EU NAVFOR Atalanta in action (source: German Navy)

The last two years were a bumpy ride for the European security policy. One may claim that the Europeans once again failed not only to convey a clear message about their security goals to the foreign partners, but also to take concrete actions in order to stave off the creeping erosion of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Do we really face a European strategic decay in that domain? Indeed, some serious doubts about this statement may be raised. Therefore, it is high time to debunk three prophecies about European security in 2012.

1. Do worry, do not be happy. The Polish Presidency did a good job. The last six months have been the most fruitful and substantial for CSDP since the French Presidency in 2008. The joint conclusions of the Council of the European Union of December 2011 gave a vivid signal that the EU Member States are still willing to further develop the CSDP concept and necessary capabilities (personnel, assets, intelligence analytical support.) It was not easy to reach a consensus as there are multiple visions of European security and the pace in which it should evolve. Despite that fact the current message is a bit more optimistic than a year ago: Be of good cheer! After two years of stagnation there is a light of hope for CSDP. However, there are still a lot of obstacles on the European way toward ultimate success. One of them are financial constraints.

2. Crisis will impede everything. Against the backdrop of current financial constraints, the challenge for Europe is to do better with less while making good on its responsibilities. The crisis has inevitably made it more difficult for politicians to sell the benefits of the ongoing defense integration to the wary public. The crisis has blunted the importance of Europe in the world, exposed the Old Continent to numerous risks and threats, but also put it to the critical test that it cannot fail. The biggest challenge for Europeans remains the weakening of mutual trust between the Member States. The Weimar initiative from December 2010 – which sought to strengthen CSDP – has to some extent filled the gap. Poland, France and Germany were able to build a coalition of the willing and able (e.g. Finland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Romania) to spark a new wave of trust that may empower CSDP. However, crisis can only be overcome by concrete actions. Therefore, without a visible sign of progress in the implementation of the pooling and sharing initiative in 2012 it will be hard to revamp CSDP. In fact, an agreement on at least basic issues (e.g. support structures required for education, training and exercises) is a must.

3. The EU will diminish its external security policy engagement. To be fair, a glance at the number and locations of the past and current EU missions around the world reveals the union’s clear desire to live up to its ambitions in terms of crisis management policy. Since 2003, the EU has launched 25 civilian and military missions, in such far-flung countries as Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008-2009 and Guinea-Bissau from 2008-2010. Currently, the EU’s engagement in the world stretches from the Balkans, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo; through Eastern Europe, in Georgia and Moldova; to the Middle East, in the Palestinian territories; up to Africa, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Horn of Africa and Uganda. In 2011, as a result of budget cutbacks, the EU has struggled at least to maintain the status quo of its foreign operational engagements. Some experts even thought that the EU was likely to adopt an even less expeditionary posture in the future. On the contrary, the 2012 agenda looks both ambitious and promising. Besides, the ongoing operations the EU will remain committed to addressing the security challenges in the Sahel with a view to start a CSDP mission to reinforce regional security capabilities, in close cooperation with the African Union. A second operation, in South Sudan (with a focus on airport security), is also being prepared. Finally, the Polish Presidency has facilitated the amendment process of the Athena mechanism which administers the financing of common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications. Therefore, it will be now easier than before to set up a mission.

On paper it all seems doable and easy. But, as diplomats say: Paper is patient. After the Libyan crisis there is a growing sense of ambiguity about the real outcome of the EU’s crisis management policy. Therefore, it is more than certain that the development of CSDP will be a long process. But Europeans should not forget that they are approaching a “do or die” moment for Common Security and Defense Policy.

Dominik P. Jankowski serves as Expert Analyst at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland and is pursuing a doctorate at the Warsaw School of Economics.

The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland.

Osh, Kyrgyzstan — A security guard stands near an overturned Russian-made Tupolev Tu-34 passenger jet at the airfield outside the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh, a day after the plane crash. The packed passenger jet flipped over and caught fire on landing. PHOTOGRAPH BY: JILDIZ BEKBAEVA / AFP / GETTY IMAGES

It was a rough but lucky landing (both “rough and “lucky” are strong understatements here) when a Soviet-built Tupolev (Tu-134) crash landed in dense fog in the city of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan. According to The Washington Post 82 passengers and 6 crew members were evacuated, 31 of them were injured and 17 hospitalized. Miraculously everyone on board survived. No doubt, the local emergency services deserve some major kudos for reacting quickly, killing the fire and safely evacuating everybody from the scene.

RT reports there were about a dozen of children among the passengers. One of them, a seven-month-old girl, was diagnosed with a head injury and concussion. The Ministry of Transportation of Kyrgyzstan said that the crashed vehicle was working its last days, with its airworthiness due to expire on 19 January. It was also reported that the aircraft had been manufactured in 1979 and was not equipped with modern navigation systems such as GPS. Reports say one of the likely causes is a mistake made by the pilot operating the aircraft, but the accident is still to be investigated.

Here’s the description of the crash from The Aviation Herald. Note that this report on the number of passengers and crew on board of the aircraft differs from other sources. “An Altyn Air (alias Kyrgyzstan Altyn) Tupolev TU-134A, registration EX-020 performing flight QH-3 from Bishkek to Osh (Kyrgyzstan) with 73 passengers and 6 crew, suffered a hard landing resulting in the right main gear collapse, right main wing separation and the airplane rolling on its back while landing on Osh’s runway 12 in fog and low visibility around 12:15L (06:15Z), official times of landing varying from 12:05L to 12:48L. The aircraft came to a stop on soft ground about 10 meters off the right runway edge. A fire fed by a fuel leak off the left wing erupted which was quickly extinguished by airport emergency services. One passenger received serious injuries, 24 people received minor injuries (concussions, bruises), 16 of which were taken to local hospitals.”

We know that the bird involved in the crash is a Tupolev-134. Here’s a little blurb about the Tu-134s from the Associated Press: The twin-engined Tu-134, along with its larger sibling the Tu-154, has been the workhorse of Soviet and Russian civil aviation since the 1960s, with more than 800 planes built. It also has remained in service with many post-Soviet carriers. In recent years, Russia and other former Soviet nations have had some of the world’s worst air traffic safety records. Experts blame poor maintenance of the aging aircraft, weak government controls, insufficient pilot training and a cost-cutting mentality.

This type of Soviet-built aircraft was infamously involved in several deadly crashes. Here’s more info on Tupolev crashes. More recently, this past June a Tu-134 crashed in northern Russia killing 43 passengers, but it appears that a drunken pilot was at fault. Earlier in 2011 at least 43 were injured when a Tu-154B carrying 124 people, burst into flames before take-off from Surgut, Russia. And of course another painful reminder of Soviet-era aviation was the crash of a Tu-154 plane near Smolensk that killed Polish President Lech Kaczynski and 95 other people in April of 2010. Pilot error was clearly at fault here – both captain and first officer ignored numerous instrumentation warnings including verbal commands from the plane’s terrain awareness warning system (TAWS) warning the pilots to “PULL UP.” Procedure requires any pilot who receives that warning from the TAWS to immediate pull up and throttle to maximum to avoid an imminent collision with the ground. Clearly both pilots heavily deviated from standard safety protocols.

Back to our Kygryztan Air crash. Until the final findings of the commission are published it’s too early to draw any conclusions, although bad weather conditions had something to do with it. The Tupolevs are aging and even though in the past they might have been sound and well engineered planes, they have become outdated compared to modern aircraft. Not to mention they are not being properly maintained as they are mostly employed in cash-strapped countries. Modern day aircraft are sophisticated enough to be able to land automatically without human intervention more akin to a tram with a stop-and-go button. No Cold War-era planes can compete with that. In an initiative to keep its skies safe,  the E.U. banned airlines it deems unsafe from operating in European airspace and according to its website this includes the airline that was involved in the Kyrgyz crash.

There’s a lot of chatter and opinions on aviation websites debating the airworthiness of Soviet-built planes and the skill of Soviet/post-Soviet pilots. I found one post on The Aviation Herald board about the Osh accident particularly interesting. “There has been a lot of pressure on the pilot to fly (as the only road linking the northern and southern parts of the country has been often closed recently because of snow and avalanches. Flying is the only way to get to Bishkek in a reasonable time (road 14 to 16 hours now for a flight that takes 40 minutes). A TU 134 with its navigation equipment should not have been clear on that day. That the pilot was able to bring down the plane speaks for his skills and the robustness of the plane. A similar crash with one of the old Boeing 737 they use here had been fatal for sure.”

One of my colleague here at the Foreign Policy Blogs recently wrote a post in a similar vein about the safety of Soviet-made planes.

Here are more photos of the crash.

I have recently read an opinion by Fehim Tastekin, a Turkish Caucasus expert, who regularly writes for the Turkish daily Radikal. I find the article very important, so I translated it to the attention of FPA Blogs followers:

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http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1073865&Yazar=FEHIM-TASTEKIN&Date=30.12.2011&CategoryID=100

Amidst its growing engagement in the Middle East and the Arab Spring, as well as its resurrecting Kurdish insurgency problem, Turkey installed the NATO Missile Defense Shield in September 2011. Many observers interpreted Turkey’s decision as a move against Iran, as a response to its expanding nuclear and missile capabilities, while Turkish officials indicated that the installment of this missile shield in Turkey was agreed upon much earlier and has nothing to do with Iran. The purpose of the missile shield also exposed differences within NATO countries. For example, French President Sarkozy had claimed “We call a cat, a cat; today’s threat is Iran”, while Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said “We also call a cat, a cat, but we haven’t specified a threat like [Iran]“. Hillary Clinton too had commented on the matter by “The shield is not directed against Russia; in fact it has to do with Iran”.

Russia wasn’t convinced however; Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov indicated “words fly, military technic is permanent; we want written guarantees”. To follow up, Russia’s decision to re-direct Kaliningrad missiles to European capitals increased the interpretations of a ‘new Cold War’. Yet, some observers indicate that Russia’s Kaliningrad move is not a mere reaction, but a part of a more profound thinking. According to Nevazisimaya Gazeta, Kremlin was informed of a U.S.-backed Israeli air raid against Iranian nuclear facilities and argued “… there will soon be a surprise raid. Iran will retaliate and the war will spread out. If Iran is invaded, Russia will not sit idly and will certainly send military aid.” Indeed, Russia Minister of Defense supported this perception, explicitly warning the United States in a Reuters interview that “an attack against Iran would be a wrong decision”.

Though more troublesome perhaps, is that Russia’s mistrust towards NATO’s missile shield was not confined to words. Soon after the installment of the missile shield, Russia made the following moves:

- Complete and urgent modernization of the 102nd Military base in Armenia
– Units close to Yerevan were deployed to Gumru, closer to the Turkish border
– Military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were put under alarm on December 1, 2011
– Some ships from Russia’s Black Sea fleet were re-deployed closer to the Georgian territorial waters.
– Missile command base at Dagestan was ordered to be ready for battle
– Guided missile frigates in the Khazar fleet were re-deployed to Mahackale and Kaspiysk.
– Alexander-E missiles were sent to the Krasnodar base, their range covering the NATO missile shield in Malatya
– Kuznetsov aircraft carrier was sent to Tartus, which is interpreted as a dual move against a possible military intervention to Iran and Syria

Russia also considers the possibility of an Azeri military move towards Karabakh to reclaim that territory lost to Armenia. When Russia extended its use of Armenia’s Gumru base, it also signed an agreement to protect Armenia against external attacks. Additionally, Russia is worried about its military presence in Armenia because of Georgia’s annulment of the treaty that enabled Russian troops to use Georgian territory to be transferred further south. The necessity to bolster Russian military presence in Armenia may lead Russia to force its way through Georgia. Meanwhile, Russia also needs to guarantee its use of the Gebele radar installation in Azerbaijan whose lease ends in 2012. Azerbaijan raised the cost of the installation from 7 million to 100 million US dollars per annum, while hints at the possibility of negotiating the cost in exchange for Russian support for its territorial demands over Karabakh.

Russia also considered Gebele radar installation as a test case for American intentions. When the Bush administration considered the installation of the radar site in Poland in 2007, Russia suggested that two countries should use Gebele radar base (with 6000 kilometer range extending from the Indian Ocean to North Africa) together. Bush government’s refusal was interpreted by Russia as a sign of American expansionism, as the Gebele radar base is more than sufficient to act as an early warning system against Iran. Together with the installation of the NATO missile defense shield in Turkey, Russia no longer believes that this is intended as protection against Iran.

On the other hand, NATO shield was an interesting move on the part of the Turkish government. It successfully silenced those who interpret Turkish foreign policy as ‘moving away from the West’ and also those who criticize Turkey for deteriorating relations with Israel as well as those who question Turkey’s commitment to its partnership with the United States. It allowed Turkish diplomats to argue “see, we are protecting Israel at the expense of deteriorating our relations with Iran and Russia”.

[end of article]

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All this makes me think that Turkey might be returning back to its ‘lone wolf’ foreign policy and siege mentality:

The problem is, just as Assad’s suppression methods and Turkey’s belligerent stance against him had caused the collapse of Turkey’s ‘zero problems policy’ in the south, NATO missile shield not only caused the collapse of this doctrine vis-à-vis Iran, but also vis-à-vis Russia and by extension, the Caucasus. Systemic constraints are pushing Turkey back to its pre-2002, traditional foreign policy understanding and a return back to its Cold War role: covering NATO’s southern flank. What makes Turkey’s new role ‘updated’ is that the Middle East is more active and more relevant to American interests than it was through the Cold War and therefore, Turkey may be the bridgehead of a new and more difficult dual-containment policy against Shia and Russian influence.

The new Cold War v2.0 is more complex and difficult for Turkey, which requires quicker balancing and more intricate set of interdependencies. At a time when Turkey’s domestic Kurdish problem is intensifying, simultaneously countering Russian AND Iranian influence at such proximity is a heavy burden for any country. Following months will create more visible cross-regional entrenchments and the United States must find a way to re-assert its relevance and weight in the wider region, certainly for Turkey, for any strategy of containment to succeed – if there still is such a strategy.

Source: Google Images

Events of this past November revealed more cracks in U.S. -Russia relations that seemed propitious just several months ago. To start with, on November 22, the U.S. announced the decision to cease its obligations under The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), referring to information sharing and mutual inspections with Russia. The decision came as a delayed countermeasure to Russia’s unilateral suspension of its own obligations under the same Treaty in 2007.

Just a day later following the U.S. announcement, Russian President Medvedev responded with its own “if-then” stipulation when mentioning that Russia could possibly opt out from the START Treaty, if the United States continues its ambitious ballistic missile plan in Europe. Moscow has repeatedly expressed its discontent with the development of the missile defense project in Europe, accusing the West of excluding Russia from participating in the decision – making process. This is especially sensitive since Moscow perceives the radar installations in Poland, Romania and Turkey as a direct threat to its nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Finally, few days after a Pakistani decision to close supply route for U.S. troops, the Russian Envoy to NATO threatened to suspend Northern Distribution Network (NDN) that serves as a critical component to U.S. operations in Afghanistan as it allows the transportation of almost fifty percent of all non-lethal goods to U.S. troops. Consequently, a shut down of the alternative route could seriously undermine U.S. military capacity and put U.S. troops in a vulnerable position. By pointing out at the vital role Russia plays in U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan, Moscow shows that it is entitled to have an equal say in security matters.

All of the above-mentioned events carry an important message that although an attempt to improve the relations between Russia and the United States might have had a good start, as long as their positions on the pre-existing matters are not reconciled, a meaningful cooperation is hardly possible. That said, the split over Georgia, Moldova, and the ballistic missile defense in Europe continues to persist and define Russian and U.S. policies towards each other, much as any attempt to address them unilaterally only exacerbates the situation.

Let’s go back to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. It was signed on November 19, 1990 establishing equal limitation on armed forces that NATO and Warsaw Pact member-countries could deploy between Atlantic Ocean and Ural Mountains. For several years it served as a guaranty of security and control over the overwhelming amount of Russian military weaponry.

Consequently, the lack of a similar security agreement, especially the one regarding nuclear weapons, relaxes limitations and allows the parties more room in their defense planning. All that leads to growing uncertainty, distrust and risk of escalation that would keep the parties uneasy and suspicious of each other actions. In the absence of an agreed structure or a system for minimizing perceived threats, old concerns will persist and grow as will the rhetoric that accompanies these types of ‘Tit-for-Tat’ actions.

By not renewing the CFE Treaty obligation, Russia demonstrated that it has not reconsidered its position in the neighborhood, neither has it overcome its disagreement with NATO’s eastward expansion. Russia chose to unilaterally suspend its participation in the Treaty in 2007, which allowed to keep its troops in Transdniestria and Abkhazia, breakaway Republics of Moldova and Georgia.

Finally, while the United States turns its attention to the Asia Pacific region, it seems that Russia is gradually slipping from U.S. foreign policy agenda. At the same time Russia looks for ways to emphasize its critical role for the success of the U.S. foreign policy goals and to establish a status of an equal partner on security matters.

The Obama Administration plans to complete an anti-ballistic missile
shield to protect European allies against Iran "whether Russia likes it
or not," the U.S. envoy to NATO said on Friday.

Moscow's objections to the project, which includes participation by
Romania, Poland, Turkey and Spain, "won't be the driving force in what
we do," Ivo Daalder, the ambassador, told reporters at a breakfast
session.

The U.S. estimate of the Iranian ballistic missile threat has gone up,
not down, over the two years since President Barack Obama opted for a
new, four-phased deployment to protect the United States and NATO
allies, Daalder said.

"It's accelerating," Daalder said of the U.S.-perceived threat of Iran's
ballistic missiles, "and becoming more severe than even we thought two
years ago."

"We're deploying all four phases, in order to deal with that threat,
whether Russia likes it or not," he added. At the same time, he urged
Moscow to cooperate in both to deal with Iran and to see for itself
that, as he put it, the system's capabilities pose its strategic
deterrent force no threat.

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