S&P finally downgraded France’s credit rating several weeks ago along with some other EU Member States. Such decision by S&P could undeniably cost Sarkozy’s reelection in May 2012. Many see the downgrade of France’s credit rating as Sarkozy’s sole responsibility. But May 2012 is still very far away from a political standpoint. Since his election in 2007 Sarkozy has been a very polarizing political figure in France as proven by the large variety of nicknames given by the media such as President Bling-Bling, Sarko l’Américain, and so on. This blog will put into perspective Sarkozy’s first and maybe last mandate as French President by assessing his contribution to the construction/safeguard of the EU (in defense and security questions), advancing French foreign policy, and the buildup of the transatlantic relations.

Sarkozy, son of a Hungarian immigrant, rose to the highest political sphere quite quickly and unconventionally in French standard. He started his political life in the mid-1970s in the Municipal Council of Neuilly-sur-Seine, one of the richest suburbs of Paris, wherein a large segment of France’s political, economic, industrial and financial elites live. The fact that Mr. Sarkozy’s political life started surrounded by the French elite was considerable for his political career. The creation of an intellectual and support base traditionally takes place in the famous Grandes Ecoles, such as Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), as it has been the case for previous French presidents and ministers, and certainly is the case of François Hollande, the Socialist Candidate. Sarkozy was able to compensate this lack with its Neuilly connections. The latest scandal connecting Sarkozy with the L’Oreal heiress, Liliane de Bettencourt, is one example of his powerful network. A paper produced by the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute counts some interesting facts on the rise of Sarkozy and his understanding of politics.

Following his election in May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy appeared to have changed radically the direction of France’s foreign policy, especially towards the US. Sarkozy’s decision to re-establish ‘cordial’ relations with the US, still under the presidency of Bush, was in direct rupture with his predecessor, Jacques Chirac. The latter opposed his American counterpart, President Bush, in 2003 on the hot topic of the invasion of Iraq. The 2003 transatlantic and European split was real and substantial. The European unity was only reinstituted with the approval of the 2003 European Security Strategy, which symbolizes the agreement between EU Member States of a common agenda and united security vision. As per Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense at the time, Europe was then divided between Old and New Europe; France being one of the old members considering its opposition to the Iraq war. The tensions between the US and France remained high until the election of Sarkozy. Some talked at the time of ‘Sarko l’Américain,’ as he expressed at many occasion during and after the presidential race his admiration for the American model. However, Justin Vaïsse of the Brookings, argued that in fact the Americanism of Sarkozy is much more embedded into Hollywood and Elvis Presley rather than the admiration for the American political system.

The transatlantic relations between France and the US can be divided into three periods. First, from 2007 to 2008, the last part of the Bush administration, which I often refer as the ‘good Bush period,’ was favorable for a rapprochement between the two sides of the pond. Second, after the election of Obama, the honeymoon was extremely short. Very early in his presidency, Obama reoriented the attention of the US foreign policy from Europe to Asia. Such strategic move by Obama has affected the relations with his European counterparts. And the third period was since the G8 summit in Pittsburgh, following the collapse of the financial system in 2008, with closer relations on dealing at the international level with the financial crisis and with Iran. However, in general, the rupture with Chirac was over-emphasized, as Sarkozy did not change that much the direction of the French foreign policy. Sarkozy’s decision to fully reintegrate France within the military structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a moderate signal of his Atlanticism considering that France was always an active and core member of the alliance. The debate in France about such move was certainly excessive.

France was also a key actor during the summer 2008 crisis in Georgia. Following the invasion of Georgia by Russia, Sarkozy played an important role in monitoring Russia-West relations and in limiting a major split between the former Cold War enemies. Sarkozy did play a central role, but made some costly decisions and compromises for not only Georgia, but also the field of international law and human right. At that time France held the EU Presidency and was the voice of the EU, undermining Javier Solana’s role. Russian-French relations have historically been good since the late 19th century and remain quite stable. The latest part of this love story was the sale by France of a French Mistral class amphibious assault ship, creating criticism on both sides of the Atlantic.

One of the highest points of his presidency will remain the gamble on the Libyan campaign. Following a disastrous beginning of the year 2011 with total miscalculations and evaluations of the importance and reality of the Arab spring in Tunisia and then Egypt, Sarkozy decided to be proactive in the support of the rebels in Libya fighting Colonel Qaddafi. The miscalculation by the prestigious French diplomatic corps and intelligence services will remain as a stain and most likely become a cas d’école of diplomatic failure for future generations. Sarkozy did play a crucial role in getting the UN Security Council to agree on the UNSC Resolution 1973 allowing the implementation of a no-fly zone over Libya. Sarkozy was then able to bring the Americans on board and get NATO involved in the war in Libya. The use of NATO was critical for the success of the mission as French and British armies, navies and air forces have been considerably affected by budget cuts. For example, as of today Britain does not have an aircraft carrier, which seems quite contradictory to its historical strategic culture and heritage as a maritime power. The Libyan mission was a success and will become a template for future military interventions: short, precise, highly technologized, multilateral, and quite cheap. However, Sarkozy’s decision to use NATO was a major setback for the EU, which was completely bypassed by London and Paris, as well as discredited. The best example of the CSDP weakness is the fact that EUFOR Libya was created, but never deployed. Thus, HR Ashton remained quiet and irrelevant throughout the different steps of the Libyan campaign.

What next for 2012? Sarkozy does have a busy schedule until the first round of the presidential election. The year starts quite well for France and ultimately Sarkozy considering the fact that India decided to buy for $20bn of France fighter jet, Rafale, at the expense of the EADS’ Eurofighter Typhoon. Such contract is a true illustration of Sarkozy’s understanding and mastery of politics. The Financial Times published an outstanding article on the dogfight taking place backstage in order to sale the fighter jet. In addition to his reelection campaign, several topics need to be addressed, or at least discussed: first, Iran. What should France do about it? Is it the time to empower the EEAS led-by Lady Ashton and use the similar approach of 2003 EU3+1 implemented during Solana’s mandate? Or is it the time to discuss military operation within NATO? What is certain is that Sarkozy will not get a UNSC Resolution as China and Russia will definitely oppose it. Second, the mission in Afghanistan. France has been progressively removing its troops from Afghanistan, but has actively contributed to the European Gendarmerie Force (EFG) in charge of training the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army. With the announcement by the US to remove the troops by 2014, the Europeans will soon be following this trend. Will the EGF remain or should it come back home as well? Third, Syria. The violations of international law by the Syrian government are undeniable and some members of the Arab League monitoring team have even expressed their anger and opposition to the Assad regime. Avoiding and sidelining Syria could haunt Sarkozy in the future, the same way the Rwanda genocide has been haunting French political elites for over 15 years, but for different reasons. Sarkozy understands that the UNSC will not agree on a Resolution, but decision needs to be taken on the matter. Unfortunately until today China and Russia have favored sovereignty over humanity. Could it be done outside the laws with a NATO-led operation as it was done in 1999 in Kosovo? It would be ethically a right mission embodying the R2P concept, but wrong as it would violate international law. Fourth, Turkey. Franco-Turk relations have been at their lowest since the adoption by the French Assembly of the recent law criminalizing the denial of the Armenian genocide. Poor bilateral relations with Turkey will ultimately hurt and affect the overall EU and NATO relations. Turkey could block, as it has done in the past, Berlin Plus type NATO operations. Sarkozy must address the matter with Turkey and find new common ground. Fifth, the economic crisis has been painful for the Euro-Atlantic community. The Eurozone is still not safe and saved, as the financial and economic situations of Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal remain volatile. Sarkozy with his German counterpart, Ms Merkel, have a lot of work in readjusting and agreeing on the rules of the game and reforming the Eurozone. Sixth, the British headache. Since the gamble of Prime Minister Cameron back in November, the relations between Britain and France have not been of the most pleasant. The Franco-Anglo relations are central for the construction of the common EU defense polict as it was the case in the 1998 Saint-Malo Treaty creating the ESDP, and in the 2010 Defense Treaty. Both actors need one another in order to maintain their active foreign policies and keep the construction of the CSDP going. 2012 will be interesting to see how France and Britain readjust their relations either with the reelection of Sarkozy; or with the election of Mr. Hollande.

Even though, I have not been a supporter of Mr. Sarkozy’s domestic and social policies as well as fundamentally disagree with his leadership and governing style, I have to admit that he has been an interesting international leader. His approach to foreign policy is quite in the continuity of French Gaullist heritage. However, the case of the French operation in Ivory Coast, last April, has been completely under-studied and under-covered by global media. Some have argued that the Libyan mission was a simple cover-up for the real mission and French interests, Ivory Coast. I would also criticize his lack of commitment to the construction and strengthening of the EEAS. It is true that Ms. Ashton has not been the best representative as well as has been unable to establish a common EU vision, however she was appointed by the 27 Heads of State and Government. Sarkozy was part of the appointing committee, and privileged at that time the securing of the DG Internal Market to Michel Barnier rather than getting a French HR. Sarkozy’s priorities were set: French’s influence over the common market, even though the Directors are theoretically not supposed to represent their national government; l’Europe de la defense after.

Until then there is one thing that I can’t wait to see: who will be representing France at the NATO summit in May in Chicago?

Person of the Year – Fatou Bensouda

The face of international war crimes prosecution is now an African woman.  Fatou Bensouda was chosen to succeed Luis Moreno-Ocampo as the International Criminal Court’s Chief Prosecutor in December.  Bensouda has formerly served as Solicitor-General in Gambia, and as an adviser and trial attorney at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.  The choice of Bensouda will help the I.C.C.’s image in Africa where all of the crimes in cases being prosecuted at the court occurred.   When Bensouda takes over in June she will become only the second Chief Prosecutor for the I.C.C. and the first African.

Sudan

South Sudan gained independence in July as Omar al Bashir’s genocidal campaign expanded. Civilian targets in Darfur and South Sudan continue to suffer dozens of casualties weekly by aerial bombardments from the north, while the targeted killing of civilians has expanded to South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions where mass killings and mass rapes began before South Sudan officially existed, and continue to this day. Meanwhile Sudanese president/genocidaire Bashir has received less pressure and softer criticism from Western governments than other Arab leaders despite his body count being larger by magnitudes. Bashir has a warrant issued for his arrest by the I.C.C. but still managed to visit Malawi, Djibouti, Egypt and China last year with impunity.

Côte d’Ivoire

Laurent Gbagbo became the first former head of state to appear before the International Criminal Court, in December.  The former president of Ivory Coast was arrested in April after months of violence in the country which claimed 3,000 lives resulting from Gbagbo’s refusal to relinquish power after being defeated in the 2010 presidential election by Alassanne Ouattara. The I.C.C. is continuing its investigation into the situation in Ivory Coast where former chief prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has described attacks against civillians there as widespread and systematic.  Pro-Ouattara forces are also suspected of ethnically motivated massacres.

Libya

On June 27th, Moammar Gaddafi became the second sitting head of state issued with an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court.  Warrants were issued for Gaddafi for crimes against humanity following the February 15 uprising, along with his son and de-facto Prime Minister at the time Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and for Intelligence Chief Abdullah Al-Senussi.  The case against Moammar Gaddafi was terminated in November following his death.  The I.C.C. is working with Libya on possible avenues of prosecution of Saif Gaddafi who is in Libyan custody, deciding whether the trial will occur in Libya, The Hague or both.  Conflicting reports persist as to whether Al-Senussi has been captured or remains at large.

Kenya

The ‘Ocampo Six’ faced Confirmation of Charges hearings in September and October and expect a ruling on whether their trials will proceed at the I.C.C. in the first few weeks of the new year.  Six high rankings officials, including two candidates in this year’s presidential contest, are being charged with crimes against humanity relating to the 2008 post-election violence.  The ‘Six’ hopes of dismissal were bolstered by the Court’s decision in December declining to confirm charges against Callixte Mbarushimana for allegedly orchestrating attacks on civilians in the D.R.C. from abroad.  Mbarushimana has also been implicated in murders during the Rwandan Genocide and has been released in France.

Sierra Leone

The trial of former Liberian war lord and president Charles Taylor concluded in March at the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  Two months later contempt proceedings commenced upon reports that prosecution witnesses were being sought out and offered bribes to recant their testimony.  The judges are still in deliberation and a verdict is expected in early 2012.  Wikileaks released a 2009 cable showing U.S. diplomats trying to arrange to extradite Taylor for trial in America if he is acquitted at the S.C.S.L.  Taylor is currently on trial for his involvement in the Sierra Leonian Civil War and at trial has been accused of commanding the Revolutionary United Front, and using them primarily as a diamond pillaging force, killing and maiming thousands of civiallians during the war. 

 
Central African Republic

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Rwanda 

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda wrapped up its last calendar year in 2011.  In July of 2012 the new International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals is set to take over the remaining work of the ICTR (and that of the ITCY in 2013) which is currently estimated at less than 4%.  Two former National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development leaders were sentenced to life in prison for their roles in the 1994 Genocide in December, meanwhile convicted Genocide architect, former Rwandan Defense Ministry Chief of Staff, Theoneste Bagosora’s life sentence was commuted to thirty-five years after appeals judges cleared him from charges surrounding some mass murders, while maintaining his conviction for genocide.  In light of the impending closing of the ICTR and improvements in the Rwandan judicial system, the tribunal made its first referral of a genocide case to the domestic courts in Rwanda.  Just five years previously the Tribunal refused to make such referrals citing the Rwandan court system’s inability to adequately administer justice.  Since its inception in 1994 eighty-three of the ninety-two people indicted by the tribunal have been arrested; sixty-three have been sentenced to jail terms spanning from nine months to life imprisonment; five accused are still on trial and nine remain at large.

This end of year has been quite tumultuous in Europe: European citizens are in the street, rating agencies threaten to downgrade the rating of some members of the Eurozone, the race to elections is going full speed in several EU countries, all this taking place in a dire economic and political climax. The political debate in Europe has been quite violent, and France has played a considerable part to it. Under President Nicolas Sarkozy, France has been extremely active on the European and international stage leading the way in many European Summits and other sorts of meeting. However, France has also been in the middle of considerable political and diplomatic crises: one with its neighbor Britain; and the other with Turkey. These bilateral crises could spill-over to higher levels.
The crisis between France and Britain has reached its peak the week following the European Council to reform the Treaties on December 8th and 9th. British Prime Minister, David Cameron, vetoed the agreement that would have led the way to the construction of a fiscal union. Instead it became an intergovernmental agreement between the 17 members of the Eurozone. Germany Chancellor, Ms. Merkel, wanted an agreement among 27 in order to increase the accountability of Member States, while Mr. Sarkozy preferred an intergovernmental agreement. Ms. Merkel had to settle down with her second option because of Britain, even though she “insisted on wholesale revision of the EU’s treaties to enshrine in law the Eurozone’s promise of greater fiscal discipline.”
In the aftermath of the meeting the members of the French ruling party as well as members of the government started a war of words against their cross-channel neighbor. French Prime Minister, François Fillon, and the head of the French central Bank suggested that the AAA credit rating of Britain should be downgraded before France considering that British economy – inflation and debt – was worst than the French. French Finance Minister, François Baroin, added on French public radio that “in terms of the economic situation, one prefers to be French rather than British at the moment.” Even Nicolas Sarkozy took an active role in the vendetta by declaring that Mr. Cameron had acted like a child during the EU Summit.
As declared by a European diplomat in the Financial Times, “Nobody understood what Cameron wanted – nobody. We were talking about big things – saving the euro – and he was asking for peanuts. It was not the time or place.” Even the centrist and pro-European deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, who declared that “I’m bitterly disappointed by the outcome of last week’s summit, precisely because I think now there is a danger that the UK will be isolated and marginalized within the European Union.” He underlined that the interests of Britain is with the EU and that being isolated could only have negative considerable economic, financial, and political consequences for Britain. Following the aggressive tone of the French government, one of the few assets across the channel has declared that the French attacks were ‘simply unacceptable.’

The second crisis concerns a project of law by the French Parliament on the Armenian genocide, which was approved earlier on today, December 22nd. Despite public manifestation in front of the building of the French Assembly and the repeated threats of the Turkish government, the French deputies passed the law, which still needs to be approved by the Senat. Under French law, the denial of the Armenian genocide of 1915 would be penalized by one year of imprisonment as well as a heavy fine. Under the law, France recognized two genocides, the Jewish genocide that took place during World War two and the Armenian of 1915. This is no secret that Ankara, the capital of Turkey, still refused to recognize it. The question of the Armenian genocide has been at the center of Turkish membership to the EU. The diplomatic consequences between the two partners will be considerable with the possible implementation by Ankara of diplomatic, commercial and economic sanctions. Following the approval of the draft law, Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Erdogan, declared the suspension of bilateral meetings, called back the Turkish ambassador to France, as well as putting on hold all military exercises between the two countries.
Relations between Paris and Ankara have not been at their best since the election of President Sarkozy in 2007. Mr. Sarkozy clearly expressed France opposition to the EU membership of Turkey. Plus during his presidential run in 2006-07, Mr. Sarkozy pledged for his support of a law that would penalize any kind of denial of the Armenian genocide.
However, France claims that the proposed text does not target Turkey, as it is not even mentioned in the text and expressed by Valérie Boyer, a right wing deputy. Turkey’s reaction has been to denounce the colonial past of France and all the excess that occurred in Algeria and Rwanda.

What to take from these two considerable political and diplomatic crises beyond the fact that France is in serious period of crisis and confusion. Frustrations are high in France. Even after the success of the Libyan mission and the leadership of France with Germany on trying to save Greece and ultimately solving the Euro crisis, President Sarkozy’s approval ratings are at an all-time low. President Sarkozy as well as the members of his party, UMP, are feeling the progressive shift of the political and societal wind. The level of unemployment, low growth, societal tensions, continuous strikes, erosion of the welfare state, social inequalities and so on have affected the functioning of the state and the credibility of Mr. Sarkozy’s abilities to govern and ultimately lead. By frustrating and offending its close allies and partners, France is not helping its case.
However, it would be a considerable strategic mistake for France to continue down this path for two reasons. First, France needs the support of Britain in order to solve the crisis in Europe. A stable economic and financial Britain can only benefit the EU and ultimately France. The degree of interdependence between the island and the continent is too important to be left behind. Britain has its share of the blame and needs to either commit to the EU or leave. The status quo has lasted well too long. In this time of crisis, Britain cannot keep playing hardball, as it will not only affect its growth and political stability. Thus, the political divisions between Cameron and Clegg are unhealthy for the future of Britain. Second, Turkey has emerged as a new regional power. France cannot destroy its diplomatic, economic, military and political ties with such an important emerging power. For example, one of the solutions of the Syrian crisis lies down with Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey has been a reliable partner of the EU and its Member States. Alienating Turkey, a secular state in a conflicted region, would not be in the interest of neither France nor the EU. Thus, the Turkish-French fraught could have considerable impact on the weakening Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Turkey, a NATO member, will not hesitate to block any future Berlin plus type mission affecting the success of CSDP operation as well as the cooperation between the EU and NATO on military and humanitarian matters.

French must take a hard look at itself and have an honest discussion about its current situation and the future that it wants for itself domestically and internationally. The current presidential race could become this platform of discussion in order to shape a new future and design appropriate and needed policies. Domestic and economic problems cannot affect the ties with its partners. French’s interests need to be reassessed. It is not in the interest of France and the EU to have its government shouting inflammatory narratives. France cannot isolate itself for the simple reason that its power emerges from its international stature.

What is certain is that the EU is in serious crisis politically, economically, ideationally, and sentimentally. It will take some times before the emotions go down. In this interesting climax, we can only wish well to the new member, Croatia. It will most likely be a tumultuous Christmas dinner. Welcome to the family!

Africa’s economic prospects have always been a topic of great consternations for local governments and international analysts and commentators.  A continent rich in commodities (oil, diamonds, minerals), with a favorable demographic trends, and the potential for economic growth, has historically been ‘stuck in the muck’.  Yet, things are turning around, and the past decade has seen consistent economic growth (faster than East Asia’s), a 200% increase in trade with the rest of the world, a decline in foreign debt (by a quarter) and budget deficits (by two thirds), and inflation in the single digits (8%).

Although there still a lot to be done throughout the continent, a recent article by The Economist (Africa’s hopeful economies: The sun shines bright) was talking about the emergence of Africa’s “Lion Economies.”  However, the global financial crisis which, has crippled the U.S. and EU economies and is threatening global trade and commodity prices, could also derail Africa’s economic prospects and its significant progress to sustainable growth.

With this in mind, in January 2012, the African Union Heads of State and Government will hold their annual summit and focus on the theme of “Boosting Intra-Africa Trade”.  The choice of the theme is both appropriate and timely, given the challenges facing the continents ability to continue to rely on global trade and high commodity prices for growth, and the need to come up with strategies to improve the situation.

On average over the past decade, only about 10 – 13% of African trade is with African nations, whilst 40% of North American trade is with other North American countries, and 63% of trade by countries in Western Europe is with other Western European nations.

To this end, African countries have established the African Union, and created various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to improve growth through trade.  In this context, the RECs are pursuing integration through free trade, and developing customs unions and a common market.  Eventually, these efforts are expected to converge to an African Common Market (ACM) and an African Economic Community (AEC), whereby economic, fiscal, social and sectoral policies will be continentally uniform.

Pooling economies and markets together through regional integration provides a sufficiently wide economic and market space to make economies of scale possible.  Trade enables countries to specialize and export goods that they can produce cheaply, in exchange for what others can provide at a lower cost.  Trade also provides the material means in terms of capital goods, machinery and raw and semi-finished goods that are critical for growth.

More importantly, through such an economic marketplace, Africa can strengthen its economic independence and empowerment with respect to the rest of the world.  A united Africa can better negotiate for access to markets (foreign and domestic), commodity prices, foreign investment and technology transfers with its trading partners in the U.S. and the EU.

Even more importantly, is the ability to negotiate better terms of trade with the BRIC countries, which operate more nationalistically in the global market then the U.S.-EU market economies (negotiating with governments vs. negotiating with corporations).  A generation ago, Brazil, Russia, India and China accounted for just 1% of African trade.  Today they make up 20%, and by 2030 the rate is expected to be 50%.  Therefore, as the BRIC economies go, so will Africa’s economic prosperity – thus enhancing the negotiating needs of the continent vis-à-vis the BRIC countries.

A New Continental FTA –

Therefore, if trade is a vehicle to growth and development, then removing the barriers that inhibit it can only help increase its impact.  In order to address this trend, African leaders are making new commitments to boosting intra-African trade.

First was the landmark decision by COMESA, EAC (East Africa Community – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda) and SADC to establish a single Free Trade Area.  The launch of this tripartite FTA initiative covering 26 African countries (more than half of AU membership) with a combined population of 530 million (57% of Africa’s population) and a total GDP of $630 billion (53% of Africa’s total GDP) has galvanized interest towards a much broader Continental FTA.

It will enlarge markets for goods and services, eliminate the problem of multiple and overlapping memberships, enhance customs cooperation and broader trade facilitation, promote harmonization and coordination of trade instruments and nomenclature, and broader relaxation of restrictions on movement of goods, persons and services.

The collaboration and cooperation of RECs through the Continental FTA should further improve regional infrastructure and consolidate regional markets through improved interconnectivity in all forms of transport and communication as well as promote energy pooling to enhance the regions’ competitiveness.

Export-led Growth Alternatives –

The one lesson from South-East Asia that all developing countries and regions must never forget is that export-led growth will always produce desirable economic benefits.  Focusing on existing areas where the continent has a comparative advantage (fuels, minerals, and even food products) will continue to generate valuable returns to be invested in those areas that need additional financing.

Food production in particular (along with beverages, tobacco, and other agricultural products) could be a boondoggle for African countries.  Although the continent as a whole is a food importer (see chart from a recent Issue Paper prepared by the AU Commission for the 2012 AU Summit), Africa has 60% of the world’s uncultivated arable land.  With rising populations in Asia, food is becoming more and more valuable, and global food prices and constantly rising.  Africa more than Europe is in need of ‘Common Agricultural Policy’ which puts real focus and energy (meaning financing) behind this potentially very profitable segment of the economy.

However, as the Commissions Issue Paper points out, the continents infrastructure and logistic shortcomings make all efforts to increase trade (export or intra-African) very expensive and uncompetitive.  In particular, because of infrastructure bottleneck (roads, ports, telecommunications, and storage) transport costs are 63% higher in African countries compared with the average in developed countries (and constitute 14% of the value exported in African countries, against 8.6% in developed countries).

Furthermore, delays at African customs are, on average, longer than in the rest of the world: 12 days in Sub-Saharan countries compared with 7 days in Latin America, less than 6 days in Central and East Asia, and slightly more than 4 days in Central and East Europe.  These delays add a tremendous cost to importers and exporters, and they increase the transaction costs of trading among African countries.  Each transport day lost due to customs and related problems are equivalent to additional tax.  In addition, delays and complicated procedures related to insuring goods and customs guarantee requirements raise the cost of exporting from Africa and compromise the continent’s competitiveness.  For food and agricultural (perishable) goods, such delays can be devastating – leading to the complete loss of entire shipments.

The Road Ahead –

For Africa, it often seems that the obstacles outweigh the potential for sustainable poverty alleviation and continuing economic growth.  The current situation is hanging in the balance, especially after the global financial crisis and the recent political upheaval in the north (see Arab Spring).

But, incrementally, it appears that the leaders of the African Union are fully aware of the way forward; a Continental FTA that focuses on Intra-African trade.  The road (for regional integration) is long and hard, but if the AU can ‘build it’ then goods will come and go, and trade could do for Africa what it has done for South and East Asia.