The North Koreans allegedly conducted secret, nearly undetected nuclear tests in 2010. And they almost got away with it. That is, until Lars-Erik De Geer, an atmospheric scientist at the Swedish Defence Research Agency in Stockholm, took a closer look at the monitoring data from Russian and Japanese stations close to North Korea.

Reporting in Nature, Geoff Brunfiel explains that, in May of that year, detectors in South Korean picked up some radioactive xenon which became the topic of discussion three months later at a gathering at the CTBTO. At the time, no one could figure out where the xenon came from. However, De Geer decided to examine the data more closely and, nearly a year later, concluded that the North Koreans had conducted two clandestine nuclear tests – one in April and one in May of 2010.

The appearance of xenon-133 and xenon-133m, according to De Geer, point to the possible tests in mid-April. Barium-140 and decay product lanthanum-140 were detected in May, which De Geer believes indicate a second test. “In Sweden, we saw this kind of thing decades ago from Russian underground tests.”  De Geer’s analysis will appear in the April/May issue of Science and Global Security.

But, not everyone is convinced of De Geer’s findings. Jeffrey Lewis, father of Arms Control Wonk and now director of the East Asia non-proliferation program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California and Ola Dahlman, a retired geophysicist who previously worked with the CTBTO, are skeptical that De Geer’s data conclusively point to nuke tests. Both believe that, absent additional data, including seismic data, it is not clear that the presence of xenon means that the tests did occur. Lewis, for example, points to the operation of a number of nuclear power plants in the vicinity of the sensors and which could have been responsible for the presence of xenon.

Nonetheless, the discussion surrounding the xenon detection and other data will no doubt serve to strengthen the network by encouraging analysis of abnormalities and other unexplained evidence picked up by the CTBTO’s sensors.

Zhang and Harper meet in Ottawa on February 1. (c) Reuters

The Chinese Ambassador to Canada, H.E. Zhang Junsai, spoke at a luncheon at the Montreal Council on Foreign Relations today. The Montreal Gazette has an article on his talk, emphasizing the fact that he twice affirmed that China is committed to peace in the Arctic.

A member of the audience that the newspaper reported to be a “specialist in Arctic and northern security issues” asked Zhang about the region, and he responded, “We hope that this will be solved by peaceful means. I don’t know much about this but we would like to participate and be (an) observer. We hope that the countries (on the council) would support China’s request.”

CBC quoted Zhang: “My understanding, not of my government, is we should have a joint scientific research in this area because a lot of things are unknown.” Scientific research has been one area in which China has been able to contribute a lot, whether with its research expeditions on its icebreaker or its station on Ny-Alesund.

China seeks to gain permanent observer status on the Arctic Council, which Canada will begin chairing next year. There are a number of other countries on the Arctic Council, but all of them are European; none from the Far East have been admitted. Currently, Denmark supports China’s bid. This is not surprising given the recent increase in trade between the two countries and China’s high hopes for investing in Greenland’s minerals. Yet Norway dropped its support of Chinese observer status after Beijing cut off political and human rights dialogues with Oslo when the Nobel Committee awarded imprisoned Chinese activist Liu Xiaobo with the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2010. Beijing also took other retaliatory measures such as enforcing stricter controls on Norwegian salmon imports, causing their sales to fall dramatically. Though the Nobel Committee is made up of five members appointed by the Storting, Norway’s parliament, they are not beholden to it, so it is somewhat misguided for Beijing to take out its displeasure on Oslo.

This excerpt, taken from the Nobel Committee’s website, describes Alfred Nobel’s vision in setting up the committee and the prize.

“Nobel may also have feared that the highly political nature of the Peace Prize would make it a tool in power politics and thereby reduce its significance as an instrument for peace. A prize-committee selected by a rather progressive parliament from a small nation on the periphery of Europe, without its own foreign policy and with only a very distant past as autonomous military power, may perhaps have been expected to be more innocent in matters of power politics than would a committee from the most powerful of the Scandinavian countries, Sweden.”

The awarding of a Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese activist has altered not just Chinese-Norwegian relations, but also Arctic relations. This is a world a century away from that of Nobel, indeed.

In the Guardian, Karsten Klepsvik, the senior Arctic official at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was quoted as saying, “I can neither confirm nor deny this story, but I can say bilateral contacts between Norway and China are at a low level.” Norway’s decision to counteract China’s snubs by blocking it in the Arctic Council shows that it is upping the stakes in the dispute by moving the chess pieces north. The Arctic, and membership in the region’s most important multilateral body, are now important enough to be used as bargaining chips. If China doesn’t back down, it will need to shore up support with other countries, like Canada, instead. Prime Minister Stephen Harper will be visiting China next week, so the government will have another opportunity to convince the leader of the upcoming Arctic Council chair of its merit.

China has already invested millions in the Athabaska oil sands. It is also planning to invest in Quebec’s Plan Nord, the province’s strategy for developing its northern half. Last August, Quebec Premiere Jean Charest traveled to China and Japan to promote Asian investment in his province. On January 12, Wuhan Iron and Steel Co., China’s third-largest steelmaker, successfully closed the deal to create a joint venture with Adriana Resources, a Canadian iron ore producer, to develop deposits in Lac Otelnuk, in Nunavik, Quebec. Jilin Jien Nickel also recently announced a CAN $400 million investment in a nickel mine near Kangiqsujuaq, Nunavik, and it has signed agreements with three Inuit communities to pay royalties. An in-depth article that examines “la grande séduction Québec-Asie,” or Quebec’s attempts to attract Chinese and Indian investment, is a great read from Cyberpresse (in French).

China needs resources, and it will get them from the Arctic. But it might not receive a helping hand from Norway anytime soon unless it changes tack.

The Dassault Rafale fighter jet,
manufactured by the French company Dassault Aviation, has won India's
mammoth contract worth $10.4 billion, say sources. The Indian Air Force 
plans to buy 126 aircraft over the next ten years.

The process
to determine the L1 (lowest bidder) has been completed, and sources
indicate that the final contract is expected to be signed in  the next
financial year. The first 18 aircraft will be bought off the shelf. The
rest 118 will be manufactured in partnership with an Indian company.

There
were six contenders for the world's biggest defence deal which included
the Russian MiG- 35,Lockheed Martin's F-16 Falcon, Boeing's F-18
Hornet, the Swedish Saab Grippen, Euro-Fighter Typhoon and Rafale.

Of
these, the European EADS Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale were
in the final race for the global tender for a medium multi-role combat
aircraft (MMRCA). The Eurofighter bid was backed by four partner nations
including Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom while the
Dassault Rafale was backed by the French Government.

READ MORE

Arctic Ambassador Klavs Holm

Earlier this month, Denmark appointed Klavs A. Holm as the new Arctic Ambassador, an office which will become permanent. At the same time, Danish Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal announced the closure of the embassies in Iraq, Benin, and Zambia. This move gives a strong signal that Denmark is putting forth a more visible diplomatic presence in the circumpolar north while refocusing its priorities in the Global South, where it will open embassies in Myanmar and Libya. Ambassador Holm will represent all three parts of the Danish Commonwealth: Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands. He will also coordinate the implementation of the government’s Arctic strategy, released last August.

Holm previously served as the Danish Ambassador in London, Paris, and Singapore. He also represented Denmark to the EU, in Brussels, where he worked on Arctic issues. The current ambassador for Public Diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will have his work cut out for him, as Foreign Minister Søvndal made clear when he visited Thule Air Force Base last December. When asked what assignments the new Arctic Ambassador would have, he responded, “If you ask for specific tasks, we can name climate change, which means that shipping in the Arctic is increasing in scope. There are very specific tasks to perform in relation to search and rescue in these remote areas. The area is large, and first and foremost, we must prepare the new agreements.” Specifically, he added, “It is clear that we need the Americans to not block civilian usage of Thule. Now, there will be a negotiation process to clarify how far we can go” (translated from the Danish). Search and rescue will thus be an important topic for Holm, as will mining and indigenous peoples – two issues which overlap heavily in Greenland. China has lately expressed strong interest in investing in Greenland’s mineral deposits, the Wall Street Journal reports, which might be cause for Holm to visit Beijing.

Denmark can now be added to the short list of countries which have Arctic ambassadors, which includes Sweden, Finland, and Russia. The United States and Canada are noticeably absent from this list, though there have been calls in the latter country to bring back the position (see here and here). Canada had an Arctic Ambassador from 1994 to 2006, but the role was abolished, as former Foreign Minister Peter McKay then stated, “We didn’t feel we were getting good value for money from that position.”

News Links

“New Danish Arctic Ambassador,” IPS

“Søvndal udnævner ambassadør for det aller nordligste,” Politiken (in Danish)

The Communication Networks Lab at the School of Electrical Engineering at KTH Royal Institute of Technology is seeking PhD students KTH in Stockholm is the largest and oldest technical university in Sweden. No less than one-third of Sweden’s technical research … Continue reading →

KTH School of Computer Science and Communication (CSC) announces a post-doctoral position with a focus on the approximability of NP-hard optimization problems. The Workplace KTH is the largest technical university in Sweden. Education and research cover a broad spectrum within … Continue reading →

KTH in Stockholm is the largest and oldest technical university in Sweden. No less than one-third of Sweden’s technical research and engineering education capacity at university level is provided by KTH. Education and research spans from natural sciences to all … Continue reading →

EU NAVFOR Atalanta in action (source: German Navy)

The last two years were a bumpy ride for the European security policy. One may claim that the Europeans once again failed not only to convey a clear message about their security goals to the foreign partners, but also to take concrete actions in order to stave off the creeping erosion of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Do we really face a European strategic decay in that domain? Indeed, some serious doubts about this statement may be raised. Therefore, it is high time to debunk three prophecies about European security in 2012.

1. Do worry, do not be happy. The Polish Presidency did a good job. The last six months have been the most fruitful and substantial for CSDP since the French Presidency in 2008. The joint conclusions of the Council of the European Union of December 2011 gave a vivid signal that the EU Member States are still willing to further develop the CSDP concept and necessary capabilities (personnel, assets, intelligence analytical support.) It was not easy to reach a consensus as there are multiple visions of European security and the pace in which it should evolve. Despite that fact the current message is a bit more optimistic than a year ago: Be of good cheer! After two years of stagnation there is a light of hope for CSDP. However, there are still a lot of obstacles on the European way toward ultimate success. One of them are financial constraints.

2. Crisis will impede everything. Against the backdrop of current financial constraints, the challenge for Europe is to do better with less while making good on its responsibilities. The crisis has inevitably made it more difficult for politicians to sell the benefits of the ongoing defense integration to the wary public. The crisis has blunted the importance of Europe in the world, exposed the Old Continent to numerous risks and threats, but also put it to the critical test that it cannot fail. The biggest challenge for Europeans remains the weakening of mutual trust between the Member States. The Weimar initiative from December 2010 – which sought to strengthen CSDP – has to some extent filled the gap. Poland, France and Germany were able to build a coalition of the willing and able (e.g. Finland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Romania) to spark a new wave of trust that may empower CSDP. However, crisis can only be overcome by concrete actions. Therefore, without a visible sign of progress in the implementation of the pooling and sharing initiative in 2012 it will be hard to revamp CSDP. In fact, an agreement on at least basic issues (e.g. support structures required for education, training and exercises) is a must.

3. The EU will diminish its external security policy engagement. To be fair, a glance at the number and locations of the past and current EU missions around the world reveals the union’s clear desire to live up to its ambitions in terms of crisis management policy. Since 2003, the EU has launched 25 civilian and military missions, in such far-flung countries as Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008-2009 and Guinea-Bissau from 2008-2010. Currently, the EU’s engagement in the world stretches from the Balkans, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo; through Eastern Europe, in Georgia and Moldova; to the Middle East, in the Palestinian territories; up to Africa, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Horn of Africa and Uganda. In 2011, as a result of budget cutbacks, the EU has struggled at least to maintain the status quo of its foreign operational engagements. Some experts even thought that the EU was likely to adopt an even less expeditionary posture in the future. On the contrary, the 2012 agenda looks both ambitious and promising. Besides, the ongoing operations the EU will remain committed to addressing the security challenges in the Sahel with a view to start a CSDP mission to reinforce regional security capabilities, in close cooperation with the African Union. A second operation, in South Sudan (with a focus on airport security), is also being prepared. Finally, the Polish Presidency has facilitated the amendment process of the Athena mechanism which administers the financing of common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications. Therefore, it will be now easier than before to set up a mission.

On paper it all seems doable and easy. But, as diplomats say: Paper is patient. After the Libyan crisis there is a growing sense of ambiguity about the real outcome of the EU’s crisis management policy. Therefore, it is more than certain that the development of CSDP will be a long process. But Europeans should not forget that they are approaching a “do or die” moment for Common Security and Defense Policy.

Dominik P. Jankowski serves as Expert Analyst at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland and is pursuing a doctorate at the Warsaw School of Economics.

The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland.

The School of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) at KTH, the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm announces one Post Doc position in SiC process technology. KTH in Stockholm is the largest and oldest technical university in Sweden. No less … Continue reading →

KTH in Stockholm is the largest and oldest technical university in Sweden. No less than one-third of Sweden’s technical research and engineering education capacity at university level is provided by KTH. Education and research spans from natural sciences to all … Continue reading →

The Communication Networks Lab at the School of Electrical Engineering at KTH Royal Institute of Technology is seeking PhD students KTH in Stockholm is the largest and oldest technical university in Sweden. No less than one-third of Sweden’s technical research … Continue reading →