Last year was the Year of the Rabbit for the Chinese – promising among other things good luck!  However, China which came out of the global financial crisis almost unscathed (or at least better off than most major world economies) hit one too many ‘speed-bumps’ in 2011.  Last year’s inflation is threatening a significant slow-down of the Chinese economy, and the housing market is in such collapse that it could lead to real civil unrest.

Overall, in 2011 China assumed a more assertive role on the global stage.  China’s new posture was reflected in an aggressive trade agenda, a push for a larger role in international institutions, and provocative moves in the South and East China Seas.  These actions were both a reflection and a consequence of China’s growing economic prominence and resource needs, as well as China’s view that the United States is in decline while China is ascendant.

China continued the backsliding from market reforms in favor of an increased role of the state in the economy.  China continues to subsidize its state-owned enterprises to the detriment of both private Chinese firms and international competitors.  Despite promises by President Hu Jintao and other Chinese officials to ease a policy of discriminating against foreign companies in government procurement decisions; however, real change remains elusive, particularly among the provincial and local governments.

Currency Liberalization

China continued its aggressive capital controls during 2011, a policy which pegs the renminbi (RMB) to the dollar, restricts the flow of foreign capital in the domestic market, and investing foreign reserves in U.S. Treasury bonds.

By the end of 2011, China’s foreign exchange reserves are projected to be over $3.2 trillion, up nearly one trillion from $2.4 trillion back in January of 2010.  China’s foreign exchange reserves are now roughly three times greater than that of Japan, which has the second-highest foreign exchange reserves in the world.  Roughly two-thirds of China’s foreign exchange reserves are generally thought to be denominated in U.S. dollars, although the exact makeup of the reserves is unknown, because the Chinese government considers it to be a state secret.

Somewhat better known is the volume of China’s foreign exchange reserves that are made up of U.S. Treasury securities.  As of July 2011, the official estimate by the U.S. Treasury Department

stood at $1.2 trillion, up slightly from the same period one year before.  The real amount is considerably higher, since the $1.2 trillion does not take into account any purchases made on the secondary market nor does it factor in purchases made by intermediaries or made through tax havens, such as the Cayman Islands.

On the positive side, the Chinese government allowed the RMB to rise by roughly 6% in nominal terms over the last year, from 6.641 RMB per dollar at the beginning of the year, to 6.30 RMB per dollar by the end of December 2011.  This is the second-fastest rate of appreciation since the Chinese government eliminated its hard peg to the dollar in 2005.

The 12^th Five-Year-Plan

In March 2011, China ratified its 12th Five-Year Plan (2011– 2015), a government-directed industrial policy that focuses on the development and expansion of seven ‘‘strategic emerging industries.’’  The central and local governments will likely continue to combine targeted investment with preferential tax and procurement policies to ensure that Chinese firms emerge as global leaders, or ‘‘national champions,’’ in these industries within the next five years.

One of the main objectives of the 12th Five-Year Plan is to redirect China’s economy to one more focused on domestic consumption and less on exports and investment.  The plan assumes that China’s growth would therefore be more balanced and sustainable.  The plan also emphasizes higher value-added production and increased government support for domestic high-tech industries.

Increasing household consumption, a major goal of the 12^th Five-Year Plan, and the subsequent emergence of a more assertive consumer class, may be in direct contradiction to the Chinese government’s policy of keeping economic power firmly in the hands of the state and may compromise lending to many vested interests, including SOEs and the export sector.

Analysts and foreign business leaders fear that the emphasis on industrial upgrading will lead to the introduction of new government subsidies, which in turn will disadvantage foreign competitors.

In particular, the government’s new growth model includes such goals as:

• Setting a GDP growth target of 7% (down from the current actual GDP growth rate of 10%).  To do that, the government will have to divert money away from construction and corporate subsidies, and instead use public funds to increase household incomes.
• Cutting import tariffs to reduce input-costs, while boosting consumer demand and reducing China’s reliance for growth on exports which generates trade surpluses and contributes to the global trade imbalance.
• Improving the income of farmers and migrant workers, who have benefited the least from China’s phenomenal economic growth, by increasing minimum wages.  In particular, provinces across China have announced a string of double-digit wage increases this year as part of the government desire to increase incomes among the rural regions and migrant workers in the cities.
• Increasing spending on healthcare and full nationwide social welfare insurance to reduce the need for “precautionary savings” and encourage more Chinese consumer spending.
• Raising the minimum threshold for personal income tax.  This could exempt hundreds of millions of people from having to pay taxes, and boost household spending.

The most important short-term priority for the government is to address increases in food price, which Beijing intends to do through price controls.  In order to control inflation, the government intends to keep using the tools and methods that it has been employing thus far: manage liquidity, use price controls, curb real-estate speculation, and “adjust and improve” property tax policies.  Furthermore, the budget for this year shows a 35% increase in spending on low-income housing.

(For more, read: China’s 12th Five-Year-Plan – Will It Help With the Global Trade Imbalance?)

Inflation

While China has taken an externally assertive posture, it faces many internal challenges. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) relies on economic growth, combined with strict authoritarian rule, to maintain control over a factious and geographically vast nation.  Sharp increases in consumer prices, a pivotal factor in the early days of the student protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, are once again a problem for the Chinese economy.

Inflation is the Achilles heal of the CCP; inflation is what precipitated the Tiananmen Square demonstrations back in 1989, is what fueled the Arab youth discontent for the status quo, and is what is caused by China’s undervalued currency and current account restrictions.  What was but a prospect of inflation in 2010, turned to a serious threat to the longevity of the Chinese economy in 2011, forcing the government to impose price controls to a number of goods.  The rise in property values during the year, led to fears of a bubble market, and a significant drop of values by the end of 2011.  In the middle of the year, inflation was as high as 6.5%; the second highest level in the past 10 years.

Property Bubble

Following a decade-long boom and nearly two years of attempts by the central government to cool the overheated sector, the housing market in China appears to have turned.  In order to cool the overheating residential-property market, the central government has restricted purchases of multiple homes, demanded larger down-payments and curtailed opportunities for speculators to “flip”, or quickly sell on, properties.  It has curbed developers’ access to bank lending and cut off credit from new trust companies.  It is also encouraging the use of property taxes like those introduced in Shanghai and Chongqing last year.

Taken together, these measures have certainly slowed down the market.  Price growth has been slowing since early 2010.  Analysts suggest that prices fell during December 2011 in 60 of the 100 cities it monitors.  Land prices are falling fast, too.

In 2010, property construction accounted for 13% of Chinas GDP, and for more than 25% of all investment in what is the most investment-dependent economy of the world.  Property directly accounts for 40% of Chinese steel use; the country itself produces more steel than the next 10 producing countries combined, making it by far the most important buyer of inputs such as iron ore.  Construction in China is also important for a host of other industries, from copper, cement and coal to power generation equipment.  Most analysts agree that the sector matters to an extraordinary degree for the overall Chinese growth, for commodity demand, household expenditures, external trade and underlying heavy industrial profitability.

According to government figures, which most analysts believe understate the reality, average housing prices more than doubled in the last four years nationwide, while in Beijing and some other regions the price increase was more like 150%.  Data are incomplete but analysts say the price of an average apartment in a Chinese city is now about 8-10 times the average annual income nationwide; in cities like Beijing and Shanghai the ratio is closer to 30 times.  Now, by some estimates, property prices might fall by as much as 25% in the near future, and by another similar amount in the following two to three years.

However, its impost to remember that before 1998 China did not have a residential real estate market to speak of.  In urban areas, all housing was built and allocated by the state through the ubiquitous “work unit”.  In the countryside, peasant farmers built their own homes on land allotted to them by the state or the collective.

The real estate market that now plays such an important part in China’s overall economy was born when the Communist party decided in the late 1990s to begin transferring ownership of the vast majority of housing to individuals.  It is easy to forget that the market is just over a decade old and, apart from a brief dip in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis when transactions dried up, most Chinese have only seen prices double every couple of years and never seen them fall.  Besides, China is a country where speculative bubbles have been a constant phenomenon since market-based reforms picked up pace in the 1980s.

(For more, read: China Property – A lofty ceiling reached)

WTO – 10 Year Anniversary

In December of 2011, China celebrated 10 years since its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Last year also marks the end of China’s probationary period, under the terms of its Accession Agreement to the WTO.  The probationary period required China to lower its tariffs to levels below those of many other developing countries.  But compared with most industrialized countries, China was allowed to impose considerably higher tariffs (on average around 25%, while U.S. tariffs are mostly under 5%) — tariffs China has retained even as its economy has subsequently grown to No. 2 in the world.

Practices such as forced technology transfer and the creation of joint venture companies as a condition to obtaining access to the Chinese market; the adoption of unique, Chinese-specific standards for high-tech equipment; and extensive intellectual property rights violations are among the faulty policies designed to help China achieve its economic and development goal, while blatantly violating the spirit and often the letter of WTO law.

In the ten years since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), China has maintained a steep growth trajectory, outpacing both Germany and Japan to become the second largest economy in the world. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown from $1.32 trillion in 2001 to a projected $5.87 trillion in 2011 (an increase of more than 400%).  Concurrently, China has lifted 400 million of its citizens out of poverty and has experienced the largest rural-to-urban migration in history.

However, 2011 has been a particularly confrontation year in terms of trade disputes with the U.S., China’s most important trade partner.  The U.S. initiated consultations with the Chinese government on a number of cases (chicken products, subsidies, and internet restrictions), and China followed suite in the case of imports of U.S. cars.  Currently, three previous WTO cases involving U.S.-China trade are both open and active.  The Raw Materials case, which resulted in a decision favorable to the United States, is under appeal as of August 31, 2011.  The Flat-rolled Electrical Steel case and the Electronic Payments case have both advanced to formal dispute settlement, though no decision has been reached.

(For more, read: Sino-American Trade Relations – A heated exchange)

Soft Power – Climate Change

In December 2011, the World Climate Change Summit in Durban, South Africa, was considered a (at least very promising) success, thanks in part to the new found commitment of China to the cause.  More specifically, for the first time since the Kyoto agreement back in 1997, large emerging economic powers such as China, India and Brazil agreed to legal constraints on their emissions (unlike their previous resistance in 2007 and 2009, which clearly doomed past climate change efforts).

In the past, a familiar stalling point has been the refusal by emerging powerhouses such as China to agree to legal targets.  That has prompted others – most notably the US – to insist that they could not sign up to such pledges.  China, which in 2007 overtook the US to become the globe’s largest emitter, was one of the largest obstacles. However, China is still classed as a developing country under UN climate conventions and therefore not subject to legally binding constraints.

Having been blamed for wrecking the 2009 Copenhagen talks, Beijing went to Durban eager to promote its green credentials.  In a series of side events, its delegates boasted of China’s rising dominance of renewable energy markets and a five-year plan that for the first time includes plans for emissions trading and carbon intensity reduction targets.

There is still a lot of follow-up needed to make these new commitments real, but it seems that climate change (and the profitable side of this issue: development and marketing of green energy sources) is one area where China is willing to ‘play ball’ with the rest of the world and stretch its ‘soft power’ muscles.

(For more, read: Climate Change – The great regrouping)

Taiwan Strait

Despite the continuing improvement in economic and diplomatic relations across the Taiwan Strait, China deploys some 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles against the island.  In 2011 we saw the sale by the U.S. to Taiwan of a new $5.8 billion package of upgrades to its aging fleet of F–16 fighter jets.  In response to that, China indicated that it might suspend a series of military-to-military engagements.

However, as much as military build-up and confrontation across the Taiwan Strait will always define the China-Taiwan relationship, the upcoming Taiwanese Presidential election overshadowed developments at the end of last year.  China’s strategic planners are very alarmed by the uncertainty over the outcome of this month’s presidential election in Taiwan.

President Ma Ying-jeou, the Beijing government’s preferred candidate who has steered a path of warmer ties and direct economic links with the mainland, is suddenly in a tough race for reelection.  Ma’s chief opponent is Tsai Ing-wen, chairwoman of the Democratic Progressive Party, which officially backs the independence of Taiwan.  Tsai has raised the Beijing government’s ire for her refusal to publicly support an informal, unwritten, 20-year-old agreement between the two sides stipulating that there is just “one China.”

For months, the election was expected to hand an easy reelection victory to Ma, from the ­Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, after he steered the island through the worst of the global recession and secured a new trade deal with China.  But the race became more unpredictable with the entry of a third candidate, James Soong, a former Nationalist Party stalwart who founded the People First Party.

For China, a victory by the DPP will be considered a setback to cross-strait relations, and could lead to an military escalation as China is preparing for its own leadership transition.

China in South-East Asia

To the consternation of its neighbors, China asserts its expansive territorial claims in the South and East China Seas.  China is increasingly capable of pursuing its own interests at the expense of regional, perhaps even global, stability.  David Gordon of the Eurasia Group recently argued that China has overplayed its hand in Asia, and its rapid growth and aggressive posturing (both economic and military) “is inadvertently driving Asian states to build closer economic and strategic ties with the U.S. and each other.”

Over the past 18 months China has taken a very aggressive tone towards territorial disputes in the South China Sea and elsewhere.  Mr. Gordon further argues that Beijing has miscalculated its ability to cater to nationalist feelings domestically without alarming its neighbors, and is now (inadvertently) driving Asian nations to build closer economic and strategic ties with the U.S. and each other.

The Chinese leadership is very concerned with developments with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a U.S. led effort for freer trade among Pacific economies which the Chinese press often casts it as an aggressive U.S.-led ploy to squeeze China out of South East Asia.  During the fall, the U.S. formally accede to the East Asia Summit (the ASEAN+3 – just like China did back in 2005), a move that the other SE Asian nations welcome, as they hope that the U.S. could provide a counterweight to China in the region.

Last but not Least – Domestic Unrest

Every year, China experiences some kind of public unrest, be it because of food product contamination that was not handled properly by the authorities, or some natural disaster that was not remedies properly afterword’s, or some transportation accident that could have been averted.  Last year was no different.  However, what happened during the fall in a couple of rural places could have greater ramifications for this year.

In the Southern village of Wukan, protests began on 21–23 September 2011 after officials sold land to real estate developers without properly compensating the villagers.  Several hundred to several thousand people protested in front of and then attacked a Chinese Communist Party building, a police station and an industrial park.  Residents of Wukan had previously petitioned the national government in 2009 and 2010 over the land disputes.

In an apparent attempt to ease tensions, authorities allowed villagers to select 13 representatives to engage in negotiations.  Security agents abducted five of the representatives and took them into custody in early December.  The protests strengthened after one of the village representatives, Xue Jinbo, died in police custody in suspicious circumstances.  The villagers forced all Communist Party officials and police to flee the village, which came back with reinforcements and laid siege to the village, preventing food and goods from entering the village.

Eventually, the village representatives and provincial officials reached a peaceful agreement, satisfying the villager’s immediate requests.

During December, protests in the town of Haimen, of Guangdong province, which drew thousands of participants were ignited over plans to expand a coal-fired power plant in the town—a plan that residents opposed, arguing that existing coal-fired plants had caused environmental and health damage.  Demonstrations began on 20 December when thousands of residents barricaded a freeway and surrounded government offices in an attempt to block the project.

Riot police fired tear gas into the crowd and beat protesters with riot sticks.  Tensions cooled by 23 December, after Communist Party officials declared that the plant expansion plans would be temporarily suspended, and authorities agreed to release detained protesters.  Although the protests in Haimen were unrelated to demonstrations in nearby Wukan, Haimen residents told Reuters that they had followed developments in Wukan closely, regarding it as a good model of how citizens might negotiate with authorities.

This is not the beginning of China’s ‘Arab Spring’ moment.  China is a very large and very diverse country.  But when the people at the bottom of the ‘food chain’ can justify physical confrontation with the authority as the only viable way of ‘negotiating’ with the government, then everyone should be paying very close attention!

I wonder, what will the year of the Dragon bring…  more assertiveness by local people, or more resolve by the government in Beijing?

Photo Credit: Reuters

A Malaysian judge has ruled today that fiery opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim is not guilty of sodomy charges brought forth by a former male aide. The verdict opens up the possibility for Ibrahim to stand in the next general election and challenge the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) party which has held political power in the country for the past five decades.

The ruling from the presiding High Court judge, Mohamad Zabidin Diah, was rather unexpected, and Ibrahim stated that he was “pleasantly shocked” by the verdict. This was not the first time Ibrahim has faced allegations of sexual misconduct. In 1998, he was convicted of a similar charge and spent six years in prison before the ruling was overturned. One year prior, Ibrahim was the Deputy Prime Minister and looked poised to be the next leader of the country. However, after campaigning on an anti-corruption platform, he was sacked by then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. Ibrahim has consistently maintained that the subsequent sodomy charges levied against him were politically motivated.

After emerging from prison, Ibrahim put together a coalition of three opposition groups in the 2008 elections and scored the biggest political victory against BN in Malaysia’s democratic history. The BN lost five out of the nation’s sixteen states and also lost its traditional two thirds majority in Parliament. Not long after the elections, new charges appeared against Ibrahim, this time from his former male aide, Saiful Bukhari Azlan.

Exiting the courthouse today surrounded by his supporters, Ibrahim now seems poised to mount the strongest challenge yet to BN’s longtime control of Malaysia; the next elections are scheduled to be held no later than 2013. Ibrahim’s message is one of populism: in the wake of the Arab Spring and other myriad occupy movements across the globe this past year, Ibrahim is seen as the reformist candidate who has pledged to rollback several harsh laws which have served to curtail many political and civil rights within Malaysia. Moreover, he is seen as the voice of the country’s various ethnic minorities — such as Han Chinese and Indian — who have long been left out of the political process.

http://www.campeche.com.mx/noticias/nacional/pan-y-pri-marcan-ruta-del-2012/6942

Mexico’s presidential election, to be held July 1, looks like a foregone conclusion. President Felipe Calderón’s right-wing National Action Party (PAN) has fallen far out of favor due to Mexico’s terrible drug violence. In the past 5 years, the drug wars have killed over 45,000 people. The Northern border city of Ciudad Juarez had 300 murders in 2007; in 2010, the figure was 3,622, giving this place the highest murder rate in the world. As Mr. Calderón’s critics like to point out, Juarez’s murder rate is higher than anywhere in Iraq or Afghanistan. With the PAN’s national security policy in disarray, Enrique Peña Nieto of the rival Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) led a recent presidential poll by 25%. Seeing these numbers reminds me of last time around in 2005, when President Calderón and the PAN trailed but went on to win the election, and wondering if the upcoming result will be as everyone expects.[1][2]

Is it truly unthinkable that the PAN could win again? Polling evidence says it is indeed unthinkable. Mitofksy’s November 2011 poll of voter preferences gave 44.6% to Peña Nieto (EPN), 19.7% to the PAN’s Josefina Vázquez Mota (JVM), and 16.1% to Andres Manuel López Obrador of the left-wing Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). PAN optimists observe that at the same point before the 2006 election, Mr. Calderón was third place in the polls before coming back to win. The difference is that the PAN’s current deficit is much higher at 25%, versus the 5% deficit Mr. Calderón faced in November 2005. However, not all commentators agree that a PRI victory is inevitable. I will discuss three reasons the PAN has a shot: EPN’s recent campaign gaffes, Mexico’s growing economy, and the Vázquez Mota factor.

Enrique Peña Nieto, the PRI’s man in 2012, is photogenic, well-known, and liked. At age 45, he has already served 6 years as Governor of Mexico State, the country’s most populous. While his image is attractive, some are questioning his ability to relate to ordinary Mexicans. At the 2011 Guadalajara International Book Fair, EPN was asked to name three books that had influenced his life. He struggled with the answer in an awkward speech eerily similar to Sarah Palin’s inability to name her own preferred newspapers.[3] In another gaffe, EPN was unable to state the price of the tortilla, a staple food in Mexico. EPN explained that he was not “the lady of the house.”[4] While these are hardly political killers, it is unimaginable that the President of Mexico could not know the price of a tortilla. EPN’s party has also suffered from disgrace at the leadership level. On December 2, PRI President Humberto Moreira resigned due to a debt accounting scandal in Coahuila State, where Moreira had been Governor. The PRI led Mexico for 71 years until 2000, and its detractors call it a bastion of corruption. The Moreira scandal provides more ammunition.

Another concrete issue where the PAN can directly challenge the PRI is Mexico’s economic progress. Duncan Wood of the Center for Strategic and International Studies writes “it is undeniable that successive PANista governments have been successful in…preparing the way for long-term prosperity.”[5] According to data from the IMF and government sources, real GDP grew 5.4% in 2010 and about 3.8% in 2011, after falling 6.2% during the 2009 recession. On January 3, the Mexican Government sold $2 billion in 10-year bonds at lowest-ever coupon and yield rates. This means that the bonds pay lower interest rates than past issues, and that investors demanded a very small discount when buying them. There has also been progress on unemployment, which soared up to 6.41% in September 2009, but had declined to 4.97% in November 2011 (Source: INEGI). Inflation will be a challenge due to the recent depreciation of the peso, which declined in value from 11.5 per dollar in May to around 13.7 per dollar currently. However, analysts are confident that the Central Bank has both the reserves and the strategy to stabilize the peso. Mexico is also expected to run a negative trade balance of around $4 billion and a current account deficit of $7 billion for 2011. However, the current account deficit will be easily offset by foreign direct investment, projected at around $20 billion annually for the next couple of years. The PAN can use its record to show that it is best poised to help the economy take next steps. These include liberalizing the labor market, widening the tax base, and incentivizing private companies to invest in state-owned oil producer PEMEX. The latter reform is necessary because PEMEX’s refining capacity has lagged domestic demand, forcing the government to subsidize imported gasoline. This reform is also controversial, as PEMEX’s unionized workers are extremely opposed.

The third factor that should keep EPN up at night is the woman to whom The Economist attributes “a flash in the PAN.” Josefina Vázquez Mota, most recently PAN leader in the Chamber of Deputies, served as Education Minister under President Calderón (2006-2009) and Minister of Social Development under President Fox (2000-2005). She is now in the driver seat to become the PAN’s candidate for the highest office. The popularity of JVM’s party has waned – public opinion of the PAN was 27% favorable and 30% unfavorable in November according to Mitofsky. However, she has solid anti-establishment credentials. As Education Minister she argued with the head of Mexico’s powerful teachers’ union, Elba Esther Gordillo, a political ally of President Calderón. Calderón has also endorsed a competitor, former Finance Minister Ernesto Cordero, to be the PAN’s nominee.[6]

Separation from Calderón has not hurt JVM within the party where 52% of members prefer her to be the nominee as of November, up from 38% in August. She is also making strides with the public at large: in the 3 months from August to November, the percentage of the public that recognizes JVM increased from 56.4% to 67.4%. In the same period her share of preference in a head-to-head contest with EPN and López Obrador (AMLO) increased 3%. JVM’s campaign may have more potential to win supporters through advertising than her competitors, who are both known by over 90% of the public. The PAN’s official primary in February will give her a boost through media exposure. Her key issues, strengthening education quality and the justice system, will be used to accuse the PRI of failing to develop Mexican institutions during the PRI’s long period in power. JVM may be the breath of fresh air the PAN needs, and the PRI should be concerned: its polling lead over the PAN has declined from a gargantuan 42% in November 2010, to a less gargantuan 25% one year later.

Source:PKKH

ISLAMABAD: Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani militants have held a series of meetings aimed at containing what could soon be open warfare between the two most powerful Pakistani Taliban leaders, militant sources have said.

Hakimullah Mehsud, the head of the Pakistani Taliban, also known as the Tehreek-i-Taliban (TTP), and his deputy, Waliur Rehman, were at each other’s throats, the sources said.

“You will soon hear that one of them has eliminated the other, though hectic efforts are going on by other commanders and common friends to resolve differences between the two,” one TTP commander said.

Any division within the TTP could hinder the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda’s struggle in Afghanistan against the United States and its allies, making it more difficult to recruit young fighters and disrupting safe havens in Pakistan used by the Afghan militants.

Despite multiple reports of the Rehman-Mehsud split, Rehman told Reuters on Tuesday there was no problem between the two.

“There are no differences between us,” Rehman said.

The TTP, formed in 2007, is an umbrella group of various Pakistani militant factions operating in Pakistan’s unruly northwestern tribal areas along the porous border with Afghanistan.

It has long struggled with its choice of targets. Some factions are at war with the Pakistani state while others concentrate on the fight against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan.

There has been a noticeable decrease in militant attacks in Pakistan, but there continue to be random acts of violence across the country.

Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban commanders are asking the TTP to provide more men for the fight in Afghanistan and are looking to smooth over the dispute between Mehsud and Rehman.

Long-standing feuds

Taliban sources said Rehman had ordered his fighters to kill Mehsud because of his increasing closeness with al Qaeda and its Arab contingent.

Mehsud’s former deputy has also confirmed that the TTP chief received money from Pakistan’s arch-rival, India, to kill former ISI official Colonel Imam, who was acting as a mediator between the Pakistani Taliban, Afghan insurgents and the Pakistani government.

The reported enmity between Mehsud and Rehman is not the only conflict within the TTP ranks.

Mehsud has a long-standing feud with militant commanders Maulvi Nazeer in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan, both of whom have non-aggression agreements with the Pakistani military.

Mehsud’s men have also fought with the militia under the control of Fazal Saeed Haqqani, the former TTP head in the Kurram tribal region. He has accused Mehsud of killing his commanders and innocent people and kidnapping for ransom.

Haqqani, who is close to the militant Afghan Haqqani network, broke away from the TTP last year.

A pamphlet distributed by militants in North Waziristan this week announced the formation of a council to try to resolve the conflicts.

“All jihadi forces have jointly, on the recommendation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, formed a five-member commission which will be known as the Shura Muraqba,” the pamphlet said, using the term by which the Afghan Taliban describe themselves.

“The Shura Muraqba will be working to resolve differences and problems between mujahideen.”

It said that any “mujahideen” found to have committed an “unlawful” killing or kidnapping would be punished under Islamic law. It is likely any attack on a fellow “mujahideen” commander would be considered “unlawful”.

“All mujahideen should respect the decisions of the council that has been set up,” a senior commander of the Haqqani faction in Kurram said.

“If people continue to do as they like, the situation will not improve. Things will instead get much worse.”

Husain Haqqani: Pawn in a larger game?

There are numerous issues besides ‘Memogate’ that directly affect the people, like the shortage of gas, electricity, clean drinking water, housing, healthcare, employment and so on. But the issue gains significance because so far, no democratically elected civilian government in Pakistan has ever been allowed to complete its tenure and hand over power to the next one through democratic elections (as I outlined in this paper). There were hopes that this government would be the first to do so – a critical step towards the continuation of a democratic political that is necessary to move the country away from the military-dominated politics of the past – something, as it is now all too apparent, is not a thing of the past after all. In this context, it’s important to understand the current situation and its dangers. Myra MacDonald sums it up in an analysis for Reuters. Some insights were posted to this blog earlier (here and here). Additional facts are laid out in a document received today (reproduced below) that outlines some facts about Husain Haqqani and ‘memogate’. Also read this important article, ‘Treason? Under what Constitution? in the New Pakistan blog, which dissects the ‘memo’ contents and notes that each item in the document falls under the constitutional purview of the federal government…

Issue at hand: Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the US, Husain Haqqani, is currently a virtual prisoner as his life is under danger both from the extremists and from the security agencies. He is residing for his own safety at the Prime Minister’s residence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan imposed a travel ban on him on December 1, 2011 restricting him from leave the country. His wife, Member of Pakistan’s Parliament, Farahnaz Ispahani’s life is also in danger, which is why she is currently in the US where she had come for medical checkups.

This situation arose after the false allegations by an American businessman of Pakistani origin, Mansur Ijaz, who claimed that the Ambassador and President Zardari had sought American help to prevent a military coup in Pakistan. Ambassador Haqqani has flatly denied these allegations. Further, Ambassador Haqqani knew Admiral Mullen very well and could have contacted him directly anytime; it defies understanding why he would need Ijaz to convey a message to Admiral Mullen.

A history of false claims: Mansur Ijaz is well-known over the years for self-promotion and false claims. During the mid-1990s he claimed that he had close ties to the Sudanese government and would be able to help the Clinton administration get Osama Bin Laden. However, both Clinton NSA Sandy Berger and the 9/11 Commission that interviewed Ijaz found no credible evidence in what he said. In 1999 Ijaz claimed to be the American envoy to India and Pakistan to help resolve the Kashmir dispute but in the end neither side found him credible or someone who could deliver. In 2004 Ijaz claimed that chemical warheads were being smuggled into Iraq for an attack on American troops which he later denied.

The ‘memo’: Former US national security advisor General Jim Jones conveyed Ijaz’s memo to then Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen. Gen Jones in an affidavit has sworn that he believes Ambassador Haqqani had nothing to do with the memo. According to General Jones the language of the memo was akin to what Ijaz wrote.

Ijaz claims that soon after he wrote an OpEd about the ‘memo issue’ on October 10, 2011, Pakistan’s ISI chief, Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha flew to London, met him and examined the evidence and found it credible. However, Admiral Mullen has stated that when he received the memo from Gen Jones, he did not find it credible and took no action on it.

Threats: Asma Jahangir, leading human rights advocate and counsel to Ambassador Haqqani, has stated that Ambassador Haqqani is under threat from his own intelligence-security agencies. In this context Admiral Mullen in one of his final testimonies stated that Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI, and the Pakistani military have often lied to the Americans, and provide support to the extremist groups, including those who kill Americans.

Action required: Ambassador Haqqani needs to have his passport returned to him and have his name taken off the Exit Control List (ECL) so he can travel. The due process of law must be applied.

Background: The government’s opponents – in the media, political parties, military-intelligence establishment – have used this opportunity to attack the government and try to make Ambassador Haqqani a scapegoat. Some worrying facts:

• Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif (who in 1999 had Ambassador Haqqani imprisoned and tortured for writing OpEds against his regime)  is the leading petitioner before the Supreme Court.
• • The Supreme Court took up Mr Sharif’s petition instead of sending it to a trial court first.
• The Supreme Court ignored due process of law and immediately placed a travel ban on Ambassador Haqqani without letting him or his counsel appear before court.
• The head of the ISI himself conducted a forensic investigation and the army chief and head of ISI have stated in their affidavits that they believe the ‘memo’ was genuine – which points to an attempt to frame the Ambassador by institutions that have never agreed with his views.
• A political-media trial and witch-hunt has been ongoing since Ijaz’s OpEd first appeared in the Financial Times.

Detailed Background and Information

Background of Memo: The origins of the memo are in dispute. On October 10, 2011 an American businessman of Pakistani descent, Mansur Ijaz, wrote an OpEd in Financial Times alleging that in the aftermath of the Osama Bin Laden raid of May 2, 2011, he was approached by a senior Pakistani diplomat to pass on a memo to enlist the US military’s help to head off a feared military coup, in exchange for overhauling the country’s powerful top security leadership. He said he gave the memo to former NSA Gen (retd) Jim Jones who passed it on to then Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen.

In the ensuing weeks Ijaz claimed that Amb Husain Haqqani was that senior diplomat and that he and Amb Haqqani corresponded by Blackberry messenger messages, phone conversations and emails.

Amb Haqqani flatly denied these allegations. Admiral Mullen stated that he had received a memo but he did not find it ‘credible.’ According to Mullen’s spokesman “I have said this before and am saying again today. Nothing about that letter had the imprimatur on the Pakistani Government. It was not signed. And the contents of it Admiral Mullen did not find credible. So he took no action on it.” (November 22, 2011)

Amb Haqqani returned to Pakistan on November 19 and tendered his resignation in order to ensure a free and fair inquiry into the issue. The civilian government, while supporting Amb Haqqani’s account accepted his resignation. His passport was confiscated upon his return to Pakistan.

Supreme Court action: December 23, former Prime Minister and leader of the main opposition party, PML-N, Nawaz Sharif filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) claiming that under article 184(3) of the Constitution, the SCP could take up any issue of public importance which relates to fundamental rights. SCP accepted the petition along with other petitions.

On December 1, 2011 the Pakistan Supreme Court placed former ambassador Husain Haqqani on the Exit Control List (ECL) barring him from being able to leave the country, without giving the former ambassador or his lawyer to appear before the court. So due process of law was not followed and Mr Haqqani’s fundamental rights were violated.

Gen Jones in his affidavit to the Pakistan Supreme Court stated that while he did pass on the memo he does not believe Amb Haqqani had anything to do with the memo.

On December 30, Pakistan’s Supreme Court set up a 3-member judicial commission to investigate the issue. According to the SCP judgment a petition seeking an investigation into the affair had “succeeded in establishing that the issues involved are justiciable.” The court also upheld the travel ban on Amb Haqqani. Further, the court has ordered the attorney general of Pakistan, Foreign Ministry and the Pakistani High Commissioner in Canada to approach the parent company of Blackberry, Research In Motion (RIM).

The government maintains that since Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy the correct forum for any such inquiry should be the parliament. The Parliamentary Committee on National Security was already looking into the case and that should be the proper venue not the Supreme Court.

Counter arguments by Amb Haqqani’s lawyer, Asma Jahangir: According to Ambassador Haqqani’s lawyer, leading human rights advocate, Asma Jahangir, the verdict was the “darkest day for the judiciary because the apex court has subjected fundamental rights to national security.”

Terming the court’s judgment ‘disappointing’, she said, “today we feel that the military authority is superior to the civilian authority. Today, the struggle for the transition to democracy has been blocked.” And, “I am forced to think if it is the judiciary of the people or the judiciary of the establishment.” Ms Jahangir also expressed her deep regrets and said she was totally unprepared for this reward of sacrifices rendered by lawyers’ fraternity, as the Court ‘dimmed even a fraction of ray of hope’, while providing the petitioner with relief beyond what they had sought.

Ms Jahangir said the decision was against the rule of law and had compromised a citizen’s right to justice. The verdict reflected undue supremacy of national security and integrity over human rights. “When order came on 1st December, Husain Haqqani was not heard. He did not even have a lawyer,” she said. “Saying that there is a memo and linking it with Husain Haqqani are two different things, it’s more of a media trial that got hyped after Supreme Court’s order”.

DG ISI Shuja Pasha and Gen. Kayani: quick to accept Mansoor Ijaz's claims

Amb Haqqani’s lawyer and others have pointed to the role of Pakistan’s security services, especially its intelligence agency. Both the head of Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha and Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, submitted petitions before the Supreme Court insisting they believed the memo was genuine and needs to be investigated. Significantly, according to Mansur Ijaz, Lt Gen Pasha travelled to London in October and ascertained that the memo was genuine. Why was Lt Gen Pasha so eager to travel to London and agree with what Ijaz said? Whose permission did he obtain before doing so? Is he the person who should perform a forensic investigation? Mr Ijaz also alleged in an interview in December that soon after the Bin Laden raid Lt Gen Pasha travelled to the Gulf to muster support for a military coup.

Imminent danger to Mr Husain Haqqani: A media trial has been ongoing since Mansoor Ijaz’s OpEd published in FT in October. The involvement of opposition parties and their leaders in this political-media witchhunt.

The judiciary seems to be ruling on the basis of national security ideology instead of constitution and law.

All those individuals who are speaking out in Pakistan for democracy and human rights are being silenced one by one. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, former Governor Salman Taseer, former Minister Shahbaz Bhatti were assassinated. Former Amb Haqqani and his lawyer have received serious death threats.

On January 1, 2012, Ms Jahangir announced that she was quitting the case as she did not have faith in the commission been set up by the Supreme Court. According to Ms Jahangir, the Supreme Court’s decision on the petition was a victory for the country’s establishment, and it was being used to transform the country into a ‘security state.’

Ms Jahangir further stated that her client, Mr Haqqani, was under threat from the security agencies. She feared that the security forces-intelligence agencies would try to coerce a statement out of Mr Haqqani. That is why he first stayed at the President’s House and is currently residing at the Prime Minister’s residence.

(ends)

The equation as it should be: Army following policies set by the civilian elected government, not the other way round. (Reuters file photo)

What is ‘Memogate’? The ‘memo’ in question is a letter allegedly written at the behest of Pakistan’s President by the Ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani, asking USA to prevent a possible military coup in Pakistan after US Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan on May 2, 2011. Haqqani denied the allegations, sent in a letter offering to resign in order to facilitate an impartial inquiry, and returned to Pakistan to clear his name. Instead, he found his resignation letter accepted. The Supreme Court barred his exit from Pakistan. He has been forced for his own safety to confine himself first to the Presidency and then to the Prime Minister House. On Dec 30, 2011, The Supreme Court in response to a petition against the ‘memo’ formed a three-member judicial commission to look into the matter that the media has dubbed as ‘memogate’.

Asma Jahangir, counsel for Husain Haqqani and former Supreme Court Bar Association President, has refused to appear before the commission saying that she does not trust the judiciary. She has said that instead of forming a commission to create or produce new evidence the Supreme Court should have looked into the evidence placed before it to decide whether there was a prima facie case and whether the court could proceed to enforce any fundamental rights by making a binding order.

"When did the army ever leave (power) that it should come back?" asked Asma Jahangir

The entire affair appears to be geared towards undermining the democratic political process in Pakistan – specifically at targeting President Asif Ali Zardari, using Husain Haqqani as a vehicle. Asma Jahangir has unequivocally termed the Supreme Court’s judgment as a victory for the military that has run affairs in Pakistan for decades and is obviously still all-powerful behind the scenes.

Asma Jahangir has argued that the Supreme Court had no right to bar Haqqani’s travel abroad. Nor does Supreme Court or the judicial commission set up, have the right to demand Blackberry (RIM) data without due process of law. No server (BU or RIM) should share data with Commission, which is essentially pursuing a political dispute, not criminal charges. The judiciary seems to be ruling on the basis of national security ideology instead of constitution and law.

In the first place, the Supreme Court was not competent in the first place to uphold the petition as maintainable, given that no fundamental right had been violated as a result of the memo and its alleged conspiracy. Secondly, the memo had in any case failed to achieve its alleged aim – according to its recipient (then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen) as well as the Pakistan Army Chief.

“Article 184(3) empowers the Supreme Court to make an order in matters of public importance guaranteed in Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution in which violation of any fundamental rights has taken place. In this case, no violation of fundamental rights has taken place, a most essential question, without an answer to which the court should not have proceeded to make an order of this nature,” comments advocate Asad Jamal in his informative article of Dec 4, 2011 (Deconstructing the SC order on the memo).

The existing evidence is not sufficient to determine whether there was some conspiracy or threat to the security or sovereignty of Pakistan. The evidence placed before the court by the DG ISI and Mansoor Ijaz shows that there was no conspiracy or threat to the security or sovereignty of Pakistan.

In fact there are several contradictions in Mansoor Ijaz’s claim. For one thing, his email dated 10 May, 2011 (annexed with Mansoor Ijaz’s affidavit before the SC) addressed to Gen (Retd.) James Jones, former US national security adviser who handed the ‘memo’ to Admiral Mullen, states that the so-called memorandum had been prepared by three persons. Moreover, Gen. Jones in his affidavit has said that Mansoor Ijaz never mentioned Husain Haqqani’s name in his communication with him, implying that Husain Haqqani was never involved in drafting it or in asking for its delivery to Mike Mullen.

The court says it will not go into the facts of the case, but is clearly influenced by the DG ISI’s statement that he went and met Mansoor Ijaz on October 22, 2011, examined his evidence and believed that what he was told was correct. If the DG ISI has evidence about the case, given that he went all the way to London to meet Pakistan origin US citizen Mansoor Ijaz, why has he not presented it in the court to facilitate the evidence collection?

Husain Haqqani: Scape-goated?

Mansoor Ijaz’s Blackberry messages (BBMs) contain nothing from Husain Haqqani about the supposed memo.  Going by the transcript, assuming it is genuine, it was Mansoor Ijaz who offered to fly down to meet Husain Haqqani in 90 minutes – it was not Haqqani who invited him. There are other obvious problems with the existing evidence, including discrepancies in the BBM transcript attached with Mansoor Ijaz’s reply and that published in The News. Then, Mansoor Ijaz in his covering email to Gen (Retd.) James Jones, former US national security adviser who handed the ‘memo’ to Admiral Mullen, writes that the attached ‘memo’ was drafted by three ex-officers related to national security. Gen. Jones in his affidavit testified that Mansoor Ijaz never mentioned Husain Haqqani.

“Article 184 (3) is not an automatic trigger that gets pulled with the filing of a petition; a petitioner has to make out a proper case,” notes advocate Jamal. “When there is no violation, what fundamental right will the SC maintain? The commission appointed by the SC is to conduct an inquiry but its findings will not be binding on any court of law, the government or the Parliament. So what fundamental rights will be enforced?”

The argument so far was restricted to the maintainability of petitions but by appointing a commission, the court went a step further, granting the entire relief (and more) in one go without hearing the arguments, or discussing the commission’s terms of reference. Then, after assuming that the memorandum’s “issuance, prima facie, seems to be established”, the court suggested that the offence (the nature of which is yet to be determined) may invoke Article 6 of the Constitution, i.e. the offence of treason, notes Jamal.

He points out that: “The petitioners have, intriguingly, arrayed the President of Pakistan as a respondent, to which no objection was raised by the Court.” This lends credence to the widespread perception that the real target in this case is the President – an allegation that Asma Jahangir also levelled in her interview with Matiullah Jan of DawnNews TV, Dec .31, 2011.

Many lawyers privately agree with this view but balk at expressing their opinions publicly, afraid of antagonising the courts on which they depend for their living. “They have to plead before these same courts for relief for their clients,” says Asad Jamal. “No one wants to risk getting their backs up.”

The court’s attitude to Asma Jahangir was downright hostile, he observes. “She stood for three hours before they let her speak, and she barely said a few words when they cut in, they basically didn’t let her speak”.

Regarding Asma Jahangir’s refusal to appear before the Commission, Asad Jamal notes that for one thing, she had expressed her distrust of the Commission, and secondly, its proceedings are expected along the lines of a criminal case, which is not her area of expertise.

Last but not least, it is a matter of grave concern that Husain Haqqani, his lawyer Asma Jahangir, the columnist Marvi Sirmed and others who have taken a stand in this issue that counters the view propagated by the security establishment, find themselves at serious risk in Pakistan.They regularly receive threats to their lives. A highly dangerous situation in the current climate in Pakistan, where rule of law leaves much to be desired.

(ends)

As Reported By Reuters

President Barack Obama signed a sweeping US defense funding bill on Saturday which includes new sanctions on financial institutions dealing with Iran’s central bank, and curtailing up to $850 million in aid to Pakistan. The bill was signed despite concerns about sections that expand the US military’s authority over terrorism suspects and limit his powers in foreign affairs.

The massive defense bill Congress passed on earlier in December freezes 60 per cent of the $850 million aid, or $510 million, until the US defense secretary provides lawmakers with assurances that Pakistan is working to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs). US lawmakers say that many Afghan bombs that kill US troops are made with fertilizer smuggled by militants across the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

“The fact that I support this bill as a whole does not mean I agree with everything in it,” Obama said in a statement, citing limits on transferring detainees from the US base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and requirements he notify Congress before sharing some defense missile information with Russia as problematic.

The bill, approved by Congress last week after its language was revised, aims with its Iran sanctions to reduce Tehran’s oil revenues but gives the US president powers to waive penalties as required. Senior US officials said Washington was engaging with its foreign partners to ensure the sanctions can work without harming global energy markets, and stressed the US strategy for engaging with Iran was unchanged by the bill.

The bill may also prove problematic for Pakistan in ways other than providing assurances of concrete steps to counter the manufacture of IEDs. The sanctions placed on dealing with Iran’s central banks may weigh on Pakistan’s plans for the Iran-Pakistan pipeline which aims to provide gas to Pakistan.

Pakistan needs the gas supplies from Iran to augment its own gas reserves which have been shrinking fast, leading to widespread gas shortages affecting its industry and daily life.

Filed under: Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Pakistan Army, Pakistanis, President Obama, United States, US Army, US-Pakistan Relations Tagged: Afghanistan, Iran, NATO, Pakistan, Pakistan Aid, Pakistanis for Peace, President Obama, US Aid, US Pakistan Relations

I have recently read an opinion by Fehim Tastekin, a Turkish Caucasus expert, who regularly writes for the Turkish daily Radikal. I find the article very important, so I translated it to the attention of FPA Blogs followers:

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http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1073865&Yazar=FEHIM-TASTEKIN&Date=30.12.2011&CategoryID=100

Amidst its growing engagement in the Middle East and the Arab Spring, as well as its resurrecting Kurdish insurgency problem, Turkey installed the NATO Missile Defense Shield in September 2011. Many observers interpreted Turkey’s decision as a move against Iran, as a response to its expanding nuclear and missile capabilities, while Turkish officials indicated that the installment of this missile shield in Turkey was agreed upon much earlier and has nothing to do with Iran. The purpose of the missile shield also exposed differences within NATO countries. For example, French President Sarkozy had claimed “We call a cat, a cat; today’s threat is Iran”, while Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said “We also call a cat, a cat, but we haven’t specified a threat like [Iran]“. Hillary Clinton too had commented on the matter by “The shield is not directed against Russia; in fact it has to do with Iran”.

Russia wasn’t convinced however; Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov indicated “words fly, military technic is permanent; we want written guarantees”. To follow up, Russia’s decision to re-direct Kaliningrad missiles to European capitals increased the interpretations of a ‘new Cold War’. Yet, some observers indicate that Russia’s Kaliningrad move is not a mere reaction, but a part of a more profound thinking. According to Nevazisimaya Gazeta, Kremlin was informed of a U.S.-backed Israeli air raid against Iranian nuclear facilities and argued “… there will soon be a surprise raid. Iran will retaliate and the war will spread out. If Iran is invaded, Russia will not sit idly and will certainly send military aid.” Indeed, Russia Minister of Defense supported this perception, explicitly warning the United States in a Reuters interview that “an attack against Iran would be a wrong decision”.

Though more troublesome perhaps, is that Russia’s mistrust towards NATO’s missile shield was not confined to words. Soon after the installment of the missile shield, Russia made the following moves:

- Complete and urgent modernization of the 102nd Military base in Armenia
– Units close to Yerevan were deployed to Gumru, closer to the Turkish border
– Military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were put under alarm on December 1, 2011
– Some ships from Russia’s Black Sea fleet were re-deployed closer to the Georgian territorial waters.
– Missile command base at Dagestan was ordered to be ready for battle
– Guided missile frigates in the Khazar fleet were re-deployed to Mahackale and Kaspiysk.
– Alexander-E missiles were sent to the Krasnodar base, their range covering the NATO missile shield in Malatya
– Kuznetsov aircraft carrier was sent to Tartus, which is interpreted as a dual move against a possible military intervention to Iran and Syria

Russia also considers the possibility of an Azeri military move towards Karabakh to reclaim that territory lost to Armenia. When Russia extended its use of Armenia’s Gumru base, it also signed an agreement to protect Armenia against external attacks. Additionally, Russia is worried about its military presence in Armenia because of Georgia’s annulment of the treaty that enabled Russian troops to use Georgian territory to be transferred further south. The necessity to bolster Russian military presence in Armenia may lead Russia to force its way through Georgia. Meanwhile, Russia also needs to guarantee its use of the Gebele radar installation in Azerbaijan whose lease ends in 2012. Azerbaijan raised the cost of the installation from 7 million to 100 million US dollars per annum, while hints at the possibility of negotiating the cost in exchange for Russian support for its territorial demands over Karabakh.

Russia also considered Gebele radar installation as a test case for American intentions. When the Bush administration considered the installation of the radar site in Poland in 2007, Russia suggested that two countries should use Gebele radar base (with 6000 kilometer range extending from the Indian Ocean to North Africa) together. Bush government’s refusal was interpreted by Russia as a sign of American expansionism, as the Gebele radar base is more than sufficient to act as an early warning system against Iran. Together with the installation of the NATO missile defense shield in Turkey, Russia no longer believes that this is intended as protection against Iran.

On the other hand, NATO shield was an interesting move on the part of the Turkish government. It successfully silenced those who interpret Turkish foreign policy as ‘moving away from the West’ and also those who criticize Turkey for deteriorating relations with Israel as well as those who question Turkey’s commitment to its partnership with the United States. It allowed Turkish diplomats to argue “see, we are protecting Israel at the expense of deteriorating our relations with Iran and Russia”.

[end of article]

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All this makes me think that Turkey might be returning back to its ‘lone wolf’ foreign policy and siege mentality:

The problem is, just as Assad’s suppression methods and Turkey’s belligerent stance against him had caused the collapse of Turkey’s ‘zero problems policy’ in the south, NATO missile shield not only caused the collapse of this doctrine vis-à-vis Iran, but also vis-à-vis Russia and by extension, the Caucasus. Systemic constraints are pushing Turkey back to its pre-2002, traditional foreign policy understanding and a return back to its Cold War role: covering NATO’s southern flank. What makes Turkey’s new role ‘updated’ is that the Middle East is more active and more relevant to American interests than it was through the Cold War and therefore, Turkey may be the bridgehead of a new and more difficult dual-containment policy against Shia and Russian influence.

The new Cold War v2.0 is more complex and difficult for Turkey, which requires quicker balancing and more intricate set of interdependencies. At a time when Turkey’s domestic Kurdish problem is intensifying, simultaneously countering Russian AND Iranian influence at such proximity is a heavy burden for any country. Following months will create more visible cross-regional entrenchments and the United States must find a way to re-assert its relevance and weight in the wider region, certainly for Turkey, for any strategy of containment to succeed – if there still is such a strategy.

Riot police officers standing on duty in the western Kazakh city of Aktau following the deadly riots. Tretyakov / Reuters

Recent riots in Zhanaozen and Shetpe in the Mangystau province in western Kazakhstan have resulted in at least 16 deaths and over 100 injured. This information is according to the Kazakh authorities although unverified eye witness accounts and human rights groups put the death toll at more than 50. The number of those wounded in the clashes is most likely much higher than reported.

The violence that took place between the police and protesting oil workers and their sympathizers last week is the most bloodshed the country has seen since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Ironically (or intentionally) these events coincided with the 20th anniversary festivities held across Kazakhstan to mark the occasion that included the unveiling of a replica of Paris’s Arc de Triomphe in the capital of Astana.

The violence started on Friday, December 16. Since last May, disgruntled oil workers were occupying the central square in Zhanaozen, a nondescript industrial city of some 90,000 residents in western Mangystau province, citing disputes over wages and job losses. Some of the thousands of initial strikers were dismissed, prompting many of their colleagues to return to work.

The New York Times writes that the protesters shifted their focus to political demands including the right to form independence parties. “In response, the authorities announced plans to hold a state-sponsored New Year’s holiday party for children on the site, apparently in a ruse aimed at providing an excuse to clear out the workers. In an online video said to be shot at the scene, protesters are shown pushing past police lines to dismantle a stage for the party, then overturning a tree decorated for the holiday. It also showed police officers firing into the air.”

The Moscow Times reports a slight variation on the theme: “fired oil workers and sympathetic citizens stormed a stage erected for an Independence Day party and smashed sound equipment in central Zhanaozen. They later set fire to the city hall, the headquarters of a local oil company, a hotel and dozens of other buildings, including trade centers and houses, burned cars and buses and plundered ATMs.”

Police opened fire and according to the officials 14 protesters were killed in the clashes in Zhanaozen alone. An article from the Telegraph has a short video of the storming of the stage.

The following day the unrest spread to the neighborhood village of Shetpe, 60 miles north of Zhanaozen, where a crowd blocked a train coming from the port of Aktau. According to the authorities, one person was killed and 12 were wounded.

On Sunday morning, December 18, about 500 protesters gathered near the main square in Aktau facing a large force of riot police.

The city is the capital of the Mangystau region and is one of Kazakhstan’s most important oil producing centers. Aktau is a key transportation hub for the Northern Distribution Network, which provides transit of non-lethal supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. It has a population of around 180,000 people and is home to hundreds of Western expats.

The government declared a state of emergency in Zhanaozen with a 20 day curfew in effect and a ban on public gatherings until January 5, 2012. President Nursultan Nazarbayev was quick to dismiss the clashes as provocations by the “hooligans.”

After clashes in Zhanaozen, protests erupted in Shetpe. (c) The New York Times

Protests in pictures from the BBC.

From the Economist on the Kazakh clashes.

The Jamestown Foundation Blog has a good overview of the recent violence and events in Kazakhstan.

Amateur video of the clashes making rounds on the internet:

(Reuters) – After 10 months of secret dialogue with Afghanistan’s Taliban insurgents, senior U.S. officials say the talks have reached a critical juncture and they will soon know whether a breakthrough is possible, leading to peace talks whose ultimate goal is to end the Afghan war. As part of the accelerating, high-stakes diplomacy, Reuters has [...]

Aamir Qureshi / AFP – Getty Images

Cyclists compete during the second stage of the Himalayas 2011 International Mountainbike Race in the mountainous area of Lake Saif-ul-Maluk in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on Sept. 17. The cycling event, organized by the Kaghan Memorial Trust to raise funds for its charity school set up in the Kaghan valley for children affected in the October 2005 earthquake, attracted some 30 international and 11 Pakistani cyclists.

Reuters

Policemen pick up clothing and shoes of residents who were targeted by a suicide bomber during a funeral in Bero Shina, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on Sept. 15. The funeral was for a member of a pro-government Pashtun tribe in northwest Pakistan. The blast killed at least 40 people.
The death toll from a suicide bombing at a funeral in Pakistan’s northwest climbed to 40 on Friday, police said.

Fayaz Aziz / Reuters

A tear runs down a boy’s face as he lies on a bench after being treated for his injuries at the Lady Reading Hospital in Peshawar, Sept. 13. Gunmen opened fire on a school bus, killing four children and the driver. Fifteen children were wounded.
Gunmen opened fire on a school bus in the Pakistani city of Peshawar on Tuesday, killing four children and the driver, a police official said.

Naseer Ahmed / Reuters

Mohammad Azam, 56, sits injured as a dead child lies nearby, at the site of a double suicide bombing in Quetta Sept. 7. Two suicide bombers targeting a senior security official struck near government offices in the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta, killing at least 22 people.
A pair of suicide bombers killed 22 people while targeting a top army officer in southwest Pakistan on Wednesday, missing him and killing his wife, several guards, a senior officer and two children, officials said.

Banaras Khan / AFP – Getty Images

Local residents attempt to extinguish burning vechicles after a car bomb blast in Quetta on Aug. 31. A car bomb exploded in a parking lot after Eid prayers, killing at least four people and wounding 10 others.

Arif Ali / AFP – Getty Images

Pakistani railway and security officials gather around train wreckage following a crash in Lahore on Aug. 30. At least two people were killed and 17 others wounded, five of them critically, when two trains collided in the eastern Pakistani city of Lahore. Train travel is popular among Pakistan’s poorer classes, but the railways have been hit by a severe funding shortfall and a lack of barriers at most level crossings are a frequent cause of accidents.

Saood Rehman / EPA

Pakistani Army officials display ammunition and arms recovered during an operation in Dra Zinda outskirts area of Dera Ismail Khan, Aug. 29. Pakistan is under intense pressure to eliminate sanctuaries of Taliban and al-Qaida fighters, but the militants have responded by intensifying attacks on security and government installations across the country.

Stringer/pakistan / Reuters

A cobbler waits for customers at his shoe repair shop in Quetta Aug. 29.

Fareed Khan / AP

Pakistani paramilitary troops enter into a house during a crackdown operation against target killers and the extortion mafia in a troubled area in Karachi, Aug. 28. Over one hundred people lost their lives in the week prior in a fresh wave of violence which crippled the Pakistan’s largest city.

Asghar Achakzai / AFP – Getty Images

Pakistani security personnel examine a crashed American surveillance drone just inside Pakistan territory in the town of Chaman, on Aug. 25. The American surveillance drone crashed in southwestern Pakistan near a paramilitary base close to the Afghan border, Pakistani officials said.

Arshad Arbab / EPA

Pakistani security officials in Peshawar on Oct. 21 carry the coffins of paramilitary Frontier Constabulary members who were killed in an attack in the Shalobar area of Bara Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. At least 34 alleged militants and three soldiers were killed during a clash along the Afghan border in northwestern Pakistan. The fighting occurred in a stronghold of the Lashkar-e-Islam militant group.

Matiullah Achakzai / EPA

Arshad Butt / AP

 

People mourn next to the body of a relative at a hospital in Quetta, Oct. 4. Suspected Sunni extremists opened fire on Shiite Muslims traveling through southwestern Pakistan.

 

 

K.m. Chaudary / AP

 

A supporter holds a poster of Mumtaz Qadri, the confessed killer of a liberal Pakistani governor, during a rally to condemn the court decision against Qadri on Oct. 1 in Lahore. A Pakistani court convicted and sentenced Qadri to death for the killing of Salman Taseer, a murder that led to fears the country was buckling under the weight of extremism. Taseer was an outspoken critic of the country’s “blasphemy laws.”
Angry demonstrations broke out in Pakistan after a court on Saturday convicted and sentenced a police officer to death for the killing of a liberal governor.

Aamir Qureshi / AFP – Getty Images

 

Residents gather at the site of a blast in Islamabad, Sept. 29, that ripped through the top floor of a hotel building in Islamabad, injuring at least six people. City police chief Bani Amin said the cause of the blast appeared “to be a gas cylinder” that was still leaking at the Citi Hotel in the Blue Area, a bustling district of shops and restaurants.

Athar Hussain / Reuters

 

Supporters of the Pakistan People’s Party wave flags during an anti-American rally near the U.S. consulate in Karachi, Sept. 27. Pakistan, facing a crisis in relations with the United States, appears to be seeking more support from China.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Banaras Khan / AFP – Getty Images

 

Shiite Muslims shout slogans as they carry coffins during a funeral ceremony for those killed in an attack in Quetta on Sept. 21. Gunmen shot dead 26 Pakistani Shiite pilgrims traveling to Iran on Sept. 20, the deadliest attack on the minority community in Pakistan for more than a year. In a brutal assault, gunmen ordered pilgrims off their bus, lined them up and shot them. Two weeks later, a similar incident left 13 dead.
Suspected Sunni extremists shot 13 Shiite Muslims to death execution-style after ordering them off a bus and lining them up Tuesday in southwestern Pakistan, ramping up a campaign of sectarian violence that has exposed Islamabad’s inability to protect minorities.

Pervez Masih / AP

 

Displaced Pakistanis try to hand over their identity cards to get permits for relief at an office in Tando Mohammad Khan near Hyderabad, Sept, 29. Flooding killed scores of people, destroyed some 665,000 homes and displaced nearly 1.8 million people in Sindh province.

 

Athar Hussain / Reuters

 

 

Athar Hussain / Reuters

Residents peer past a cloth barrier raised to cordon off the scene of a suicide bomb attack in Karachi on Sept. 19. At least eight people were killed, including six policemen, after a Taliban suicide bomber drove an explosives-laden car into the home of a senior police official in Pakistan’s commercial center, Karachi.
At least eight people were killed, including six policemen, after a Taliban suicide bomber drove an explosives-laden car into the home of a senior police official in Pakistan’s commercial hub Karachi on Monday.

A. Majeed / AFP – Getty Images

 

Pakistani firefighters attempt to extinguish a fire after a bomb blast at a market in Peshawar on Sept. 19. The bomb killed at least five people and wounded 28 others at a market selling CDs.

 

 

 

Thank you Mark Dummett, for the report in BBC today paying tribute to Anthony Mascarenhas, the brilliant and courageous Pakistani journalist who had to flee abroad in order to be able to tell the truth – Bangladesh war: The article that changed history.

Mascarenhas

“Eight journalists, including Mascarenhas, were given a 10-day tour of the province (East Pakistan). When they returned home, seven of them duly wrote what they were told to,” writes Dummett.

“But one of them refused.”

That was Mascarenhas, who died in 1986 in London.

His wife Yvonne Mascarenhas told Dummett that she remembers him coming back distraught: “I’d never seen my husband looking in such a state. He was absolutely shocked, stressed, upset and terribly emotional. He told me that if he couldn’t write the story of what he’d seen he’d never be able to write another word again.”

“Clearly it would not be possible to do so in Pakistan. All newspaper articles were checked by the military censor, and Mascarenhas told his wife he was certain he would be shot if he tried,” writes Dummett.

Here is a case of a journalist who rose above what was no doubt being touted as the “national interest”. His subsequent reports in the Sunday Times made him a “traitor” to West Pakistan and a hero to the Bengalis. But I think he was a hero to the cause of journalism.

“There is little doubt that Mascarenhas’ reportage played its part in ending the war. It helped turn world opinion against Pakistan and encouraged India to play a decisive role,” writes Dummett… “Not that this was ever Mascarenhas’ intention”.

He was, simply, as editor of the Sunday Times, Harold Evans wrote in his memoirs, “just a very good reporter doing an honest job”.

It speaks volumes for the mainstream Pakistani narrative about the events of 1971, that I, as a journalist with a deep interest in human rights issues, never even heard of Anthony Mascarenhas until just a few years ago, and then too, quite by chance.

My uncle Zawwar Hasan, a retired journalist now over 80 years old, mentioned “Tony Mascarenhas” while reminiscing about how he ended up in this profession. Unsuccessful in getting a job in his own field, marketing, he had landed a job as a sports reporter with the government-controlled news agency Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) in Karachi in 1948. After his first assignment, a cricket match, he went to the India Coffee House with a new friend, another sports journalist, M. Akhtar.

“We wrote our reports there, and he gave me a lift to my office at APP.… Tony Mascarenhas was there – he later ended up with London Times,” said my uncle, remembering how Mascarenhas, who was editor of APP, had told him off for not coming straight back to the office after the match to file his report.

“Do you realise this is a news agency and every minute is precious. Anyway, show me what you have.”

Mascarenhas the editor then himself typed up the handwritten report (because the rookie reporter didn’t know how to type), telling him only to “come early tomorrow and learn to type.”

Being interested in the contributions of non-mainstream Muslims to Pakistan’s struggle for democracy, I was intrigued by the obviously Goan Christian name Mascarenhas. I started looking him up. I also learned how he “ended up with London Times”, initially as their correspondent in Pakistan.

According to the Times obituary of December 8, 1986, he was born Neville Anthony Mascarenhas in “Belgaum, near Goa, on July 10, 1928. A Roman Catholic, he was educated at St Patrick’s College, Karachi, before joining Reuters in Bombay in 1948.

“At the time of partition he was sent to Karachi to start their operation in the new state of Pakistan. He then helped to found Pakistan’s own news agency, APP.  In 1958 he joined the Times of Karachi as assistant editor…  From 1961 to 1971 he worked for the Morning News, mainly as assistant editor, though for two years (1963-5) he was its correspondent in India, and in 1965 was interned there with his family for three months while India and Pakistan were at war.

“In 1970 he was recruited by The Sunday Times, for which paper he wrote, the following year, the report from East Bengal which profoundly influenced opinion in the outside world, and which changed the course of his life.”

Read Dummett’s article for fascinating details about how Mascarenhas and his family escaped from Pakistan.

Later, in Cambridge MA, with access to the Harvard libraries, I found his books, The rape of Bangladesh (Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1971) and Bangladesh: a legacy of blood (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1986). As far as I know, neither is unavailable in Pakistan although I hear that there have been some translations.

Some years ago I asked a senior journalist who had been posted in Dhaka during 1971, why no one in West Pakistan wrote the truth about what was happening. “We were not allowed,” he said simply. “There was strict censorship.”

But Mascarenhas had the courage, and the opportunity, to follow his conscience.

As I wrote in an essay for the Economic and Political Weekly, the State controlled Pakistan Television, that started broadcasts in 1964, has remained very much ‘his master’s voice’.

Along with a few newspapers and the government controlled Radio Pakistan, PTV reported only what the government allowed. This censorship was particularly evident when it came to the growing unrest in what was then East Pakistan. The news censorship and slanting was so extreme that even on Dec 16, 1971, when the Pakistan army surrendered to the Indian, the West Pakistan media was still predicting victory. An exception was Anthony Mascarenhas, the Goa-born, Karachi-educated journalist…. In 1970, recruited by The Sunday Times, London, his reports on the happenings in East Bengal “profoundly influenced opinion in the outside world, and changed the course of his life”, as his obituary in The Times notes.

“He and his family had to leave their home and all their possessions in Karachi. He arrived in Britain on June 12, 1971, and the following day his three-page story appeared in The Sunday Times. It was quoted all over the world and won him awards from IPC and What the Papers Say. But it also earned him the bitter hatred of Pakistan’s military regime, and for time he had reason to fear for his life.”

Ironically, or perhaps tellingly, he had become an Indian citizen in 1976 –obviously Pakistan had disowned him — although at the time of his death he was intending to apply for British citizenship, according to the Times obituary.