It is the world’s largest Muslim country but remains for the most part secular. It is home to the eighteenth largest economy on the globe but more than sixteen percent of the population lives on less than $2 per day. Indonesia has long been considered the linchpin for Southeast Asia and, indeed, serves as a fascinating case study for which myriad domestic phenomena can be explored:  macroeconomic policy, the role of religion, and the nexus between political control and the military. In the seventh episode of the 2012 Great Decision series, produced by the Foreign Policy Association, Indonesia’s role in the region and the world, as well as its relationship with the United States, is examined in such frameworks. FPA readers can purchase a copy of the eight episode DVD and briefing book at the Great Decisions TV webpage.

The two panelists – Walter Lohman, the Director of The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, and Sadanand Dhume, a columnist for the Wall Street Journal – start with an historical overview beginning in the Cold War era to properly contextualize Indonesia’s modern trajectory.

Fearful of a communist wave which threatened to sweep Southeast Asia into Moscow’s orbit, U.S. policymakers in the Richard Nixon administration were quick to align themselves with Suharto, a zealous anti-communist Major General who had helped to overthrow the country’s previous military ruler in 1967. As Lohman posits, Washington’s support for Suharto was the lesser of two evils.

Never one to shy away from befriending some of the world's worst dictators, President Richard Nixon hosts Suharto in the Oval Office in 1969. Photo: ETAN

Despite a lack of political and civil rights under Suharto, Dhume argues that the dictator showed a knack for organization and, as a result, Indonesia underwent a period of extraordinary economic growth (abetted by millions of dollars in aid from Washington) while also enjoying some measure of political stability. Dhume is quite cavalier, however, in his dismissal of Suharto’s human rights record, saying only that there were “abuses of course,” before moving on to another point.

After the overthrow of Sukarno, the country’s previous autocrat, Suharto went on a rampage against his political opponents, especially Communists, which resulted in a bloodbath that rivaled Stalin’s endeavors in terms of sheer brutality. In December 1975, Indonesia invaded and occupied East Timor, causing untold misery and close to 100,000 deaths over the course of the following quarter century. Moreover, the Suharto regime’s behavior in West Papua has been called genocide by the Yale Law School. Yes, there were abuses, of course.

Suharto’s downfall came against a backdrop of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Indonesia’s population could tolerate Suharto’s corruption and nepotism as long as the economy continued to hum along. However, the financial collapse which hit the country was not only an economic calamity but also served as a social and political awakening as well.

Indonesians go to the polls in 1999, the culmination of a remarkably quick transition to democracy. Photo: China Daily

The elections held in 1999 were, by all accounts, free and fair. Such a reality was met with surprise by most observers who have noted the chaotic nature of quick democratic transitions. One need only look to Egypt today to find an appropriate juxtaposition. With a litany of actors – opposition figures, military personnel, and remnants from the old regime — all clamoring for a voice at the table, one should expect a rocky road. In Indonesia, there were a fair share of bumps in that road, especially between 1998 and 2002, but the end product can be held up as a model to follow for other countries undergoing the trials and tribulations of democratization.

Indonesia’s transition from autocratic rule to democracy is almost as unique as the country itself. Consisting of more than 17,000 islands, the Great Decisions panel brings up the question as to how Indonesia has maintained its territorial integrity through the years. With the exceptions of East Timor, which gained independence in 2002, and the continued struggle by separatists in West Papua, Indonesia has retained sovereignty over its whole.

Part of that was due to the iron fisted rule of Suharto, but another part is due to the nation’s religious freedom. While 88 percent of the country is Muslim, there are major areas that are home to religious minorities. Bali, for example, is largely Hindu, while Sumatra is Christian. These groups have never been persecuted for their beliefs and that has gone a long way preventing the type of schisms that have popped up in other areas of the world which have divaricating degrees of religious tension. A good contemporary example in the news lately is Nigeria, where sectarian fighting in the country’s north threatens to tear the nation apart.

In terms of democratization and minority rights, Dhume suggests that Indonesia can be an example for countries involved in the Arab Spring. This is so not just because of the mutual connection to Islam, but because Indonesia has proven that such transitions can be successfully implemented.

The United States, for its part, has maintained a very close partnership with Jakarta, even after he Suharto years. The two countries participate in various military exercises together, and have cooperated fully in the apprehension of several well-known members of Jemaah Islamiyah, a militant Islamic organization operating in Southeast Asia.  Washington values its relationship with countries like Indonesia because of the non-political role of Islam and because of its ability, in the 21^stcentury at least, to curtail the influence of the military in the political process.

President Barack Obama, seen here meeting with Indonesia President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2010, spent part of his childhood in Indonesia. Photo: Corbis Images

President Barack Obama has a personal connection to Indonesia, having spent four years of his childhood living there. He has also made two state trips to the country as President in only his first term. Ties between the two countries appear to be very strong at the moment – a reality which Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has boasted of on numerous occasions – and with Indonesia’s GDP having increased sevenfold just over the last fifteen years, Jakarta is poised to be a regional powerbroker and a significant international player in the years to come.

In an Arms Control Association issue brief published on January 4, Greg Thielmann ably makes the case for trying to resolve the Iranian nuclear dilemma by means of old-fashioned diplomacy. The ACA’s introduction to the piece forcefully gets across just how drastically and dangerously U.S.-Iranian relations have deteriorated in the last months:

“At the end of 2011, the U.S. Congress passed new legislation to sanction transactions with the Central Bank of Iran. In response, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz…. Republican presidential candidates meanwhile charged Iran with everything from building nuclear facilities under mosques to declaring its intent to attack the United States with nuclear weapons. And the Obama administration stated repeatedly that “the military option remains on the table.”

In the meantime, on a slightly more positive note, Defense Secretary Panetta has specified that (only) Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would represent a red line for the United States. And whatever Republican contenders may have been saying, it’s clear the American public wants out of the old wars the country is in and does not want to get into new ones. But today comes news of another assassination in Iran, a sharp reminder that this particular war is not merely a cold one.

Thielmann argues for opening U.S.-Iranian diplomatic channels if only to avoid possibly fatal misunderstandings. Why, if we found it possible to deal with tyrants like Stalin and Mao, he wonders, cannot we deal with the unattractive crowd currently running the show in Tehran?

I have no quarrel with anything Thielmann says here. But let me introduce just two cautionary notes as to the limits of his analysis. First, though his issue brief find many pertinent cautionary tales in the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States, we should bear in mind that the “real war” (to borrow a phrase from Richard Nixon and Walt Whitman) is not between the United States and Iran but between Iran and Israel. It is not the United States that is assassinating Iranian scientists, condoning such acts, or sabotaging nuclear facilities. Everybody knows it’s Mossad.

So if some real talking is going to take place, Israel needs to be made part of that conversation.

Second, let’s be clear that this is not just a cold war between Israel and Iran. Even during the worst years of the cold war the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union did not openly threaten to literally annihilate each other as living entities. And nor did the two superpowers assassinate each other’s scientists or blow up each other’s factories. What’s going on between Israel and Iran is virtually war, and it’s serious.

Happy New Year, everyone. Before you look forward to 2012 it’s time to look back at South Africa’s 2011.

1. Summary of 2011

There were three issues that defined 2011 in South Africa.

1) By far the most significant of these was the controversy over the Protection of State Information Bill. For many years the ANC’s critics — white, usually, though not always — have accused the party of having dictatorial tendencies. These accusations have by and large been nonsense. Until now. The Information Bill, which putatively protects state secrets from being released via the media — a canard if ever there was one — represents an Apartheid-style bill in post-apartheid clothing. If government has the ability to control, menace, and punish an independent media, that media ceases to be independent. Let’s say that you trust the current iteration of the ANC. And let’s say, fairly, that even as the party has had the necessary 2/3 of the vote, or close to it, to allow them unilaterally to amend the constitution, it has not done so. But whenever an act of government such as this passes a useful question to ask is not what this dispensation might do with it, but rather what a future, more draconian dispensation might do. The question is not whether one should trust this government. The question is whether to trust any potential future government.

What has been reassuring has been the extent to which the passage of the bill met with vibrant public dissent. Arguably civil society became more engaged with this issue than any other political question in the post-apartheid era. “Black Tuesday” protests both real and symbolic (in the form of wearing black and in many cases tape over one’s mouth) took place across the country and dominated the news cycle and brought out the best among journalists and public intellectuals. So far all of this protest was to little avail, but it is telling that South Africans did not passively take this news or gnash teeth and ball their fists impotently.

2) During the World War II era in the United States (and in other parts of the world) labor unions had tremendous potential leverage but chose not to exercise it, deciding instead to act for what they believe was the greater good. But once the war ended, so too did the gentleman’s agreement about mass strikes and as a result labor actions proliferated. The Public Sector Strikes that hammered South Africa throughout the country’s winter of labour discontent revealed both the extent of working class dissatisfaction with the ANC and served to reveal the hangover from the 2010 World Cup. By and large the unions chose not to strike during the World Cup the previous winter, but those chickens roosted this year and then some. COSATU may be in alliance with the ANC from an official governance standpoint. But the unions flexed their muscles throughout 2011, once again revealing that the tripartite Alliance might not be on all that sound footing.

3) The ANC’s very public rebuke of Julius Malema, the ANC Youth League’s enfant terrible, represents the latest act but not the last act in an ongoing drama. Malema stands, I’m going to assume, as the country’s Phoenix in waiting. Like Richard Nixon in the early 1960s Malema has vowed that he has exited politics. Trust me — whatever he says, Malema is not done with public life in South Africa. He is destined to rise from the ashes, and when he does, he will carry significant numbers of supporters with him. Maybe not enough to change the country’s political calculus, but enough to make the party hierarchy uncomfortable.

2. Most Unexpected Event

1) In a country where the unexpected is expected it is hard to identify one shocking event or incident. But for observers of South African sport 2011 was not a great year. The Springboks exited the World Cup in rather desultory fashion (though they did outplay Australia in every aspect of the game but the scoreboard, the scoreboard is the only measure that matters). Bafana Bafana was left on the outside looking in when the national team’s leadership did not realize that more than a tie was necessary to progress to the continent’s championship. And the Proteas? Well, they continue to be the best international cricket team never to assert its dominance and they don’t seem any closer to doing so now than they have since their return to international cricket.

But seriously — not knowing the rules of advancement for a major international tournament? Unforgivable.

2) I do know that many of you may not be as sports mad as I am. So the other big surprise, at least for me, was the anticlimactic way that Julius Malema stepped down from his perch at the ANC Youth League. Despite Malema’s Nixonian pronouncements that he’s done with public life, such disavowals are in the nature of the political phoenix. I’m willing to place wagers that we will, in fact, have Julius Malema to kick around in years to come.

3. Person/Group of the Year

There are three possibilities.

1) In a country where everything is political, especially that which isn’t, and that is so dominated by the ANC not only politically but culturally as well, is it any surprise that President Jacob Zuma stands at the top of this list? Love him, hate him, or tolerate him, Zuma is the essential figure in South African political life. It is quite possible that Zuma will face a political storm at the end of the year, but, assuming that he still holds on to power in the party he is likely to continue to maintain this spot for some time to come.

2) For sheer significance in a year in which a mass of public sector workers flexed some muscles and reminded people of the potentially outsized role of COSATU it is hard to overstate the importance of COSATU General Seceratary Zwelinzima Vavi. Vavi emerges every so often to speak, and when he does so, people listen. Vavi could prove to be a kingmaker. Keep an eye on him.

3) For all of the reasons stated above (and for more stated below) Julius Malema continues to be a vital figure in the country’s politics, no less so because of his avowal that he is exiting public life.

4. Forecast for 2012

1) Is the country looking at another Polokwane Moment? In December the ANC will meet in Magaung and in so doing will elect the party president and thus the almost certain winner of the country’s next national elections (and lots of other elected positions of importance). You will recall that in December 2007 the ANC ousted Thabo Mbeki from the party presidency, which began the process of his ultimate humiliation in stepping down from the presidency of the country months later. Jacob Zuma was the chief beneficiary of the events in Polokwane. But many in the party have not been especially comfortable with Zuma either personally or politically. And understandably so.

Will this dissatisfaction give way to a push similar to the one that pushed Mbeki from party leadership? The odds are against it, but Zuma has more detractors within the party than an ANC president should find comfortable. A further irony is that the ANC Youth League might be looking for Zuma’s scalp. There are rumors that Thabo Mbeki might be their man. How unfathomable would that be?

2) More on Malema: Indeed, I would not be surprised if he is visible by the time of the ANC’s party conference in Mangaung in December. Malema may for the time being be persona non grata in the ANC. But will that endure if there is enough of a public clamoring for Malema’s redemption? And if that does not happen, might Malema look toward another political party and another political party toward him?

3) And expect the ANC centenary to dominate the year. And for current party leaders to cloak themselves in that history. Whatever other predictions I make, this one, I’m pretty certain, will be right.

(By the way, in last year’s Year in Review post, which was about the continent as a whole, I think I did respectably in my forecast. The key? Much like with astrology or fortune telling, don’t get too specific!)

5. Best Book of 2011

In a year of good books about Africa, if I have to choose one to recommend, I would go with Stephen Chan’s fine Southern Africa: Old Treacheries and New Deceits, in which a respected academic expert on the region provides an accessible overview of the state of affairs in Southern Africa with particular emphasis on South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.

Have a great 2012, and thanks for reading.

I find it apt to include here the kind words that Muneeza Shamsie, renowned Pakistani writer and critic,  wrote about Pakistaniaat and about my book in her annual bibliography of Pakistan-related works. You can find the whole article at the website of the Journal of Commonwelath Literature.

Shamsie on Constructing Pakistan:

Constructing Pakistan: Foundational Texts and the Rise of Muslim National Identity (1857–1947) by Masood Ashraf Raja studies the ways in which pre-Partition literary texts in Urdu created transgeographic narratives of Muslim unity which contributed to the idea of Pakistan. He asserts that the growth of Muslim nationalism and concepts of Muslim exceptionalism were political and “a question of survival” (xvi) amid major political changes in the post-Mutiny era. He re-interprets the writings of Ghalib and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan as a means of negotiating an equitable relationship between the British Raj and the Indian Muslims (not one of patronage). He discusses the new movement in Urdu literary criticism pioneered by Azad and Hali and the reformist message in the fiction of Nazir Ahmed, who advocated Anglicization while neo-traditionals such as Shibli Nomani and Akbar Allahbadi searched for answers in Muslim history and pan-Islamism instead. Raja goes on to compare Iqbal and his modern, egalitarian universalist interpretation of Islam with Maulana Mawdudi’s concepts of an Islamic state governed by shariah.

Shamsie on Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies:

Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies, edited by Masood Raja at the University of [North] Texas, is an immensely important addition to Pakistan Studies. The journal is a peer-reviewed multi-disciplinary academic journal with online and print editions; its many literature-related writings include critical articles, reviews, bibliography and a much-needed platform for new poetry, fiction and translations by writers of Pakistani origin.

Shamsie on Pakistaniaat’s Special Issue on 1971 War, edited by Cara Cilano:

Cilano guest-edited the “Special Issue on 1971 Indo-Pakistan War” of Pakistaniaat: Journal of Pakistan Studies which has five essays that look at the national and international dimensions of the conflict. These include Philip Oldenberg’s discussion of the four different phases of the 1971 war including Kissinger’s visit to Peking; Luke A. Nichter and Richard A. Moss’s examination of the memoirs and policies of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and Mavra Farooq’s analysis of the relationship between Pakistan and China in 1971.

My personal gratitude and thanks from the entire staff of Pakistaniaat to Muneeza Shamsie for including us amongst the best of Pakistan-related works.

© 2012, Masood Ashraf Raja. This article may not be reproduced in any form without providing an active attribution link/ reference to The Pakistan Forum. All attribution links within the article must also be retained.