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Top Tips to enjoy a Funny and Memorable Stag party

Posted on 25 January 2012 by Tea Server

Stag parties are the last few days of fun that you can’t miss before one in the group finally sets off to step into a new adventure of his life. On those last days of freedom, groom is excited as well as nervous. A funny and memorable stag party will boost up the excitement and [...]

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Official Version: Pakistan Rejects NATO Report on Salala Attack

Posted on 24 January 2012 by Tea Server

Official Version: Pakistan Rejects NATO Report on Salala Attack

Rawalpindi January 23:The US Investigation Report into the Salala incident of 26th November 2011, involving aerial strikes by US aircraft and helicopters resulting into Shahadat (killing) of 24 Pakistani soldiers and injury to 13 others, was received by the General Headquarters (GHQ) Pakistan Army on the 24th of December 2011. The report received is the same unclassified version as available on the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Website. The analysis of the US Investigation Report has been carried out by Pakistan Military with a view to reiterate facts and correct the perspective.

Pakistan does not agree with several portions and findings of the Investigation Report as these are factually not correct. The fundamental cause of the incident of 26th November 2011 was the failure of US / ISAF to share its near-border operation with Pakistan at any level. This obviously was a major omission, as were several others, like the complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative / intricate Rules of Engagement as well as lack of unified military command in Afghanistan. In addition to the foregoing, US / ISAF violated all mutually agreed procedures with Pakistan for near-border operations put in place to avert such uncalled for actions. It also carried out unprovoked engagement of Pakistani Posts located inside Pakistan violating the US / ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone.

The US Investigation Report is structured around the argument of “self defence” and “proportional use of force”, an argument which is contrary to facts. Continued engagement by US / ISAF despite being informed about the incident at multiple levels by Pakistan Military within minutes of initiation of US / ISAF fire, belies the “self defence” and “proportional use of force” contention. Affixing partial responsibility of the incident on Pakistan is therefore, unjustified and unacceptable.

NADEEM MALIK
The United States has carried out more than 300 drone strikes since 2004 in pakistan, yet this operation has never been debated in US Congress; more than seven years after it began, there has not even been a single vote for or against it. This campaign is not carried out by the Air Force; it is being conducted by the CIA.
Under the War Powers Resolution — a Vietnam-era law that requires notifying …Congress of military operations within 48 hours and getting its authorization after 60 days, but not any more.
America does not declare war anymore; the last time Congress actually did so was in 1942 — against Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. “We don’t buy war bonds or pay war taxes anymore. During World War II, 85 million Americans purchased war bonds that brought the government $185 billion; in the last decade, we bought none and instead gave the richest 5 percent of Americans a tax break.” NYTSee More

NADEEM MALIK
Do you think Pakistan should open the doors once again for American Special Operation Forces (so called trainers and contractors) after what the country has experienced in recent years ? کیا پاکستان میں امریکی کمانڈوز اور سی آئی اے کے ایجنٹوں کو دوبارہ گھسنے کی اجازت دی جانی چاھیے ؟

Pakistan has lost almost 40 thousand lives since 9/11, over 4000 men of security forces were martyed and the whole country faced hundreds of sucide attacks and bomb blasts every year and hundreds of CIA-led drone strikes, NATO attacks on Pakistani posts like Salala, Abbottabad raid and Raymond Davis killings. Do we still need more ?

PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INVESTIGATION REPORT CONDUCTED BY BG STEPHEN CLARK INTO 26 TH NOVEMBER 2011 US LED ISAF / NATO FORCES ATTACK ON PAKISTANI VOLCANO AND BOULDER POSTS IN MOHMAND AGENCY

Note: This Report does not have any other versions

23 January 2012

PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INVESTIGATION REPORT CONDUCTED BY BG STEPHEN CLARK INTO 26NOVEMBER 2011 US LED ISAF / NATO FORCES ATTACK ON PAKISTANI VOLCANO AND BOULDER POSTS IN MOHMAND AGENCY

Note:

Quotes that have been taken directly from the US Investigation Report and reproduced in this document appear in red, followed by reference of each from the original US / ISAF Investigation Report.

General 1. The US Investigation Report into the Salala incident of 26
th November 2011, involving aerial strikes by US aircraft and helicopters resulting into Shahadat (killing) of 24 Pakistani soldiers and injury to 13 others, was received by the General Headquarters (GHQ) Pakistan Army on the 24th of December 2011. The report received is the same unclassified version as available on the Central Command (CENTCOM) Website. The analysis of the US Investigation Report conducted by Brigadier General (BG) Clark has been carried out hereafter with a view to reiterate facts and correct the perspective.

Mandate of the US / NATO Investigation Report
2. It is unfortunate to note that the mandate given to the US Investigating Officer (BG Stephen Clark), did not include affixing specific responsibility for the grave incident (Reference: General Mattis‟ letter to Brigadier General Stephen Clark dated 28 November 2011 appointing him as Investigating Officer, Page 3, Paras 9 and 10). Without this specific mandate the Investigation Report could not have been complete.

3. It is also revealing to read the mandate given to NATO‟s (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum team (headed by Brigadier General Michael Jorgensen) concurrently investigating the incident. In words of the US Investigation Report;
“The JFC Brunssum goal was to conduct an operationally focused fact-finding investigation into the circumstances surrounding the engagement between friendly forces and PAKMIL (Pakistan

Military) ……..”

. (Reference: Page 6, Para 1, Lines 11 through 15). Implicit in the mandate is the fact that, Pakistan was considered in an adversarial role and not part of friendly forces.

Background
4. For developing a correct perspective, it is important to give some background before going on to the specifics of the Incident (26
th November 2011) itself. The background is covered hereafter under three headings i.e. “Events Leading up to the Incident”, “Environment” and finally “Coordination Mechanism”.

Events Leading up to the Incident
5. Although the incident of 26
th November 2011, was the gravest, it unfortunately was not the first of its kind. The current incident was preceded by four others which happened between June 2008 and July 2011 and resulted in loss of 18 precious lives of our soldiers and injury to 10 others, including an incident at Ziarat Post (Mohmand Agency) on 17th June 2011 which happened close to the area of 26th November 2011 incident. The US / International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are well aware of these incidents and each time resolved to prevent recurrence. It is illuminating to mention the details of these incidents, the first of which took place on 10th June 2008 at Goraprai Post of Pakistan located in Mohmand Agency, in which US / ISAF carried out an unprovoked aerial strike resulting in Shahadat (death) of eleven Pakistani soldiers and injuries to seven others. The second such incident happened on 30th September 2010 in Kurram Agency at Kharlachi Post, where two US helicopters carried out unprovoked firing on Pakistani Post resulting in Shahadat (death) of three soldiers and serious injuries to three. The third incident took place on 19th July 2011 in Angoor Adda Sector of South Waziristan Agency, wherein; mortar and artillery fire suddenly erupted, initiated by US/ISAF against Pakistani Border Posts at 0945 hours (Pakistan Standard Time). Despite repeated contacts with ISAF, including Lieutenant General (LG) Keen and Major General (MG) Laster and activation of other coordination mechanisms, the fire which was proving fatal continued for several hours resulting in the Shahadat (death) of four Pakistani soldiers. As US / ISAF failed to bring the fire to an end, COAS General Kayani had to intervene personally with Chief ODRP (Office of the Defence

Representative Pakistan), LG Keen at the US Embassy Islamabad, warning, that if the fire did not stop immediately he would order an enhanced level of response, beyond the one which was already being given by Pakistan Military up until that time in the shape of small arms and mortar fire. This intervention finally brought the fire to a halt. The resultant US / ISAF inquiry into this, and other similar incidents remained shy of accepting responsibility and hence failed to hold anyone accountable, as far as we (Pakistanis) know.

Environment
6. Before going into the details of the incident of 26
th November 2011 and the US Investigation Report, it is important to understand the environment as well as the coordination mechanisms which existed to prevent exactly such an eventuality.

7. After an extensive nine months operation in Mohmand Agency, Pakistan Army cleared the entire area upto the border with Afghanistan and established several border posts including Volcano and Boulder at the end of September 2011. When the Pakistani forces were carrying out operations in Mohmand Agency, US / ISAF were kept informed and they carried out some supportive operations on the Afghan side, along and close to River Kunar. With no presence of US / ISAF / Afghan forces close to the border on Afghan side, these Pakistani Posts were critical for prevention of terrorists‟ infiltration from either side of the border. This is substantiated by the US Investigation Report, which when referring to the Area of Operation SAYAQA states,
“…….. there had been neither Coalition nor ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) presence in the area for some time” (Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Last Line). Pakistan has been experiencing infiltration of terrorists from Afghan Province of Kunar which had become a safe haven for terrorists of all hues including those who had escaped the Pakistan Army‟s operation in Mohmand. Since September 2011, no crossing from Pakistani side from Mohmand Agency into Afghanistan had taken place, however, unfortunately several large (and some small) scale attacks on Pakistani Border Posts and civilians had occurred regularly, emanating from Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan into Dir, Chitral, Bajaur and Mohmand areas of Pakistan. There were seven such major attacks by terrorists from Afghan side

resulting in loss of 102 personnel and injuries to 25 others (security forces and civilians). Pakistan has repeatedly provided specific information to US / ISAF about presence of hard-core terrorist elements including some High Value Targets located in the Afghanistan Province of Kunar and Nuristan.

8. The Pakistani Posts in question (Volcano and Boulder) are located approximately 1450 metres apart on a kidney shaped barren ridge, which is just under 8000 feet high
(Refer Figure 1 below). The posts were (and are) located 300-400 metres from the international border inside Pakistan. There are a few abandoned huts opposite Volcano Post. Village Maya {map references of which were asked for by Pakistan Military and received from ICEPAK-ODRP (ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan-ODRP) on 29 December 2011 and where ISAF ostensibly carried out operations on night 25/26 November 2011} lies approximately 1.5 kilometres from the Pakistani Boulder Post and 1.2 kilometres from the border. The Pakistani Posts and most of Maya Village are mutually inter-visible. Each of these Pakistani Posts had 5-6 bunkers none of which were underground, but were constructed above the surface of the 8000 feet high ridge which was devoid of vegetation. All these bunkers, therefore, were easily visible from afar. These bunkers and posts had been there for over two months. Volcano Post had 27 personnel while Boulder had 25. They belonged to 7 Azad Kashmir (AK) Regiment of Pakistan Army which had played a crucial role in clearing Mohmand Agency from terrorists and, therefore, were well familiar with the environment and their surroundings. In the absence of any ISAF / Afghan National Army (ANA) / Afghan Border Police (ABP) presence opposite these, and some of the other posts in Mohmand Agency, any movement which is not shared, especially at night close to the border, is assumed to be hostile. Fire, therefore, is carried out on such movement(s). This is true for both ISAF and Pakistan Military for entire Area of Responsibility of ISAF‟s Regional Command – East (RC-E) and that of Pakistan Military‟s 11 Corps. Fire is also carried out on suspected movement(s), such a fire is called “speculative fire”. On any given night several Pakistani Posts, if and when deemed necessary carry out speculative fire.

9. Opposite Mohmand Agency, where these posts were located, US / ISAF had carried out at least 1-2 operations in and around Village Maya prior to 26

th November incident in the months of October / November 2011, which involved ground forces and air support. Even when active ground operations are not taking place, an average of 2-3 US / ISAF aerial platforms operate opposite Mohmand Agency on daily basis; these include Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, fighter aircraft, helicopters and drones. Resultantly, it is inconceivable that these or any other Pakistani Posts in the area were / are not known to US / ISAF.

Coordination Mechanism
10. Having elaborated the environment, it is essential to understand the detailed coordination mechanism and mutually agreed procedures which existed between Pakistan and US / ISAF for effective, incident-free, near-border operations. The coordination mechanism includes a number of forums at three different tiers i.e. at strategic, operational and tactical, all meant to build redundancy by timely sharing of information and coordinating near-border operations. At the strategic level, Military Operations Directorate of GHQ interfaces with ODRP headed by (LG Keen) based at the US Embassy Islamabad. Within the US Embassy another setup called ICEPAK also interacts with Military Operations Directorate, GHQ. In addition to this interface, Military Operations Directorate also has communication through the office of the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), with the Headquarters ISAF represented by MG Nicholson, but more regularly with HQ ISAF Joint Command (IJC) represented by MG Laster. Pakistan‟s Air Headquarters also interacts/coordinates with Tactical Monitoring Cell (TMC) located within US Embassy Islamabad and working alongside ODRP. The strategic coordination mechanism is aided by exchange of Liaison Officers (LOs) at operational level.

11. These operational level measures are further reinforced by tactical level arrangements. These include Border Coordination Centres (BCCs) where Pakistan, US / ISAF and Afghanistan sides are represented by Liaison Officers

for tactical level coordination. One such centre is located opposite Mohmand Agency inside Afghanistan at a place called Nawa. It was this Centre which was responsible for the coordination of operations where the incident took place. These BCCs are centrally linked to Joint Operations Centre at RC-E Bagram through Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) at Torkham with the purpose of sharing operational information and assisting in resolving issues. Additionally, Border Flag Meetings are also organized at local / tactical levels to coordinate routine issues. There are a total of twenty six Pakistani Military LOs deputed for the aforementioned purposes.

12. There also exist mutually agreed procedures for near-border operations. These include; effective utilization of border coordination mechanism, sharing of information about impending operations and coordinating requests for establishing blocking position / conducting complementary operations on the other side of the border. Moreover, in case, if troops of one side come under fire which is originating from across the border, immediate sharing of information about point of origin of fire is done with the side wherefrom the fire is originating. The responsibility thereafter to bring the fire to a halt is of the country from where fire is originating. Finally, in the eventuality of both sides opening fire on each other, immediate cessation of fire must take place as soon as communication is established. Unfortunately, on 26
th November 2011, US / ISAF violated all these mutually agreed procedures.

Unfolding of Events
13. Having explained the background (Events leading up to the Incident, Environment, Coordination Mechanism), the details of the 26
th November 2011 incident are covered hereafter using the US Investigation Report.

14. The unfolding of events is explained in the succeeding paragraphs under the same three stages or sections {
Stage 1: Preparation and initial operation, Stage 2: Contact and lethal action, Stage 3: Reaction. (Reference: Page 11, Para 10)} as enunciated in the US Investigation Report, quoting from the report itself to highlight discrepancies and omissions in US/ISAF version of events so as to

bring facts to the fore. Although, Pakistan Military has differences with some of the timings of the unfolding of the events as given in the US Investigation Report, it has chosen to use the same timings (as given in the US Report) for analyzing, so as to avoid confusion and use a common basis. For the same reason Pakistan Military has also not questioned the existence of an operation called SAYAQA, planned and conducted on night 25/26 November 2011 by US / ISAF.

Stage 1: Preparation and Initial Operation by US / ISAF

(Preparation and Insertion through Helicopters upto Pre-Contact)

15. What we now know as Operation SAYAQA, was not shared at any level with the Pakistan Military despite multiple existing arrangements between the two sides to do so. The incident is even more regrettable because a few hours prior to it, Commander ISAF (General Allen) and at least two of his senior staff members were in GHQ to coordinate and share details of exactly such operations which ISAF now claims to have conducted on the night of 25/26 November 2011. Major Generals Nicholson and Laster who accompanied General Allen to GHQ on 25 November 2011, briefed DGMO about some other operations in another zone but chose not to share anything about an operation opposite Salala which was to happen the same night and so close to the border. MG Laster at the time of visiting GHQ had already been briefed by his staff about the operation opposite Salala area planned for night 25/26 November 2011. The operation was named SAYAQA. The US Investigation Report states that,
“The initial CONOP (Concept of Operations) proposed insertion at a Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ), which was within 1km (kilometre) of the Pakistan (PAK) border…… Accordingly, it was briefed to the IJC’s DCOS JOPS (ISAF Joint Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff – Joint Operations), U.S. Marine Corps Major General (MajGen) James Laster on 22 November 2011. He made two demands: move the HLZ further away from the border, effectively reducing this to a Level 1 CONOP; and, confirm the location of Pakistan’s border checkpoints (Pakistani Posts). The CONOP was rebriefed to him on 23 November 2011 with a HLZ (known as HLZ HOLDEM) 1.3km to the north of the objective (Maya Village) and

2.3km from the Pakistan border, and a map produced showing the known PAK border checkpoints (Pakistani Posts). The map did not show checkpoints (Pakistani Posts) in the area where the engagements took place. The CONOP was then approved by MajGen Laster in his separate capacity as USFOR-A DCOS Interoperability (United States Forces in Afghanistan’s Deputy Chief of Staff)”

(Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a. of US Investigation Report). MG Laster‟s one observation of moving the HLZ away from the border was addressed, the other i.e. “confirm the location of Pakistan’s border checkpoints” (Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a., Lines 6-7 of US Investigation Report) was not. It is clear from the foregoing that the Pakistani Posts were not verified, despite instructions by MG Laster. When MG Laster was re-briefed on the CONOP on 23 November 2011, he should have been told about the Pakistani Posts. As he wasn‟t told it implies the staff did not carry out adequate pre-mission preparation. This raises serious questions about the planning process because the confirmation of Pakistani posts could easily have been done by a simple ISR sweep. The Investigation Report has also recommended the same (Reference: Page 27, Para 43 of US Investigation Report).

16. The CONOP approved by MG Laster should have been shared at various levels in the existing elaborate coordination mechanism meant for this very purpose. It wasn‟t – intentionally so, due to the mistrust amongst the ISAF personnel towards Pakistan Military. In the words of the US Investigation Report,
“The REL (releasable) PAK CONOP was not released to the PAKMIL in a timely manner – contrary to SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures), order and directives – because of a prevailing sense of mistrust amongst the three forces (PAKMIL, ANSF and Coalition Forces)” (Reference: Page 28, Para 48, Lines 6 through 8 of US Investigation Report).

17. The US Investigation Report states,
“The NBCC (Nawa Border Coordination Centre) was not provided with a copy of the CONOP through official channels but received a “back channel” copy from an interested third party (reference is not understood)…… ICEPAK (ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan)

was not provided with a copy of the CONOP

“.(Reference: Page 12, Para 11.b., Lines 3 through 8). “The ODRP usually receives near-border CONOPs in advance; however, the CONOP for Operation SAYAQA had not been sent to the ODRP” (Reference: Page 14, Para 15, Lines 3 through 5 of US Investigation Report).

18. It is interesting to note that this was not the first time that operations in Maya Village were being carried out; US / ISAF had already conducted 1-2 operations in and around the area of Maya Village in the months of October / November, prior to 26
th November incident. It is not possible that even during the previous operation(s), US / ISAF made an innocent omission of not checking the details of the Pakistani Posts.

(Contact and Lethal Action by ISAF)

19. There is no doubt in the minds of Pakistan Military that US / ISAF troops were aware of the border alignment, as at least 1-2 operations had been carried out in and around the Maya Village prior to 26
th November incident during the months of October / November. According to the US Investigation Report “The GF (Ground Forces) were aware of the heightened threat as Coalition Forces had experienced several contacts (coming under fire) in this area, the last being 5 October 2011″ (Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Lines 4-5). This was the same area where operation was being carried out on 26th November 2011. Investigation Report further confirms the fact that US / ISAF troops were aware of the Border when it states, “At 2206 hours (Afghanistan Standard Time), all elements were “boots on the ground” at HLZ HOLDEM. The GFTL (Ground Forces Team Leader) noted that it was uncharacteristically quiet. As the special operators adjusted to their environment they looked up at a dark gray moonless sky and fixed their eyes upon the rocky ridgeline (the general location of Pakistani Posts) as a reference because it was the only contrasting image that they could see; they were aware that this was the border with Pakistan”. (Reference: Page 15, Para 20, Lines 1 through 5).

20. According to the US Investigation Report,
“The GF comprised a team of 14 U.S. Special Operations Forces …….. and an ANA CDO (Commando) Company (100 men)” (Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Lines 1 through 3). The Investigation Report goes on to state, “The CONOP was rebriefed to him (MG Laster) on 23 November 2011 with a HLZ (known as HLZ HOLDEM) 1.3km to the north of the objective and 2.3km from the Pakistan border” (Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a., Lines 7 through 9). The GF were, according to the Investigation Report, in Maya Village at 2309 hours, when they came under fire, “At 2309 hours the GF came under heavy machine gun fire, the tracer rounds indicating that it came from the eastern ridgeline near the border …. Following the initial contact of heavy machine gun fire, the rest of the ME (Main Elements) and SE1 (Supporting Elements) were engaged by effective mortar fire; …. coming from a point on the ridge…… the machine gun fire did not stop but increased and a second mortar round which landed only 50m (metres) from the group, divided the force” (Reference: Page 16, Paras 22,23 and 24). According to the Investigation Report, it was in response to this Pakistani fire and in self defence that the GF asked for air support. The aerial platforms then engaged the Pakistani Posts, according to the Report, for “a 90 minute period” (Reference: Page 4, Para 1, Line 9 of US Investigation Report) (factually Pakistani Posts had been engaged for two hours). In fact the Pakistani Posts had never fired in the direction where US / ISAF patrol (without sharing any information with Pakistan Military) was ostensibly operating. The speculative fire from Pakistan side was undertaken on a suspected militant movement by firing only three mortar and a few machine gun rounds at a location only 400 metres from the Volcano Post, a location which was already registered and which lay almost 1.5 to 2 kilometres away from Maya Village, and in a different direction. Therefore, there is absolutely no chance that this fire could have landed even close to US / ISAF GF, let alone being effective. It is, therefore, evident from the aforementioned detailed account that, by US / ISAF‟s own admission, the GF was in Maya Village at 2309 hours (The exact map references / LAT/LONGs of Maya Village were asked for, and provided to Pakistan Military by ICEPAK-ODRP, obviating any possibility of confusion). Even

if they were not in Maya Village at the time, they just could not have been at the location where Pakistani Posts carried out speculative fire, as this was temporally not possible. On any given night
several Pakistani posts carry out speculative fire if and when deemed necessary.

21.
Figure – 2 below is illuminating. The Figure highlights the distance of the HLZ to Maya Village based on what has been stated in the US / ISAF Investigation Report, “The CONOP was rebriefed to him (MG Laster) on 23 November 2011 with a HLZ (known as HLZ HOLDEM) 1.3km to the north of the objective (Maya Village) and 2.3km from the Pakistan border” (Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a., Lines 7 through 9). It also indicates the direction of Pakistani speculative fire which was in a totally different direction. If the GF were, as per timings quoted above, in Maya Village, busy in their operation when they allegedly came under Pakistani Fire; for the report to draw linkage of US / ISAF aerial response to this fire to justify its unprovoked attack is unjustified and violative of self defence ROE (Rules of Engagement).

22. As there are legal implications of using a force as the US / ISAF did, in the manner that it did, therefore, “self defence” has been used to justify an unwarranted and disproportionate response. The ROE of self defence could have only been used, if the fire had been effective, hence the Investigation Report goes to great lengths to assert that Pakistani fire was effective
“a second mortar round, which landed only 50m from the group, divided the force” (Reference: Page 16, Para 24, Lines 1-2). If the fire of mortar landed so close, there should have been casualties, but according to the US / ISAF Investigation Report itself, “…….by 0400 hours they were back at their base with no casualties” (Reference: Page 18, Para 31). Not only was the response, not in self defence, it was

disproportionate, excessive and sustained which resulted in death of 24 soldiers while 13 sustained injuries. The unprovoked engagement thus left behind 7 widows and 16 orphans. By the Investigation Report‟s own admission it continued for 90 minutes (actually it continued for two hours) and it involved two F – 15s, two Attack Helicopters (AH) – 64 Apaches, one Attack Cargo (AC) 130 and a Multi-mission Cargo (MC) – 12 Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. There were drones in the air as well. The F-15s, Apaches and AC-130 all unloaded full ordnance, including Hellfire missiles on the Pakistani Posts,
“At 0039 hours, an AH-64D engaged an identified tripod weapon inside a bunker in EA-1 (Engagement Area-1) and destroyed it with a HELLFIRE missile” (Reference: Page 13, Para 12, Lines 15 through 17 of US Investigation Report). These weapon platforms‟ continuous engagement, spread over as long as almost 2 hours, does not support the assertion that the force used was proportionate and in self defence. To justify the grave US / ISAF excesses committed on the night of 25/26 November, the Investigation Report tries to contort the facts and confuse the issue by stating that, “The explosions of the AC-130H engagement reverberated around the valleys. Despite the effectiveness of the engagement, the GF continued to be engaged by mortars and machine guns” (Reference: Page 17, Para 25, Lines 4-5, Para 26, Lines 1-2). Any person even with rudimentary understanding of military operations would know, that when under attack from aerial platforms, the ground troops – in this case Pakistani Border Posts personnel – would respond to the immediate threat i.e. aerial platforms firing on them rather than on a ground force one and a half to two kilometres away. This is exactly what the Pakistani Posts did – fired back at the helicopters, in self defence with all available weapons including artillery.

23. Despite being informed by Pakistan at 2340 Afghan Standard Time (AST) about the aggression by US forces, the engagement of Pakistani Posts continued until 0104 (AST) (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – References: Annex D, Page D-6, Serial N and Page 13, Para 12 of US Investigation Report) for as long as 1 hour and 24 minutes. In the process, every soldier on and around the posts, even on reverse slope of the Ridge, was individually targeted. This pattern of

engagement cannot be justified by calling it „self defence‟. According to the US Investigation Report, three main aerial fire engagements of Pakistani Posts by US / ISAF took place. Multiple fire engagements by US aerial platforms took place after information about US / ISAF aggression against the Pakistani Posts had been shared at multiple levels, by Pakistan Military, and after Pakistani Military was assured that the fire engagement was being stopped.

24. While this extended fire engagement of Pakistani Posts was going on, the Pakistani Liaison Officer at NBCC was informed about an incident “
just after midnight” (Reference: Page 14, Para 14, Line 11 of US Investigation Report). By this time both the Pakistani Border Posts had already been targeted by fire. Even when the information was shared, albeit extremely belatedly, with Liaison Officer NBCC, it was of a general area 14 kilometres north of the actual engagement area (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page 14, Para 14 of US Investigation Report).

25. It is evident from the US Investigation Report that Pakistani Liaison Officer was intentionally not provided with specific map references i.e. LAT/ LONGs “
The BSO (Battle Space Owner) (TF (Task Force) BRONCO), then called the NBCC to report the GF was being engaged. Per RC-E instructions, the BSO passed the exact grid location of the source of hostile fire to the NBCC but informed the NBCC to only pass a general location to the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO (Liaison Officer) as part of the NBCC’s effort to have the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO confirm whether or not PAKMIL were at the location of the hostile fire. The NBCC then passed a general location to their PAKMIL LNO using GIRoA (Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) district borders as a geographic reference” {Reference: Page 22, Para (3) & (4) of US Investigation Report }. At no stage did the Pakistani Liaison Officer say that there were no Pakistani Military Troops in the area. He just could not have said so without map references being provided to him. Therefore, the US Investigation Report is amiss when it states on Page 22, Para 4, Lines 4 and 5 that the Pakistani LO stated that there were no

Pakistani Military troops in the area. US / ISAF have overlooked the fact that by the time information was shared with Pakistani LO, both the Pakistani Posts had already been struck by US / ISAF fire making the whole argument irrelevant.

26. Precious lives could have been saved, had the US / ISAF chain of command / staff been more responsive and alive to the situation. There was no urgency whatsoever in a situation where due to use of overwhelming and disproportionate force by US, lives were being lost and where time was of extreme essence. This displays utter disregard for the lives of the Pakistani soldiers. In the words of the Investigation Report, “
time sensitive senior Command override measures for border area incidents are lacking” (Reference: Page 5, Para 3, Line 12).

Stage 3: Reaction

(Post Action Events)

27. The intelligence picture depicted in the Investigation Report is erroneous and biased wherein it states
“Reports have indicated INS (insurgents) have been wearing PAKMIL uniforms in order to move freely across the border. The ABP (Afghan Border Police) report indiscriminate shooting incidents against civilians and their livestock in the Maya Valley from the border” (Reference: Page 8, Para 5, Lines 4 through 7). The investigating officer has accepted without verification, the assertions of the Afghan Border Police especially because he and his Investigation Team, according to the Investigation Report, could not visit Village Maya and other areas close to the site of the incident. The US / ISAF Investigation Report states, “Security concerns did not allow the investigating teams to safely travel to the villages on either side of the Afghanistan – Pakistan border that were near the area of the incident” (Reference: Page 7, Footnote to Para 3.a., Lines 2 through 4). A few months back in October this year, the Afghan authorities at the highest level had blamed Pakistan publicly for firing hundreds of rounds / rockets and killing numerous civilians in Kunar. ISAF leadership having inquired into the matter confirmed to Pakistan Military leadership that Afghan assertions could not be substantiated and that these were

a result of misinformation originating from the Afghan Border. The allegation against Pakistan was later denied publicly by the Afghan President by agreeing to the ISAF‟s viewpoint that no artillery / rocket fire had originated from Pakistan. In this backdrop, for the investigating team to take the comments of some individuals located close to the international border on the Afghan side at “face value” and mention them in their report without thorough investigation brings into question the whole exercise.

28. Moreover, reports of discovery of Pakistani Law Enforcement Agencies‟ uniforms from Maya Village after the end of Operation SAYAQA is an unconvincing attempt to cover the US / ISAF attacks by giving a misleading impression that Pakistani soldiers on Volcano and Boulder posts may well have been mistaken by US / ISAF to be anyone else.

Summary of Pakistan’s Viewpoint
29. Pakistan does not agree with several portions and findings of the Investigation Report as these are not factually correct.

30. Pakistan expresses its regret over the mandate and terms of reference given to the Investigating Team which was not mandated to determine or affix responsibility for the incident. (Reference: General Mattis‟ letter to Brigadier General Stephen Clark dated 28 November 2011 appointing him as Investigating Officer, Page 3, Paras 9 and 10).

31. Pakistan has noted US / ISAF acceptance of its failures, which Pakistan believes were deep, varied and systemic. There have been several similar, though not as grave, US / ISAF failings in the past. Despite promises of thorough investigations, US / ISAF failed to hold anyone accountable after each of these incidents. (Details at Page 2, Para 5 of
this Report).

32. The fundamental cause of the incident of 26
th November 2011 was the failure of US / ISAF to share its near-border operation, with Pakistan at any level. It is highly regrettable that despite this major failing, the Investigation Report has tried to pin partial responsibility on Pakistan (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page 4, Para 3 of US Investigation Report). Establishing positive identification of the Pakistani Posts which was lacking and which has been acknowledged in the US / ISAF report, was the direct and clear responsibility of US / ISAF who were, by their own admission, carrying out a near-border operation. Positive identification could very conveniently have been done by a simple Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft sweep which the US Investigation Report itself has also recommended, (Reference: Page 27, Para 43, Lines 7-8).

33. US / ISAF violated all mutually agreed procedures with Pakistan for near-border operations put in place to avert such uncalled for actions. It is increasingly obvious to Pakistan Military that the entire coordination mechanism has been reduced to an exercise in futility, is more for the purposes of optics and that it has

repeatedly been undermined. There were instructions given to US personnel, as mentioned in the US / ISAF Investigation Report, wherein the
information to Pakistan Military was to be deliberately withheld. Had the disclosure been honest and as per the agreed procedures, the attacks could have been stopped at the earliest and precious lives saved. Even a cursory reading of Paragraph 38. b. (1) on Page 24 of US Investigation Report would confirm Pakistan‟s contention. The said sub-paragraph reads: “The TF (Task Force) BRONCO battle captain provided specific grid references to the ISAF LNO (ISAF Liaison Officer) at NBCC (Nawa Border Coordination Centre) with the stipulation that these specific coordinates were not to be provided to the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO (Pakistan Military Liaison Officer) and that only a general location was to be passed”. The very purpose of sharing information about fire originating from Pakistan was for Pakistan to suppress / stop it. Without giving exact map references (LAT / LONGs), how could this have been achieved?

34. According to well established mutually agreed procedures, in case of fire originating from across the border, the responsibility to suppress / stop it rests on the side from where the fire is originating. In the present instance, no such intimation was received from the US / ISAF. Such an intimation would have demonstrated the bona fides of the US / ISAF stance. The only intimation that was conveyed to the Pakistan Liaison Officer at Nawa Border Coordination Centre was
after both the posts had been struck by fire and even this late intimation was incorrect by as much as 14 kilometres. The US Investigation Report states, “It was later discovered that a misconfigured electronic CPOF (Command Post of the Future) map overlay was used by the NBCC (Nawa Border Coordination Centre), this caused the NBCC to refer the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO (Pakistan Military Liaison Officer) to a “general location” that was 14km to the north of the actual engagement area” (Reference: Page 14, Para 14, Lines 13 through 15).

35. In an effort to provide justification for US / ISAF actions, the Investigation Report has gone to extreme lengths to construct the whole incident as an act of

“self defence” and the force used by US / ISAF / NATO as legal and proportionate. At no stage did the Pakistani Posts fire on, or in the direction of the Helicopter Landing Zone or the route from Helicopter Landing Zone to Maya Village. The sketch of the incident site at
Figure – 2 (Maya Village has been marked on the map as per the map references provided by ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan / ODRP) clearly belies the ISAF assertion about responding in self defence. The report accepts that there were no US / ISAF casualties, yet it still argues the self defence Rules of Engagement by stating that the “fire on GFs (Ground Forces) was effective” (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page F-2, Paras 6 and 7). In fact, it were the Pakistani Posts which were defending against an unprovoked attack. Pakistan, therefore, rejects the findings of the US Investigation Report that: “the catalyst for this tragedy ultimately was the initial and continuing engagement by PAKMIL (Pakistan Military) forces on Coalition Forces – who in turn responded accordingly and appropriately” (Reference: Page 29, Para 53, Lines 2 through 4). The US Investigation Report in fact ignores the sentiments and questions the intelligence of the Pakistani people by stating that “The LOAC (Law of Armed Conflict) was respected and the ROE (Rules of Engagement) were applied correctly and legally” (Reference: Annex I, Page I-1, Para 8).

36. The following facts and their sequence, strengthen the opinion that the said incident was
deliberate at some level:-

a. US / ISAF having carried out 1-2 operations in and around Maya Village prior to 26
th November incident in the months of October / November, (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Lines 4-5 of US Investigation Report), having seen and closely monitored Pakistan‟s nine months long operation in Mohmand Agency leading to the creation of Volcano and Boulder Posts, the location of the posts atop a barren ridge as high as approximately 8000 feet and the US / ISAF‟s cutting edge surveillance / observation technology, all defy US / ISAF contention

that they were unaware about the location of these Pakistani Posts. (There have been incidents in the past where as small an activity, as addition of new weapons on
existing Pakistani posts by Pakistan Military, were immediately noticed by US / ISAF and their purpose discussed with Pakistan).

b. The US aircraft / helicopters continued to target Pakistani Military personnel deliberately for two hours. Even the US Investigation Report admits the attack spread over
“90 minutes” - far too long a time for an “innocent” engagement. According to the US Investigation Report, three main aerial fire engagements of Pakistani Posts by US / ISAF took place. Multiple fire engagements by US aerial platforms took place after information about US / ISAF aggression against the Pakistani Posts had been shared at multiple levels, by Pakistan Military, and after Pakistani Military was assured that the fire engagement was being stopped.

c. Even if we assume that these posts were not known to US / ISAF, within minutes of initiation of unprovoked attack by US, US / ISAF had been informed at multiple levels by the Pakistani side, but they continued firing with impunity.

d. All Pakistani soldiers were in uniform and could not be mistaken for anyone else.

e. The failure in timely sharing of Concept of Operations even with concerned
US coordination staff at Nawa Border Coordination Centre and ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan (which is located in US Embassy Islamabad and manned exclusively by US personnel) raises serious doubts about the incident being “accidental“.

f. It is highly improbable that such a large number of mistakes (as acknowledged in the US Investigation Report) could have been coincidental.

37. Unfortunately the impartiality and transparency of the investigation was adversely affected when senior US officials repeatedly stated that the incident was “not intentional”, without waiting for completion of the Investigation. Pakistan believes that this stance may well have influenced the findings of the report.

38. Due to complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative / intricate Rules of Engagement (all acknowledged in US / ISAF Investigation Report), the responsibility for failing to stop the attack rests squarely on US / ISAF. Pakistan Army on its part had, on numerous occasions and at all levels, highlighted the potential problems associated with not having all the forces in the Afghan theatre under a unified command. The activities and operations of US Special Forces and Afghanistan Border Police are but two examples which have been raised consistently by the Pakistani side. The incident of 19
th July 2011 in Angoor Adda Sector of South Waziristan Agency, (details mentioned on Page 2, Para 5 of this Report) was also, we believe, a result of lack of unified military command in Afghanistan.

39. Pakistan Military is dismayed to learn that despite being ten years into the war, one reason to which the incident of 26
th November 2011 has been attributed is, “imprecise terminology between the RC-E JOC (Regional Command – East Joint Operations Centre) and SOTF-E JOC (Special Operations Task Force – East Joint Operations Centre)” (Reference: Page 24, sub-para e, Line 1 of US Investigation Report). This is disturbingly indicative of fundamental flaws in the US / ISAF / NATO procedures.

40. US / ISAF / NATO in knowingly targeting Pakistani Posts well inside Pakistan were in clear violation of the ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone.

41. The recommendation of the US / ISAF Investigating Report stating,
“train and practice procedures for cross-border and near-border operations including time-sensitive procedures” (Reference: Page 5, Para 4, Lines 4-5 of US Investigation Report) is maleficent. Investigating an incident which involves breach of Pakistan‟s territorial integrity and sovereignty and putting in a recommendation of how to do it better next time is potentially troublesome for any future cooperation and border coordination.

Additional Details Required
42. Following additional details are required, which may be provided for completing our analysis / assessment:-

a. The full and complete classified version of the US Investigation Report be made available.

b. Provision of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance picture of the complete incident along with all aerial platform videos and record of radio transmissions and communication between the crew(s) of the aerial platforms involved in the incident.

Concluding Remarks
43. The US / ISAF Investigation Report into the 26
th November 2011 incident, apart from being factually incorrect, also brings to fore the larger issue of lack of trust of US / ISAF towards the Pakistani Military. Moreover, the unprovoked engagement of Pakistani Posts located inside Pakistan was a clear violation of US / ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone. Unfortunately, this was not the first incident of this kind as US / ISAF / NATO have been involved in at least four similar incidents in the past, after each of which, US / ISAF regretted the incident and resolved to prevent recurrence. Not only did the recurrence of incidents continue but as far as we know, no one was ever actually held accountable.

44. The US Investigation Report, is structured around the argument of “self defence” and “proportional use of force”, an argument which is contrary to factsand therefore self serving. Sustained aggression which continued for as long as
“90 minutes” despite US / ISAF being informed about the incident at multiple levels by Pakistan Military within minutes of initiation of US / ISAF fire, belies the “self defence” and “proportional use of force” contention.

45. Failure to share information about a near-border operation with Pakistan at any level was a major US / ISAF / NATO omission, as were several others, like the complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative / intricate Rules of Engagement as well as lack of unified military command in Afghanistan.

46. There have clearly been several failures on the part of US / ISAF / NATO (as acknowledged in the US Investigation Report). Trying to affix partial responsibility of the incident on Pakistan (Reference: Page 29, Para 53, Lines 3-4 of US Investigation Report) is, therefore, unjustified and unacceptable.

Filed under: CURRENT AFFAIRS

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Civil Military Relations in Pakistan

Posted on 12 January 2012 by Tea Server

By Harry Pasha:

With pressure mounting on the PPP government and President Zardari at the center of every new crisis, it appears that the house he built by patching together some deals is crumbling faster than a thatched cabin pulverized by a fierce typhoon. The formidable alliance he cobbled together with major political parties is shaken up by the establishment assault and appears to be near collapse.

Pakistan’s history is replete with similar stories. Contrary to the common belief, the Army started interfering in country’s politics when it first helped Gov. Ghulam Mohammed remove the second PM Nazimuddin from power in 1953. US ambassador in his confidential Memo to the State Dept stated: “<b>Nazimuddin dismissal was planned and accomplished through combined efforts of Army leadership (specifically Def Secy Iskander Mirza and C-in-C Gen Ayub) and Gov Gen himself</b>”. “the Governor-General, Mr. Ghulam Mohammed could never have dared to dismiss a Ministry which had appointed him, had he not have had the support of the Army. The Army would take its cue from the Defense Secretariat. Therefore this is in fact a coup d’etat by Mr. Iskander Mirza and the Army, which has nominated Mr. Mohammed Ali as its agent.” In 1952 Gen. Ayub Khan told the US Consul General in Lahore, “<b>that the Pakistan Army will not allow the political leaders to get out of hand and the same is true regarding the people of Pakistan. He stated that he realized that the Army was taking on a large responsibility, but that the Army’s duty was to protect the country.</b>”
Gen. Ayub was planning to take over the government since 1953 and had informed the US embassy in no uncertain terms that the Pakistan Army would immediately declare martial law and take charge of the situation… and “<b>the Pakistan Army would not allow either politicians or the public to ruin the country</b>”. Ayub had arbitrarily decided that he would not allow even the people of Pakistan to decide the fate of country and he or the Army would make that decision. Pakistan had and still is paying a huge price for the haughty worldview of the Army Generals. References Below.

The Army cultivated US from the early 1950s to become its important ally in the region. The various defense agreements that Pakistan signed with the US enhanced the image of the Army in the general public and allowed the Army to become the most powerful political faction in Pakistan. Initially, the US would go along with the Pakistan Army’s coup but after the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, the US developed a policy in the area that called for some form of partnership between the Army and the civilians and the first Benazir government in 1989 was the first beneficiary of the change in US policy after Gen. Zia died in mysterious circumstances.

<b>Jon Alterman, a very typical member of the National Security priesthood in the US recently re-emphasis the policy in Egypt’s context and he wrote, “American interests,however, call for a different outcome, one that finds a balance — however uneasy — between the military authorities and … politicians.” </B>  NYT see below.

The policy was again implemented in Pakistan when an uneasy alliance between the Musharraf government and the PPP was presented to the people of Pakistan in 2007-08; the partnership with the PPP was agreed upon and mediated by Condoleezza Rice, former US Sec of State.

The Kerry Lugar Bill in 2009, in the Army’s view, broke the agreement the Army had with the US and the Zardari government as the K-L Bill called for stopping all US Aid to Pakistan in case of the Army interference. The Army believed that the Army agreed to a partnership with the civilians but the K-L bill clearly put the Civilian government on top and that was not acceptable to the Army.

The narrative of often uneasy relationship is not confined to Pakistan only and many countries including the US share many forms of often contentions and sometime mutually acceptable partnership between the Military and the civilian governments.

The government in the US itself has developed in to a partnership between the civilians and the Pentagon. With strong democratic currents and tradition of regular elections, the civilian organs such as the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the White House wield more power in the internal affairs but the Pentagon input is vital in running the foreign and defense policy of the US. One sociologist C. Wright Mills wrote extensively on the military-civilian Partnership in the US in the mid fifties and presented the idea of the Power Elite. Later it was publicly acknowledged by President Eisenhower when he talked about the rising Military-Industrial complex in the US in 1961. There were many conflicts between the White House and the Pentagon within the Kennedy Administration over Cuba. Preside Johnson was pressured in to sending more troops to Vietnam by the Pentagon. He ended up ceding the control of the Vietnam War and his foreign policy to the Pentagon. During the Clinton Admin, the Pentagon refused to send ground forces to Serbia and Kosovo in 1998 and the whole operation was conducted from the Air. Recently, President George W. Bush and his political cronies also known as the Neo-cons took the lead in starting the Iraq war but soon after the start, the Bush admin lost control of its defense and foreign policy and was merely a spectator when decisions were made in Pentagon for the war on terror or the Iraq and Afghan war issues. He was so much under the Pentagon thumb that he frequently sent the Army Generals to the Congress to defend the Iraq war. The US Army Generals were repeatedly found to be parading the Congress and promoting their war policies. The famous Surge in Iraq was publicly advocated by the US Army. The Bush admin and its civilian spokesperson always deferred to Gen. David H. Petraeus, the architect of the Surge, on policy matters. There was a battle in DC between the Pentagon and the Obama White House over more troops in Afghanistan in 2009 and both parties had been talking to each in public by way of multiple leaks.

Then we have Israel where the Israeli Defense Forces popularly known as the IDF shares power with the civilians and the elected Prime Minister. In Israel usually the Defense Minister is either a former General or a representative of the IDF. The IDF enjoys a veto power over Israel’s foreign policy. Recently both the present and the former Mossad chiefs publicly disagreed with the civilian Government of PM Netanyahu over Iran’s nukes.

Turkey’s history after the First World War is also replete with battles between the civilians and the Army Generals. One Turkish Prime Minister lost his life, like ZAB did in Pakistan, over the control of the country. However, over the years and after a long struggle, the civilians appear to have an upper hand but to say that they are completely independent would not be accurate. The Turkish Army still has tremendous clout over the state affairs.

Historically, the Pakistani politicians enter the government knowing full well that they have to share powers with the Army but slowly the Army interference in even the minor issues of governance frustrates the civilian leaders. Former PM Nawaz Sharif twice ousted the COAS after he was frustrated with the undue Army interference and now Zardari government finds itself in an irretrievable situation.

Ref:

http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/emerson20april1953.htm

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/31/opinion/egypts-real-revolution.html?_r=1

http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/pakintrigue.htm#ayub

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C._Wright_Mills

http://www.amazon.com/House-War-James-Carroll/dp/0618187804

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0156716100/ref=cm_cr_asin_lnk/180-4248032-9540858

NOTE: The article is based on research and the references are provided at the end. I would appreciate it if the editors please not change the subject substantially as all parts ofthe article are linked with the issues involved.I have placed bold tags on some sections. Thanks.

Harry Pasha is management consultant based in the USA. He has a keen interest in Pakistani politics and US –Pakistan relations. He occasionally writes for the Sindhi daily, Kawish.

Syndicated from: Pak Tea House

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Politics in Austria: Expatriates and Bureaucrats

Posted on 05 January 2012 by Tea Server

Theodor Lessing’s book Der Jüdische Selbsthass (Jewish Self-hatred) was the first work to discuss the concept of Jewish self-hatred, which as the British Journal of Social Psychology states “is often used rhetorically to discount Jews who differ in their lifestyles, interests or political positions from their accusers.” In Austria, this accusation is sometimes labeled against expatriates, Austrians living abroad and daring to point out the petty and indolent political discourse in the “island of the fortunate,” as Pope Paul VI labeled Austria in the 1970s.

I heard this accusation thrown against me more than once in discussions about domestic politics, Austrian manners, and the infamous Austrian ‘soul’ (“Die oesterreichische Seele”). The most circle-the-wagons response I got was “if things are so bad, why don’t you then stay in your fancy New York apartment indefinitely?” My reply is always the same. I never said things are ‘bad,’ but that I am a skeptic of many things Austrians are traditionally proud of, such as the corporatist social partnership or the free-riding, much cherished Austrian neutrality. What I always like to point out is that I am a skeptic of Austria in the true Socratic meaning of the word, i.e. someone who is free from all prejudices and attempts an inquiry into accepted opinions about the nature of things. At this point, people usually change the subject, which I assume is not because I won an argument but because they are fed up and think my case to be hopelessly lost not to believe in the “Brave New Austrian World.”

And indeed I sometimes ask myself why it is so hard to believe in a prosperous, well-run, little democracy in the heart of Europe. In that sense, I am the antithesis to distinguished historian Guenther Bischof’s observation:

Over the years, they (Austrian expats) experience a high degree of assimilationism, once they turn their backs on Austria. While the prewar refugees from Austria often maintained a high degree of emotional attachment to their homeland, which they were forced to leave, this younger crop of careerists sports hardly an iota of nostalgia or much emotional involvement for their birthplace. They want to be successful and leave Austria behind.

I am very much emotionally attached to my country, yet I think for a young person, there are simply bigger fish to fry in the world than the Austrian state eagle. The truth is that Austria has experienced a miraculous economic recovery from the Second World War—the last true big upheaval in Austrian history—and since has been successful in creating a prosperous, well-run social democracy strongly embedded within an European Union of like minded countries.

The political battles in Austria are petty because there is not much to fight about. A little change in the tax code here, a little adjustment in the social security system there; it is no coincidence that Arno Geiger’s great postwar novel on Austria is called Es geht uns gut (We are doing well). In many ways, we are again in Stefan Zweig’s pre-war Vienna of his autobiography Die Welt von Gestern (The World of Yesterday), where “bureaucrats could set their watches to the day when they retire.”

The result is that the country does not produce statesmen or politicians; it principally produces administrators and bureaucrats because the environment does not require visions or new ideas, but merely the slight improvement of the already existing. Helmut Schmidt’s statement in the 1980s that “wer Visionen hat, soll zum Arzt gehen” (whoever has visions should go and see a doctor) was not a sardonic but factual statement. Western Germany had very little room to maneuver on the international stage because it was locked between two competing blocs in the middle of a Cold War that at any moment could lead to a nuclear exchange. Austria, because of its small size, will always be dependent on exterior factors and is ‘locked’ within the European Union and its bigger neighbors.

The best evidence for this is the young political elite of Austria, which primarily consists of young Doppelgaenger (a double of a living person) of long serving politicians. “Er ist tuechtig!” (He is strenuous), or “Er hat noch keinen Fehler gemacht!” (He has not made a mistake yet) are the most often heard praises for young politicians in all parties, which might as well be applied to any Austrian bureaucrat since the days of emperor Joseph II. Yet, as the tagline of the western film The Man Who Shot Liberty Vance states, “When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.” In the case of Austria, that means even superbly organizing a proper Catholic thanksgiving celebration can cause you to be labeled “a political talent” as was the case with former Vice Chancellor Josef Proell, who as a young party member did precisely that. In most other countries, this would make you a good events planner, but in Austria, it makes you a political hopeful, i.e. for non-Austrians and after stripping the legend, an administrative hopeful.

Where are Austria’s grand strategists and statesmen? For example, it is a sheer impossibility to devise a daring new foreign policy for the Balkans or Eastern Europe (which was hijacked by the Austrian private sector more than 20 years ago) or dispatch the best and brightest of Austria to Brussels, the true ‘great uncle’ of small European powers, to push Austrian ‘interests’. (When did anyone ever hear any Austrian politician mention the word ‘Austrian interests’?) I am not even mentioning the rise of China, nuclear Iran, the war in Afghanistan, terrorism in Pakistan, the power transition in North Korea, or the current upheaval in Russia. “Such outward things dwell not in Austrian desires,” to paraphrase Shakespeare’s Henry V, and never seems to be a concern for any party. The exception of course is the United States to which small Austria defiantly proclaims, “Austria is not the 51st state of the United States.”

At the end of the day, bashing Austria as an expat is merely like trying to find the one thing that is wrong with a Jane Austin novel; the elegant form often hides the weakness of the content. Even the Americans recognize Austria’s obsession with outward appearance as a diplomatic cable from the US Embassy in Vienna indicates, “More than most countries, Austria places great importance on conferences and ceremonials.” Yet as the US motivational speaker Wayne Dyer once said, “Transformation literally means going beyond your form.” In that sense, expats bashing Austria are just expressing their frustration that little will change over the years in our Alpine republic. But then again, why should it; Uns gehts ja so gut (we are doing so well!)

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Army finds fault with US probe head

Posted on 29 December 2011 by Tea Server

ISLAMABAD – Rejecting the detailed NATO probe on last month’s border attack, Pakistan Army has questioned the validity of the findings supervised by a military man who held command of allied forces in Afghanistan.
The military has expressed serious reservations over the US Air Force Brigadier General Stephen Clark’s leading the Mohmand attack probe while refusing to show any compliance for the launch of a fresh investigation.
The development reportedly followed an exchange of written communication between the Pentagon and Pakistan’s military headquarters (GHQ) amid the reports that the latter has raised serious questions over the authenticity of the NATO report under the supervision of Brigadier General Clark.
According to informed officials, the Pakistan military holds Clark as one of the commanders responsible for the November 26 deadly attack on two Pakistani military pickets – Volcano and Boulder – that killed 24 soldiers. As head of Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF), Clark remained Colonel Commandant of the 27 Special Operations Forces (SOF) Wing that carries out ground and aerial operations in Afghanistan. The 16 Squadron Wing of the United States Air Force (USAF), that saw its gunship choppers bombarding the Pakistani pickets, was also headed by Brigadier General Clark in his official capacity as the chief pilot.
The Squadron 16, it is learnt, directly oversees the operational command of the sophisticated gunship choppers AC-130 H Spectre that were used in the Mohmand Agency attack. Apart from heading the combat mission in Afghanistan, Brigadier General Clark also remained the Commander of 4th SOF at the USAF.
Citing the afore-stated factors, Pakistan’s military, in the Wednesday’s correspondence with the Pentagon, is reported to have pointed out Stephen Clark’s unsuitability for leading a sensitive probe that, according to military circles, compromised his objective position owing to his direct professional linkages with allied combat forces in Afghanistan. “He is not neutral. Given that he himself commands the Special Operations Forces, we have grounds to believe that the November 26 episode did not happen without Clark’s consent. He is as much to be held responsible as General Allen is,” military officials said.
When contacted on Wednesday, the NATO Air Operations spokesperson in Afghanistan Christopher DeWitt told this scribe that Pentagon was in better position to address any queries on Brigadier General Stephen Clark. Pentagon’s spokesperson George Little was not accessible at his official cell phone nor did he return the emails. 
The NATO, it is further learnt, has offered Pakistan to launch a fresh probe into Mohmand Agency with Pakistan military being part of the investigation but this suggestion has also been turned down. “They’re not ready to accept anything but wanting the NATO to claim full responsibility of the border bombing incident and apologise unconditionally,” Nato-based sources said about Pakistan’s disinterest shown regarding the probe.
Earlier last Friday, Pakistan Army had rejected the initial findings of the investigation on Mohmand Agency attack released by the Pentagon. A military statement had said, detailed response (to the report) would be given as and when the formal report was received. This newspaper had reported Sunday that NATO was unlikely to share the detailed report with Pakistani military sensing adverse reaction from the latter. This development followed the requests by the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Chief General David Mattis which had been turned down for a meeting with Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. Reportedly, General Mattis wanted to visit Pakistan to brief the country’s military top brass on November 26 attack.
Pakistani officials say that the military refused to cooperate on last month’s probe because the probe’s findings in the presence of General John Allen, the NATO Commander in Afghanistan, and Brigadier General Clark were “pretty obvious”. Military circles believe that an impartial inquiry was not possible without putting into probe General Allen, Clark and Afghan National Army’s Head General Sher Muhammad Karimi.
Special Correspondent from Washington adds: While dropping hints of disciplinary action against those responsible for last month’s NATO attack that killed 26 Pakistani soldiers, the US military said Tuesday that Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has been briefed on its investigation into the deadly incident.
The full report was presented to Gen Kayani by a US military officer stationed at the US Embassy in Islamabad, Pentagon spokesman Navy Captain John Kirby told reporters.
He said the report from the joint US-Nato investigative team was not released publicly until Monday to allow time for the Pakistani leadership to read the findings first. “We wanted General Kayani to be able to see the entire thing,” he said. The approach represented ‘an appropriate professional courtesy’ to Kayani, he added.
A summary of the report was released Thursday by the officer who led the investigation, Brigadier General Stephen Clark.
The US report provides more details on the November 25-26 air strikes that Clark says were the result of a series of mistakes and botched communications on both sides — reflecting an underlying mistrust between the two countries.
It took the NATO-led force 90 minutes to halt air strikes after a Pakistani liaison officer first alerted US and coalition counterparts that Pakistani troops were coming under fire from American aircraft, the report said.
The probe also said the US military had failed to notify the Pakistanis in advance of the night raid near the border and that a coalition officer mistakenly gave the wrong location of the US troops to his Pakistani counterpart.
Kirby, the Pentagon spokesman, said military leaders will use the final report on the investigation to determine if anyone should be punished. Those decisions, he said, would be made by officers in the chain of command, depending on whether they found that mistakes were made by US or NATO personnel.
Syndicated from: PAKISTAN DEFENCE BLOG

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Why the Bride Shouldn’t be Part of the Bachelor Party

Posted on 20 December 2011 by Tea Server

I’m going to take issue with this post I’m afraid. I was asked to write this by a friend but I can’t bring myself to pass off such a statement as my own! The bride should be part of the bachelor … Continue reading

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Syndicated from: GeoTauAisay Pakistan

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Bringing Solutions to the Table in Afghanistan

Posted on 21 October 2011 by Tea Server

The current showboating between Pakistan and the US will not bring any solution to the table.

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Defending Gay Rights: It’s about Fairness, Tolerance and Human Decency

Posted on 15 August 2011 by Tea Server

We all need to let those who are gay be true to themselves – in peace. After all, doesn’t homophobia seem philosophically inconsistent with the idea of a peaceful religion and a loving God?

Syndicated from: Newsline » Viewpoint

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