So, the situation of genocide of the Baloch has reached to the point where a bill has been tabled in the US which supports the ‘independence’ of Balochistan! Those fighting the Pakistani state for ‘freedom’ are looking forward to a practical response against the bill and waiting for the action in this regard.

This, however, is not a joke – a bill in the US House of Representatives does not immediately give independence to Balochistan – and may have quite severe repercussions on the land of the Baloch.

Pakistani state has always been blamed to protect on permanent basis the Punjabi interests and exploit the southern units of the ‘federation’ – Sindh and Balochistan – and has been fought back by the Sindhi and Baloch nationalists. How the Punjab started grabbing the country’s reigns was such loud that the first person to present the Pakistan Resolution in the Sindh Assembly, Saeen GM Syed, started campaigning against the exploitation of Sindh which, after the massacre of the Benglis in the then-East Pakistan resulting in the independent Bangladesh, turned into a strong movement of independence of Sindh. The slogan of Jeay Sindh turned out to be Jeay Sindhudesh referring to the proposed independent Sindh to be named, Sindhudesh.

However, in response, the Pakistani state’s infamous ISI has been in action and picking up the nationalists in both the lands, who are often found dead in the wilderness­­­ – bullet-riddled and mutilated.

Although this is an everyday story of Balochistan now, Sindh has also been witnessing such ‘kill-and-dump’ cases. Many nationalists have allegedly been abducted by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan and would be suffering in the torture cells.

In Sindh, the Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM) has been worst victim of the intelligence agencies in this regard. Although the members of the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM), one of the major Sindhi nationalist parties, Jeay Sindh Tehrik (JST) and other parties have been facing no different situation, it’s worse for JSMM because they, unlike the other parties, openly support an armed movement for the freedom of Sindh.

On such case is of Muzaffar Bhutto (Amnesty International), the vice chairman of the party, who abducted by the intelligence agencies at New Saeedabad (Sindh) while travelling with his wife and brother-in-law from Sukkur to Jamshoro. This was not the first time that Mr. Bhutto was picked up by the agencies; he had been in the agencies’ custody extra-judicially from 2006 to 2009 and suffered torture.

BBC Urdu talked to Saima Bhutto, wife of Mr. Bhutto, on her protest in front of the parliament, Islamabad; here’s the video:

Recently, Mr. Noam Chomsky, the renowned American political analyst and activist, has written a letter regarding the enforced disappearances in Sindh and Balohchistan with a special stress on the case of Mr. Bhutto.

Following is the scanned image of the letter:

Many would question the credibility of the letter since it names the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in such cases of ‘involuntary disappearance’.

For this, I contacted Mr. Chomsky on the contacts found on http://goo.gl/AjnqZ. I just wanted to make sure if the letter under discussion was ‘genuine’ and that he really felt concerned about the enforced disappearances of the Sindhi and Baloch nationalists. I wrote an email to him:

Respected Sir,

Hope this email finds you in good health- I’m ….

The purpose of writing this letter to you is to ask you for your kind confirmation whether the attached (scanned) letter is actually written by you. Since it involves the sensitive issues pertaining to the intelligence agencies of Pakistan, I need your confirmation before publishing it on my blog. I found it being shared on Facebook by some nationalists (not representatives of any Sindhi nationalist political party, though).

I hope you would be able to get a few moments to respond to the email, sir.

Thanking you in advance,

Me
Karachi, Sindh
Pakistan

(Dated: Feb 17, 2012)

I was prepared not get any response from him since he must be getting loads of emails everyday — but, to my surprise and excitement, he actually did respond to my email. I received a firm, single-line response from him:

The letter is genuine.

Noam Chomsky

(Dated: Feb 17, 2012)

Feeling confident after receiving a response from The Chomsky, I responded informing him about the worst situation of human rights violation in Sindh and Balochistan and how important it was for the world to take notice of such actions. To this, following was his response (opt not to publish my 2nd email here):

Very pleased to hear that the letter may be of some slight help in overcoming these state crimes and tragedies.  It will I’m sure be a hard struggle.

Noam Chomsky

(Dated: Feb 19, 2012)

–

Before this post, I have blogged the scanned images of the letter written by Congressman Dan Burton to the President of Pakistan, Mr. Asif Ali Zardari. Mr. Burton has also expressed his concern over the human rights violation in the form of the enforced disappearances of Sindhi and Baloch nationalists. Read the letter here.

Tagged: Baloch, Balochistan, Enforced Disappearances, Jeay Sindh, JSMM, JSQM, JST, Missing Persons, Muzaffar Bhutto, Nationalism, Nationalist, Noam Chomsky, Sindh, Sindhi

The United States (US) Committee on Foreign Affairs is set to convene a congressional hearing on Wednesday (February 8), for an exclusive discussion on Balochistan.

The extraordinary event has generated great interest among followers of Pakistan-US relations, as the allies’ mutual relationship seems to be deteriorating. The powerful House of Representatives committee oversees America’s foreign assistance programs and experts believe it can recommend halting US assistance to Pakistan over human rights violation in Balochistan.

Calls for ‘independence’
While Islamabad has strictly treated Balochistan as an internal matter, the debate on such a divisive topic by the powerful committee has highlighted the level of American interest in Balochistan and its support, if any, for the nationalist movement. On its part, Pakistan has kept Washington at arm’s length on the Balochistan issue, by refusing to grant it permission to open a consulate in Quetta.

A Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, who recently co-authored an article with Congressman Louie Gohmert expressing support for an independent Balochistan, will chair the hearing.

“Perhaps we should even consider support for a Balochistan carved out of Pakistan to diminish radical power there (in Pakistan),” Rohrabacher wrote in his piece.

According to Asia-Pacific Reporting Blog, “it is expected that the hearing will tackle issues related to whether or not the US Congress should tie human rights issues in Balochistan to Pakistani aid.”

Witness box
Another area of interest is of the controversial witnesses who will testify before the committee. The three-member panel comprises of defence analyst Ralph Peters, Georgetown assistant professor, C. Christine Fair and Ali Dayan Hasan, Pakistan Director of the Human Rights Watch.

Ironically, the panel on Balochistan does not include a Baloch representative, an issue which has disappointed the Baloch diaspora in the United States, who fear the misinterpretation of their stance by people they view as unfamiliar with the Baloch conflict.

One of the witnesses, Ralph Peters, attracted scathing criticism by right-wing Pakistani strategists in June 2006, when his article Blood Borders was published in the Armed Forces Journal with a map of Free Balochistan. Peters, 59, a former US army officer, is expected to support in his testimony the idea of an independent Balochistan comprising of the Balochistan provinces in Pakistan and Iran and parts of Afghanistan.

On the other hand, Dr Christine Fair is known as a passionate supporter of Pakistan with an anti-India stance. The Pakistani media quoted Dr Fair in March 2009, for allegedly linking India with the Baloch insurgency. She was reportedly questioned the role of the Indian consulates in Afghanistan and Iran.

“Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan,” she told a roundtable organized by the Foreign Affairs magazine, “I can assure you they (Indians) are not issuing visas as their main activity.” Later on, however, she told Outlook, an Indian news magazine, in an interview that the Pakistanis had blown her comments out of proportion.

On Twitter, a week ahead of the hearing, Dr Fair called Ralph Peters, the fellow witness, a “nut” and asked “WHAT does he know?” On Saturday, she also irked the Balochs by questioning their majority status in Balochistan while in another Tweet she warned the separatists not to “expect me to support an independent Balochistan”.

Public debate
Dr. Akbar S. Ahmed, Pakistan’s former high commissioner to the United Kingdom, told Dawn.com that the congressional hearing was a “significant step” in highlighting Balochistan’s problems. “The information provided in the event,” he said, “will not only be used by members of the US Congress but will also be picked up by the world media.”

“The shocking stories of torture and murder in Balochistan will become part of the public debate. It is in the interest of Pakistan to quickly and effectively resolve the situation in Balochistan bringing back the Baluch with honor, respect and dignity,” said Dr Ahmed, who is currently the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at the American University in Washington DC.

Dr Ahmed, who served in 1980s as the Commissioner of three districts in Balochistan, says the hearing can potentially create a great deal of negative publicity for Pakistan.

Close watchers
In the United States, the conflict in Balochistan has been gaining remarkable attention of late. While some officials from the government and non-governmental organizations have only expressed concern over the situation, other individuals, including former army soldiers, State department officials and members of the US Congress, have now begun to publicly assert support for an independent Balochistan.

For instance, on January 15, Victoria Nuland, the State Department spokeswoman, expressed America’s “deep concern” over the ongoing violence in Balochistan, especially targeted killings, disappearances and human rights violations.

“This (Balochistan) is a complex issue. We strongly believe that the best way forward is for all the parties to resolve their differences through peaceful dialogue,” she said.

Last year on November 16, the State Department deputy spokesman, Mark Toner, had also observed during a press briefing, “You know, more broadly, we do have concerns about the situation in Balochistan. We’ve addressed those concerns with the government of Pakistan.”

Nationalist view
Baloch nationalists are cautiously monitoring Wednesday’s hearing.

“To be honest, we are not very optimistic about this meeting,” Sardar Akhtar Mengal, a former chief minister of Balochistan, told Dawn.com, “but both support and attention from the US are significant because the presence of the US cannot be overlooked in South East Asia. It is essential that the US gives attention to Balochistan, as the aid that is given to Pakistan in the name of war against terror is being spent to commit atrocities in Balochistan.”

A political expert in Washington DC, who requested anonymity, said during the election year, the Republicans are likely to bring up the Balochistan issue to castigate Democratic President Barrack Obama for deliberately keeping quiet against Pakistan, an ally in the war on terror, for allegedly misusing American assistance to fight the secular Balochs instead of quashing the Taliban.

After the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, many American policymakers have become disillusioned with Pakistan and now some of them propose an independent Balochistan to fight religious extremism. Last month, Louie Gohmert, another Republican Congressman from Texas, suggested that the US should, “talk about creating a Balochistan in the southern part of Pakistan…they love us. They’ll stop the IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and all the weaponry coming into Afghanistan, and we got a shot to win over there.”

Sardar Mengal, who leads the largest Balochistan National Party (BNP), says the hearing does not mean that the Washington is going to support the Baloch cause in the future.

“What the US can do for us is to care for the Baloch as human beings. Since Washington is apparently a committed supporter of human rights, it is obligatory that the US should stop the genocide of the Baloch nation by the authorities as it has done in other parts of the world, supporting their right of self-determination.”

M. Chris Mason, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, who recently retired from the US Foreign Service, has emerged as another ardent proponent of free Balochistan in the United States.

In an article, Mason, who lecturers at the prestigious National Defense University, argued an independent Balochistan would solve many of the [Af-Pak] region’s most intractable problems overnight and would create “a territorial buffer between rogue states Iran and Pakistan.”

“The answer to the current Pakistani train-wreck is… recognizing Balochistan’s legitimate claim to independence… to help the Baluchis go the way of the Bangladeshis in achieving their dream of freedom from tyranny, corruption and murder at the hands of the diseased state,” he wrote.

Routine matter
Hassan Abbas, a scholar based in Washington DC who until recently was Quaid-i-Azam Chair Professor at Columbia University in New York, seriously doubts if the US will officially support Baloch nationalists at this time as this will complicate US-Pakistan relations.

“I think the hearing is a routine matter as all security related issues in Pakistan are being analyzed in the policy world with keen interest as well as concern. The hearing will discuss human rights issue as well as politics,” says Abbas, who is also a Senior Advisor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, “but the hearing itself will not create any serious diplomatic row. The US Congress must listen and understand that there is a variety of perspectives on the subject.”

Dr Ahmed, meanwhile, attributes the deepening crisis in Balochistan to Islamabad’s failure to understand that time is running out for it.

“The leaders of Pakistan are so focused on the power struggles in Islamabad that they seem to have little will or imagination to deal with the urgent issues that concern the country’s largest province of Balochistan.”

How will Islamabad respond to the hearing?

“Pakistan’s establishment is quite sensitive about the Balochistan crisis and they will follow the hearings closely and sceptically,” says Hassan Abbas, whose book, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, was published in 2005.

According to Abbas, hawkish elements in Pakistani media are likely to create a lot of hue and cry over the hearing. Yet he cautions, “They will serve Pakistan better by focusing on projecting the concerns of the ordinary Baloch people, who are disenfranchised, distressed and increasingly getting disenchanted.”

Sardar Mengal of BNP, who was detained in Karachi for several months during the Pervez Musharraf regime, predicts there would be a definite reaction from the government.

“They can only display their superiority to the ones who are weaker, and in this case, the Baloch are the weaker ones,” he says and warns, “But if there is a reaction from Pakistan toward us, this time it will be once and for all. Either the Baloch will swim across or sink as a nation.” (Courtesy: Dawn, Pakistan)

Caricature: A Jewish man, called 'the Zionist thing,' holding an ax, stands on an island of skeletons of Palestinians in a sea of blood. (Source: Vakit)

A textbook case of hate speech in Turkish media: The story, entitled ‘Mishcon Indecency,’ suggests that “Zionists, who have been doing ethnic cleansing in Palestine for over a century” show that “they have no limit to indecency (or moral corruption)” because some members of the Israeli lobby in the United States supported a U.S. House of Representatives Resolution that was against Turkish interests. Note that the title includes the Turkish version of the common Hebrew name, Mişon (Mishcon), in an attempt to symbolize and generalize Jews. Although it is the Jewish lobby that supported the resolution in the U.S. Congress, the article uses ‘Mischon’ and ‘Zionists,’ not Jewish lobby or Israeli lobby. It also has the hidden message that suggests that ‘it was already known that Jews have no decency’ and ‘their’ decision to support the anti-Turkey resolution in the U.S. Congress ‘proves it’.

Although there is no universally accepted definition of the term hate speech, most states have adopted legislation to address the problems caused by it. Prejudice, racism, xenophobia, homophobia, Antisemitism and discrimination are all underlying motives of hate discourse. According to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation 97(20),

“hate speech covers all forms of expression which spread, incite and promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, or other forms of hatred based on intolerance including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.”[i]

The European Commission 2011 Progress Report on Turkey emphasizes that Antisemitism and hate speech in the media (targeting missionaries or Christians in general) remain an important issue. Despite national and international calls, the Turkish government has not addressed hate speech and hate crimes in the country. Therefore, Turkish media has absolute freedom in publishing reports and commentaries full of insulting and defamatory content. Not only are the issues reported with extreme manipulation of the facts (based on ideological and political affiliations of the newspaper), they often include hate speech.

For example, in the country’s ultraconservative Islamist newspapers Milli Gazete and Vakit (known as Yeni Akit since 2010), the staunch supporters of the ruling AK Party, one can find defamatory content about Armenians, Christians, Jews, gays, and AK Party’s political opponents. Moreover, these papers use ‘being of Jewish/Armenian/Greek origin’ or ‘having a Jewish relative’ or even ‘allegedly being of Jewish/Armenian/Greek origin’ as defamatory phrases to ‘vilify’ the targeted group or individuals (often political opponents of conservative groups, the AK Party and their allies):

(Source: Yeni Akit)

A commentary appeared in Yeni Akit in November 2011, entitled ’Generals’ Jewish Son-in-laws,’ aims to vilify and defame the Turkish military, because some of its generals have son-in-laws who happened to be of Jewish origin. According to the article, it is “strange” that after the “discovery” of footage showing high ranking Army officers at the Wailing Wall (Western Wall), which is accepted as a holy site by the “Zionists,” it is now “discovered’ that “some generals have Jewish son-in-laws.” Here, the purposes is to attack the presumed opponents of the AK Party (and  the Islamist ideology the newspaper represents) by associating them with something or someone that is “Jewish,” as if it is something threatening, immoral or bad. 

In another story, the same newspaper attempts to vilify Büşra Ersanlı (a Turkish academic who has been detained on the charges of being a member of the KCK, the alleged urban wing of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK). The article’s title is ‘Ersanlı’s Jewish lover (Ersanlı’nın yahudi aşkı), in reference to Ersanlı’s former husband who is a Turkish-Jew. There is a clear effort to associate Ersanlı with something ‘Jewish,’ and more importantly, the article suggests that ‘the Jewish link’ shows the “truth about Ersanlı,” again, as if it is something concerning for the reader.  

What people see in the media has influence on their perceptions. Therefore, hate content shouldn’t be seen as just mere propaganda – it may actually provoke and incite violence:

(Source: Vakit)

In 11 July 2009, a group of youngsters from the youth movement of the far-right Grand Union Party (BBP) disrupted a concert organized at Istanbul’s Topkapı Palace. The main sponsor of the event, a local wine company, had promoted the concert with banners saying ‘Take your wine and come enjoy the full moon,’ and ‘Tchaikovsky, wine and sunset: What else is there to say?’ A week before the event, Vakit began publishing commentaries (in its print and online editions) emphasizing that wine was to be served “right next to Prophet’s belongings” at Topkapı Palace which was “once filled with the voices of Ottoman soldiers reciting Quran before going to battle.” “This is how a country is destroyed” and “wine audacity in sacred courtyard,” read the titles of the newspaper.

In its latest report on the subject (Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: Incidents and Responses), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) underlines ‘intolerant discourse’ as an important factor contributing to the occurrence of hate crimes. Moreover, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights stresses that hate crimes “pose a serious threat to domestic and international security, thus undermining societal cohesion by sowing the seeds of conflict and wider-scale violence.”[ii] Therefore, they not only harm the individual or group targeted in the crime, but affect the entire community to which the victim belongs.

The Association for Social Change (ASC, Sosyal Değişim Derneği in Turkish) is a leading organization focusing on the hate issue in Turkish media. Their 2009 report, entitled ‘Hate Crimes in National Media: 10 Years, 10 Cases,’ covers the years between 1998 and 2008 and focuses on a large selection of newspapers that represents most political and ideological sides in Turkey.[iii] The ASC researchers investigated hate speech instances in ten categories including ethnic background, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, and religious affiliation. Of the 30,000 articles and commentaries investigated, the researchers analyzed 200 pieces in detail and provided ten ‘textbook cases of hate speech’ for each category.

(Source: Association for Social Change)

According to this study, 79 percent of all material analyzed is characterized as ‘hate crimes’ leaving the hate speech with 21 percent. 24 percent of all hate crimes are related to ethnic identity, followed by those related to political identity (19 percent), sexual identity (16 percent), and religion (16 percent). Moreover, a staggering 47 percent of all hate speech instances are related to ethnic identity. Categorized as a single unit, ‘hate crimes and hate speech’ related to ethnic identity tops the list of ten categories with 42 percent. It is followed by religion (20 percent), national identity (11 percent), and political affiliation (11 percent). Of all the newspapers studied, Yeni Şafak, Milli Gazete, Vakit and Zaman – all conservative newspapers and staunch supporters of the AK Party – have the highest number of hate speech content about religious identity.[iv]

The study also revealed that there is more hate speech against certain groups in certain dates. For instance, before or on April 24 (Genocide Remembrance Day in Armenia) of every year, there was a recognizable increase in the negative and discriminatory discourse against the Armenians. Similarly, before or on March 21^st (Nevruz), discourse against the Kurds and the Kurdish identity was more offensive. Another important finding that must be mentioned here is that hate speech about sexual orientation and identity is common in almost all newspapers regardless of their political and ideological affiliation.

The headline reads "PKK feeds on pork," and the article suggests that "the PKK members who 'slay Imams' and 'want Churches' in the East, are 'apparently' feeding on pork." Here the purpose is to associate the PKK with Christianity, as if it is a bad thing, to curtail the organization's influence among Muslim Kurds. (Source: Yeni Akit)

Hrant Dink Foundation is another organization that is focusing on the hate issue in Turkish media. The foundation has an ongoing project called ‘media watch on hate speech’. The project allows readers to submit hate speech cases via the Internet to the project website. According to their latest reports, there is an increasing hate speech against missionaries and Christians in Turkey.[v]

I think part of the increase in hate speech against missionaries may be related to the emergence of “PKK is against Islam” themed reports and commentaries. Since early 2011, there has been a visible increase in stories in which PKK members ‘eat pork’ and ‘exercise shamanic rituals,’ while the security forces find ‘bodies of uncircumcised PKK members.’  Reports about ’PKK members converting in masses to Christianity to obtain financial support from Christian aid and missionary organizations’ are also being circulated regularly in Yeni Akit, Milli Gazete and Sabah. It is known that the government has been trying to counter PKK’s influence in country’s eastern provinces by a strategy, which I call 3D+I, or Defense, Diplomacy, Development and Islam. There is strong resistance to this policy among the Kurds, but the pro-government media seems to catch up with it.

Another organization, Kaos GL, the most active NGO promoting the rights of LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) community in Turkey, is focusing on homophobia in Turkish media. The organization has recently won a legal case over ‘perverts’ insult (in an article appeared in Yeni Akit) on Turkey’s High Court of Appeals (Yargıtay). Kaos GL’s lawsuit against Yeni Akit was initially rejected by two Ankara courts on the grounds that the newspaper was ‘within the limits of criticism.’ The Supreme Court of Appeals, however, overruled the previous decision stressing that ‘the freedom of the press does not encompass the freedom to insult the personal freedoms of individuals.’ Since the Supreme Court of Appeals is the highest court for reviewing verdicts given by courts of criminal and civil justice, its decision sets a precedent for future lawsuits.

The good news is, there is growing public attention on hate speech and hate crimes in Turkey. In January 2012, more than fifty NGOs announced that they have come together in a campaign to demand hate crimes legislation in the new Turkish constitution. The Campaign for Hate Crime Legislation (Nefret Suçları Yasası Kampanyası) is perhaps the most important step to date in Turkey for addressing hate speech and hate crimes. However, the AK Party, which has the majority in the parliament, has not taken any step for such legislation yet.

I think the hate speech problem in the Islamist and pro-government media shows yet another shortcoming of ‘Turkey as a model to the Middle East’ concept. It is very confusing that, the AK Party, which has been promoted as the ‘champion of democracy’ in Turkey and the ‘model political movement for democracy and development in the Middle East,’ has not addressed the problems caused by hate crimes. More interestingly, the newspapers, which have the highest Antisemitic, homophobic, racist, insulting, and defamatory content, are the ones that have been the closest media allies of the AK Party government.

UPDATE, February 6, 2012:

As I was doing my daily readings of Turkish media, I saw an article on habervaktim.com discussing the hate speech legislation campaign I mentioned above.

Here is a quick translation of what the article suggests:

Lately, while the so-called ‘hate speech legislation’ campaign has been introduced as if there is a hate speech problem in Turkey, it is discovered that Jews’ newspaper Şalom is behind provocative activities. Although hate crimes legislation is not in the agenda of the majority of the people, marginal groups are working to introduce the so-called problem in West’s agenda. Marginal groups such as those which portray sexual perversion in their activities are supported by those who claim to be the representatives of Jews, Greeks and Armenians in Turkey.

Here, the message is “the majority” doesn’t have a problem with hate speech and only “marginal groups such as those who portray sexual perversion” are supporting this issue because, in the background, “the Jew” supports them. It is important to note that the concept of “support/will of the majority” is used to “justify” certain policies by ultraconservative newspapers. The newspaper tries to avoid calling gays “perverts,” but make use of another homophobic phrase “sexual perversion,” while it also attempts to discredit those who support the hate crime legislation as if they are not the ‘real the representatives’ of the minorities in the country. The article also openly calls Şalom as the ‘behind-the-curtain’ mastermind of the ‘so-called hate crimes issue’ in Turkey, which the newspaper suggests is an attempt to discredit Turkey in the West.

_____________________

Official Version: Pakistan Rejects NATO Report on Salala Attack

Rawalpindi January 23:The US Investigation Report into the Salala incident of 26th November 2011, involving aerial strikes by US aircraft and helicopters resulting into Shahadat (killing) of 24 Pakistani soldiers and injury to 13 others, was received by the General Headquarters (GHQ) Pakistan Army on the 24th of December 2011. The report received is the same unclassified version as available on the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Website. The analysis of the US Investigation Report has been carried out by Pakistan Military with a view to reiterate facts and correct the perspective.

Pakistan does not agree with several portions and findings of the Investigation Report as these are factually not correct. The fundamental cause of the incident of 26th November 2011 was the failure of US / ISAF to share its near-border operation with Pakistan at any level. This obviously was a major omission, as were several others, like the complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative / intricate Rules of Engagement as well as lack of unified military command in Afghanistan. In addition to the foregoing, US / ISAF violated all mutually agreed procedures with Pakistan for near-border operations put in place to avert such uncalled for actions. It also carried out unprovoked engagement of Pakistani Posts located inside Pakistan violating the US / ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone.

The US Investigation Report is structured around the argument of “self defence” and “proportional use of force”, an argument which is contrary to facts. Continued engagement by US / ISAF despite being informed about the incident at multiple levels by Pakistan Military within minutes of initiation of US / ISAF fire, belies the “self defence” and “proportional use of force” contention. Affixing partial responsibility of the incident on Pakistan is therefore, unjustified and unacceptable.

NADEEM MALIK

The United States has carried out more than 300 drone strikes since 2004 in pakistan, yet this operation has never been debated in US Congress; more than seven years after it began, there has not even been a single vote for or against it. This campaign is not carried out by the Air Force; it is being conducted by the CIA.
Under the War Powers Resolution — a Vietnam-era law that requires notifying …Congress of military operations within 48 hours and getting its authorization after 60 days, but not any more.
America does not declare war anymore; the last time Congress actually did so was in 1942 — against Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. “We don’t buy war bonds or pay war taxes anymore. During World War II, 85 million Americans purchased war bonds that brought the government $185 billion; in the last decade, we bought none and instead gave the richest 5 percent of Americans a tax break.” NYTSee More

NADEEM MALIK

Do you think Pakistan should open the doors once again for American Special Operation Forces (so called trainers and contractors) after what the country has experienced in recent years ? کیا پاکستان میں امریکی کمانڈوز اور سی آئی اے کے ایجنٹوں کو دوبارہ گھسنے کی اجازت دی جانی چاھیے ؟

Pakistan has lost almost 40 thousand lives since 9/11, over 4000 men of security forces were martyed and the whole country faced hundreds of sucide attacks and bomb blasts every year and hundreds of CIA-led drone strikes, NATO attacks on Pakistani posts like Salala, Abbottabad raid and Raymond Davis killings. Do we still need more ?

PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INVESTIGATION REPORT CONDUCTED BY BG STEPHEN CLARK INTO 26 TH NOVEMBER 2011 US LED ISAF / NATO FORCES ATTACK ON PAKISTANI VOLCANO AND BOULDER POSTS IN MOHMAND AGENCY

Note: This Report does not have any other versions

23 January 2012

PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INVESTIGATION REPORT CONDUCTED BY BG STEPHEN CLARK INTO 26NOVEMBER 2011 US LED ISAF / NATO FORCES ATTACK ON PAKISTANI VOLCANO AND BOULDER POSTS IN MOHMAND AGENCY

Note:

Quotes that have been taken directly from the US Investigation Report and reproduced in this document appear in red, followed by reference of each from the original US / ISAF Investigation Report.

General 1. The US Investigation Report into the Salala incident of 26
th November 2011, involving aerial strikes by US aircraft and helicopters resulting into Shahadat (killing) of 24 Pakistani soldiers and injury to 13 others, was received by the General Headquarters (GHQ) Pakistan Army on the 24th of December 2011. The report received is the same unclassified version as available on the Central Command (CENTCOM) Website. The analysis of the US Investigation Report conducted by Brigadier General (BG) Clark has been carried out hereafter with a view to reiterate facts and correct the perspective.

Mandate of the US / NATO Investigation Report
2. It is unfortunate to note that the mandate given to the US Investigating Officer (BG Stephen Clark), did not include affixing specific responsibility for the grave incident (Reference: General Mattis‟ letter to Brigadier General Stephen Clark dated 28 November 2011 appointing him as Investigating Officer, Page 3, Paras 9 and 10). Without this specific mandate the Investigation Report could not have been complete.

3. It is also revealing to read the mandate given to NATO‟s (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum team (headed by Brigadier General Michael Jorgensen) concurrently investigating the incident. In words of the US Investigation Report;
“The JFC Brunssum goal was to conduct an operationally focused fact-finding investigation into the circumstances surrounding the engagement between friendly forces and PAKMIL (Pakistan

Military) ……..”

. (Reference: Page 6, Para 1, Lines 11 through 15). Implicit in the mandate is the fact that, Pakistan was considered in an adversarial role and not part of friendly forces.

Background
4. For developing a correct perspective, it is important to give some background before going on to the specifics of the Incident (26
th November 2011) itself. The background is covered hereafter under three headings i.e. “Events Leading up to the Incident”, “Environment” and finally “Coordination Mechanism”.

Events Leading up to the Incident
5. Although the incident of 26
th November 2011, was the gravest, it unfortunately was not the first of its kind. The current incident was preceded by four others which happened between June 2008 and July 2011 and resulted in loss of 18 precious lives of our soldiers and injury to 10 others, including an incident at Ziarat Post (Mohmand Agency) on 17th June 2011 which happened close to the area of 26th November 2011 incident. The US / International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are well aware of these incidents and each time resolved to prevent recurrence. It is illuminating to mention the details of these incidents, the first of which took place on 10th June 2008 at Goraprai Post of Pakistan located in Mohmand Agency, in which US / ISAF carried out an unprovoked aerial strike resulting in Shahadat (death) of eleven Pakistani soldiers and injuries to seven others. The second such incident happened on 30th September 2010 in Kurram Agency at Kharlachi Post, where two US helicopters carried out unprovoked firing on Pakistani Post resulting in Shahadat (death) of three soldiers and serious injuries to three. The third incident took place on 19th July 2011 in Angoor Adda Sector of South Waziristan Agency, wherein; mortar and artillery fire suddenly erupted, initiated by US/ISAF against Pakistani Border Posts at 0945 hours (Pakistan Standard Time). Despite repeated contacts with ISAF, including Lieutenant General (LG) Keen and Major General (MG) Laster and activation of other coordination mechanisms, the fire which was proving fatal continued for several hours resulting in the Shahadat (death) of four Pakistani soldiers. As US / ISAF failed to bring the fire to an end, COAS General Kayani had to intervene personally with Chief ODRP (Office of the Defence

Representative Pakistan), LG Keen at the US Embassy Islamabad, warning, that if the fire did not stop immediately he would order an enhanced level of response, beyond the one which was already being given by Pakistan Military up until that time in the shape of small arms and mortar fire. This intervention finally brought the fire to a halt. The resultant US / ISAF inquiry into this, and other similar incidents remained shy of accepting responsibility and hence failed to hold anyone accountable, as far as we (Pakistanis) know.

Environment
6. Before going into the details of the incident of 26
th November 2011 and the US Investigation Report, it is important to understand the environment as well as the coordination mechanisms which existed to prevent exactly such an eventuality.

7. After an extensive nine months operation in Mohmand Agency, Pakistan Army cleared the entire area upto the border with Afghanistan and established several border posts including Volcano and Boulder at the end of September 2011. When the Pakistani forces were carrying out operations in Mohmand Agency, US / ISAF were kept informed and they carried out some supportive operations on the Afghan side, along and close to River Kunar. With no presence of US / ISAF / Afghan forces close to the border on Afghan side, these Pakistani Posts were critical for prevention of terrorists‟ infiltration from either side of the border. This is substantiated by the US Investigation Report, which when referring to the Area of Operation SAYAQA states,
“…….. there had been neither Coalition nor ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) presence in the area for some time” (Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Last Line). Pakistan has been experiencing infiltration of terrorists from Afghan Province of Kunar which had become a safe haven for terrorists of all hues including those who had escaped the Pakistan Army‟s operation in Mohmand. Since September 2011, no crossing from Pakistani side from Mohmand Agency into Afghanistan had taken place, however, unfortunately several large (and some small) scale attacks on Pakistani Border Posts and civilians had occurred regularly, emanating from Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan into Dir, Chitral, Bajaur and Mohmand areas of Pakistan. There were seven such major attacks by terrorists from Afghan side

resulting in loss of 102 personnel and injuries to 25 others (security forces and civilians). Pakistan has repeatedly provided specific information to US / ISAF about presence of hard-core terrorist elements including some High Value Targets located in the Afghanistan Province of Kunar and Nuristan.

8. The Pakistani Posts in question (Volcano and Boulder) are located approximately 1450 metres apart on a kidney shaped barren ridge, which is just under 8000 feet high
(Refer Figure 1 below). The posts were (and are) located 300-400 metres from the international border inside Pakistan. There are a few abandoned huts opposite Volcano Post. Village Maya {map references of which were asked for by Pakistan Military and received from ICEPAK-ODRP (ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan-ODRP) on 29 December 2011 and where ISAF ostensibly carried out operations on night 25/26 November 2011} lies approximately 1.5 kilometres from the Pakistani Boulder Post and 1.2 kilometres from the border. The Pakistani Posts and most of Maya Village are mutually inter-visible. Each of these Pakistani Posts had 5-6 bunkers none of which were underground, but were constructed above the surface of the 8000 feet high ridge which was devoid of vegetation. All these bunkers, therefore, were easily visible from afar. These bunkers and posts had been there for over two months. Volcano Post had 27 personnel while Boulder had 25. They belonged to 7 Azad Kashmir (AK) Regiment of Pakistan Army which had played a crucial role in clearing Mohmand Agency from terrorists and, therefore, were well familiar with the environment and their surroundings. In the absence of any ISAF / Afghan National Army (ANA) / Afghan Border Police (ABP) presence opposite these, and some of the other posts in Mohmand Agency, any movement which is not shared, especially at night close to the border, is assumed to be hostile. Fire, therefore, is carried out on such movement(s). This is true for both ISAF and Pakistan Military for entire Area of Responsibility of ISAF‟s Regional Command – East (RC-E) and that of Pakistan Military‟s 11 Corps. Fire is also carried out on suspected movement(s), such a fire is called “speculative fire”. On any given night several Pakistani Posts, if and when deemed necessary carry out speculative fire.

9. Opposite Mohmand Agency, where these posts were located, US / ISAF had carried out at least 1-2 operations in and around Village Maya prior to 26

th November incident in the months of October / November 2011, which involved ground forces and air support. Even when active ground operations are not taking place, an average of 2-3 US / ISAF aerial platforms operate opposite Mohmand Agency on daily basis; these include Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, fighter aircraft, helicopters and drones. Resultantly, it is inconceivable that these or any other Pakistani Posts in the area were / are not known to US / ISAF.

Coordination Mechanism
10. Having elaborated the environment, it is essential to understand the detailed coordination mechanism and mutually agreed procedures which existed between Pakistan and US / ISAF for effective, incident-free, near-border operations. The coordination mechanism includes a number of forums at three different tiers i.e. at strategic, operational and tactical, all meant to build redundancy by timely sharing of information and coordinating near-border operations. At the strategic level, Military Operations Directorate of GHQ interfaces with ODRP headed by (LG Keen) based at the US Embassy Islamabad. Within the US Embassy another setup called ICEPAK also interacts with Military Operations Directorate, GHQ. In addition to this interface, Military Operations Directorate also has communication through the office of the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), with the Headquarters ISAF represented by MG Nicholson, but more regularly with HQ ISAF Joint Command (IJC) represented by MG Laster. Pakistan‟s Air Headquarters also interacts/coordinates with Tactical Monitoring Cell (TMC) located within US Embassy Islamabad and working alongside ODRP. The strategic coordination mechanism is aided by exchange of Liaison Officers (LOs) at operational level.

11. These operational level measures are further reinforced by tactical level arrangements. These include Border Coordination Centres (BCCs) where Pakistan, US / ISAF and Afghanistan sides are represented by Liaison Officers

for tactical level coordination. One such centre is located opposite Mohmand Agency inside Afghanistan at a place called Nawa. It was this Centre which was responsible for the coordination of operations where the incident took place. These BCCs are centrally linked to Joint Operations Centre at RC-E Bagram through Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) at Torkham with the purpose of sharing operational information and assisting in resolving issues. Additionally, Border Flag Meetings are also organized at local / tactical levels to coordinate routine issues. There are a total of twenty six Pakistani Military LOs deputed for the aforementioned purposes.

12. There also exist mutually agreed procedures for near-border operations. These include; effective utilization of border coordination mechanism, sharing of information about impending operations and coordinating requests for establishing blocking position / conducting complementary operations on the other side of the border. Moreover, in case, if troops of one side come under fire which is originating from across the border, immediate sharing of information about point of origin of fire is done with the side wherefrom the fire is originating. The responsibility thereafter to bring the fire to a halt is of the country from where fire is originating. Finally, in the eventuality of both sides opening fire on each other, immediate cessation of fire must take place as soon as communication is established. Unfortunately, on 26
th November 2011, US / ISAF violated all these mutually agreed procedures.

Unfolding of Events
13. Having explained the background (Events leading up to the Incident, Environment, Coordination Mechanism), the details of the 26
th November 2011 incident are covered hereafter using the US Investigation Report.

14. The unfolding of events is explained in the succeeding paragraphs under the same three stages or sections {
Stage 1: Preparation and initial operation, Stage 2: Contact and lethal action, Stage 3: Reaction. (Reference: Page 11, Para 10)} as enunciated in the US Investigation Report, quoting from the report itself to highlight discrepancies and omissions in US/ISAF version of events so as to

bring facts to the fore. Although, Pakistan Military has differences with some of the timings of the unfolding of the events as given in the US Investigation Report, it has chosen to use the same timings (as given in the US Report) for analyzing, so as to avoid confusion and use a common basis. For the same reason Pakistan Military has also not questioned the existence of an operation called SAYAQA, planned and conducted on night 25/26 November 2011 by US / ISAF.

Stage 1: Preparation and Initial Operation by US / ISAF

(Preparation and Insertion through Helicopters upto Pre-Contact)

15. What we now know as Operation SAYAQA, was not shared at any level with the Pakistan Military despite multiple existing arrangements between the two sides to do so. The incident is even more regrettable because a few hours prior to it, Commander ISAF (General Allen) and at least two of his senior staff members were in GHQ to coordinate and share details of exactly such operations which ISAF now claims to have conducted on the night of 25/26 November 2011. Major Generals Nicholson and Laster who accompanied General Allen to GHQ on 25 November 2011, briefed DGMO about some other operations in another zone but chose not to share anything about an operation opposite Salala which was to happen the same night and so close to the border. MG Laster at the time of visiting GHQ had already been briefed by his staff about the operation opposite Salala area planned for night 25/26 November 2011. The operation was named SAYAQA. The US Investigation Report states that,
“The initial CONOP (Concept of Operations) proposed insertion at a Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ), which was within 1km (kilometre) of the Pakistan (PAK) border…… Accordingly, it was briefed to the IJC’s DCOS JOPS (ISAF Joint Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff – Joint Operations), U.S. Marine Corps Major General (MajGen) James Laster on 22 November 2011. He made two demands: move the HLZ further away from the border, effectively reducing this to a Level 1 CONOP; and, confirm the location of Pakistan’s border checkpoints (Pakistani Posts). The CONOP was rebriefed to him on 23 November 2011 with a HLZ (known as HLZ HOLDEM) 1.3km to the north of the objective (Maya Village) and

2.3km from the Pakistan border, and a map produced showing the known PAK border checkpoints (Pakistani Posts). The map did not show checkpoints (Pakistani Posts) in the area where the engagements took place. The CONOP was then approved by MajGen Laster in his separate capacity as USFOR-A DCOS Interoperability (United States Forces in Afghanistan’s Deputy Chief of Staff)”

(Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a. of US Investigation Report). MG Laster‟s one observation of moving the HLZ away from the border was addressed, the other i.e. “confirm the location of Pakistan’s border checkpoints” (Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a., Lines 6-7 of US Investigation Report) was not. It is clear from the foregoing that the Pakistani Posts were not verified, despite instructions by MG Laster. When MG Laster was re-briefed on the CONOP on 23 November 2011, he should have been told about the Pakistani Posts. As he wasn‟t told it implies the staff did not carry out adequate pre-mission preparation. This raises serious questions about the planning process because the confirmation of Pakistani posts could easily have been done by a simple ISR sweep. The Investigation Report has also recommended the same (Reference: Page 27, Para 43 of US Investigation Report).

16. The CONOP approved by MG Laster should have been shared at various levels in the existing elaborate coordination mechanism meant for this very purpose. It wasn‟t – intentionally so, due to the mistrust amongst the ISAF personnel towards Pakistan Military. In the words of the US Investigation Report,
“The REL (releasable) PAK CONOP was not released to the PAKMIL in a timely manner – contrary to SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures), order and directives – because of a prevailing sense of mistrust amongst the three forces (PAKMIL, ANSF and Coalition Forces)” (Reference: Page 28, Para 48, Lines 6 through 8 of US Investigation Report).

17. The US Investigation Report states,
“The NBCC (Nawa Border Coordination Centre) was not provided with a copy of the CONOP through official channels but received a “back channel” copy from an interested third party (reference is not understood)…… ICEPAK (ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan)

was not provided with a copy of the CONOP

“.(Reference: Page 12, Para 11.b., Lines 3 through 8). “The ODRP usually receives near-border CONOPs in advance; however, the CONOP for Operation SAYAQA had not been sent to the ODRP” (Reference: Page 14, Para 15, Lines 3 through 5 of US Investigation Report).

18. It is interesting to note that this was not the first time that operations in Maya Village were being carried out; US / ISAF had already conducted 1-2 operations in and around the area of Maya Village in the months of October / November, prior to 26
th November incident. It is not possible that even during the previous operation(s), US / ISAF made an innocent omission of not checking the details of the Pakistani Posts.

(Contact and Lethal Action by ISAF)

19. There is no doubt in the minds of Pakistan Military that US / ISAF troops were aware of the border alignment, as at least 1-2 operations had been carried out in and around the Maya Village prior to 26
th November incident during the months of October / November. According to the US Investigation Report “The GF (Ground Forces) were aware of the heightened threat as Coalition Forces had experienced several contacts (coming under fire) in this area, the last being 5 October 2011″ (Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Lines 4-5). This was the same area where operation was being carried out on 26th November 2011. Investigation Report further confirms the fact that US / ISAF troops were aware of the Border when it states, “At 2206 hours (Afghanistan Standard Time), all elements were “boots on the ground” at HLZ HOLDEM. The GFTL (Ground Forces Team Leader) noted that it was uncharacteristically quiet. As the special operators adjusted to their environment they looked up at a dark gray moonless sky and fixed their eyes upon the rocky ridgeline (the general location of Pakistani Posts) as a reference because it was the only contrasting image that they could see; they were aware that this was the border with Pakistan”. (Reference: Page 15, Para 20, Lines 1 through 5).

20. According to the US Investigation Report,
“The GF comprised a team of 14 U.S. Special Operations Forces …….. and an ANA CDO (Commando) Company (100 men)” (Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Lines 1 through 3). The Investigation Report goes on to state, “The CONOP was rebriefed to him (MG Laster) on 23 November 2011 with a HLZ (known as HLZ HOLDEM) 1.3km to the north of the objective and 2.3km from the Pakistan border” (Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a., Lines 7 through 9). The GF were, according to the Investigation Report, in Maya Village at 2309 hours, when they came under fire, “At 2309 hours the GF came under heavy machine gun fire, the tracer rounds indicating that it came from the eastern ridgeline near the border …. Following the initial contact of heavy machine gun fire, the rest of the ME (Main Elements) and SE1 (Supporting Elements) were engaged by effective mortar fire; …. coming from a point on the ridge…… the machine gun fire did not stop but increased and a second mortar round which landed only 50m (metres) from the group, divided the force” (Reference: Page 16, Paras 22,23 and 24). According to the Investigation Report, it was in response to this Pakistani fire and in self defence that the GF asked for air support. The aerial platforms then engaged the Pakistani Posts, according to the Report, for “a 90 minute period” (Reference: Page 4, Para 1, Line 9 of US Investigation Report) (factually Pakistani Posts had been engaged for two hours). In fact the Pakistani Posts had never fired in the direction where US / ISAF patrol (without sharing any information with Pakistan Military) was ostensibly operating. The speculative fire from Pakistan side was undertaken on a suspected militant movement by firing only three mortar and a few machine gun rounds at a location only 400 metres from the Volcano Post, a location which was already registered and which lay almost 1.5 to 2 kilometres away from Maya Village, and in a different direction. Therefore, there is absolutely no chance that this fire could have landed even close to US / ISAF GF, let alone being effective. It is, therefore, evident from the aforementioned detailed account that, by US / ISAF‟s own admission, the GF was in Maya Village at 2309 hours (The exact map references / LAT/LONGs of Maya Village were asked for, and provided to Pakistan Military by ICEPAK-ODRP, obviating any possibility of confusion). Even

if they were not in Maya Village at the time, they just could not have been at the location where Pakistani Posts carried out speculative fire, as this was temporally not possible. On any given night
several Pakistani posts carry out speculative fire if and when deemed necessary.

21.
Figure – 2 below is illuminating. The Figure highlights the distance of the HLZ to Maya Village based on what has been stated in the US / ISAF Investigation Report, “The CONOP was rebriefed to him (MG Laster) on 23 November 2011 with a HLZ (known as HLZ HOLDEM) 1.3km to the north of the objective (Maya Village) and 2.3km from the Pakistan border” (Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a., Lines 7 through 9). It also indicates the direction of Pakistani speculative fire which was in a totally different direction. If the GF were, as per timings quoted above, in Maya Village, busy in their operation when they allegedly came under Pakistani Fire; for the report to draw linkage of US / ISAF aerial response to this fire to justify its unprovoked attack is unjustified and violative of self defence ROE (Rules of Engagement).

22. As there are legal implications of using a force as the US / ISAF did, in the manner that it did, therefore, “self defence” has been used to justify an unwarranted and disproportionate response. The ROE of self defence could have only been used, if the fire had been effective, hence the Investigation Report goes to great lengths to assert that Pakistani fire was effective
“a second mortar round, which landed only 50m from the group, divided the force” (Reference: Page 16, Para 24, Lines 1-2). If the fire of mortar landed so close, there should have been casualties, but according to the US / ISAF Investigation Report itself, “…….by 0400 hours they were back at their base with no casualties” (Reference: Page 18, Para 31). Not only was the response, not in self defence, it was

disproportionate, excessive and sustained which resulted in death of 24 soldiers while 13 sustained injuries. The unprovoked engagement thus left behind 7 widows and 16 orphans. By the Investigation Report‟s own admission it continued for 90 minutes (actually it continued for two hours) and it involved two F – 15s, two Attack Helicopters (AH) – 64 Apaches, one Attack Cargo (AC) 130 and a Multi-mission Cargo (MC) – 12 Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. There were drones in the air as well. The F-15s, Apaches and AC-130 all unloaded full ordnance, including Hellfire missiles on the Pakistani Posts,
“At 0039 hours, an AH-64D engaged an identified tripod weapon inside a bunker in EA-1 (Engagement Area-1) and destroyed it with a HELLFIRE missile” (Reference: Page 13, Para 12, Lines 15 through 17 of US Investigation Report). These weapon platforms‟ continuous engagement, spread over as long as almost 2 hours, does not support the assertion that the force used was proportionate and in self defence. To justify the grave US / ISAF excesses committed on the night of 25/26 November, the Investigation Report tries to contort the facts and confuse the issue by stating that, “The explosions of the AC-130H engagement reverberated around the valleys. Despite the effectiveness of the engagement, the GF continued to be engaged by mortars and machine guns” (Reference: Page 17, Para 25, Lines 4-5, Para 26, Lines 1-2). Any person even with rudimentary understanding of military operations would know, that when under attack from aerial platforms, the ground troops – in this case Pakistani Border Posts personnel – would respond to the immediate threat i.e. aerial platforms firing on them rather than on a ground force one and a half to two kilometres away. This is exactly what the Pakistani Posts did – fired back at the helicopters, in self defence with all available weapons including artillery.

23. Despite being informed by Pakistan at 2340 Afghan Standard Time (AST) about the aggression by US forces, the engagement of Pakistani Posts continued until 0104 (AST) (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – References: Annex D, Page D-6, Serial N and Page 13, Para 12 of US Investigation Report) for as long as 1 hour and 24 minutes. In the process, every soldier on and around the posts, even on reverse slope of the Ridge, was individually targeted. This pattern of

engagement cannot be justified by calling it „self defence‟. According to the US Investigation Report, three main aerial fire engagements of Pakistani Posts by US / ISAF took place. Multiple fire engagements by US aerial platforms took place after information about US / ISAF aggression against the Pakistani Posts had been shared at multiple levels, by Pakistan Military, and after Pakistani Military was assured that the fire engagement was being stopped.

24. While this extended fire engagement of Pakistani Posts was going on, the Pakistani Liaison Officer at NBCC was informed about an incident “
just after midnight” (Reference: Page 14, Para 14, Line 11 of US Investigation Report). By this time both the Pakistani Border Posts had already been targeted by fire. Even when the information was shared, albeit extremely belatedly, with Liaison Officer NBCC, it was of a general area 14 kilometres north of the actual engagement area (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page 14, Para 14 of US Investigation Report).

25. It is evident from the US Investigation Report that Pakistani Liaison Officer was intentionally not provided with specific map references i.e. LAT/ LONGs “
The BSO (Battle Space Owner) (TF (Task Force) BRONCO), then called the NBCC to report the GF was being engaged. Per RC-E instructions, the BSO passed the exact grid location of the source of hostile fire to the NBCC but informed the NBCC to only pass a general location to the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO (Liaison Officer) as part of the NBCC’s effort to have the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO confirm whether or not PAKMIL were at the location of the hostile fire. The NBCC then passed a general location to their PAKMIL LNO using GIRoA (Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) district borders as a geographic reference” {Reference: Page 22, Para (3) & (4) of US Investigation Report }. At no stage did the Pakistani Liaison Officer say that there were no Pakistani Military Troops in the area. He just could not have said so without map references being provided to him. Therefore, the US Investigation Report is amiss when it states on Page 22, Para 4, Lines 4 and 5 that the Pakistani LO stated that there were no

Pakistani Military troops in the area. US / ISAF have overlooked the fact that by the time information was shared with Pakistani LO, both the Pakistani Posts had already been struck by US / ISAF fire making the whole argument irrelevant.

26. Precious lives could have been saved, had the US / ISAF chain of command / staff been more responsive and alive to the situation. There was no urgency whatsoever in a situation where due to use of overwhelming and disproportionate force by US, lives were being lost and where time was of extreme essence. This displays utter disregard for the lives of the Pakistani soldiers. In the words of the Investigation Report, “
time sensitive senior Command override measures for border area incidents are lacking” (Reference: Page 5, Para 3, Line 12).

Stage 3: Reaction

(Post Action Events)

27. The intelligence picture depicted in the Investigation Report is erroneous and biased wherein it states
“Reports have indicated INS (insurgents) have been wearing PAKMIL uniforms in order to move freely across the border. The ABP (Afghan Border Police) report indiscriminate shooting incidents against civilians and their livestock in the Maya Valley from the border” (Reference: Page 8, Para 5, Lines 4 through 7). The investigating officer has accepted without verification, the assertions of the Afghan Border Police especially because he and his Investigation Team, according to the Investigation Report, could not visit Village Maya and other areas close to the site of the incident. The US / ISAF Investigation Report states, “Security concerns did not allow the investigating teams to safely travel to the villages on either side of the Afghanistan – Pakistan border that were near the area of the incident” (Reference: Page 7, Footnote to Para 3.a., Lines 2 through 4). A few months back in October this year, the Afghan authorities at the highest level had blamed Pakistan publicly for firing hundreds of rounds / rockets and killing numerous civilians in Kunar. ISAF leadership having inquired into the matter confirmed to Pakistan Military leadership that Afghan assertions could not be substantiated and that these were

a result of misinformation originating from the Afghan Border. The allegation against Pakistan was later denied publicly by the Afghan President by agreeing to the ISAF‟s viewpoint that no artillery / rocket fire had originated from Pakistan. In this backdrop, for the investigating team to take the comments of some individuals located close to the international border on the Afghan side at “face value” and mention them in their report without thorough investigation brings into question the whole exercise.

28. Moreover, reports of discovery of Pakistani Law Enforcement Agencies‟ uniforms from Maya Village after the end of Operation SAYAQA is an unconvincing attempt to cover the US / ISAF attacks by giving a misleading impression that Pakistani soldiers on Volcano and Boulder posts may well have been mistaken by US / ISAF to be anyone else.

Summary of Pakistan’s Viewpoint
29. Pakistan does not agree with several portions and findings of the Investigation Report as these are not factually correct.

30. Pakistan expresses its regret over the mandate and terms of reference given to the Investigating Team which was not mandated to determine or affix responsibility for the incident. (Reference: General Mattis‟ letter to Brigadier General Stephen Clark dated 28 November 2011 appointing him as Investigating Officer, Page 3, Paras 9 and 10).

31. Pakistan has noted US / ISAF acceptance of its failures, which Pakistan believes were deep, varied and systemic. There have been several similar, though not as grave, US / ISAF failings in the past. Despite promises of thorough investigations, US / ISAF failed to hold anyone accountable after each of these incidents. (Details at Page 2, Para 5 of
this Report).

32. The fundamental cause of the incident of 26
th November 2011 was the failure of US / ISAF to share its near-border operation, with Pakistan at any level. It is highly regrettable that despite this major failing, the Investigation Report has tried to pin partial responsibility on Pakistan (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page 4, Para 3 of US Investigation Report). Establishing positive identification of the Pakistani Posts which was lacking and which has been acknowledged in the US / ISAF report, was the direct and clear responsibility of US / ISAF who were, by their own admission, carrying out a near-border operation. Positive identification could very conveniently have been done by a simple Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft sweep which the US Investigation Report itself has also recommended, (Reference: Page 27, Para 43, Lines 7-8).

33. US / ISAF violated all mutually agreed procedures with Pakistan for near-border operations put in place to avert such uncalled for actions. It is increasingly obvious to Pakistan Military that the entire coordination mechanism has been reduced to an exercise in futility, is more for the purposes of optics and that it has

repeatedly been undermined. There were instructions given to US personnel, as mentioned in the US / ISAF Investigation Report, wherein the
information to Pakistan Military was to be deliberately withheld. Had the disclosure been honest and as per the agreed procedures, the attacks could have been stopped at the earliest and precious lives saved. Even a cursory reading of Paragraph 38. b. (1) on Page 24 of US Investigation Report would confirm Pakistan‟s contention. The said sub-paragraph reads: “The TF (Task Force) BRONCO battle captain provided specific grid references to the ISAF LNO (ISAF Liaison Officer) at NBCC (Nawa Border Coordination Centre) with the stipulation that these specific coordinates were not to be provided to the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO (Pakistan Military Liaison Officer) and that only a general location was to be passed”. The very purpose of sharing information about fire originating from Pakistan was for Pakistan to suppress / stop it. Without giving exact map references (LAT / LONGs), how could this have been achieved?

34. According to well established mutually agreed procedures, in case of fire originating from across the border, the responsibility to suppress / stop it rests on the side from where the fire is originating. In the present instance, no such intimation was received from the US / ISAF. Such an intimation would have demonstrated the bona fides of the US / ISAF stance. The only intimation that was conveyed to the Pakistan Liaison Officer at Nawa Border Coordination Centre was
after both the posts had been struck by fire and even this late intimation was incorrect by as much as 14 kilometres. The US Investigation Report states, “It was later discovered that a misconfigured electronic CPOF (Command Post of the Future) map overlay was used by the NBCC (Nawa Border Coordination Centre), this caused the NBCC to refer the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO (Pakistan Military Liaison Officer) to a “general location” that was 14km to the north of the actual engagement area” (Reference: Page 14, Para 14, Lines 13 through 15).

35. In an effort to provide justification for US / ISAF actions, the Investigation Report has gone to extreme lengths to construct the whole incident as an act of

“self defence” and the force used by US / ISAF / NATO as legal and proportionate. At no stage did the Pakistani Posts fire on, or in the direction of the Helicopter Landing Zone or the route from Helicopter Landing Zone to Maya Village. The sketch of the incident site at
Figure – 2 (Maya Village has been marked on the map as per the map references provided by ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan / ODRP) clearly belies the ISAF assertion about responding in self defence. The report accepts that there were no US / ISAF casualties, yet it still argues the self defence Rules of Engagement by stating that the “fire on GFs (Ground Forces) was effective” (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page F-2, Paras 6 and 7). In fact, it were the Pakistani Posts which were defending against an unprovoked attack. Pakistan, therefore, rejects the findings of the US Investigation Report that: “the catalyst for this tragedy ultimately was the initial and continuing engagement by PAKMIL (Pakistan Military) forces on Coalition Forces – who in turn responded accordingly and appropriately” (Reference: Page 29, Para 53, Lines 2 through 4). The US Investigation Report in fact ignores the sentiments and questions the intelligence of the Pakistani people by stating that “The LOAC (Law of Armed Conflict) was respected and the ROE (Rules of Engagement) were applied correctly and legally” (Reference: Annex I, Page I-1, Para 8).

36. The following facts and their sequence, strengthen the opinion that the said incident was
deliberate at some level:-

a. US / ISAF having carried out 1-2 operations in and around Maya Village prior to 26
th November incident in the months of October / November, (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Lines 4-5 of US Investigation Report), having seen and closely monitored Pakistan‟s nine months long operation in Mohmand Agency leading to the creation of Volcano and Boulder Posts, the location of the posts atop a barren ridge as high as approximately 8000 feet and the US / ISAF‟s cutting edge surveillance / observation technology, all defy US / ISAF contention

that they were unaware about the location of these Pakistani Posts. (There have been incidents in the past where as small an activity, as addition of new weapons on
existing Pakistani posts by Pakistan Military, were immediately noticed by US / ISAF and their purpose discussed with Pakistan).

b. The US aircraft / helicopters continued to target Pakistani Military personnel deliberately for two hours. Even the US Investigation Report admits the attack spread over
“90 minutes” - far too long a time for an “innocent” engagement. According to the US Investigation Report, three main aerial fire engagements of Pakistani Posts by US / ISAF took place. Multiple fire engagements by US aerial platforms took place after information about US / ISAF aggression against the Pakistani Posts had been shared at multiple levels, by Pakistan Military, and after Pakistani Military was assured that the fire engagement was being stopped.

c. Even if we assume that these posts were not known to US / ISAF, within minutes of initiation of unprovoked attack by US, US / ISAF had been informed at multiple levels by the Pakistani side, but they continued firing with impunity.

d. All Pakistani soldiers were in uniform and could not be mistaken for anyone else.

e. The failure in timely sharing of Concept of Operations even with concerned
US coordination staff at Nawa Border Coordination Centre and ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan (which is located in US Embassy Islamabad and manned exclusively by US personnel) raises serious doubts about the incident being “accidental“.

f. It is highly improbable that such a large number of mistakes (as acknowledged in the US Investigation Report) could have been coincidental.

37. Unfortunately the impartiality and transparency of the investigation was adversely affected when senior US officials repeatedly stated that the incident was “not intentional”, without waiting for completion of the Investigation. Pakistan believes that this stance may well have influenced the findings of the report.

38. Due to complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative / intricate Rules of Engagement (all acknowledged in US / ISAF Investigation Report), the responsibility for failing to stop the attack rests squarely on US / ISAF. Pakistan Army on its part had, on numerous occasions and at all levels, highlighted the potential problems associated with not having all the forces in the Afghan theatre under a unified command. The activities and operations of US Special Forces and Afghanistan Border Police are but two examples which have been raised consistently by the Pakistani side. The incident of 19
th July 2011 in Angoor Adda Sector of South Waziristan Agency, (details mentioned on Page 2, Para 5 of this Report) was also, we believe, a result of lack of unified military command in Afghanistan.

39. Pakistan Military is dismayed to learn that despite being ten years into the war, one reason to which the incident of 26
th November 2011 has been attributed is, “imprecise terminology between the RC-E JOC (Regional Command – East Joint Operations Centre) and SOTF-E JOC (Special Operations Task Force – East Joint Operations Centre)” (Reference: Page 24, sub-para e, Line 1 of US Investigation Report). This is disturbingly indicative of fundamental flaws in the US / ISAF / NATO procedures.

40. US / ISAF / NATO in knowingly targeting Pakistani Posts well inside Pakistan were in clear violation of the ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone.

41. The recommendation of the US / ISAF Investigating Report stating,
“train and practice procedures for cross-border and near-border operations including time-sensitive procedures” (Reference: Page 5, Para 4, Lines 4-5 of US Investigation Report) is maleficent. Investigating an incident which involves breach of Pakistan‟s territorial integrity and sovereignty and putting in a recommendation of how to do it better next time is potentially troublesome for any future cooperation and border coordination.

Additional Details Required
42. Following additional details are required, which may be provided for completing our analysis / assessment:-

a. The full and complete classified version of the US Investigation Report be made available.

b. Provision of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance picture of the complete incident along with all aerial platform videos and record of radio transmissions and communication between the crew(s) of the aerial platforms involved in the incident.

Concluding Remarks
43. The US / ISAF Investigation Report into the 26
th November 2011 incident, apart from being factually incorrect, also brings to fore the larger issue of lack of trust of US / ISAF towards the Pakistani Military. Moreover, the unprovoked engagement of Pakistani Posts located inside Pakistan was a clear violation of US / ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone. Unfortunately, this was not the first incident of this kind as US / ISAF / NATO have been involved in at least four similar incidents in the past, after each of which, US / ISAF regretted the incident and resolved to prevent recurrence. Not only did the recurrence of incidents continue but as far as we know, no one was ever actually held accountable.

44. The US Investigation Report, is structured around the argument of “self defence” and “proportional use of force”, an argument which is contrary to factsand therefore self serving. Sustained aggression which continued for as long as
“90 minutes” despite US / ISAF being informed about the incident at multiple levels by Pakistan Military within minutes of initiation of US / ISAF fire, belies the “self defence” and “proportional use of force” contention.

45. Failure to share information about a near-border operation with Pakistan at any level was a major US / ISAF / NATO omission, as were several others, like the complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative / intricate Rules of Engagement as well as lack of unified military command in Afghanistan.

46. There have clearly been several failures on the part of US / ISAF / NATO (as acknowledged in the US Investigation Report). Trying to affix partial responsibility of the incident on Pakistan (Reference: Page 29, Para 53, Lines 3-4 of US Investigation Report) is, therefore, unjustified and unacceptable.

Filed under: CURRENT AFFAIRS

By Pramit Pal Chaudhri for The Hindustan Times

In Pakistan’s current crisis, why is its military is so reluctant to consider simply seizing power? One reason is that General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani cannot count on the US looking the other way. At a minimum, Washington would have to slap sanctions on an economically faltering country. At a maximum, it would be the last straw in a bilateral relationship at its lowest ebb since it was first woven in the 1950s.

Pakistan’s establishment claims it has been used and abused by the US, the most serious violation being that country’s stealth attack on Abbottabad that led to Osama bin Laden’s death. There has been the Raymond Davies affair, the endless drone attacks and the increasingly public accusation of double-dealing by senior US officials – the most notable being Admiral Mike Mullen’s linking of the Inter-Services Intelligence with terrorist groups.

There is some satisfaction for India in all this. It has been persistently claiming the existence of a military-terrorist nexus. Many in Washington agree. After Abbottabad, there is no one in Washington who doesn’t. The US-Pakistan relationship, says Daniel Twining of the German Marshall Fund, “was really at a historic high for the past decade but is diminishing.” But it might not matter as much to the US if relations fall apart, he says.

Other events are undermining the basis of the US-Pakistani bond. Islamabad had expected the US to totally retreat from Afghanistan, leaving Pakistan’s Taliban allies in charge. Instead, the US will leave a substantial force behind along with many drone bases. The US is talking with the Taliban, but only desultorily with groups that Islamabad patronises.

With the US Congress also pulling the plug on aid to Pakistan, what is left? The answer is nukes. “If Pakistan didn’t have nuclear weapons, with Al Qaeda almost gone, no one would care a fig about that country,” said one ex-US ambassador to the region. As they realise this, Islamabad is getting more paranoid about the security of its “strategic assets.” The more unstable they look, the more willing the US will be to try and do something risky to salvage Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

US officials are talking about a “new normal” in their Pakistan relations. This would cut ties to the bare bones: counterterrorism cooperation, limited military transit requirements, Afghan talks, narcotics and some humanitarian assistance. “We’ll have to work with the Pakistan military on a limited basis while negotiations with the Taliban proceed,” says John Schlosser, a former state department South Asia hand.

There seems to be no real understanding among Pakistanis that their leverage is dwindling or how much Abbottabad vapourised their credibility in the US. A parliamentary committee report on how to change the US relationship bizarrely demanded, for example, a civilian nuclear agreement.

It could get worse. “The relationship will fall further if the US finds [Al Qaeda chief] Zawahiri in Pakistan. Or there are terror strikes on India or the US,” says Bruce Riedel, former AfPak advisor to Barack Obama.

The worst thing is that Washington is decoupling just at a time when Pakistan, economically and otherwise, can least afford to lose their most generous international partner.

Filed under: Afghanistan, Democracy, India, Nuclear, Pakistan, Pakistan Army, Pakistanis, President Obama, Taliban, United States, US Army, US-Pakistan Relations Tagged: Afghanistan, Asif Ali Zardari, Husain Haqqani, India, Mansoor Ijaz, Memogate, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, President Obama, Taliban, United States, US Army, US Pakistan Relations

Google, Reddit, and Wikipedia all are using their considerable web presence today to protest legislation pending in the U.S. Congress. According to the Google announcement:

Two bills before Congress, known as the Protect IP Act (PIPA) in the Senate and the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in the House, would censor the Web and impose harmful regulations on American business. Millions of Internet users and entrepreneurs already oppose SOPA and PIPA.

It may appear to the casual reader that this is an effort by entertainment corporations (Hollywood) to impose their particular view of internet regulation on the rest of the country and encountering opposition from Silicon Valley. What’s not commonly understood (and why this is a subject for our discussion) is that provisions of these laws block foreign websites. In other words, the U.S. Congress has taken it upon itself to legislate for the world. This is why Wikipedia (a global encyclopedia) has blacked-out it’s English-language version that is available all over the world. While this is much more common than most would think (the U.S. Congress often sets standards that other countries and businesses must meet in order to do business in the U.S. – often their largest market – which makes the U.S. Congress a de facto global lawmaking body) it’s an excellent example of the global scope of American laws.

It’s particularly ironic that the U.S. Congress is seeking to curtail internet access while another branch of the U.S. government, the Executive Branch (namely the State Department) is seeking to undermine those countries that censor the internet. As this report notes:

The United States plans to pump millions of dollars into new technology to break through Internet censorship overseas amid a heightened crackdown on dissent in China, officials have said. State Department officials said they would give $19 million to efforts to evade Internet controls in China, Iran and other authoritarian states which block online access to politically sensitive material [...] The funding comes out of $30 million which the US Congress allocated in the current fiscal year for Internet freedom.

The New York Times clarifies some of the specific strategies and tactics the U.S. will use as this policy is implemented:

The State Department plans to finance programs like circumvention services, which enable users to evade Internet firewalls, and training for human rights workers on how to secure their e-mail from surveillance or wipe incriminating data from cellphones if they are detained by the police [...] Administration officials say that the emphasis on a broad array of projects — hotly disputed by some technology experts and human rights activists — reflects their view that technology can be a force that leads to democratic change, but is not a “magic bullet” that brings down repressive regimes.

A commendable policy, to be sure, but what happens if the repressive regime is the U.S.?

We are witnessing a very odd development in which other countries seek to block access to politically sensitive material while the U.S. seeks to block access to commercially sensitive material. Some would say it amounts to the same thing: state-sponsored censorship.

It is now a stock phrase among presidents and presidential candidates that they want to champion U.S. values abroad. Here is a perfect opportunity for them to do that. Does the U.S. stand for freedom of expression or censorship? The upcoming votes on SOPA and PIPA may well provide the answer.

Image Credit: CNN/AFP/Getty Images

WikiPedia  & some other websites have decided to black out for 24 hours in protest to SOPA and PIPA, meaning Stop Online Piracy Act and  Protect IP Act respectively.

Wikipedia Blackout

The statement appearing on Wikipedia says:

Imagine a World
Without Free Knowledge
For over a decade, we have spent millions of hours building the largest encyclopedia in human history. Right now, the U.S. Congress is considering legislation that could fatally damage the free and open Internet. For 24 hours, to raise awareness, we are blacking out Wikipedia.

Photo sharing site Flickr has also joined the cause and decided to give its user an option to blackout pictures as a symbolic gesture against the two bills. Flickr blog urges its users to Help Raise Awareness about PIPA & SOPA.

When you are viewing a picture on Flickr, you will see an option to darken the picture beneath it. Here is what it looks like:

Flicker Blackout

A notification appears on top of the picture when “Darken this photo” button is pressed with an option to tweet and support the cause. You can see the picture which we darkened here. Here is a snapshot of the picture to show you how it looks like after being darkened:

Flicker Blackout

Other sites, like Demonoid have also blacked out in protest to SOPA & PIPA, bills in  United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate respectively.

Demonoid Blackout

IF SOPA & PIPA are passed, despite severe criticism and opposition by most of the United States public, the internet can turn into a controlled place resembling a dictatorial territory instead of a free democratic environment.

Read more about SOPA & PIPA here.

In an Arms Control Association issue brief published on January 4, Greg Thielmann ably makes the case for trying to resolve the Iranian nuclear dilemma by means of old-fashioned diplomacy. The ACA’s introduction to the piece forcefully gets across just how drastically and dangerously U.S.-Iranian relations have deteriorated in the last months:

“At the end of 2011, the U.S. Congress passed new legislation to sanction transactions with the Central Bank of Iran. In response, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz…. Republican presidential candidates meanwhile charged Iran with everything from building nuclear facilities under mosques to declaring its intent to attack the United States with nuclear weapons. And the Obama administration stated repeatedly that “the military option remains on the table.”

In the meantime, on a slightly more positive note, Defense Secretary Panetta has specified that (only) Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would represent a red line for the United States. And whatever Republican contenders may have been saying, it’s clear the American public wants out of the old wars the country is in and does not want to get into new ones. But today comes news of another assassination in Iran, a sharp reminder that this particular war is not merely a cold one.

Thielmann argues for opening U.S.-Iranian diplomatic channels if only to avoid possibly fatal misunderstandings. Why, if we found it possible to deal with tyrants like Stalin and Mao, he wonders, cannot we deal with the unattractive crowd currently running the show in Tehran?

I have no quarrel with anything Thielmann says here. But let me introduce just two cautionary notes as to the limits of his analysis. First, though his issue brief find many pertinent cautionary tales in the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States, we should bear in mind that the “real war” (to borrow a phrase from Richard Nixon and Walt Whitman) is not between the United States and Iran but between Iran and Israel. It is not the United States that is assassinating Iranian scientists, condoning such acts, or sabotaging nuclear facilities. Everybody knows it’s Mossad.

So if some real talking is going to take place, Israel needs to be made part of that conversation.

Second, let’s be clear that this is not just a cold war between Israel and Iran. Even during the worst years of the cold war the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union did not openly threaten to literally annihilate each other as living entities. And nor did the two superpowers assassinate each other’s scientists or blow up each other’s factories. What’s going on between Israel and Iran is virtually war, and it’s serious.

Dear FPA Blogs followers,

Azeri APA News Agency recently conducted an interview with me regarding the French National Assembly’s decision to criminalize the refusal to refer to the events of 1909-15 as a genocide and how this affects Turkey’s Caucasus policy. This is the transcript of that interview:

————————-

http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=163076

New York. Isabel Levine – APA. APA’s interview with Mr. H. Akin Unver, Turkey and Middle Eastern analyst at the Princeton University, New Jersey

- What are your views on Armenia’s negative insistence on international community as the French National Assembly recently passed the bill penalizing denial of the so-called genocides recognized by the law? 

- Events of 1909-15 are a part of Armenian national identity and it is perhaps the only issue that binds the international Armenian Diaspora together, without which, the Diaspora will most probably fall apart. Therefore, the Diaspora’s insistence on the genocide question is linked to its raison d’être – from their
point of view, this indeed, is a victory. On the part of the French National Assembly, on the other hand, I think, this is a failure.

Whether one believes the events of 1909-15 are genocide or not, French National Assembly’s view on the matter extends way beyond legislating on another country’s history, and infringes upon the Copenhagen political criteria for European Union membership, as well as the Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as it relates to freedom of expression.

To that end, I don’t think any observer or scholar would associate French National Assembly’s move as a matter of principle or retrospective legislation on human rights; it is a simple pre-electoral and populist legislation, which is passed by less than 10% of the French National Assembly and therefore, does not represent 90% of the French people. More worrisome perhaps, is that the legislation tramples the founding principles of the European Union and is an inherently undemocratic (and even anti-democratic) move.

- What are the prospects of the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation in conditions when the Armenian lobby does not disavow the global campaign for recognition of ‘Armenian genocide’ by parliaments, as well as by the US Congress? 

- This dilemma was addressed many times between Turkish and Armenian governments; Turkey has been complaining about the Diaspora drawing a wedge between Turkish and Armenian governments, whereas Armenia sees the Diaspora a natural extension of the Armenian consciousness. In return, the Diaspora will not accept any settlement with Turkey that marginalizes the Diaspora’s influence.

I believe the Diaspora’s permanent role in this issue is to assert its weight and influence over the negotiations by using its financial capabilities and large amounts of money sent to Armenia from abroad, which surpasses the Armenian national budget. Armenia is dependent on Diaspora money and therefore, cannot sign bilateral agreements with Turkey regarding the genocide question without the consent of the Diaspora.

I do not believe that the radicalized segments of the Diaspora will give up the genocide issue, nor will it simply disappear from the Turkish-Armenian equation. The only way we can talk about a Turkish-Armenian reconciliation without the influence of the Diaspora is that either Turkey accepts genocide allegations and pay large amounts of compensation (and possibly land transfers) in a protracted legal process, or if Turkey creates an immediate need for the Republic of Armenia (either through trade revenues that exceed Diaspora money, or via a military-strategic necessity) which will create an urge for the Armenian decision-makers to sideline the Diaspora and deal directly with Turkey. Both of these options are quite unlikely at this time, though.

- What should the US do in that case – stand aside (of the reconciliation process) or continue participating in the processes? 

- Even though the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee passed a non-binding resolution on the genocide issue in March 2010, I think this is the furthest it can get in any American institution as long as Turkey remains a key ally in post-war Iraq and growing Iranian and Russian influence.

While the administration may issue statements calling for Turkey to recognize the genocide allegations, it will refrain from doing anything binding. Even though Turkey and Armenia had signed reconciliation protocols in October 2009, there is very little move towards honoring its principles as Turkey moves closer to Azerbaijan for the future of the Nabucco pipeline deal.

I believe the future of Nabucco is closely linked to the future of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. As long as Turkish-Azeri relations remain close and energy
politics remain the most important issue in Turkey’s Caucasus policy, I believe the United States will support Turkey’s position with regard to Armenia.
Although US Vice-President Joe Biden had suggested Turkey to ‘pursue its protocol with Armenia’ during his recent visit, Armenia is not a priority either for Turkey or the United States at this moment.

- And how will the French National Assembly’s “genocide” bill affect to the Nagorno-Karabakh adjustment process? 

- Most visibly, it will push Turkey towards Azerbaijan and will cause the collapse of the Turkish-Armenian protocols. This is important, as the US leave Iraq, and leaves a massive power vacuum in the Middle East and Russia, Iran and Turkey move in to fill that gap; a conflict is now more likely. There is a possibility that Azerbaijan, benefiting from successive securitizing moves in the region, may engage in a quick military move against Karabakh.

Russia certainly prepares for this possibility. When Russia extended its use of Armenia’s Gumru base, it also signed an agreement to protect Armenia against external attacks. Russia is concerned with the size of its military presence in Armenia because of Georgia’s annulment of the treaty that enabled Russian troops to use Georgian territory to be transferred further south. The necessity to bolster Russian military presence in Armenia may lead Russia to force its way through Georgia, or rely solely on Azerbaijan for the transfer of its troops to Armenia. This draws a strategic wedge between Russia and Armenia, and renders Russia’s commitment to protect Armenia uncertain. Meanwhile, Russia also needs to guarantee its use of the Gabala radar installation in Azerbaijan whose lease ends in 2012. Azerbaijan raised the cost of the installation from 7 million to 100 million US dollars per annum, while hinting at the possibility of negotiating the cost in exchange for Russian support for its position over Karabakh.

In this scenario, Azerbaijan suddenly finds itself in a very advantageous position strategically, having both Turkish and Russian support over the Karabakh question. Sarkozy and the Armenian Diaspora in France put Armenia in an extremely difficult situation over Karabakh; I am not sure they realize this.

- Turkey has already agreed to host radar for the early warning missile defence system being created by the United States and NATO. Do you think the French Parliament’s decision will influence Turkey’s activity as a NATO member, its place and importance in the region? 

- The bill already started to affect Turkey’s relations with France. Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced an eight-point sanctions list against France and unilaterally cancelled all military cooperation agreements, including joint training, intelligence sharing and air space – territorial waters restrictions. Furthermore, Turkey declared that it would stop cooperating with France in all European Union projects (which essentially affects Turkey’s relations with the EU fundamentally). In many ways, Turkey’s EU policy is changing to an understanding similar to that of China, which considers the European Union as an ineffectual political entity and instead deal with the European countries individually.

In that regard, I think the NATO missile shield has more to do with Turkey’s commitment to its alliance with the United States and also its concern with growing Russian and Iranian influence in the region. Even though Turkey has cordial relations with both countries, Turkish decision-makers understand that they need concrete balancing power against Russia and Iran and I think missile shield must be interpreted within the context of Turkey’s own security concerns. Of course, Turkey’s NATO commitments will remain, but Turkish-French cooperation within NATO will freeze in the short- to medium-term.

In the second week of December 2011, the US congress agreed on a defense bill that includes a provision to freeze some $700 million in assistance until Pakistan comes up with a strategy to deal with improvised explosive devices. According … Continue reading →

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