Somewhere in the long list of things we lost in blood and fire is the joy of poetry.

It is a loss I cannot reconcile with. My memories get in the way. It was through poetry, that I learnt to think, feel, mean and be. Words existed in our household with an identity of their own, like people with names, personalities and pasts. There would be good words and bad, happy and melancholy, wise and wanton. When strung together in perfect meter and imperfect reason, they would offer doggerel explanations of the abstract in a way no other genre could. Poetry would respect life for its expanse and vagueness, not subject it to confined dialectics.

I have always felt that a poem, whether conceived in joy or pain, captures forever the place in life that elicited it; like a white Christmas trapped in a snow globe. There is a strange comfort in hearing from another, what one is feeling within. And so, having navigated life by finding solace, company and sometimes humour in these footprints from the past, I cannot imagine a world without the abstract. To lose the joy of poetry is to lose the counsel of wonder. It is not a loss to be reconciled with.

My grandfather used to quote that a poem is never finished, only abandoned. He was, among many things, a writer and a critic. His book, ‘Urdu shaairi ka tanqeedi ja’eza’ (a critical overview of Urdu poetry), is more of poetry in the horizontal than prose. However, you may not be able to find the book in print anymore. I have an old copy which I hold very dear. I fear that if I don’t, it will be lost forever as the irrelevancy that poetry has become today…

We may be sympathetic to the passion of Faiz and the romance of Faraz, but truth is that most other poets, some very good ones, hardly make it to their second editions. Book stores like Ferozesons, Maavra etc which used to have complete collections of all poets, black, white and brown, have degenerated to the level of deli’s selling what sells. Ironically, you would more easily find classical poets’ complete works in India, than in Pakistan. But is it the problem, or merely a symptom?

Perhaps it is both. Literature, in particular poetry, cannot be treated like Wall Street Journal, good only as long as it sells. But publishers are in the business of selling. I believe the onus therefore lies on the universities, Urdu boards and academies of the country to promote poetry, not as a mercantile pursuit, but as a way of looking at life.

It has to be the easiest thing to do! One would only need to create the platforms. The rest will just happen. Who can deny the fiery provocation of Faiz’s ushhaq, the transcendent drift of Ghalib’s sense of self and the lofty persuasions of Iqbal’s shaheen? What heart wouldn’t relate to the pained pride that was felt and expressed in every possible form by Faraz. Who wouldn’t identify with Jon’s temper, Nasir’s agony or Perveen’s insecurities? Whose thoughts would atleast once not have wandered as freely as Zaidi’s?

These are life-long relationships waiting to happen. Failure to recognize the joy and perspective these bring to life would be like sentencing oneself to a tunneled life clogged with reality and deprived of oxygen. We have too many people worrying ‘what colour is their parachute’, and not enough wondering ‘what colour is the wind’. It is a whole different ball game of self-actualization that is as, if not more, important as the more tangible pursuits in life.

An immediate priority should be an all-hands-on-the-deck effort to digitize Urdu poetry. We should do it before it disappears. If the Urdu Academy doesn’t do it, perhaps we should look at a more private venture to make it happen. Universities, colleges, and poetry lovers all over would need to plough in. A first step in this direction may be developing a reliable OCR for Urdu. With the talent we have in the country in the field of IT, and given the fact that Urdu has no home but ours, it is the least we should do. With the OCR in place, digitization can be led by the universities, proof-read by poetry lovers and institutions, and preserved forever in the cyber-world.

The second step, hopefully an outcome of the first, would be integrating poetry with life. More Mushaairas, more ghazal singers, more celebration of the new and appreciation of the old in the field. What better way to drain the paranoia from reality-clogged minds, too afraid to dream and too clumsy to dance?

It will take time, perhaps five to ten years, but it will be forever. I sincerely hope that we act before it is too late.

For as long as I lived in Lahore, my idea of a perfect evening was an old bench in Lawrence Gardens, a book of poetry and a steaming cup of doodh patti. I feel we have an obligation to add this joy to the packsack of keepsakes we leave behind for the next generation. They can add coffee and kindle a’ la mode, but atleast they will have their counsel of wonder …

Arctic Ambassador Klavs Holm

Earlier this month, Denmark appointed Klavs A. Holm as the new Arctic Ambassador, an office which will become permanent. At the same time, Danish Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal announced the closure of the embassies in Iraq, Benin, and Zambia. This move gives a strong signal that Denmark is putting forth a more visible diplomatic presence in the circumpolar north while refocusing its priorities in the Global South, where it will open embassies in Myanmar and Libya. Ambassador Holm will represent all three parts of the Danish Commonwealth: Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands. He will also coordinate the implementation of the government’s Arctic strategy, released last August.

Holm previously served as the Danish Ambassador in London, Paris, and Singapore. He also represented Denmark to the EU, in Brussels, where he worked on Arctic issues. The current ambassador for Public Diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will have his work cut out for him, as Foreign Minister Søvndal made clear when he visited Thule Air Force Base last December. When asked what assignments the new Arctic Ambassador would have, he responded, “If you ask for specific tasks, we can name climate change, which means that shipping in the Arctic is increasing in scope. There are very specific tasks to perform in relation to search and rescue in these remote areas. The area is large, and first and foremost, we must prepare the new agreements.” Specifically, he added, “It is clear that we need the Americans to not block civilian usage of Thule. Now, there will be a negotiation process to clarify how far we can go” (translated from the Danish). Search and rescue will thus be an important topic for Holm, as will mining and indigenous peoples – two issues which overlap heavily in Greenland. China has lately expressed strong interest in investing in Greenland’s mineral deposits, the Wall Street Journal reports, which might be cause for Holm to visit Beijing.

Denmark can now be added to the short list of countries which have Arctic ambassadors, which includes Sweden, Finland, and Russia. The United States and Canada are noticeably absent from this list, though there have been calls in the latter country to bring back the position (see here and here). Canada had an Arctic Ambassador from 1994 to 2006, but the role was abolished, as former Foreign Minister Peter McKay then stated, “We didn’t feel we were getting good value for money from that position.”

News Links

“New Danish Arctic Ambassador,” IPS

“Søvndal udnævner ambassadør for det aller nordligste,” Politiken (in Danish)

By Sonya Rehman

Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy was in her office, in her hometown of Karachi, Pakistan, when she found out that “Saving Face,” which she co-directed with Daniel Junge, had been nominated for an Academy Award for best documentary short.

Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy – Photo: Amean J

Read the entire article here!

The Wall Street Journal, Scene Asia

It is the world’s largest Muslim country but remains for the most part secular. It is home to the eighteenth largest economy on the globe but more than sixteen percent of the population lives on less than $2 per day. Indonesia has long been considered the linchpin for Southeast Asia and, indeed, serves as a fascinating case study for which myriad domestic phenomena can be explored:  macroeconomic policy, the role of religion, and the nexus between political control and the military. In the seventh episode of the 2012 Great Decision series, produced by the Foreign Policy Association, Indonesia’s role in the region and the world, as well as its relationship with the United States, is examined in such frameworks. FPA readers can purchase a copy of the eight episode DVD and briefing book at the Great Decisions TV webpage.

The two panelists – Walter Lohman, the Director of The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, and Sadanand Dhume, a columnist for the Wall Street Journal – start with an historical overview beginning in the Cold War era to properly contextualize Indonesia’s modern trajectory.

Fearful of a communist wave which threatened to sweep Southeast Asia into Moscow’s orbit, U.S. policymakers in the Richard Nixon administration were quick to align themselves with Suharto, a zealous anti-communist Major General who had helped to overthrow the country’s previous military ruler in 1967. As Lohman posits, Washington’s support for Suharto was the lesser of two evils.

Never one to shy away from befriending some of the world's worst dictators, President Richard Nixon hosts Suharto in the Oval Office in 1969. Photo: ETAN

Despite a lack of political and civil rights under Suharto, Dhume argues that the dictator showed a knack for organization and, as a result, Indonesia underwent a period of extraordinary economic growth (abetted by millions of dollars in aid from Washington) while also enjoying some measure of political stability. Dhume is quite cavalier, however, in his dismissal of Suharto’s human rights record, saying only that there were “abuses of course,” before moving on to another point.

After the overthrow of Sukarno, the country’s previous autocrat, Suharto went on a rampage against his political opponents, especially Communists, which resulted in a bloodbath that rivaled Stalin’s endeavors in terms of sheer brutality. In December 1975, Indonesia invaded and occupied East Timor, causing untold misery and close to 100,000 deaths over the course of the following quarter century. Moreover, the Suharto regime’s behavior in West Papua has been called genocide by the Yale Law School. Yes, there were abuses, of course.

Suharto’s downfall came against a backdrop of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Indonesia’s population could tolerate Suharto’s corruption and nepotism as long as the economy continued to hum along. However, the financial collapse which hit the country was not only an economic calamity but also served as a social and political awakening as well.

Indonesians go to the polls in 1999, the culmination of a remarkably quick transition to democracy. Photo: China Daily

The elections held in 1999 were, by all accounts, free and fair. Such a reality was met with surprise by most observers who have noted the chaotic nature of quick democratic transitions. One need only look to Egypt today to find an appropriate juxtaposition. With a litany of actors – opposition figures, military personnel, and remnants from the old regime — all clamoring for a voice at the table, one should expect a rocky road. In Indonesia, there were a fair share of bumps in that road, especially between 1998 and 2002, but the end product can be held up as a model to follow for other countries undergoing the trials and tribulations of democratization.

Indonesia’s transition from autocratic rule to democracy is almost as unique as the country itself. Consisting of more than 17,000 islands, the Great Decisions panel brings up the question as to how Indonesia has maintained its territorial integrity through the years. With the exceptions of East Timor, which gained independence in 2002, and the continued struggle by separatists in West Papua, Indonesia has retained sovereignty over its whole.

Part of that was due to the iron fisted rule of Suharto, but another part is due to the nation’s religious freedom. While 88 percent of the country is Muslim, there are major areas that are home to religious minorities. Bali, for example, is largely Hindu, while Sumatra is Christian. These groups have never been persecuted for their beliefs and that has gone a long way preventing the type of schisms that have popped up in other areas of the world which have divaricating degrees of religious tension. A good contemporary example in the news lately is Nigeria, where sectarian fighting in the country’s north threatens to tear the nation apart.

In terms of democratization and minority rights, Dhume suggests that Indonesia can be an example for countries involved in the Arab Spring. This is so not just because of the mutual connection to Islam, but because Indonesia has proven that such transitions can be successfully implemented.

The United States, for its part, has maintained a very close partnership with Jakarta, even after he Suharto years. The two countries participate in various military exercises together, and have cooperated fully in the apprehension of several well-known members of Jemaah Islamiyah, a militant Islamic organization operating in Southeast Asia.  Washington values its relationship with countries like Indonesia because of the non-political role of Islam and because of its ability, in the 21^stcentury at least, to curtail the influence of the military in the political process.

President Barack Obama, seen here meeting with Indonesia President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2010, spent part of his childhood in Indonesia. Photo: Corbis Images

President Barack Obama has a personal connection to Indonesia, having spent four years of his childhood living there. He has also made two state trips to the country as President in only his first term. Ties between the two countries appear to be very strong at the moment – a reality which Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has boasted of on numerous occasions – and with Indonesia’s GDP having increased sevenfold just over the last fifteen years, Jakarta is poised to be a regional powerbroker and a significant international player in the years to come.

By Sonya Rehman

I’m stoked. Photographed the lovely, pixie-faced Sarah Cheema for the Wall Street Journal’s art/culture website – Scene Asia. Didn’t think it’d get published, but it did. ‘SceneStyle’ is a section on their website that features people in cool garb on streets around the world. So, so proud that we could represent Lahore, Pakistan!

Sarah Cheema, architecture student. ASOS dress, traditional Kashmiri coat, traditional Pakistani slippers.

View the original post here!

The Wall Street Journal – Scene Asia

Today is the first of January 2012, a new year has begun. It will bring joy and happiness for many, some will suffer and some will struggle. That is the reality of life.

2012 will be a challenging year for small businesses across the globe. With deepening economic crisis in Europe, threat of Euro zone and Euro, possibility of Greece and Italy defaulting and push to convince Germany to take the hit by paying for financially strangled nations in Europe, things are not promising!

The US Economy continued in depression since 2007. Although, US economists and the media, including New York Times. Los-Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal, Herald Tribune have acknowledged US economic growth in 2011, the consumer market still looks dull!

Middle East remained a turbulent region during 2011; it is highly unlikely for this region to perform well in the New Year.

According to Moody’s, Asia Pacific economies are going to see some slowdown mainly reflecting upon the economic crisis in Europe. There are chances of recovery in the second half of 2012, but a lot depends on how well the US and European economies perform!

The situation is alarming and a number of businesses particularly domestic businesses in smaller economies will be required to play safe. To be able to survive, small businesses must focus avoiding four major mistakes during 2012:

Expansion without growth:

A number of enthusiasts consider expansion as a tool to increase revenue. A major misconception! Before expansion starts brining revenue, a lot needs to be spent on hiring people, capital expenditure, benefits, marketing etc. If the market does not offer some growth potential in the normal course, expansion will be self-destructive!

Underutilized resources:

It is often seen that companies fail to optimize their resources. Spend time and energy in identifying the right potential of your human and other resources and engage them at an optimal level to achieve maximum output. Any underutilized resources, is money going down the drain!

Increasing Cost of Doing Business:

Cost of doing business increases exponentially for companies that are not managing their accounts well. One of the ways to keep the cost of doing business low is by balancing the receivables and payables. This reduces the financial cost of your businesses. Save energy, manage productivity and reduce cost of inventory – somehow keep strong focus on reducing your cost of doing business.

Saying no to technology:

In this world of social networking, digital marketing and technological advancement, it is highly lethal to delay integrating technology in your business model. Small or big, businesses need to learn how best they can deploy technology.. Social Media and Digital marketing is particularly supportive in case of local retail businesses. Technology is something cannot be ignored in 2012!

I wish you all a very Happy and prosperous 2012!

As Reported by The Wall Street Journal

Seven journalists died in Pakistan during the year in direct relation to their work, out of a total of 43 journalist killed worldwide in the year, the report said.

There were no deaths in India, after one killing in 2010. In 2008, four Indian journalists died either while covering the conflict in Kashmir or through target killings due to their investigations of criminal activities.

In combat zones such as Libya, where five journalists died in 2011 — the joint second-highest number with Iraq – the killings tend to be random, with reporters caught in the broader fighting. But Pakistan continues to suffer largely from target killings.

These deaths occur when a reporter has unearthed details about militancy or a business deal and is targeted to stop this information getting out. Five of the seven deaths in Pakistan were targeted killings and all remain unsolved, the CPJ said.

In the past five years, 29 journalists have died carrying out their work in Pakistan. Five journalists died in India during the same period.

The best-known case in Pakistan this year involved Saleem Shahzad, a reporter for Asia Times Online, who died in May after writing a report which alleged al Qaeda had infiltrated Pakistan’s navy.

Human Rights Watch, the New York-based advocacy group, said Mr. Shahzad before his death had complained of receiving threats from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate military spy agency. ISI officials deny the threats and any involvement in his killing. The case is unsolved.

“Long-term CPJ research shows Pakistan to be among the worst countries in the world in bringing the killers of journalists to justice,” the report said.

Five journalists also died in Iraq from both insurgent attacks and targeted killings, illustrating an entrenched level of violence there as the last U.S. forces pulled out the country at the weekend.

Three journalists died in Mexico, including the first case of a reporter killed for work on social media, the report said. Many of the dead had taken on Mexico’s powerful drug traffickers in their reports.

The Arab Spring revolutions across the Middle East and North Africa led to the first cases of journalist deaths in Syria and Tunisia since the CPJ began recording fatalities in 1992, the report said. The committee independently confirms that journalists died while covering their beats.

Filed under: Pakistan, Pakistanis Tagged: Human Rights Watch, Pakistan, Pakistan Journalists, Pakistanis, Saleem Shahzad

By Sonya Rehman

Last year, Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, a Pakistani filmmaker, won an International Emmy for “Pakistan’s Taliban Generation,” her documentary focusing on young Taliban recruits in the aftermath of Sept. 11.

Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy co-directs ‘Saving Face,’ a documentary about acid-attack victims in Pakistan.

A new project of hers, in collaboration with Daniel Junge, is “Saving Face,” about a British-Pakistani plastic surgeon who treats Pakistani victims of acid attacks. The film follows some of these women as they grapple with what happened to them. “Saving Face,” which will air on HBO next year, has been shortlisted for the Oscars in the “Best Documentary, Short Subject” category.

Ms. Obaid-Chinoy, 33 years old, talked about “Saving Face” and “Taliban Generation,” how she films controversial interviews and why she wishes she’d made “City of God.”

Read the entire article here!

The Wall Street Journal, Scene Asia

According to a recent poll by Latinobarómetro, a public opinion survey conducted in 18 countries in the Latin American region, 45% of Brazilians agree that “democracy is preferable to any other type of government.”[1] Alarmingly, the figure is down from 54% last year. The Economist proposes an explanation: “Dilma Rousseff, the new President, has taken a tough line on corruption, thus drawing more attention to it.” Since June, 6 of Dilma’s ministers have been forced out of the Cabinet; 5 due to corruption scandals. As Brazil analysts have pointed out, Dilma’s intentions may be progressive, but the exodus cannot be fully understood as a laundering of Brasília’s ministries. The exits may have an opposite effect, as they are a rip in the fabric of her governing Coalition.

As a recap, Dilma’s Cabinet has been turbulent to say the least. 6 officials of the administration have left since June, and 5 did so due to corruption allegations. All 6 were part of the government of Dilma’s mentor Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The timeline goes as follows[2]:

• June 7: Chief of Staff Antonio Palocci resigns over allegations that he used his government position to profit through a private consulting business.
• July 6: Transport Minister Alfredo Nascimento resigns due to allegations that kickbacks were collected on transportation and infrastructure contracts.
• August 4: Defense Minister Nelson Jobim resigns after insulting other ministers; no corruption this time.
• August 17: Agriculture Minister Wagner Rossi resigns after allegations of cash kickbacks throughout the ministry. This scandal featured “reports of a man who walked the halls of the Agriculture Ministry making payoffs from a wheeled suitcase.”[3]
• September 14: Tourism Minister Pedro Novais resigns after allegedly misusing public funds. These allegations include the claiming of costs at a sex motel as government expenses; it is not clear if this charge refers to Novais or someone else at the ministry.
  • October 26: Sports Minister Orlando Silva resigns due to reports of R$40 million (US$ 22.5 million) in kickbacks for himself and the Communist Party of Brazil. Silva allegedly took funds in the ministry parking garage.

Commentators have tried to diagnose the exodus; explanations I will discuss here include both competition for scarce government patronage resources and philosophical disagreement over the proper relationship between government and the governed.

In their piece “The Price of a Disproportional Cabinet: The Paloccigate in Brazil,” Carlos Pereira and Carlos Aramayo of the Brookings Institution identify a key challenge of Dilma’s Cabinet as under-representation of minority parties.[4] The relative size of Dilma’s Worker’s Party (PT) in the Chamber of Deputies demonstrates Dilma’s reliance on these minority parties. While Dilma’s multi-party Coalition holds about 64% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies (326 seats out of 513), the PT itself holds 88 seats (27% of the Coalition, and 17% of the entire Chamber). According to data from Pereira and Aramayo, PT members hold 17 out of 37 Cabinet posts, or 46% of the total. In analyzing Palocci’s resignation as Dilma’s Chief of Staff, Pereira and Aramayo note that Palocci had been forced to resign from Lula’s government due to prostitution allegations, but that he never lost support of his party. In the case of his recent resignation the Cabinet, and specifically its PT members, withdrew support. Pereira and Aramayo imply that PT members turned on Palocci because his recent misdeeds led to personal profit, while explaining rebellion in the rest of the Coalition “as the price Rousseff paid for allocating a disproportionate cabinet.” Pereira and Aramayo also note that Dilma missed an opportunity post-scandal to equitably realign the Cabinet. Further internal discord may ensue, particularly given another expected Cabinet realignment prior to mid-term elections next year. Analysts note that the key catalyst in Dilma’s drive has been the Brazilian press, who originated many allegations of wrongdoing, and will be eager to publish further allegations in the inter-Coalition struggle for government resources.[5]

The Economist posits that Dilma’s key challenge may be larger than a misaligned Cabinet; rather, she does not agree with her Coalition partners on how Brazilian government should be run. The Economist optimistically notes Dilma’s focus on government efficiency; she has left many government jobs unoccupied, and added independent technocrats to the government at the expense of party stalwarts. Combined with the firing of unclean Cabinet ministers, these actions have caused senior leaders within her Coalition to regard Dilma as “dangerously naïve.”[6] According to the report, senior politicians in the Coalition’s two largest parties are worried that in the anti-corruption campaign, Dilma “may have started something she cannot stop.” These parties are the PT and the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), a powerful partner who has the second-most Chamber seats in the Coalition and is the party of Vice President Michael Temer. The PMDB is known for utilizing government handouts, and is likely at odds with Dilma over the use of patronage in government. Current disagreement has hamstrung the government, taking up Dilma’s capacity and preventing any major reforms for now. A need for disciplined fiscal policy to check inflation (6.97% on a rolling 12-month basis, source: IBGE) and control government spending will not be preferred by those wanting a patronage system either. Dilma’s actions against the departed ministers have led to a shakeup of political foundations that is not favored by ostensible allies whom she relies on. It is therefore possible that a popular leader with a strong mandate could decapitate her own ability to govern.

Because Brazil’s political establishment knows that the Cabinet will change again in 2012, an incentive for jockeying remains. According to Pereira and Aramayo, Dilma has exacerbated this by not using chances to bring members of smaller Coalition parties into the Cabinet during the shakeup. Perhaps Dilma has felt pressure to keep Lula’s allies around, or perhaps she believes her own party to be more popular than suggested by the composition of the Chamber of Deputies. Over the next year, we should examine Brazil to see if the political cleanup continues, and if it tragically causes Dilma’s Coalition to shatter.

One person writes: “I have been in many places, but I have never been in Cahoots. Apparently you can’t go there alone. You have to be in Cahoots with someone. I’ve also never been in Cognito. I hear no one recognizes you there. I have, however, been in Sane. You have to be driven there. I have made several trips there, thanks to my family, friends and those where I have worked.”

I find myself in some interesting places – like Love. Have you ever been in Love? It can be a hard place to leave. Occasionally I find myself in Fear, in Doubt and, at times, in Capable. I don’t like to spend a lot of time there.

But what about Sincere? Have you been in Sincere, lately? I’ve been there and it is not an honorable place to go.

Is there such a thing as a fake relationship?

You remember comedian Tommy Smothers old line? “The best thing about getting older is that you gain sincerity. Once you learn to fake that, there’s nothing you can’t do.”

I heard a true story of a teenager who got a tattoo on her hip – a delicate little Japanese symbol. At her friend’s house she showed it off. The friend’s mother commented on it and the girl begged, “Please don’t tell my parents.”

The mother assured her that she wouldn’t say anything about it. Then she asked, “By the way, what does it stand for?”

“Honesty,” she said.

I love irony.

When I am sincere, there’s nothing to hide. I am just me. It’s something I can’t fake. And if I’m the best me that I can be, then what can I be that is any better?

The Wall Street Journal once printed a little piece titled “Sincerity.” It is one of my favorites.

“I wish I were big enough honestly to admit all my shortcomings; brilliant enough to accept praise without it making me arrogant; tall enough to tower above deceit; strong enough to welcome criticism; compassionate enough to understand human frailties; wise enough to recognize my mistakes; humble enough to appreciate greatness; staunch enough to stand by my friends; human enough to be thoughtful of my neighbor; and righteous enough to be devoted to the love of God.”

I am really not all that strong. I don’t always act with courage. I am certainly not as brilliant as others, as charming or as wise. But today I can be me. And when I lie down tonight, I’ll sleep easy knowing it will have been enough.

Well, the sordid saga is finally over. Husain Haqqani has resigned as Ambassador to the U.S. and, notwithstanding demands for inquiries and follow ups, I am resting assured that this matter will be forgotten relatively soon. At the very least, the inquiries and commissions and investigations will be buried in paperwork and bureaucraticese to the point where no one will care anymore. This is what happens with every single inquiry or commission into something controversial, and I suspect this will be the same.

Who are angry right wing Pakistanis going to send abusive tweets to now? Photo: AP

Here are some questions I’ve been mulling over the last few days:

1. What exactly happened here?

Obviously, nobody knows for sure. Well, correction: two people know for sure. But really, nobody knows for sure.

Of course, that shouldn’t stop us from speculation. Here’s my best guess:

The Blackberry exchange is real. The memo, however, was not written by Husain Haqqani (the language and writing is terrible; Haqqani is Zardari’s go-to man for all those fake op-eds in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post… go and read the memo and see for yourself if it reads by someone who’s written for those publications, albeit under someone else’s name).

The memo was probably written by Mansoor Ijaz himself, and its contents were probably agreed upon by the two. That’s my guess.

Of course, this sets up a series of follow up questions. Such as…

1a Why would Haqqani go through someone so clearly untrustworthy and unreliable?

On the one hand, it makes absolutely no sense. Haqqani is a street-smart guy who knows about the daily practice of politics better than most people alive. It wouldn’t make sense for him to commit such a rookie mistake. And because it seems so unlikely, people seem eager to believe that this entire thing is an elaborate conspiracy.

I’m not so sure. If the best defense is “why would he do something so stupid?” then I’m sorry, that’s not up to the mark. My view is that smart people do stupid things all the time. One of my favorite books ever is David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest, a book that shines a light on smart people committing one strategic blunder after another in Vietnam.

Let’s not pretend that people good at their job are immune to mistakes of judgment. Napoleon was a pretty good military commander, then committed a pretty big mistake. His cost him all but 10,000 soldiers in an army of half a million. An ambassadorship is chump change compared to that, I’m sure you’ll agree. People screw up. It happens.

1b Was Ijaz playing Haqqani?

By the end of it, Ijaz was obviously firmly in the GHQ-ISI camp. The question is: when did he join them? Was at some point during the crisis? Or was it before the entire thing began? If it’s the latter, then that is essentially another way of saying that Ijaz played Haqqani the whole frigging time.

I don’t buy that. Haqqani is clearly an order of magnitude brighter than this guy. I can’t believe that Ijaz was acting on behalf of the ISI in some conspiracy the whole time and not once did Haqqani suspect what was going on. That just strikes me as highly unlikely. More likely, Ijaz flipped somewhere in the middle, when the controversy was just gathering apace and the khakis probably presented him with an offer he couldn’t refuse.

2. How will this move impact US-Pakistan relations?

Not very seriously, in my opinion. On the list of things that matter to US-Pakistan relations, the personality of the ambassador from one of the countries to the other country is pretty low down on the totem pole.

Another way of thinking about this is to accept this disjuncture: Haqqani was, by almost all accounts, a fantastic ambassador and brilliant diplomat. And yet US-Pakistan relations are about as bad as they’ve been in a decade.

What does that mean? Well, for me, it means that individuals don’t matter a great deal when it comes to figuring out outcomes and processes between states. Institutions, interests, geography, the balance of power — these are the things that clearly matter a lot.

I’m sure Haqqani’s excellence in his role mattered a little bit on the margins, maybe a billion dollars of aid here or there. But individuals simply don’t impact the overarching trajectory of interstate relations. If Kayani was replaced by a generic khaki tomorrow, the US-Pakistan relationship would be largely the same. Bob Gates was replaced by Panetta, and the relationship was largely the same. Haqqani will be replaced, and the relationship will be largely the same.

3. Is this a win for the khakis and a loss for the civvies?

On the surface, sure. And that’s certainly how it was being played up by the liberal twitterati. The basic tenor of this analysis was: woe is us, the khakis have pulled a fast one, the poor civvies lose again.

I think that analysis is lazy. Sure, this is a win for the khakis, they’ve hated Haqqani since he lobbied against Musharraf in DC and wrote a book heavily criticizing the military and its role in Pakistani politics and society (and probably well before then actually). They would obviously prefer to live in a world where someone they don’t trust and don’t like is not the primary face of the Pakistan government in Washington.

That said, the belief that this was some elaborate conspiracy and the poor PPP is once again the victims of the dastardly GHQ is dumb. Understand this: there is not a single democracy in the world, even (especially?) the ones in which the civilians rule the roost, where someone who did what Haqqani allegedly did would survive. Not a single one. In our rush to decry the civilian-military (im)balance in Pakistan, this fact seems to have gotten lost. What Haqqani is accused of doing is a really, really big deal!

Even if you agree with the larger goals of the memo and the intellectual basis behind it, this was a really stupid and bad way to go about it. No reasonable person can disagree that this is a fireable offense, all over the world, democracy or not.

Of course, the question then becomes: was he actually party to the fireable offense, or was this an elaborate plan concocted by the GHQ-ISI from the beginning? I have very serious doubts about the latter proposition — I think we sometimes give too much credit to the military for strategic adroitness and tactical brilliance that it doesn’t really have.

The bottom line is: none of us can know for sure. I think that my belief that there’s no smoke without fire here is a reasonable one. Others may disagree. That’s fine. Just be aware that angrily and decisively asserting that this was an unjustified or unfair move rests on the supposition that he is absolutely not guilty. And there is no way that all the Haqqani defenders out there know that for sure. So why are they pretending that they do?

I would also add that I don’t think Haqqani would have gone away so easily, or that Zardari would have let him go so easily, if there wasn’t some evidence backing up his involvement that they have both seen. This, after all, is not the first time the military has wanted to get rid of one of Zardari’s men. How long, for instance, have they tried to get rid of that fool Rehman Malik? And unlike Haqqani, Rehman Malik is terrible at his job, so he can’t even play the competence card. Or what about Haqqani himself, who was rumored to be on the chopping block post-Kerry/Lugar?

And yet, Malik has survived, despite the odds, and Haqqani hasn’t, not this time anyway. That tells me that there was something different about this case that forced Zardari’s hand in a way the other cases did not.

4. If Haqqani can be fired for a fireable offense, why can’t the military brass be fired for a fireable offense?

This is the key issue for me. Post Osama raid, I (along with others) urged the government to form a consensus on cutting the military down to size, to strike while the going was good. The military was thoroughly discredited and there would be no better opportunity for true accountability.

Unfortunately, the khakis got away with their mistake (as they often do) while the civvy got stuck with his. That’s obviously not an ideal set of circumstances for the state’s development.

The ironic or tragic thing about this whole episode is that Haqqani was — if you believe he is somehow involved in this — trying to achieve something that we all wanted, at the same time as we all wanted, but in a way very, very different to what we wanted. The correct way would have been to try to get the two big parties and a couple others on board for a thorough parliamentary inquiry. I wonder if he tried that way at all, and whether he was rebuffed by Zardari and Gilani if he did.

Either way, my point is that Haqqani is suffering for a mistake he allegedly made. But the khakis are not suffering for a mistake they definitely and incontrovertibly made. That’s a problem.

Here’s the thing though: only the civilians can solve that problem. Relying on the goodwill of the khakis for self-accountability is a strategy doomed to failure. Getting a collective backbone, and getting a critical mass of politicians together who feel more comfortable taking the military on than they do taking each other on, would be two good steps. In a weird way, we need our civilians to act more like the khakis: ready to strike when they have to, taking no prisoners, and showing no mercy.