forces (Gul, Imtiaz and Jaffar, Nabil, 2012). Punjab developed massive madrassas with government help during Gen Ziaul Haq’s time to produce mujahedeen to counter Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The fallout from jihadi madrassas spilled over into sectarian violence and attacks on soft civilian targets leaving 30,000 dead. Jihadi madrassas were in place in KP (Haqqania in Okara Khattak) as well as in Karachi (Madrassa Bonaria) (Hussain, 2012). Unfortunately most people in Pakistan are convinced that attacks on Pakistani people are the work of American, Israeli and Indian intelligence agencies.

Pakistani Jihadi Organisations

With retreat of the Russian troops the jihadi organisations turned their attention towards Kashmir and India for their terrorist activities. During Gen Musharraf’s Kargil disaster (May-July 1999) these mujahedeen were wrongly portrayed as leading the attack. When these Mujahids were prevented from meddling in Kashmir and India under international pressure they moved to Fata and carried out suicide attacks in Pakistani cities (Hussain, 2012). The monster created by our intelligence agencies started to attack our own civilian population and security forces. For a while these home grown Taliban conquered Swat and were poised to establish ‘Islamic’ system of government before army crackdown in 2009.

For the western media Taliban became associates of Al Qaeda in the leadership mode and after 9/11 were the target of the American might. Let us be clear that Taliban had no role in 9/11 beyond sheltering their leader Osama. Osama being an Arab had no leadership role in the tribal society of Afghanistan or Fata. For last six years of his life he was hiding in Abbottabad, Pakistan and had no role in Afghan resistance movement.

Taliban in western literature became synonymous with any religious organisation targeting the invading forces in Afghanistan and hence an enemy. The Western paranoia reached a stage where all Muslims and their religion Islam were designated as radical Islam, terrorists, militants, extremist or fundamentalists. Unfortunately other religions do not describe their ‘extremists’ in the same way as Islam. The Christian evangelists are just as radical as ‘ultra right’ Jews or ‘extremist’ Hindus. All religions have subset of people who claim to know the ‘true’ meaning of their religion but the issue is of imposing their views on others. The West should have recognised Taliban as freedom fighters against an occupying army. In fact Taliban designation covers a large number interest groups ranging from Jihadi ideologues to outright dacoits striving for loot through robbing banks or kidnapping for ransom. The Taliban do not have a standing army. The dress code has not changed over centuries, which include carrying arms, and we cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. We also have to recognise that Wahhabi interpretation of Islam did not emerge with funding from Saudi Arabia during Russian occupation of Afghanistan. In fact Wahhabi Islam reached Fata area in 1824 and soon spread to Afghanistan initially as anti Sikh and later anti British platform to oust the infidels from the Muslim society.

People admire the bravery and tenacity of Pashtuns of Fata and Afghanistan and their place in history. They have been devastated and made paupers in the name of ‘gairat’. The Afghan leadership has also been eulogised for their farsightedness and sagacity. Nothing can be far from the truth (Siddiqi, Muhammad Ali. No Sandhurst no West Point. Dawn. February 16, 2012).

Emergence of TTP

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is not a single homogeneous body. TTP was formed under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud in an agreement between 13 different armed groups in December 2007 against the Pakistani security forces, schools, mosques, markets and Nato forces in Afghanistan but it remains a loose federation of different interest groups. The Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar is striving to unite these groups to concentrate on on-going battle against the Nato forces in Afghanistan. A meeting organised by Afghan Taliban on December 11, 2011 in Datta Khel area, NWA the Afghan Taliban requested TTP to sink their differences and fight the Americans. Hakimullah Mehsud, Waliur Rehman, Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur attended the meeting. Sirajuddin Haqqani was representing the Afghan Taliban. Two representatives of Quetta Shura along with Al Qaeda commander Abu Yahya al-Libi attended the meeting. It was decided to establish a five-member Shura-e-Murakeba (Observation Council) which was launched on January 2, 2012 to sort out differences and concentrate on fighting the Americans in Afghanistan rather than take on the Pakistani security forces (Murshed, S Iftikhar. A dagger at the heart. The News. January 30, 2012).

The TTP is also involved in suicide bombing in major cities of Pakistan. The basic resentment emerged as the basis of revenge against killing of their kith and kin by the security forces and drone strikes. Revenge is basic cultural trait of the people of Fata. On the other hand killing of innocent people in Pakistan alienated any sympathy for them and went against the TTP public popularity. It is not surprising that bombing of cities in Pakistan has been put on hold. There is the issue of cross border attacks on Nato forces by some organisations in Fata. Since the Pakhtun relations lived across the porous ‘border’ (Durand Line) the TTP and other organisations were duty bound to help their brethren in Afghanistan. This has been strongly resented by the Americans and tried to put pressure on Pakistan to stop these attackers. The other aspect of Taliban ideology is found in rest of Pakistan especially in Punjab and hence called Punjabi Taliban. The Taliban belief of war against West, India and Israel and pro Taliban jihad is rampant in religious and main political parties in major urban areas of Pakistan. Majority of Taliban jihadi ideology mind set in Pakistan do not subscribe to violence as a means of change in the society. We do fear a military intervention (coup) since they are the ‘saviour of Pakistan’ and custodians of its ideology? Gen Zia’s indoctoration of the Pakistan military has played a significant role in the mind change of previous set of military commanders. Gen Hamid Gul is the prime example of jihadi generals of the past now part of ‘Defence of Pakistan Council’ organisation based on hate America, India and Israel.

Nato Invasion of Afghanistan and its Aftermath

Up to 2001 Afghanistan was an insignificant state ruled by Wahhabi leaning semi literate bunch of nobodies living in the Stone Age with scant understanding of developments in the world. They imposed their version of Wahhabi Islam. The world had forgotten Afghanistan with retreat of Russian army in 1989 till 2001. The most powerful army ever seen in the world seething with rage decided to ‘take out’ Osama after the 9/11 attack by a group of Arabs mainly from Egypt-none from Afghanistan. It seemed that the Taliban in Afghanistan would be pushover against the might of high-tech American army and their 500lb bombs dropped by air. It was predicted that Taliban would be totally eliminated by American hammering and what would be left of them shall beg for peace on American terms. Little did they realise that ten years later they would be still trying to find a way out of Afghanistan. Unfortunately the world and Pakistanis know very little about the conflict area in Afghanistan or Fata. For the world and Pakistani Fata and adjoining Afghanistan became the ‘bad lands’ and ‘most dangerous place in the world’ after 9/11. For the British in India these places were always the ‘bad lands’ only fit to train their army and seek medals for valour of their fighters against improvised lands. We need to explore the background of resistance of the people in the area before we make sweeping judgments.

The past of Afghanistan is haunting the Americans today and we need to divulge the past to understand what is happening today. We need to explore the historical role of foreign fighters and Punjabi Taliban in present context. These foreign fighters never assumed leadership role in the tribal system. The phenomenon of people crossing into Afghanistan from India to fight is not a new one.

Afghanistan Invasions in History

The Achaemenid Empire founded by Cyrus the Great (575 BC-530 BC) followed by Darius the Great (550-486 BC) included Afghanistan and part of Pakistan. Alexander’s objective was to conquer the Persian Empire and invaded Pakistan in 326 BC calling it India. He stopped at the banks of river Beas because beyond that was not India. This was a short Greek incursion of which the people of the area had no recollection. Bactrian Greeks ruled Afghanistan and northern Pakistan from 256 BC to 1^st century BC when Parthians finally defeated them. This was followed by invasion by Yuezhi (Kushan) and Scythians (Saka). The impact of invasion by different armies on local culture there is no documented evidence of change besides development of Indo-Greek sculpture used by Buddhists during Kushan period and adoption of Parthian dress of salwar kamiz by the people. In the middle of 4^th century AD Afghanistan was overrun by Epthalite branch of Huns. They finally managed to conquer most of northern India. Huns introduced title ‘khan’ into Afghanistan and Pakistan (Tanner, 2002). Besides invading armies over centuries different ethnic groups have silently moved across India from the west to permanently settle there. These migrating bands quietly integrated into the Indian society. Unfortunately these historical migrations have not been properly documented. In recent times war in Afghanistan has also displaced people. During the Russian invasion more than 3 million Afghans migrated to Pakistan. Today some 1.7 million Afghans refugees are still in Pakistan.

In more recent times the British invasion of Afghanistan by the ‘Army of the Indus’ to install a British puppet (modern American Karzai) as their ruler in 1839 led to annihilation of the army in its retreat in 1842. The Afghan invasion was pushed by the then Governor General Lord Auckland due to unfounded fear of Russian expansion into Afghanistan (this finally happened in 1979 when Russian army invaded Afghanistan). This was the time when Britain was the sole super power. British arrogance led them to disaster. To boost army’s morale Sindh was conquered in 1843. This was followed by annexation of Punjab in 1849. These British moves sent clear message about future British intentions to the hill tribes in the north west of the expanding British Empire. As early as 1847 Herbert Edwards as the British officer with the Sikh administration posted to Bannu as Assistant Resident, at that time border of ‘Eastern Afghanistan’, was able to subdue the valley and extract revenue for the Sikh Darbar (Obhrai, 1983). Starting in 1849 the British were regularly sending in punitive ‘expeditions’ into the Tribal belt. By 1857 British had launched 15 expeditions into the ‘Frontier’. By 1939 the ‘expeditions’ had increased to 58 (Barthorp, 2002). It is unfortunate to note that the British army in India used Fata as live training ground for its soldiers. But when the army faced well-equipped European armies during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and WW I it was found to be sadly lacking in battle skills. It was highly unethical to use the people of Fata as a military training ground for fame and glory. But if you are all powerful then ethics do not matter.

Before Sikh invasion of Peshawar (1818) the city was the summer capital of Kabul ruler. The city was finally annexed by the Sikhs in 1834 and was ruled by Gen Paolo Avitabile. His reign of terror was known as ‘gallows and gibbets’ (Wikipedia, 2012). The first British envoy Mountstuart Elphinstone visited the Afghan king in Peshawar in 1807 (Schofield, 2003). During the Sikh Darbar the Sikhs held the plains but the mountains in the west remained independent. By 1818 the Sikhs had taken Peshawar valley but part of the territory was given as Jagir to three brothers of Kabul ruler Amir Dost Mohammad. Till 1834 the Afghans were ruling Peshawar as Jagirdars of the Sikhs before it was annexed. Peshawar was the summer capital of ruler of Kabul. The Sikh army under the dreaded general Hari Singh Nalwa defeated the Afghan army in Nowshera and in 1838 Sikh Kardars replaced the Afghan administrators. Sikh garrisons were placed in Peshawar, DI Khan, Kohat and Teri. After the First Sikh War under a treaty signed on December 16, 1846 British formed Council of Regency and Hazara, Bannu, Kohat, DG Khan and DI Khan were placed under the British Assistant Residents. Chief Commissioner ruled Punjab in 1849 and in 1859 by Lt Governor. North-West Frontier got its Lt Governor in 1932. In the districts British Deputy Commissioners were appointed. During the Sikh wars Amir Dost Mohammad of Afghanistan moved into the Peshawar valley up to the Indus in December 1848. He made a grave miscalculation by sending a contingent of cavalry to aid the dying Sikh rule against the British.

During the Sikh rule Peshawar valley (Kabul River) up to Jamrud in the west was held with great atrocities. In 1849 the British took over the Sikh Darbar territories and established pickets (check posts) along the eastern banks of Indus and in Kabul River valley along the bases of mountains to restrain raids from tribes beyond in the mountains. The British were now in direct contact with Afghanistan and Persia. The first incursion of the British forces through what was Afghan tribal area took place when their army attacked Ghazni and Kabul in 1839 what became the disastrous 1^st Anglo-Afghan War (also called Auckland’s folly) (Barthorp, 2002). This was followed by revenge attack in August 1842 when the invading British forces (‘Avenging Army’) under Gen Pollock and Gen Nott brutally killed people of all ages and both sexes. This according to Duke of Wellington was ‘Restoration of Reputation in the East’. Kabul was sacked and bazaar burnt but this time the ‘Avenging Army’ retreated quickly.

Role of ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ in History

The origin of ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ needs to be explained. From times immemorial the Pakhtun belt now located between Afghanistan and Pakistan has not changed although they were Hindus at one time then converted to Buddhism and finally to Islam. Babar (early 16^th century) records his attack into Bonair to gather livestock and make a pyramid of heads of the local population (a Turkish tradition of Central Asia). At the time of Emperor Akbar, who held Kabul as a province of his empire, the Mughal policy was to pay some tribes for safe passage and to send expeditions to others. The unrest of Fata tribes instigated by Pir-e-Roshan (Sheikh Bazid Ansari) and his descendants, formally of South Waziristan Agency resident of Jalandhar (now in India) hence technically  ‘foreign fighters’, against religious doctrine of Deen-e-Elahi and occupation of Pakhtun homeland by Mughals was a severe test for Akbar’s armies. He sent in 15 expeditions to counter the jihadis in Tirah and Waziristan and after much bloodshed (including loss of his court jester Raja Birbal) he managed to make the area peaceful through diplomacy (Hosain, 1938; Shah, 2000). The tribes were in constant war with each other but united against any invader usually led by a religious figure. Nothing has changed since.

In more recent times Wahhabi cleric Syed Ahmed Shah moved from Bareilly, India, to what is now Fata to incite the tribes against Sikh rule in Punjab in 1824. In 1830 Syed Ahmed Shah, having not received any support from the tribes, was killed fighting the Sikh army in Balakot where he was buried.  His 300 surviving followers retreated to Sitana in Bonair and settled on the property of Syed Akbar Shah who became their Amir. The subsequent resistance movement was Wahhabi in nature. They were displaced from time to time but managed to establish ‘training’ centres in Tirah, Chamarkand and other places. Bonair became a serious problem for the British in 1852 when ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’, as labelled by the British, with the help of Hasanzai tribe took over the Kotla fort belonging to Nawab of Amb. An expedition was launched against them in 1853 and the fort was taken back.  At the time of Mutiny of 1857 the Hindustani fanatics led by Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan caused some problems. Their village called Narinji was attacked in July and later in August 1857 by a British force and set on fire. According to Major Vaughan “Not a house was spared; even the walls of many were destroyed by elephants…Three prisoners were taken—one was a Bareilly Maulvi, second a Chamla standard-bearer and the third a vagrant of Charonda; they were all subsequently executed.” Next was attack on the village of Sitana led by Sir Sydney Cotton. The Hindustanis came into attack dressed in white in silence and ‘every Hindustani in the position was either killed or taken prisoner (Nevill, 1910; Wylly, 1912).

Hindustani Wahhabi in Bonair 1860s

The scenes of massacres were still fresh in the memory of the tribes when the British forces launched Frontier War in 1863. The idea of this war was to teach a lesson to the tribes of Bonair to stop raids into the settled areas under British control and to ‘Hindustani fanatics’ of Wahhabi Islam who considered the British as occupier of their lands across India making jihad legitimate. The British felt that ‘Hindustanis’ were also spreading Wahhabi Islam in Fata and had to be stopped (Albinia, 2008).

To oppose British occupation the ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ were receiving funds from ‘Southern’ Bengal’ with its headquarter in Patna in Bihar. The arms and ammunition was coming from the Gulf and Afghanistan. Later armaments were supplied from ‘Mesopotamia’. The Mulka village in Mahabun Mountains of Syeds of Bunair housed left overs of Syed Ahmed Shaheed (d 1830) uprising against Sikh rule, was eventfully burnt by the locals under a British detachment in 1863. Between 1850 and 1863 the British launched 20 expeditions into the mountains beyond the plains occupied by the British forces. Each time the number of invading forces increased. In Sitana campaign (1863) more than 5,000 troops were used and later enforced. The initial force was trapped in Ambela Pass and Gen Sir Sydney Chamberlain was evacuated with severe wounds. The cost of the expedition was worrying for the British administration. The opposing tribesmen had few matchlock guns and mostly relied on swords and hurling stones. Swords were used in close quarter action (Adye, John. Sitana: a mountain campaign of the borders of Afghanistan in 1863. Published 1866). In 1860s the Afghan jezail with a range of 300 yards was better then the Brown Bess used by the British army. The introduction Snider and later Lee Metford and Martinis rifles (1897) with smokeless powder backed by artillery gave the British again the advantage. Finally the introduction of machinegun (Gatling and Maxim) made the British army a superior force. At the same time the tribes managed to acquire new weapons and balance was again maintained (Skeen, 1932). By 1906 Muscat imported 278,000 pounds worth of rifles from four European countries. The arms were transported to Mekran coast by boat and from their Afghan camel caravans took them to Southern Afghanistan and sold to the tribes. The British tried to block the movement by sea and land (Wylly, 1912).

The main issue of attacks by the British beyond its borders into Tribal Areas of Afghanistan (now Fata) was raids (cattle lifting) by tribes supported by ‘Hindustani Fanatics’ in the area. We must realise that the people living in inhospitable mountains had limited agricultural resource, living partly a nomadic life and raids in the more prosperous plains. In 1858 the British army raid destroyed Sitana, Bonair on the southern slopes of Mahabun Mountains. The British claimed that part of Amb State which was under British protection had been invaded by ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ and had to be evicted by the British Army. This was followed by destruction of ‘Hindustani settlement’ of Mulka located on the northern slopes of Mahabun Mountains in 1863. The British army in another raid destroyed ‘Hindustani village’ of Mundee in 1864. The other British approach was to block supplies, funds and fighters from British India. For the people of Fata fear of British occupation of Sindh and later Punjab was an indication of their advancement and occupation of their areas  (Punjab Administration Report, 1863-64 and 1867-68). The retaliatory raids into Tribal Territories by British forces became a nuisance for the poor. The tribes requested the Hindustani Jihadis to move their training camps into remote areas or leave the area. The Jihadis from outside Fata returned following Russian invasion in 1979.

20^th century Wahhabi Movement in India

There was resentment against British occupation of India among the educated youth in India. The Wahhabi doctrine of jihad carried intense appeal for these men. They decided to launch their jihad from Pakhtun tribes of British and Afghan frontier. They hoped that Afghanistan and Turkey would help them to conquer India. Large number of educated Muslims in India decided to move into the Tribal Area and some into Afghanistan in 1905. These British citizens called ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ were interned in Afghan territory at Jallalabad by the Afghan king Amir Habibullah Khan under pressure from the British. Influential Indians in Afghan court finally released them. Although highly educated young anti British volunteers were influenced by Deoband School led by Sheikhul Hind Maulana Mehmoodul Hassan they were looked upon with suspicion. The money was supplied from across India from Calcutta, Patna and Punjab. However they were sadly disillusioned with the state of affairs they found in Afghanistan. There was no rule of law and the justice system was a replica of ancient system where the only the king finally gave his verdict. There was no system of education and this is where the ‘Young Afghans’ with the help of young Indian students led by Dr Abdul Ghani from various parts of India proposed to bring change. A society with proposed constitution and educational awareness threatened Amir Habibullah’s rule. In 1909 Dr Abdul Ghani and 38 British subjects members of Mashroota movement were interned in the Ark Fort Kabul while seven Afghani citizens were blown from artillery pieces. The Islamic Wahhabi renaissance of Afghanistan with system of the West ended with complete disillusionment of educated Muslims of India. Amir Habibullah was assassinated in 1919 and the new Amir Amanullah released them.

The Muslims of India during the WW I felt betrayed by the British when it went to war against Turkey a Muslim country and the home of the Khalifa of the Muslim World. This was the Khalafat Movement joined by Hindus and Sikhs as a means to ouster of the British from India. The Muslim preachers across India were asking for jihad against the infidels in particular an end of Indian occupation by the British.

Another jihadi group of about 20,000 people entered Afghanistan from India during Khalafat Movement of 1920. A poor country like Afghanistan could not afford to house and feed these people who has burnt their boats in India and had nothing to live on. Most moved back to India but a small hard core remained but their cause was doomed. By this time the political scene had changed. Russia as a communist state was expanding into Central Asian states also became enemy of the religion and hence of Muslims. Some Mujahids became communists. Many of jihadis in Kabul were seeking communist help to push the British out of India. Other Indians wanted help from Turkey but the country was in dire strait and refused anything to do with these Indian ‘revolutionaries’. There were endless intrigues within the Indian ranks in Russia, which did not help their cause. Amir Amanullah was advanced financial support and fearful of Russian intention he aligned with the British and would not tolerate anti British moves in his kingdom. Many of new jihadi arrivals moved to Fata and settled in older Hindustani settlements. For the British transportation of explosives was worrying and made efforts to stop this. They used secret agencies to affectively stop funding of Hindustani settlements from their sympathisers in India. The jihadi movement by Hindustani Fanatics continued till the 1930s but were a spent force and did not pose any danger to the British authorities. Only two Hindustani settlements were remaining in Fata.

The movement for jihad by Hindustani Wahhabi volunteers had sever setbacks from changing world scene and from within their ranks. However one cannot but admire these people from relatively affluent background in India chose a life of immense struggle and hardships. With no military training they faced hostile tribes, corrupt police, suspicious rulers and dacoits these people were moving across Asia and Europe despite poor resources. Their travels in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Turkey could have given credit to any Western explorer of that time (Shah, 2000). With the Russian and later American invasion the old ‘Hindustani’ now Pakistani Mujahids started to stream into Afghanistan to fight the invaders. Nothing has changed.

Fata during the British Raj

The Agencies of Fata were created firstly of Khyber to keep a hold on the Pass in 1878. Following cession of Kurram by the Afghan government in 1879 it was made an agency in 1892. The Malakand, Tochi and Wana (later Waziristan) were developed between 1895 and 1896.  The people of Waziristan were up in arms against demarcation of western border based on strategic heights rather than tribal lines. To force the tribes in accepting Durand Line Waziristan Field Force was organised in 1894. In 1901 the settled districts were made into province of North West Frontier and the Agencies separated (Obhrai, 1983). Starting in 1920 railway line from Peshawar was extended to Landi Kotal (Bayley, 1926).

The British continued its policy in Fata of ‘Butcher and Bolt’ in retaliation of tribal raids. After subduing the lashkar the villages of ‘miscreants’ were torched or blown up, the crops burnt, waterways destroyed, livestock rounded up and economic blockade of the offending area put in place. Each time a new agreement was made with the tribal elders. Starting in 1917 the British troops used ‘Air Service’ to attack the Mehsud tribal lashkar. In response the old style of Lashkar attack was abandoned. In 1930s Chief of the Air Staff Sir Hugh Trenchard proposed use of fighter aircraft to keep the tribes in check rather than rely on slow cumbersome land expeditions. He was overruled due financial constraints (Barthorp, 2002). Now drone strikes by the Americans and bombing by Pakistani F16 are trying to do the same. With advancement of military technology armoured cars and later light tanks were used. In Tirah the tribes were asked to remove ‘Turk and Afghan’ settlers (now foreign fighters) which they did sending them back to Afghanistan (Obhrai, 1938). It seems that nothing has changed in the 21^st century. Unfortunately we have no written record of the suffering or body count of people during various invasions and devastations caused by armies entering the area.

The British policy regarding Fata had been shifting. John Lawrence was in favour of ‘backward school’ making the Indus as the final ‘natural’ border. Sir Mortimer Durand advocated a ‘scientific frontier’, which was a soft face of ‘forward policy’ (Diver, 1935). The Durand Line split the ancient tribal system to secure military vantage points for the British. Whatever the policy development work in the area was limited to making roads to facilitate movement of troops at short notice. When the British left in 1947 Pakistan reversed the Fata ‘forward policy’ and pulled out the regular troops from Fata. We had peace in Fata till 2004.

Recent Developments in Fata

Let us jump to recent events shaking Fata and Afghanistan. The bookshops today are full of bewildering array of old and new publications on Afghanistan, Taliban and Al Qaeda (see Bibliography). Most of the modern authors have little understanding of the area, people or its history under discussion. Even the Pakhtuns of KP have vague understanding of the people of Fata. Fata tribes are individually unique and do not fit into a single cultural pattern. Al Qaeda, initially an all-Arab group, as an entity appeared on our radar screen through American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Al Qaeda led by Arabs has a foreign agenda and is irrelevant for Pakistan’s Fata problem.

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 galvanised the tribes and people of the country and Fata against the occupiers. This time Russian had helicopters, APCs and tanks but in this asymmetrical war the Afghans had the terrain on their side and supplies of manpower and ammunition from America, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Al Qaeda, a small splinter group, was born out of this triple marriage. The supply of Stringer missiles by the Americans negated Russian air power. On our visit to Bokhara in 1995 it was sad to note a large soldiers graveyard in the local park killed in Afghanistan-a needless butchery of the youth of Bokhara.

The American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 united the Fata tribes once again into military opposition. People of Pakistan are also opposed to American intervention in Afghanistan and drone attacks in Fata. They are supplying manpower and funds to Taliban as seen in 1860s. The ‘Hindustani fanatics’ are now ‘foreign fighters’ or called ‘Punjabi Taliban, Arab fighters or Uzbeks’. The Fata Pakhtun ‘raiders’ of 1863 were transformed into Mujahedeen during Russian occupation and then into Taliban when the Americans came in. AK47, 50 calibre machinegun, sniper rifle, Improvised Explosive Device (IED), landmines, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and suicide bombers now affectively replace the Stringer missiles. The Pakhtuns are innovative. Pakistan became an enemy of the Taliban fighting the American and Nato armies because of Pakistan governments support to Americans in the form of supplies and drone attacks. We saw spate of suicide and IED blasts in major cities of Pakistan.

The incidence of Lal Masjid in Islamabad and then attack of the Pakistani army into South Waziristan in 2004 was the last straw for peace. Most of the students who died in Lal Masjid in the army assault were from Fata and KP. Then came the incidence of US troops killing 24 FC soldiers in cold blood in North Waziristan on November 26, 2011, which was followed by retaliatory freeze of Nato supplies through Pakistan and returning of Shamsi Air Base used for drone strikes in Fata. Earlier CIA agent Raymond Davis was held for shooting two motorcyclists in Lahore and then released after payment of blood money under Islamic law. He was never tried for murder of two young men in America. This was followed by the killing of Osama in an American raid in Abbottabad, which produced bad blood between the two countries. The people of Pakistan were told of thousands of visas issued by Pakistani embassy in US to dubious people considered as CIA agents.

Ten Years of American Occupation of Afghanistan

America is bleeding in Afghanistan like its predecessor the Russians. The 1^st World armies require expensive services and equipment, which are not appropriate for war in the 3^rd World. With killing of Osama the main reason for invasion of Afghanistan has been removed. The original motivational force for the American troops in the field was to make America ‘safe’ and revenge for 9/11 by removing Al Qaeda leadership has been achieved. The Americans have killed enough innocent Afghans to settle revenge for 9/11. The civilian deaths in Afghanistan in 2011 were estimated as 3,021, which was more than 8% in 2010. A total of 4,507 civilians were wounded. These deaths were attributed to militants (77%) and 14% due to Isaf and Afghan forces. The number of suicide bombings (450) increased by 8%. Homemade explosive landmines killed 967 people (Johson, Kay. Civilian deaths in Afghan war hit record high. Dawn. February 5, 2012). A report by Amnesty International claims that 500,000 Afghans are homeless due to on-going war. About 400 people are made homeless on daily basis (War, neglect leave 500,000 Afghans homeless, says AI. Agencies. The News. February 24, 2012). Today Americans are questioning the basic reason for US invasion of Afghanistan (Cloughley, Brian. Afghan war is based on lies and deception. Counterpunch/Daily Times. February 20, 2012).

The US soldiers in the field are now fighting a non-ideological war where it is now ‘them or us’. It is not surprising that American soldiers have been caught taking fingers as souvenirs and urinating on dead Afghans. It is time they got out without giving an impression that they have their tail between the legs. In any case Americans do not need troops on the ground in Afghanistan to ward off any untoward incidence. They have 50 bases in the Middle East and Qatar and Bahrain bases are not far from Afghanistan. For surveillance the Americans have ample supply of drones and settilites. Their troops can be moved into Afghanistan at short notice. I do not see how the Americans can maintain Karzai as the leader of Afghans once they leave.

Fata Solution-Options

The other player in Afghan scene is Pakistan. Afghan leadership never had soft corner for the Pakistan. The bone of contention between the two is the 2,640 km 1893 Durand Line Agreement inherited from the British for fixing ‘spheres of influence’ between the two countries. Thus the British claimed Fata and what is now most of KP as their ‘sphere of influence’. Today neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can dictate to the Fata tribes. Both keep Durand Line as a porous border and bone of contention. The attacks into Pakistan by Taliban or its splinter groups have been worrying. Like the British earlier the American and Pakistani leadership have made agreements with the various groups of Pakistani Taliban and tribes, which each side claim were broken by the other. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have to give a clear programme for the betterment of the people.

Legally the situation in Fata and Balochistan is quite similar. In Balochistan Area A, which is only 3% of the province is under direct provincial rule where the administration is functioning. In Area B (97%) the Sardars have been given the responsibility of governance and maintenance of private armies. In Fata, since there were no tribal chiefs, governance was given to the tribes with the right of the central government to intervene under Frontier Crime Regulation. The ancient tribal autonomy is the main issue for integration of Fata into mainstream of Pakistan. There have been many suggestions for bringing Fata into the mainstream of Pakistan. Since last year political parties have been allowed to function in Fata. Some claim that Fata should change its status from ‘sphere of influence’ into a province of Pakistan. Then there are others who want Fata to become part of corrupt Khyber Pakhtunkhawa province (Afridi, Ghulam S. Fata’s integration. Dawn. February 8, 2012). The political solution has to emerge from the people of Fata and cannot be dictated by the Pakistan government. The present military policy of creating displacement of the population (IDPs) followed by indiscriminate destruction of what little livelihood of the people of the area had has been a disastrous policy. The ‘hull’ (solution) for Fata is not war but economics and education. In any case Pakistan cannot financially afford even low-level military intervention in the area. Pakistan was spending (directly and indirectly) Rs259.10 billion on ‘war on terror’ in 2005 but by 2010 this was increased to Rs2,975.04 billion. Another estimate claims that Pakistan is loosing Rs3 billion daily and Rs93 billion every month on ‘war on terror’ (Abbasi, Ansar. Pakistan lost Rs7,020b, got only Rs990b. The News. February 8, 2012). The cost of human lives lost and those maimed is also significant (Shah, Akhtar Hussain in Stabilising Afghanistan, 2011).

Historically Afghanistan was on the trade route from Central Asia and Iran to India. Later the Russians joined in. With communist take over of Russia (1917) the borders were hermitically sealed and the ancient trade movement stopped. Afghanistan became dependent on India and later Pakistan for its basic needs.

From times immemorial Afghanistan and Fata was trading and providing heavy work to India till the Russia, British and later Pakistan came to define borders. Horses and cloth were brought in from Iran and Central Asia to be sold in India. Dry fruit sale was in their hands all over India. Heavy work such as building mud walls and providing wood to the rural areas in India was the work of these hardy men from the mountains. Today Fata has a million armed men but is heavily dependent on food, electricity, infrastructure, fuel and some places gas from Pakistan. Only 7% of land in the area is cultivable. Fata survives on smuggling, heroin export, and jobs in local militia and in rest of Pakistan. We are not sure of mineral wealth of Fata since no survey has been carried out. Thanks to the Americans we now know that neighbouring Afghanistan is full of mineral wealth including rare earth minerals (Simpson, 2011). Before the Russian invasion there was insignificant poppy growth in Afghanistan. Today they are producing 5,800 tons of opium a year and the American army has failed to make a dent on heroin production or its export (Cloughley, Brian. Doing Afghan drugs. Daily Times. January 29, 2012). Fata is one important outlet for heroin export and source of earning for the poor people.

We also need to evaluate the impact of developments in Afghanistan on Pakistan. First and foremost Talibanisation to a degree has taken place in Pakistan where most people are supportive of Islamisation, which cannot be equated with Talibanisation. The first step towards Islamisation of Pakistan took place with Objectives Resolution in 1949. Since then the rulers of Pakistan have used Islam to promote their rule over the country. Some of the so-called religious scholars have used Islam for financial gains or to grab power. Money has flowed from local and foreign sources in support of different factions. Religion has become the biggest industry in Pakistan. Religion has also been source of deadly conflict within Pakistan as different sects jockey for power.

The Arab Spring in Middle East and North Africa has drifted to Islam as a source of inspiration. Even Turkey with years of enforced secularism as visualised by its army is trying to find Islamic values. The lack of understanding by the West of the Muslim World is the basis of the problem of being threatened by Islam. There is also much confusion among the Muslim World as to what is Islamic and is coloured by cultural past of each society in the Muslim World. On the other hand Muslims should understand that ‘Islam is (not) in danger’ and they do not require armed conflict to achieve their goal. The Muslim World has to realise that we are now living in a global village and cannot survive in isolation as being tried by Iran. Most of all the West needs to understand the mind set of emerging Muslim World. A free stable Afghanistan needs to evolve from Stone Age and not forced at gunpoint to perceived Western values and governance. Afghan peace would bring peace in Fata. Rest assured the Afghans or people of Fata are not going to declare war on the West.

There is a strong parallel between Russian and later American invasions. The Russians came into Afghanistan to make them communists while the Americans after the period of rage want to build a capitalist system in their style of democracy. Neither of these super powers have made any dent on the Afghans. Change comes from the mind and not guns. This was the effort of Bacha Khan the Frontier Gandhi. He was essentially a social worker and not a politician dubbed as a traitor by the Pakistani leadership. We should use the carrot rather than the stick to solve Fata problem. There has been in place Fata Development Authority for many years it has dismal record of socio-economic development as compared to rest of Pakistan. Fata also has Fata Disaster Management Authority collaborating with UN Development Programme, which requires $200 million (Ali, Zulfiqar. Donors seek access to monitor Fata uplift. Dawn. February 15, 2012). Poor figures of health and education are alarming. We do not have correct information since the army feeds it and we have no independent observers in the area (Qureshi, Shafiullah. Fata failure. The News. January 29, 2012).

Guns shall make the Fata situation worse since there is no military solution. Above all we need professional research of the area and a ten years planned strategy with the consent of the Fata tribes. The old social structure has been altered with massive influx of arms and ammunition during Russian invasion. The old British administrative system is in tatters. The Political Agent and Malik equation and the jirga system have been dismantled. We are not dealing with old Fata anymore. Solution of Fata has to emerge from its people. Before we plan for a long-term policy for Fata it has to be taken off the hands of the Pakistan Army.

PS. Today Pakistan faces a more serious problem of separatist nationalist movement in Balochistan, which unlike Fata is not a religious issue. Unfortunately successive governments in Pakistan have been in a state of denial and used the gun to make Balochistan fall in line. This time it is not going to work.

Radicalisation of Pakistani society unleashed by Gen Zia fast gaining ground is also a major issue yet to be addressed (Hussain, 2012).

Selected Bibliography

1. Adye, John. Sitana: a mountain campaign of the borders of Afghanistan in 1863. ASIM: BOO6PE65CC. Published 1866.
2. Ahmed, Khalid. The mystery of what Pakistan wants. Friday Times. Jan 2/Feb 2, 2012.
3. Al Qaeda in its own words. Edited by Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2008.
4. Albinia, Alice. Empires of the Indus. John Murray, London. 2008.
5. Baha, Lal. NWFP: administration under British rule 1901-1919. National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad. 1978.
6. Barthorp, Michael. Afghan wars and the North-West Frontier 1839-1947. Cassell & Co, London. 2002.
7. Bayley, Victor. Permanent way through the Khyber. Jarrolds Publishers, London. MCMXXXIV (1924).
8. Bellew, HW. Afghanistan and the Afghans: brief review of the history of the country and account of its people. Samson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, London. 1879.
9. Bergen, Peter L. Holy war Inc: inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden. Phoenix, London. 2002.
10. Borovik, Artyom. The hidden war: a true story of war in Afghanistan. Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 1991.
11. Bruce, Richard Isaac. The forward policy and its results. 1898.
12. Burns, Alexander. Cabool: a personal narrative of a journey to, and residence in that city, in the years 1836, 7, and 8. Reprint Ferozesons Ltd., Lahore. 1961.
13. Caroe, Olaf. The Pathans. Reprint by Oxford University Press, Karachi. 1975.
14. Charny, IW. Fighting suicide bombing: a worldwide campaign for life. Praeger Security International, Westport. 2007.
15. Deshpande, Anirudh. British military policy in India, 1900-1945. Vanguard Books, Lahore. 2005.
16. Diver, Maud. Kabul to Kandahar. Peter Davis, London. 1935.
17. Docherty, Paddy. The Khyber Pass: a history of empire and invasion. Oxford University Press, Karachi. 2007.
18. Dupree, Louis. Afghanistan. Oxford Pakistan Paperback, Karachi. 1997.
19. Edwards, Herbert B. A year on the Punjab Frontier in 1848-49. Vol. I & II. Reprint Ferozesons Ltd., Lahore. 1963.
20. Elliott, JG. The Frontier 1839-1947: the story of the North-West Frontier of India. Cassell, London. 1968.
21. Fata- a most dangerous place. Principle Author Shuja Nawaz. Centre for Strategic & International Studies. 2009.
22. Griffiths, John C. Afghanistan. Pall Mall Press, London. 1967.
23. Gul, Imtiaz and Jaffar, Nabila. Taliban and the Pakistani politics. Friday Times. Jan 2/Feb 2, 2012.
24. Hamilton, Angus. Afghanistan. William Heinemann, London. 1906.
25. Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game: on secret service in High Asia. John Murray, London. 1990.
26. Hosain, Mohammad. A few phases of the Afghans in Jullundur Busties. 1938.
27. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjabi Taliban: driving extremism in Pakistan. Pentagon Press, New Delhi. 2012.
28. Hussain, Zahid. The scorpions tail. Free Press, New York. 2010.
29. Jalal, Ayesha. Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 2008.
30. Jan, Abid Ullah. Afghanistan: the genesis of the final crusade. Pragmatic Publication. Ottawa. 2006.
31. Journals and diaries of the Assistants to the Agent, Governor-General North West Frontier and Resident at Lahore 1846-1849. First edition 1911. Reprint Sang-e-Meel. 2006.
32. Khan, Mohammad Hosain. A few phases of the Afghans in Jullundur Basties. 1938.
33. Khan, Wajahat S. The other guy’s endgame—Part I. Friday Times. Jan27/Feb-2, 2012.
34. Khan, Wajahat S. The other guy’s endgame—Part II. Friday Times. February 3-9, 2012
35. Krasmer, D Stephen. Getting tough with Pakistan. Foreign Affairs. January/February. 2012.
36. Kroernig, Matthew. Foreign Affairs. January/February. 2012.
37. Lahood, Nelly. The jihadis’ path to self-destruction. Hurst & Co. London.2010.
38. Lieven, Anatal. Pakistan a hard country. Allen Lane, UK. 2011.
39. Matinuddin, Kamal. Power struggle in the Hindukush Afghanistan (1978-1991). Services Book Club, Lahore. 1991.
40. Mir, Amir. Talibanisation of Pakistan. Pentagon Security International, New Delhi. 2009.
41. Murray, Hallan AH. The high-road of Empire. John Murray, London. 1905.
42. Nevill, HL. Campaigns on the North-West Frontier. First published 1910. Reprint Sang-e-Meel Publications. 2003.
43. Nichols, Robert. Settling the Frontier: land, law and society in the Peshawar Valley, 1500-1900. Oxford University Press. 2001.
44. Obhrai, Divan Chand. The evolution of North-West Frontier Province. First published 1938. Reprint Saeed Book Bank, Peshawar, 1983.
45. Omissi, David. The Sepoy and the Raj: the Indian Army, 1860-1940. Macmillan Press Ltd, Houndmills. 1994.
46. Pakistan: the militant jihadi challenge. Asia Report No. 164. March 13, 2009. Pennell, TL. Among the wild tribes of the Afghan Frontier. Seeley &Co., London. 1909.
47. Post Taliban. Complied and edited by Ahmed Salim. Sang-e-Meel Publication, Lahore. 2003.
48. Rashid, Ahmed. Decent into chaos. Allen Lane, UK. 2008.
49. Razvi, Mujtaba. The frontiers of Pakistan: a study of Frontier problems in Pakistan’s foreign policy. National Publishing House Ltd., Karachi. 1971.
50. Ridedel, Milton A. In search for Al Qaeda: its leadership and future. Vanguard Books, Lahore. 2009.
51. Saleem, Shahzad. Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: beyond bin Laden and 9/11. Pluto Press, London. 2011.
52. Shah, Zahid. Muslim freedom fighters of India based in Central Asia. Area Study Centre (Russia & CA) Peshawar University and Hanns Seidel Foundation. 2000.
53. Schofield, Victoria. Afghan frontier: feuding and fighting in Central Asia. Tauris Parke Paperbacks, London. 2003.
54. Simpson, Sarah. Afghanistan’s buried riches. Scientific American. October 2011.
55. Skeen, Andrew. Tribal fighting in NWFP. First published 1932. Reprint Vanguard Books, Lahore. 2009.
56. Stabilising Afghanistan: regional perspective and prospects. Edited by Maqsudat, Hassan Nuri, Mohammad Munir and Aftab Hussain. Islamabad Policy Research Institute. Hanns Seidel Foundation. 2011
57. Steven, Coll. Ghost Wars. Penguin Books. 2004.
58. Stewart, Jules. The Khyber Rifles: from the British Raj to Al Qaeda. Sutton Publishing, Phoenix Mill. 2006.
59. Sykes, Percy. A history of Afghanistan. Vol. I & II. First published 1940. Reprint Al-Biruni, Lahore. 1979.
60. Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the Great to the fall of Taliban. Oxford University Press, London. 2002.
61. The Second Afghan War: 1878-80. Complied by Charles Metcalfe MacGregor and India Army Intelligence Branch. Army Education Press. 1975.
62. Thomas, Lowell. Beyond Khyber Pass. Hutchinson & Co., London. 1920s.
63. Warren, Alan. Waziristan, the Fiqir of Ipi, and Indian army- the North West Frontier Revolt of 1936-37. Oxford University Press, Karachi. 2000.
64. Wylly, HC. From the Black Mountain to Waziristan. Macmillan and Co., Ltd. London. 1912.
65. Yate, AC. Travels with the Afghan Boundary Commission. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh. 1886
66. Zaeef, Abdul Salam. My life with the Taliban. Hachette, India. 2010.

Appendix

Chronological Table of North West Frontier Campaigns (Barthorp, Michael, 2002).

I have a much shorter commute since I moved from Chicago. This change has both merits and demerits. Obviously, all else being equal, it’s better to spend less time on a bus or subway, if you can help it. On the other hand, less time on the bus and/or subway also means less reading for fun. It’s taken me a while to get through the books listed below. Anyway, here are my thoughts on these books, arranged in alphabetical order of the authors.

Empires of the Indus: From Tibet to Pakistan, the story of a river by Alice Albinia

Really lovely read, this. Part political history, part travel diary, part long form essay, it’s just a beautifully rendered story about the Indus, its past, its future, the people who’ve relief on it for millenia, the civilizations it’s spawned, the wars its seen, how its drying up in Sindh, what China’s uber-development model means for it, and a gazillion other things I’m forgetting.  I really enjoyed this. You should buy it and read it.

Instant City: Life and Death in Karachi by Steve Inskeep

Gotta say, I was a bit underwhelmed by this. Maybe it’s because I was so, so looking forward to it that it couldn’t match my expectations. After all, I’m always on the lookout for books and articles about Karachi, mainly because it so rarely receives serious, sustained treatment from academics or journalists.

My main critique of the book is that it doesn’t really dive into Karachi the way one might expect the author to. There are, broadly speaking, two ways one can provide a great deal of depth. One is by studying extensively the academic scholarship on a region or phenomenon, and then placing one particular subject in that context. The other is by spending lots and lots of time with locals, living and breathing their lives, and writing up ones impressions after that.

I thin Inskeep goes for the latter option but it’s just not as powerful a story as I would’ve hoped. For instance, it really pales in comparison to Suketu Mehta’s Maximum City on Mumbai, in which I felt Mehta really got to know the characters inside out which in turn allowed the reader to know the characters inside out. There’s a superficial feel to the whole thing.

The one area where Inskeep definitely deserves credit is explaining how Karachi developed as a geographical construct at the neighborhood level. That’s something you don’t really see out there. But I found most everything else about the book quite meh.

Football against the enemy by Simon Kuper

I’m generally very interested in how socio-political identities form and are mediated through existing institutional and social structures, so this book was right up my alley. It’s concerned with how football matters beyond the pitch, and how the sport interacts with identities and socio-political cleavages. Why does Barcelona mean what it does to Catalunya? Why is Rangers-Celtic such a serious rivalry? What role did football play in the unification of South Africa post-apartheid?

I liked this book for the most part, but there was something throughout it that kind of bothered me., Kuper takes as a given the existing explanations for why football matters to a certain populace, rather than problematizing it and being skeptical of what he’s told by locals. It’s just something that gnawed at me throughout. I would also add that the chapter on Argentina and how its military junta (mis)appropriated football to their ends is fair enough regarding the facts, but there’s something about the tone. Kuper is a Briton writing in the early 1990s, with (presumably) the memory of the Falklans war fresh in his mind, and it’s very clear that he adopts mainstream British attitudes toward Argentina and Argentine football.

Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark

Thrill a minute, this book. Before I say anything else, I’d like to commend the authors for meticulously tracing about forty years of records, statements, archives, letters, memos and god knows what else to put this together. It’s incredibly well-researched and kudos to the authors for that.

This book is not just about A.Q. Khan, though he obviously features prominently in it. One thing that caught me by surprise (amongst others) is the extent to which the Reagan administration did Pakistan’s bidding in the 1980s. I mean, I knew they looked the other way and stuff while we were producing nukes. I had no idea how that process actually played out, until I read this. You won’t believe some of the shenanigans those guys were up to: covering up CIA findings, picking fights with other agencies, putting the Pentagon and State at odds with other arms of the U.S. government, knowingly lying to Congress about Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, destroying careers and lives…it’s all there. And it’s quite unbelievable.

There’s obviously a lot of information on the Pakistan side as well, so this is a very valuable resource for anyone doing research in the areas of nuclear proliferation, acquisition, and the nuclear balance in South Asia. One thing worth noting is how crazy and nutty and evil Generals Hamid Gul and Mirza Aslam Beg come across. They’re the type of characters only the Zaid Hamid types like at the best of times, but even against the baseline of low expectations, they come across really badly. Their antics from around the time Zia died/was killed to about halfway through Nawaz Sharif’s first term really have to be read to be fathomed.

Pakistan: A Hard Country by Anatol Lieven

This book caused a lot of angst amongst people I respect and admire in the Pakistan intelligentsia but I didn’t quite understand why. Is it too favorable to the military’s point of view? Yes, undoubtedly. It puts a halo around their head in a way that most liberal types probably don’t appreciate. But I do think the extent of his generosity to the khakis has been overstated; this certainly doesn’t read like a 500 page Ejaz Haider column, if that’s what your impression is.

I recall when it came out that someone (sorry, I forget who) made a really big deal about Lieven using “democracy” in quote marks to talk about Pakistan. Well, the reason is very clear, and Lieven sets it out in the first few pages of the book: democracy does not imply constitutionalism or liberalism, and so while Pakistan may be a procedural democracy, it has a ways to go to become anything resembling a rights-based constitutional state. That’s all the point of the quote marks was, as I understood it.

There’s plenty Lieven either gets wrong or doesn’t cover at all, but his central point — that patronage is the oil that greases the wheels of the Pakistani socio-political system, and that this is both a blessing and a curse — is well taken. I would also commend him for getting out of Islamabad and Lahore, walking the streets and talking to “ordinary” Pakistanis, which very few foreigners do when writing about Pakistan.

The overall point I would make is that this book is aimed at a very specific audience: the OSD or State Department Pakistan-Desk staffer or the New York Times op-ed writer who thinks Pakistan is on the verge of collapse any minute now. He is trying to disabuse them of that notion. And he does a fairly good job of it. If you don’t know Pakistan very well but would like to learn more, this book is a decent place to start because it covers a lot of bases. It doesn’t cover any one area very well but that’s to be expected of a book of this type.

Young Mr. Obama: Chicago and the Making of a Black President by Edward McClelland

This book’s narrative ends in 2004, so if you’re looking for any insight into Obama’s run-in to the presidency, you should look elsewhere. No, this book is about Obama’s time as an Illinois State Senator, and in particular his story in Chicago — from his time as a lawyer to community organizer to politician (one of the lessons of the book is those three professions, at least in the way Obama practiced them, are not so different as they first appear).

I really enjoyed this one. It gives you really valuable insight into one of the central questions about Obama as a politician, that is, the mismatch between his soaring rhetoric and his incrementalist style. I know it’s said that politicians “campaign in poetry and govern in prose” but Obama really takes that to the extreme, and this book gives some answers as to why. It traces his political development, and shows that throughout his life (at least until the presidency), Obama’s main challenge has been to convince middle-class, moderate voters that he is not a liberal elitist in love with himself and his fancy Harvard law degree. As a consequence, he extends a hand to his opponents to convince them of his good intentions, even when they are uninterested in compromise. Moreover, his accomplishments in the Illinois Senate, limited though they are, were as a result of his adhering strongly to his oft-cited “don’t make the perfect the enemy of the good” thing.

There’s a lot of lessons here for people who wish to understand Obama, the man and the politician. I’d recommend it pretty strongly if you’re at all interested in the subject matter.

Fermat’s Enigma: The Epic Quest to Solve the World’s Greatest Mathematical Problem by Simon Singh

Honestly, I don’t remember much about this book, given I read it about 4-5 months ago. One thing I do recall appreciating was that it was a lot less technical than (a) Singh’s other book I’ve read, The Codebook, and (b) what I expected. It’s mostly just the story of Fermat’s Last Theorem, which as Wikipedia will tell you, states

no three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation aⁿ + bⁿ = cⁿ for any integer value of n greater than two.

It goes into the ups and downs Andrew Wiles faced while proving the theorem, thought to be one of math’s toughest problems. Can’t say too much else about it, I’m afraid (though I have to say I was a teeny tiny bit disappointed that Wiles turned out to be a regular dude; I always like to imagine professional mathematicians as crazy guys with long hair who live with their mother and eat only cheese, kinda like this guy).

Raza Habib Raja
Professor Philip Oldenburg is a professor of political science in Columbia University and author of the book titled India, Pakistan, and democracy: solving the puzzle of divergent paths. As an academic, Subcontinent has been his prime area of political research. A few months ago, he was invited to Cornell University where I was privileged to hear his views on a very interesting topic which was why India and Pakistan despite being apparently similar in history and culture have taken divergent paths as far as democracy and role of military are concerned.

First of all Professor Philip made an interesting statement that India’s successful evolution as a democracy is not a “normal” phenomenon but rather an exception whereas Pakistan has evolved the way most of the third world countries with similar characteristics are likely to evolve. Now this contradicts with most of the stuff I hear about the reasons as to why India and Pakistan have taken different trajectories. I have mostly heard that democracy has not evolved simply for the sole reason because military has not allowed it to evolve. Explanation for the difference in India and Pakistan has always been pinned down to only deep conspiracies of the “deep state” against political class.
Now this analysis at least partially disagrees with the overwhelmingly prevalent and rather simplistic explanation according to which democracy does not function solely because Pakistan’s army has always been conspiring against it whereas in India the armed forces have decided to respect the political template of the government.

According to Professor Philip, a country with low literacy rate, weak industrial base and with a colonial legacy is often expected to take the similar trajectory as of Pakistan. He then cited many examples of the countries where military coups have taken place and the institution enjoys great power and privileges.
However, he made an interesting remark that Pakistan in many ways had performed worse and while many other countries (like Bangladesh and Turkey) are gradually shaping towards the ascendency of political class and strengthening of democracy, in Pakistan the political developments are pointing towards the other direction.

So what makes Pakistan a similar and yet in the longer run a “different” case as far as the role of military is concerned? Why the neighbouring India is an exception and why could not Pakistan follow the same trajectory despite the fact that it was carved out of the same British Empire?
Well the reasons are complicated and cannot be solely just attributed to the conspiracies of the military. Besides trying to understand as to why military intervenes, it should be worthwhile to also dwell as to how it is actually able to intervene. In Pakistan’s case the reasons are rooted in:
1) its general cultural and political traits such as low literacy, rural dominance and lack of developed stabilizing as well as independent institutions like Judiciary,
2) the history of Pakistan movement and its early years after coming into being
3) chaos when civilians are in power and their inability to take a decisive action when opportunity presented
4) Urban middleclass impatience and excessive emphasis on “order” which has provided armed interventions a semblance of support
5) Manipulations by the army and the intelligence apparatus

Firstly, one has to understand that military in weak third world country is often the only well-disciplined, centralized and sophisticated institution. It has sophisticated instruments of violence and has a top down chain of command which is seldom if ever broken. Particularly in countries where democratic institution are either nascent or democracy after its introduction leads to chaos, military due to its ability to bring “stability” and restore order often intervenes. Third world has thus witnessed a number of coups and Pakistan by no stretch of imagination is an exception. However, military interventions by no stretch of imagination are good developments, though in the context of tremulous political cultures, understandable .

Military once it intervenes to overthrow the political government becomes a political stakeholder and from that point onwards, takes steps particularly in the constitutional and legal realm, which solidify its acquired political status, powers and privileges. Of course the military is not accountable to the electorate and therefore in the longer run is quite insulated from the normal pressures which a political government has to go through. Military rule seriously undermines the democratic evolution and does not allow the political culture to deepen. It depoliticizes the populace and also creates a state which is not responsive to its people.

In Pakistan unfortunately the genesis of the military rule is actually in the way the Pakistan movement shaped up and the complex interplay of the dynamics of the movement with cultural and political characteristics of the region which eventually became Pakistan.

Compared to Indian freedom movement, Pakistan’s independence movement became a mass movement at a very late stage. Whereas Congress’s birth was in 1885 and it became a mass movement particularly due Gandhi’s efforts by 1920s, Muslim League even in early 1940s had not been successful to garner the same kind of mass support. Ironically the areas where it was actually popular were areas which subsequently became part of India.

It was only in the second half of the decade of 1940s that the Muslim League started to make real appeal to the people of the areas which subsequently became Pakistan.

Muslim League did not attain the political maturity the way Congress did which had gone through several generations of leaders and the political culture was institutionalized in the party as well as the movement headed by it.

This is an important distinction which shaped the respective roles of the military in both the countries. In India the political class was dominant from the beginning and moreover the public perception of the army was not of a saviour as the Indian army had served loyally under the British empire . The entrenched political culture ensured that Indian political landscape made a smooth transition from a movement into a functioning democracy from the word go. Moreover, Nehru remained at the political helm in the initial years providing the much needed political stability under democratic umbrella. Military was never in a position to stage a coup both because the chaos-which often precedes the military coup and at least is the justification the first time- was never there and secondly the army did have an “image” issue due to its close association with the colonial rule. Nehru’s revered and towering status also prevented the development of any militaristic bonapartism.

Pakistan on the other hand was founded in an area where had already been militarized as most of the recruitment was taking place from so called “Martial Races” of Punjab and what is now Khyber Pukhtunkhawa. Moreover the state apparatus was stronger in Punjab and local politicians had to rely a lot on the civil bureaucracy in order to get things “done”. The reliance of political class on the state apparatus in areas falling under West Pakistan was much greater than in areas which later became India.

So when Pakistan came into being, the local politicians, particularly in the rural areas, had already become too entrenched in the practice of looking towards state apparatus to gain privileges and powers rather than rather than through political mechanism consisting of parties, manifestoes and ideology. In rural Punjab, this practice with varying degrees continues to this date.

When Pakistan came into being the Muslim League despite having gained support in the last two years was still not a deeply rooted political party in the area which was West Pakistan. The main leaders of the League actually belonged to the areas which were in India and when they came to Pakistan, they were without the same kind of support. The nationalist movement actually brought leaders in West Pakistan whose roots had been left behind. In addition, Jinnah through charismatic did not live long and during his one year at the helm also did not do much in line with democratic norms. His one year rule was as a Governor General and was highly personalized.

In the initials years army was needed again and again both at the external front (Kashmir front) as well as the internal front (riots of 1953) to restore order. During these times while army’s role strengthened, the political landscape was fraught with chaos and repeated change of governments. The political class in the absence of a stabilizing political leader (Liaquat Ali Khan was shot dead in1951) and a political infrastructure underpinned by proper political culture, could not gain strength.

While government heads kept on changing, the Chief of Army Staff continued to gain power and moreover whereas in India the Chief of Army staff position witnessed at least five different individuals, Pakistan persisted with Ayub Khan. Repeated changes of governments and chaotic situation provided the impetus for the military intervention and when finally military intervened; there was actually a sigh of relief.

The military intervention of 1958 is extremely important as it initiated several things. First, military’s image among the urban middle class (at that time small in number but powerful due to its monopoly over education, and white collared job market) as a saviour was created. From that point onwards, the middleclass, particularly the urban middleclass has seen army in that light particularly when during short stings of democracy the situation gets chaotic. It actually expects army to intervene. Secondly, army’s self-image also enhanced to include itself as the ultimate custodian of the political stability as well. Third, it gave the loudest signal that army was a definite stakeholder and in fact more powerful than all others. So from that point onwards, political class had to factor in army more than any other stakeholder for its own survival.

Although Ayub was personally perhaps a secular but increasingly the army was tutored in Islam in order to provide it with an ideological fabric to bolster its combative zeal. Increasingly the army also started to see itself as the ultimate custodian of the ideological frontier also. It was in fact during the Ayub tenure that army also started to make overtures to the religious outfits for both external and a domestic objectives, a trend which over time has only increased .

The ascendency of army given the unique circumstances of Independence, earlier turmoil, the “expectations” of the urban middleclass, and the work done during Ayub era to solidify its status as political power, was difficult to check but nevertheless there were several opportunities which could have been availed.

Given army’s “respect” as a saviour, the best time to curtail army’s role as a political force is at the time when it has been dishonoured or humiliated. However, for that the political class besides removing the head of the armed forces also needs to exercise maturity in its own conduct. This is essential in order to dispel army’s potential role as the “saviour” of the last resort, a role which is largely perceived by the urban middleclass.

Unfortunately Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto due to his personal conduct and “I am above the law “ attitude squandered the chance. Bhutto ruled in a capricious manner, and used security forces to terrorize his rivals. Moreover, he alienated the urban middleclass too much due to his personal conduct and dictatorial traits. He rigged the elections and once again it was urban middleclass which was in complete resentment as ZAB had taken several steps to displease them and supplanted those with his style of rule. The “movement” against the election rigging was primarily an urban bourgeoisie movement and during those times there was a resurgence of army’s image also. The leaders of the movement were in fact giving overtures to the armed forces to intervene and “rescue” Pakistan. Army, at that time while apparently supporting Bhutto, was at the same time also in contact with the opposition and was cleverly plotting a coup. When army finally intervened on that fateful night, it was not only in accordance with its own institutional interests but also the interests of the urban middleclass.

This point is essential here because the urban middleclass actually has historically provided the armed interventions a semblance of popular support. Although urban middleclass is not monolithic and it would incorrect to assume that it can actually think like a unified orgasm but by and large this class is anti-democratic and apolitical in its orientation. This class is upwardly mobile, prefers stability over chaos and has been successfully tutored in a nationalist brand of civic nationalism. In Pakistan’s case the brand of civic nationalism has Islam as an important ingredient coupled with inherent negation towards plurality. Civic nationalism here tries to promote a strong centre and homogeneity or oneness. This brand of civic nationalism is strongest in the urban middle class as it is cultivated chiefly through education and then further reinforced by mass media. Further on this brand of nationalism also places strong emphasis on Pakistan’s place in the Islamic world and also in the global context.

Army, particularly the officer cadre is chiefly drawn from the middleclass and its ideological thrust is quite identical to that of the urban middleclass. So besides the deep suspicion about “corrupt” politicians and “chaotic” democracy, another major reason that urban middleclass likes army is its own ideological thrust resonates closely with that of army. Consequently despite major blunders army’s respect remains high. Even when it has suffered a blow it has buoyed again.

In some ways, it is the expectations of the urban middleclass and the pedestal on which it by and large holds the army that the latter finds additional incentives to keep a “check” on politicians.

And then there is the case of almost complete ownership of foreign policy by the army which was taken over during Zia’s time. Of course Zia was the head of the government also but the espionage activities of the army and ISI during the Afghan war made it the most important stakeholder. Once Benazir came into power she quickly had to resign to the fact that foreign policy was not an area where a civilian government could have much leeway.

Over the years, even under the façade of civilian governments, army has been running the show. Foreign policy particularly its terms of engagement with “foes” like India and “friends” like USA has become the sole domain of the army. It is from here that army draws its most strength and even its reason for existence and it won’t allow any sort of “interference” from the civilian government.

Over the years, army has ensured that Pakistan double deals with the United States, constantly adopts a hostile posture towards India and pursues the policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan. For these objectives, military and its intelligence apparatus has constantly courted militant organizations which at times have gone out of control like a Frankenstein monster only to at times turn against itself.

It is here that military simply does not listen to the concerns of the civilian governments and in fact won’t hesitate to pressurize it through back door means and even mount a coup. In 1999, it deeply embarrassed Nawaz Sharif government by initiating Kargil war while he was trying to make peace initiatives towards India. And it is agitated against Zardari led government for being too cosy with Washington (though these charges are hardly credible).

Unfortunately USA has also more or less accepted the dominance of military and has adopted the tactic of directly dealing with the military at times bypassing the civilian governments. And of course all the military dictatorships have been supported by the US which found it easier and convenient to deal with them and were ready to ignore “trivialities” like democracy.
In fact Hussain Haqqani’s masterpiece ( one of the most extraordinary books I have ever read) also makes the same point that USA in its desire of convenience found it easier to deal with military.

Turning a blind eye policy adopted by the USA has eventually resulted in military being the party they have to negotiate with even when it is not cooperating and indulging in double games. Civilian governments virtually are irrelevant.

It is hold over foreign policy and terms of engagement with critical countries like India, United States and Afghanistan which military guards even more than its finances. The entire intelligence apparatus is dedicated towards this end and if a civilian government tries to assert its authority in this domain, it pays the price.

Can we break this hold? Yes, it can be broken but for that politicians too have to show maturity and respect rule of law. They also need to show unity instead of cheap opportunism when the opportunity to weaken military presents itself. My mind immediately goes back to what happened when Osama Bin Laden was killed. Instead of having a united front, Mr. Zardari was keen on creating a rift between army and Nawaz Sharif for short sighted political gains. That opportunity was lost. And subsequently Mr. Sharif actually went to Supreme Court in Memo scandal despite the fact that the military establishment was targeting him also and if democracy were to be derailed, he too will be a loser. However, in Mr. Nawaz sharif’s head nothing mattered more than Zardari’s scalp.

We cannot wrestle away the power unless we show unity and an unshakable belief in democracy. However that belief in democracy is also underpinned by the way major political actors govern when in power and also engage with each other. Urban middleclass does not love army just for the sake of loving it. It likes army (rightly or wrongly is a separate issue) because it restores order and since it is politically insulated therefore gives an impression of merit. Army needs chaos as a reason to intervene. It needs political governments to fail to ensure its hegemony. It wants political class to be riddled with internal rifts.

What the political parties (the two main parties) can do is to at least ensure that they govern properly and ensure rule of law. They need to be united on the fact that they would not conspire against each other and will not try to seek army’s help for derailing the other.

Remember that it is no longer feasible for the army to directly rule the country and therefore the chances of an old fashioned coup are very rare. The chances of a complete roll back of the system are slim and therefore the political parties can take decisive steps provided they are united and get their act together.

1. Gillani will keep his seat : Yes I said it , and how much you hate for me this , but reality won’t change , Gillani will survive the ordeals of the supreme court, unlike musharaff he is a politician and not an administrator. Though how much we wish he would have been an effective administrator but he is an effective politician. Sidelining sovereignty , Aspirations of the common man  , Gillani rides on a strong and contend parliament and will need some miracle to knock him off his perch.
2. Inflation will rise : Yes I don’t know the stats , but I know our rulers well enough. Inflation will increase despite some good economic conditions emerging. How will you expect the government to lower prices at the expense of their own prado’s etc ( Gillani I still remember that you promised to use a cultux and then later u went for a corolla but you never mentioned land Cruiser ).
3. Hina Rabbani Khar will succeed where others failed : Khar is talented , there is no doubt about that. Though she lacks the persona of Qureshi and his precedents , she brings the women edge to the table. Her Russia visit will succeed and ties with India will gradually improve. Though a slight problem might be her carelessness to the issue of sovereignty.
4. Imran the game changer : Now this is the most difficult to predict. Imran’s khan rise to fame has left many in the parliament wondering about their future. Especially after the inclusion of hashmi , Tahreek e Insaf has emerged as a big party . But with only Imran taking the top most position with no family members , one must wonder about the loyality of Qureshi , Swati , Tareen and other . For 2012 , I predict a huge sponsored propaganda against Imran on the media . However, if khan shows patience and some political instincts , he is well placed at the top slot for the PM position next elections .
5.  Qadri will be freed : As grim as it may look to the liberals , I also don’t want this to happen. Though I am not a huge fan of Taseer and blame him and his party for the current state of affairs , but I have no proof of blasphemy on him and neither will the court. However , some sponsored elements will ensure that Qadri survives . I am not against Qadri , had Qadri killed for the love of Prophet , then he did one of the most noble things (sorry liberals ) but I have no proof against Taseer. Qadri should die for some and shaheed for others . Let Allah decide his fate and same goes for Taseer.
6. Shahbaz Taseer / Shehrbano Taseer will enter Punjab Politics : PPP is in deep troubles and they need a savior and what better than those teary Shehrbano eyes. And as her tears flows , so will the hearts of the common man in Lahore and some name saving for PPPP atleast.
7. Musharraf will return to realize he is Mr. Who : As angry as it may make the APML workers , but the reality is whenever Musharraf returns he will be disappointed . Though he was an amazing administrator but his shortcomings on political front especially on Laal Masjid issue,Supreme court and that ridiculous NRO will hurt him deeply. My advice to Mushi , stay there bro J
8. Misbah- The Man : Yes I said it to all the afridi fanatics , Misbah is and will be the king . This year expect more stability more wins and more ‘TUKS’ from Misbah as he cruises Pakistani Cricket team to the number one spot . Do expect a couple of resignations as well .
9. One more Pakistani will break the Olevels / Alevels record : I never get the fascination of giving ridiculous amount of Alevels Olevels Papers . Seriously , what does one achieve ,  ultimately a good student and one with 24 – 25 As end up in the same university . Oh sorry I forgot Unless you are Mr. Ali Moeen  Nawazish , you will be paid to represent the youth which despises you for increasing their parents expectation .suddenly 9 As in Olevels isn’t good enough
10. And Lastly ; this is not a prediction this is a fact that  I know , Fawad Khan , that famous husband in the slowest soap opera of all time will emerge as a major star of Pakistani Industry , By 2013, Pakistan will have its own Shahrukh Khan .

By Harry Pasha:

By Shahnaz Khan:

The purpose of this article is to highlight the impact of the religious laws in Pakistan as they are being currently interpreted and implemented without going into the finer nuances of either the law or the religion. These laws come into limelight from time to time for brief periods only when a famous person is involved or if there are political implications.  Once the issue disappears from the front pages of the news media the whole thing is forgotten.  But the fact is that these laws affect ordinary citizens on a daily basis.  I want to make the point that these laws, implemented without using common sense or taking the present day realities and the changing nature and circumstances of the crime, have become vehicles for promoting injustice, threats to the peace and harmony of the society, tools for political expediency, and suppression of critical thinking.

On promoting injustice: Qisas and Diyat laws are a prime example of this, being used to the detriment of the weaker members of the society that is women and the poor. Let’s first take the issue of women. Honor killings, disfigurement and mutilation of women by cutting of their body parts or throwing acid on them because someone’s “honor” is threatened are common occurrences.  Under the above mentioned law it is the “wali” of the victim who is authorized to negotiate the terms of punishment with the murderer.  He (since it is almost always a male) has the right to forgive the murderer and accept monetary compensation.  But the irony is that in most cases, wali himself (or those closely related to him) is the murderer, being the husband, the father or the brother etc.  Now does it make sense to have the murderer dictate the terms of his punishment?  It is like investing the powers of the judge, jury and the executioner in the same person who is also the offender, giving him the right to make all the decisions.  Is that the spirit of the Islamic law?

In the case of disfigurement and mutilation, the victim herself (since most of the time it a woman) should have the right to negotiate and agree to the terms of punishment.  Has there ever been a court decision where a woman was authorized to throw acid on the face of the offender or cut off his nose as a punishment?  If this is not a mockery of justice, what else is?

In fact an even more sinister aspect of this whole situation is that men, family or tribe have been granted the right to impose their will on women in the name of honor.  This is the basis of honor crimes.  That is why killing of a woman is justified because, “she deserved it” because she broke the so called moral and ethical code of the society.   This assumption, this mind set, this atrocious behavior in the name of tradition, culture and religion is a horrifying aspect of “our values and norms” that we never tire of flaunting and praising, because these values make us better than those ‘immoral’ westerners. Really?  There is a need to challenge this.  What is honor and who defines it? Why do women have to give up their decision making powers, happiness, dignity, and freedom to save the so called honor of men, family, tribe etc. etc.?  It has become honorable to kill and maim women and dishonorable to respect them, their bodies and their humanity.  If this is not a skewed logic, what else is?  And if this is not denigration of women, what else is? And we never tire of telling the world how Islam has elevated the status of women and how she has been protected!

Now let’s see how this law affects the poor.  If the victim is poor and the offender rich, he/she not only has the financial wherewithal but in Pakistan also has the added political, social and legal clout to coerce the victim’s wali into accepting the monetary compensation instead of paying with his/her life for the perpetrated crime. But what if the victim is rich and the offender is poor?  Do I have to explain what will happen?  Religion which claims to bring economic and legal justice is in fact failing the poor on both accounts.  Can there be any more atrocious consequences of a law?  Can there be a law that is more discriminatory against the poor?  If this is not a distortion of justice to the utmost, what else is? And if all of the above is not promoting injustice, what else is?

On threat to peace and harmony:  Whenever a law is passed in the name of religion, it becomes nearly impossible to change or modify it even if subsequently it becomes apparent that it is being misused, has become a contrivance for aggression and is actually causing harm to the society by disturbing peace and tranquility.  This is evident from the blasphemy laws as applied in Pakistan, which are being used to harass the religious minorities, for personal revenge, or for political motives.  Even when the accused is not convicted by the court, he or she faces a constant threat to his or her life.  At times people feel free to punish the alleged offender without due course of the law.  The person is presumed guilty unless proven innocent rather than the other way around.  Even minor and unintentional actions are interpreted in the harshest way possible thus leaving very little room for justice to be carried out fairly and impartially.  Unfortunately this, like all other religious issues, has become a political tool to be used to inflame people’s emotions (which are, regrettably, highly inflammable).   It has come to the point where even an utterance of unintended phrase, any discussion about the problems surrounding this issue, or any mention of further probing this legitimacy and authenticity of the law can cost one his or her life.  If this is not disturbing peace and tranquility of the society, what else is?

As James Baldwin, a black American novelist and play writer and a leading voice in the civil rights movement, said, “If one really wishes to know how the justice is administered in a country, one does not question the policemen, the lawyers, the judges, or the protected members of the middle class. One goes to the unprotected—those, precisely, who need the law’s protection most! —and listens to their testimony.”  So, the flag bearers of the religion, the rulers and the politicians, go and listen to the women, the religious minorities, and the poor and find out if justice is being administered in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan!

On use for political expediency:  Since religious laws are amenable to different interpretations, they have a tendency to become tools in the hands of dictators, other autocrats and selfish political motives.  Wasn’t the Qisas and Diyat ordinance of 1990 signed by Gen Zia for political expediency? Didn’t various political entities i.e. the government, the religious parties, and the army use and justify the Qisas and Diyat law to their own advantage during Raymond Davis fiasco?  Aren’t there enough historical examples and cases where religion was used to support the decisions of the ruler rather than guiding it?  Why do we refuse to learn from them?  There always have been and always will be scholars who are willing to comply with the demands of the authority.  The alliance of religion with the power will drown any dissenting voice.  It has been so in all religions and Islam is no different.

On suppression of free thought:  The last point I would like to make is that the danger lies not only in the specific laws but also the fact that when the word religion is attached to any law, rule or issue it immediately becomes off limits to any further discussion or debate among the very people whose lives will be affected by it.  The doors of reason are closed.  Questioning is not allowed. Any debate becomes a prisoner to rigid and fixed parameters set by the self proclaimed scholars, many of whom have vested interests and people are forced to suspend their intellectual faculties.  And gradually it becomes their second nature to accept whatever edicts they are asked to follow.

Plato said, “Justice in the life and conduct of the state is possible only as first it resides in the hearts and souls of the citizens.”  But when the hearts and souls of citizens have given up the quest for justice because an intellectual decay has set in due to suppression of free thought, is there still hope?

Benazir Bhutto on her arrival in Karachi in Oct, 2007. Photo: Beena Sarwar

It’s four years since those pistol shots and bomb blast in Pindi’s Liaquat Bagh ended the life of Pakistan’s most promising politician and hope for democracy. There is no one to replace Benazir Bhutto but her legacy lives on in many ways. This is the first legitimately elected government ever in Pakistan to remain in office for as long as it has – and it will be the first to complete its tenure if allowed to do so and hand over power to the next elected government. This political process is essential to move Pakistan out of a quagmire that has taken decades to push us into. There are no quick fixes, no magic wands that can change things overnight. What’s important is the process and at least that is under way – thanks to Benazir Bhutto.

Thanks to YouTube, archival footage is now available to remind us of her legacy. In his moving article on Benazir, Saroop Ijaz refers to this interview of her’s soon after Gen. Zia’s death, in which she outlines her political vision of looking ahead, without vindictiveness. He begins the piece with lines that Benazir Bhutto recited, quoting from Dr Khalid Javed Jan’s iconic poem on her return to Pakistan in 1986: “Mazhab kay jo byopairi hain, woh sab se baree bemaari hain…. In jhute or makkaron se, mahzab kay thekedaron say, mein baaghi hoon, mein baaghi hoon” (The traders of religion are the worst disease, I rebel from these liars and hypocrites).

Complete lyrics at this link.

Cameraman Arif Khan (seated 1st right) was one of those killed at the bomb blast at Karsaz. Photo: courtesy Asadullah Khan

When Benazir arrived in Pakistan in October 2007, the air of anticipation was infectious. I ended up riding out to the airport on the back of a motorbike, passing hordes of celebrating people (see my cell phone photos) and pushing my way through a huge mob, past her ‘janesars’, to the top of her truck with my colleague Absar Alam who interviewed her for Geo TV (thanks to Naheed Khan who invited us up top). This was just hours before the bomb blast that killed over 180 people and injured scores of others, including Benazir, as her convoy passed Karsaz Road in Karachi.

The next morning to everyone’s astonishment, despite her own trauma (ears oozing blood from the bomb blast), she breached security protocols to visit the injured in hospital, and by afternoon was patiently presiding over a chaotic press conference at Bilawal House. The place was ill equipped to deal with the explosion of TV channels that had taken place over the past few years. At one point, our eyes met and she smiled in recognition of the absurd situation.

Barely two months later she was dead – literally having paid with her life for democracy. I was in Lahore then. As we mourned together, Hina Jillani’s observation on how much Benazir had changed during her years of exile has stayed with me. She looked different, positively radiant, with a simple plait replacing the old bouffant hairdo, no heavy make-up, her by now trademark white dupatta draped over her head rather than the earlier matching shawls and jackets with padded shoulders. She was no longer arrogant, she listened, she was willing to learn.

Benazir Bhutto giving her first interview to a Pakistani journalist on her return in Oct, 2007. Photo: Beena Sarwar

But she remained consistent in her adherence to peaceful, non-violent, constitutional means to bring democracy back to Pakistan. This was clear even in the early years when she campaigned around the world against Gen. Zia’s military regime and came across enthusiastic young turks talked of revolution or fighting the army regime with guns. Her fighting spirit remained evident in her insistence on contesting elections under the Musharraf regime (as she did during the Zia years), even as many progressive liberals urged her to boycott. Her answer: “Boycott, and then what?”

She prevailed upon her former arch-rival Nawaz Sharif, who was dithering on the boycott issue, to agree to contest elections. Imran Khan in his wisdom, stayed out of the fray and in the political wilderness (until suddenly being projected into prominence earlier this year).

To those who tried to push her into supporting the individual over the institution (with reference to the restoration of the judiciary), Benazir wrote: “I remain committed to the freedom and vitality of democracy as the great Quaid-e-Awam had dreamt of. Yes, it is true that you have to deal sometimes with the devil if you can’t face it but everything is a means to an end. I have great respect and admiration for the Judiciary both bench and bar. I have great respect for individuals both present and ex. Ultimately, however, it is the institution that has to decide collectively what course to take. I hope this clarifies my viewpoint.” (Dec 3, 2007)

The devil of course was Musharraf and the deal was the much-maligned National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) without which she and other politicians could not have returned to Pakistan to participate in politics.

Lawyers' movement: PPP and ANP workers took the heaviest casualties on May 12, 2007 in Karachi. HRCP report: http://bit.ly/uv0uV4

As Marvi Sirmed writes in her heartfelt personal tribute remembering Benazir today, being a woman never hindered her,

“so much so that when the forces opposing her tried to use her biology against her, she turned it around. When she was expecting Bilawal, they announced elections around the dates they thought she would be in maternity. I cannot forget her coming to the political rallies with her intravenous drip in her hands… When she was expecting Bakhtawar during her premiership, the crisis was once again carefully chosen to coincide with the dates of her delivery. She did not make herself absent from her office for more than 48 hours.

“All through her political life, she struggled against the hegemony of the oppressive deep state that used every jape that they could, and from right-wing rhetoric that was nauseatingly misogynist and anti-people.”

Despite the hurdles, despite being always under siege – “We were in government but not in power” – she would say – she achieved much. Her son Bilawal lists some of these accomplishments in his tributeto his mother.

Benazir Bhutto with her children visiting Asif Zardari in prison. Photo: Larkana Times

What we do know is that there are 86,000 more schools because of Shaheed Benazir Bhutto. That, under her government foreign investment quadrupled; energy production doubled; exports boomed. Under her government, 100,000 female health workers fanned out across the country, bringing health care, nutrition, pre and postnatal care, to millions of our poorest citizens. It was under her government that women were admitted as judges to the nation’s courts, that women’s police departments were established to help women who suffered from domestic violence and a women’s bank was established to give micro loans to women to start small businesses. It was under Shaheed Benazir Bhutto’s leadership that cell phones, fibre optics and international media were introduced, and the Pakistani software industry blossomed. And it was on her very first day as prime minister, that all political prisoners were freed, unions legalised and the press uncensored. It was an amazing record of accomplishment, made even more remarkable by the constraint of aborted tenures, by constant pressure from a hostile establishment and presidents with the power to sack elected governments.”

The hostile establishment remains hostile but the President no longer has the power to sack an elected government. This is one of the current elected government’s several achievements that tend to get overshadowed by the explosive (no pun intended) situation around. Other achievements include the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), the Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package, increase of minimum wages from Rs 4,600 to Rs 7,000 a month, political rights to Gilgit-Baltistan, extension of the Political Parties Act to FATA, bills for women’s rights and empowerment, the 18th and 19th constitutional amendments (that include getting rid of Zia’s clause that allowed the President to dissolve Parliament), the combined NFC Award (moving towards provincial autonomy), signing Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline agreement despite American opposition, forcing the Americans to tie aid to Pakistan to the continuation of democracy with the ‘Kerry-Lugar Bill’ (another reason the military hates this government), kicking out the Saudi ambassador for distributing money to terrorists, expanding the Lady Health Workers programme (initiated by Benazir Bhutto), and continuing her legacy of non-vindictiveness towards political rivals and dissent. It should be a matter of pride for Pakistan that this government has not carried out any capital punishments, in line with its unofficial moratorium on executions.

The political situation remains volatile. But there are many positives to build upon. Things will not change overnight, but the process is underway. Despite the apparent unpopularity of the present government, theare is a difference this time round, given that efforts are being made to take preemptive steps to mobilise politically (for example, the Citizens’ statement on the ‘Memogate’ issue) against unconstitutional moves to topple the government. Perhaps some lessons have been learnt from the past.

“Pakistan’s nuclear assets are not safe as long as Zardari exists [Zardari ke hotay huay],” said Shah Mehmood Qureshi a couple of

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weeks ago. This is gutter politics based upon shameless posturing. By making this claim, Qureshi has proved that he has the genes of his father who was a collaborator of General Zia, Pakistan’s version of Beelzebub.

“I will hang Zardari at the Bhaati Gate,” threatened Shahbaz Sharif. He also said, and many times indeed, “I do not accept Zardari as the president of Pakistan!” Indeed the younger Sharif has lived up to the reputation of the elder brother that he was a seed that was planted and nourished by Generals Zia and Jilani.

“The memo is against the sovereignty of Pakistan,” thundered Nawaz Sharif. Certainly, the charges against Nawaz Sharif of corruption are harmless political diversions.

“Zardari and Pakistan cannot go together,” and “as long as Zardari is the president, fair elections cannot be held in Pakistan”, Imran Khan has warned many times. This is politics sans conscience because no proof is offered to justify the warning.

Our generals are ‘impatient’ with Zardari and think he is useless (fazool, in the words of army-inspired journalists who tell what the generals are thinking of Zardari). These great generals have always been defeated by the enemy but have repeatedly conquered the ‘bloody civilians’.

“Zardari is a rotten head,” claimed King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. This comes from a man who presides over one of the most murderous religious ideologies of the modern world.

From a petty bourgeois trader pedalling fake watches to the mightiest in Pakistan, all are agreed that Zardari is the cause of all ills in Pakistan. The other night I was invited to a dinner where I had a conversation with two friends, PhDs in engineering and economics respectively, and capable professors. Echoing Mansoor Ijaz, they claimed that Zardari was in the know of the American attack on the Osama compound. According to them, “Between the Navy SEALs’ assassination of Osama and the publication of Zardari’s article in The Washington Post, the time span was only two hours. How can Zardari write and publish an article on Osama’s assassination in such a short time unless he knew what was going to happen? How can The Washington Post publish an article at such short notice when it is known that top newspapers plan days and weeks before what to publish?”

This was not the first time that I had the luck to learn about Zardari from highly educated people. During Benazir’s first stint as prime minister, Brigadier Tariq Mehmood (called TM) died because his parachute did not open. I was a teacher at that time. A few professors of history and political science affiliated with right-wing political parties claimed that Zardari had taken money from the Israelis to fix TM’s death. Takbeer, an extreme right-wing weekly published from Karachi, printed a highly suggestive article claiming that TM had requested his superiors in the army to allow him and his fellow brave officers to parachute into Israel and they would break its back (Israel ki qamar torr denge!). At that time, Zardari did not hold any office, but was, all the same, Pakistan’s prime minister’s husband.

With the above few examples in view, it is possible to do a PhD on how Zardari is blamed for everything bad that happens in Pakistan. During last year’s floods, there were rumours that the rains were caused by the Americans, and Zardari was complicit. From very young children to those whose legs are in the grave, Zardari is the perfect punching bag to release our anger and frustration. YouTube is full of short videos showing little kids singing in chorus: “Zardari aik museebat hai” (Zardari is a nuisance), and adults saying as long as Zardari is our president, Pakistan will continue to suffer. From cheating in the examinations to Pakistan’s loss to India in Mohali (did Zardari not send Gilani to Mohali with a message for the players to throw the match, or else?) to electricity outages to bad weather, the eternal leitmotif is Zardari. The only blame he has escaped is that he planned the Mumbai attack, probably because our jihadi media does not want him to do or seem to be doing anything that can bring him Allah’s ‘blessings’. This also explains why he was not named as the man behind Salmaan Taseer’s assassination. Qadri, the ‘blessed soldier of Islam’, would never like to be associated with Zardari.

The point is: what will happen if Zardari quits politics and goes into retirement? What will happen to hundreds of journalists, thousands of politicians and their various flunkies, and millions of Pakistanis? Zardari has spawned an entire genre of yellow journalism. He has never sued, jailed, or harmed anyone for levelling the basest and meanest allegations at him. Thus, in a way, he has encouraged the journalistic industry, which lives off his ‘misdeeds’.

Once Zardari is out of office, he will be sorely missed, I can assure you. Where in the world will you find a president who is incessantly and viciously demonised, but never says a thing? One media house has been publishing one shameless lie after another, but Zardari has never said a thing. Our corps commanders hold a meeting and reject the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act, but Zardari does not have them sacked for their insubordination. The Americans finish off Osama, but no general is sacked for complicity or incompetence (or both). There is not a single political prisoner in Pakistan today. But no one will give Zardari the benefit. People like Zaid Hamid openly invite the army to take over because Zardari is bad, but nothing happens to them. Can anyone cite just one example from Pakistan’s history where people got away with insulting the head of the state and the largest political party?

No one is willing to say that Zardari has done any good things. He is the only president in Pakistan’s history who has donated his eyes. But people smell a conspiracy in this too. Some of the good things Zardari has done include: (1) Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), (2) Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package, (3) 43,800 acres of land distributed among landless peasants, (4) reinstatement of sacked employees in different government and semi-government departments, (5) minimum pay for labourers increased from Rs 4,600 to Rs 7,000, (6) political rights given to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, (7) bills for women’s rights and empowerment, (8) 18th and 19th constitutional amendments, (9) combined NFC Award, (10) Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline agreement despite American opposition, (11) kicking out of the Saudi ambassador for distributing money to Islamist terrorists, (12) forcing the Americans to tie aid to Pakistan to the continuation of democracy (this is why the generals are mad at him), (13) devolution of governance to the provinces, and (14) extension of the Political Parties Act (PPA) to FATA.

He even ordered the government to provide legal aid to Dr Aafia Siddiqui in order to appease the religious fanatics.

Those legions of journalists, politicians, goons and blackmailers who have been acting as mafiosos during Zardari’s time will find out the difference when a non-PPP government deals with them with an iron hand for criticising it. The pseudo-knowledge and bogus truisms the media has constructed about Zardari are a cynical mix of facts and fantasies. Frenzy has triumphed over reason.

http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\10\story_10-12-2011_pg3_4

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© 2011, Abbas Zaidi. This article may not be reproduced in any form without providing an active attribution link/ reference to The Pakistan Forum. All attribution links within the article must also be retained.