Economy in the Red: 4-Year Performance

Real Economic Performance: The SBP’s foreign exchange reserves have declined by about $2 billion in the last six months. A deterioration in the current account balance due to lower cotton/textile prices and a sharp slowdown in remittances growth, continued difficulties in attracting external financing, and the beginning of repayments to the IMF will likely put further pressure on the balance of pa…yments this year, with reserves projected at $12.1 billion by end 2011/12.
In the absence of corrective measures, the fiscal deficit is likely to reach 7 percent of GDP, much higher than the government’s revised budget target of 4.7 percent. Moreover, there are considerable downside risks to this already difficult baseline, particularly in the context of an increasingly difficult global environment and concerns about policy weakening ahead of senate elections in 2012 and parliamentary elections in 2013.

IMF Directors stressed that monetary and exchange rate policies need to better focus on containing inflation and external risks. Monetary policy is now too accommodative, and should be tightened if inflation or external pressures increase. Central bank financing of the budget needs to be curtailed, and greater operational independence of the central bank needs to be secured. Directors also called for more exchange rate flexibility to facilitate external adjustment and safeguard foreign reserves.

Unemployment is high when underemployment and unpaid employment are taken into account, while poverty incidence and measures of human development are at worrisome levels. Efforts to boost revenue mobilization were once again frustrated by a lack of political support, and the fiscal deficit widened to 6.6 percent of GDP in 2010/11. Monetary policy has become more accommodative, with the SBP directly or indirectly (through liquidity injections via open market operations) financing fiscal deficits. While the economy is recovering from the floods, the external position, until recently a source of strength on booming exports and workers’ remittances, is deteriorating.

Pakistan: Selected Economic Indicators, 2008/09–2011/12 1/
(Population: 173.5 million (2010/11))
(Per capita GDP: US$1,179 (2010/11))
(Poverty rate: 17.2 percent (2007/08))
Estimate	Projection
2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12
(Annual percentage change)
Output and prices
Real GDP at factor cost	1.7	3.8	2.4	3.4
GDP deflator at factor cost	20.0	11.9	18.8	12.0
Consumer prices (period average) 2/	17.6	10.1	13.7	12.0
Consumer prices (end of period) 2/	9.6	11.8	13.3	11.0
Pakistani rupees per U.S. dollar (period average)	25.8	6.7	2.3	…
(In percent of GDP)
Saving and investment
Gross saving	12.5	13.1	13.6	11.4
Government	-2.1	-2.4	-3.6	-3.6
Nongovernment (including public sector enterprises)	14.5	15.5	17.2	15.0
Gross capital formation 3/	18.2	15.4	13.4	13.4
Government	3.1	3.5	2.6	3.1
Nongovernment (including public sector enterprises)	15.1	11.9	10.8	10.3
Public finances
Revenue and grants	14.7	14.4	12.8	12.7
Expenditure (including statistical discrepancy)	19.9	20.3	18.9	19.5
Budget balance (including grants)	-5.2	-5.9	-6.1	-6.7
Budget balance (excluding grants)	-5.3	-6.2	-6.6	-6.9
Primary balance	-0.2	-1.6	-2.3	-2.9
Total general government debt 4/	60.7	61.5	60.1	61.7
External general government debt	30.4	30.1	26.8	24.9
Domestic general government debt	30.3	31.4	33.3	36.9
(Annual changes in percent of initial stock of broad money, unless otherwise indicated
Monetary sector
Net foreign assets	-3.2	0.5	4.1	-3.3
Net domestic assets	12.8	11.9	11.8	18.2
Broad money	9.6	12.5	15.9	14.9
Reserve Money	1.9	11.4	17.1	13.3
Private credit (percentage change)	0.7	3.9	4.0	3.4
Six-month treasury bill rate (period average, in percent)	13.1	12.2	13.7	…
External sector
Merchandise exports, U.S. dollars (percentage change)	-6.4	2.9	29.3	-1.8
Merchandise imports, U.S. dollars (percentage change)	-10.3	-1.7	14.5	9.2
Current account balance (in percent of GDP)	-5.7	-2.2	0.2	-2.0
(In percent of exports of goods and services, unless otherwise indicated)
External public and publicly guaranteed debt	182.2	177.3	153.4	158.5
Debt service	21.6	23.0	13.8	18.3
Gross reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars) 5/	9,110	12,958	14,784	12,086
In months of next year’s imports of goods and services	2.9	3.6	3.7	2.9
Memorandum items:
Real effective exchange rate (annual average, percentage change)	-2.1	1.0	6.1	…
Terms of trade (percentage change)	1.9	4.5	-3.2	…
Real per capita GDP (percentage change)	-2.6	1.6	0.3	1.3
GDP at market prices (in billions of Pakistani rupees)	12,724	14,837	18,063	20,918
GDP at market prices (in billions of U.S. dollars)	161.8	176.9	210.6	233.5
Sources: Pakistani authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1/ Fiscal year ends June 30.

Filed under: CURRENT AFFAIRS

Anniversaries are dangerous days and dangerous moments. There is often a lot of celebrating, a flash of attention and then the sun goes down and life goes on as before. We properly celebrate an accomplishment from the past without real thought or determination on how to preserve and build on the celebrated triumph.

So now we are in the run of anniversaries of the Arab Spring, where elections have been held in Tunisia and Egypt, disarray and uncertainty pervades Libya and the bloody battle continues in Syria. In places like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Yemen there are different murmurs of dissent and muddle of just what direction the movements and the reforms will go forth.

Are the elections of Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt the teaching moments that shine on this first anniversary? Or is the true result that woman with the blue bra, being beaten in Cairo coupled with a ramp up on as sexual assaults on journalists? Is the complete confusion and uncertainty of Yemen the harbinger, or the frustrating stagnation of political movement in Lebanon? Or is another wave of self-immolations in Tunisia the true elements of the story?

Perhaps it is perfect symbolism that again people are lighting themselves on fire in Tunisia. That says the circle has now been completed. Back to the beginning, the first tipping points that Tunisia — whose previous impact in the modern Arab world was designed by its dictator to be quiet at best — found itself launching a political dynamic unlike any in the area’s history, since perhaps the first great wave of Islam swept over the region.

Yet there is a difference.

In Tunisia, we saw a rapid fruition of the power to speak and demonstrate – for the moment.

In late October, nearly 90 percent of Tunisians cast their votes in historic democratic elections. The Islamist Ennahdha party received 42 percent of the vote, displayed the discipline of a political party with sophisticated machinery while demonstrating sensitivity to the concerns of the public, as half of its elected officials were women. That was counter to is perceived image of being an anti-women party by virtue of its religious affiliation.

Going further it formed a coalition with the leftist-leaning and nationalist-liberal parties. The three blocs divied up the top three positions in government. The biggest losers of the elections were the secularist, anti-religion parties as well as the remnants of the Ben Ali regime – seemingly a public shout out in favor of an alliance between parties that preserved the Arab and Muslim identity of society, and respected the principles of democratic governance, political pluralism and civil and human rights.

Now Tunisia grabbles with the impact of free speech, inexperience in running a nation and other challenges that are faced by an infant representative government. The likely scenario next for the Tunisian revolution is that a new constitution will be written and offered as a referendum in the fall, followed by new parliamentary elections at the end of the year. If the current government is able to reduce the economic hardships on the poor and the middle class, reform the security agencies and the judiciary as promised, then they may repeat its victory – and show that the nation that went first continues to lead.

That all looks good.

One year out it is worth recalling the longtime saying that revolutionaries are not the ones who reap the fruits of the revolution. After the revolutionaries comes the time of the opportunists and the time of failed hopes.

Egypt shows just that. Those who viewed the events from afar, and thus did not drink in the elixir of street joy after the rapid revolutionary results, suspected it would be a long, difficult and puzzling challenge to wrest control from the military and other longtime power brokers. Those chess players may not be seen but they know how to move the pieces.

The past year in Egypt has been marked by brutal suppression of peaceful protests by army officials. Instead of protecting Egyptians, the Supreme Council on Armed Forces used extremely violent tactics such as tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition to disperse protesters. They are responsible for the deaths of at least 41 civilians over the past year.

The SCAF also renewed emergency law, a 30-year-old mainstay of the Mubarak regime that allows for abuse and detention of any citizen who is critical of the government. There are prison terms witing under the law for any person whose speech it deems to be ‘insulting’ or ‘defaming’. According to Human Rights Watch, SCAF has tried more than 12,000 civilians under military tribunals since January 2011, including children under the age of 15. Emergency law hinders all types of freedoms of expression in Egypt, and suppresses the freedom of all citizens to voice their opinion without fear of prosecution.

The power to speak has many repercussion. While each nation is different, the seeds of humanness are the same. Preventing them always lends itself to cruel creativity.

These are teaching moments in the countries of the Arab restiveness. Spring turned to summer and fall and winter, a full year of seasons. Unleashed, untethered, unscripted at the beginning, it is no surprise it has propelled those to success: those who has the organization, the plan, and the ability to drive that plan.

As some nations now wiser than they were a year ago? On the surface, it seems not in a region where freefall and fluid change now seems to be the script for the near future. Even in Tunisia, journalists are facing increasing assaults, Human Rights Watch reports, noting that the trial of a television director on morality charges for airing a controversial animated film is a disturbing turn for the infant democracy.

Free speech was the cry a year ago, but perhaps today only free to a certain degree. The cries are in the shattering of dreams. In the Arab world, it may be the second anniversary that tells a much more true story.

The December protests in Russia against parliamentary election results have marked a momentous change to the current Russian political situation. The protests have revealed the looming necessity for authorities to respond in a timely manner, and to acknowledge the new scenario. Widespread public discontent with existing policies is shaping a new, uncomfortable reality for the Russian political leadership – a reality that it has reluctantly been forced into deal with.

So far, the first steps have been small but important. First, not only were the December rallies sanctioned, they also received unusual exposure by state media. Soon after, President Medvedev announced sweeping political reforms including direct election of local governors, as opposed to an appointment by the Kremlin, as well as proposing a simplified registration for political parties and independent presidential candidates. These are significant changes that no one was seriously talking about just few months ago, as they seemed impossible in the country’s political climate.

New developments affected the Kremlin’s inside political circle, including the resignation of the chairman of United Russia, Boris Gryzlov, and the departure of Vladimir Surkov, former chief of staff and the ‘grey cardinal’ of Russia’s domestic policies. Political reshuffling aimed to address public discontent with the way the past election was handled, yet Putin made it clear that a rerun is out of the question. Instead, he attempted to restore the communication and dialogue with voters via a televised call-in show just a few days after the first December rally, and a presidential campaign website that is presumably open to public suggestions and criticism.

Although these changes are valid and testify to Putin’s understanding that old–fashioned tactics no longer work, his latest attempts to address public discontent have not been successful either: they have not gained public approval, let alone confidence. Are the reforms not good enough? Or are they too late? Both. Solutions offered by the political leadership are nowhere near the necessary structural changes, but are rather just short-term concessions that are long-overdue. They are therefore unable to win the public’s trust.

While Putin acknowledges that ‘everyone develops and everyone should meet the demands of today and tomorrow,’ it is time for his own understanding of people’s demands to expand and go beyond ‘stable utility prices and easier utility expenses formulas’ – those were demands and calls from last year’s protests. People have moved on to new, important subjects such as fair elections and the protection of their rights. As long as authorities remain separated from this new reality, their attempts in gaining confidence and approval from the voters will have little effect.

For comparison’s sake, Mikhail Prokhorov – a new presidential candidate – focuses his presidential campaign on up-to date and pressing issues. For instance, he promises early parliamentary elections, decreasing the number of state officials, and reinforcing oversight of their efficiency, and indirectly touches upon the unsubstantiated imprisonments of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev – a matter that has long been taboo in high level political discussion.

Ironically, according to recent polls, Russia’s Prime Minister Putin still remains the most popular politician in Russia. Should the Russian populace find a change necessary, he might reconsider his ‘concession’ tactics and move to either more demanding issues or a heavy-handed approach, using security forces to quell demonstrations, or possibly, embellishing on a growing outside threat from the West.

Guest Contribution by Jonathan D. Halevi

The following piece was originally published by Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. The author, Jonathan D. Halevi, is a senior researcher of the Middle East and Radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs headed by former Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Dr. Dore Gold. Mr. Halevi is also director of research for the Orient Research Group Ltd., a strategic and private information services company. 

The prevailing optimism in media reports concerning the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist party’s readiness to adhere to the peace treaty with Israel is based on general statements made by senior officials in both parties. These statements maintain that Egypt must honor the international treaties that it signed.

Yet a more rigorous examination of the two parties’ stances identifies a markedly different tendency. Both seek a way to cast off the Camp David agreement in a manner that will incur minimal diplomatic and economic damage to Egypt, and restore Egypt to its leading role in the circle of states confronting Israel.

The Muslim Brotherhood has set a number of criteria for examining international agreements, including the Camp David agreement: the considerations of Islamic canon law (Sharia), the position of the Egyptian people, and the degree of Israel’s compliance with the agreement from Egypt’s perspective.
The strategic objective of the Egyptian Islamic movements is to transform Egypt into a prime regional force that will lead the diplomatic and military battle against Israel. This means re-examining the Camp David agreement and submitting it to the decision of the new parliament that will be controlled by the Islamic parties or to a referendum – thereby alleviating the responsibility of any future Egyptian government for cancelling the peace treaty. These developments can be averted if the U.S. and its allies take a firm position against any initiative to undermine the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, and all echelons of the Egyptian establishment are made to understand the implications of any such action.

The revolution in Egypt, followed by elections to the parliament, has elevated the Islamic parties to a position of power as they enjoy an absolute parliamentary majority after the two initial stages of the parliamentary elections. The Muslim Brotherhood movement’s Freedom and Justice party won 49 percent of the total seats that it contested (73 out of 150) in the first stage of the elections and the Salafist al-Nur party won about 20 percent of the seats (30 seats). In the second stage of the elections the Muslim Brotherhood won about 40 percent of the votes and al-Nur about 35 percent. The final stage of the elections will take place in January 2012. However, we can already form the distinct impression that the Egyptian parliament will be controlled by the absolute majority retained by these two extreme Islamic parties.

In recent journalistic reports we repeatedly hear the claim that the Freedom and Justice party and the al-Nur party will continue to honor the Camp David peace agreement with Israel after the new regime has been consolidated under their leadership. These reports are essentially based on general statements made by senior officials in both parties to the effect that Egypt must honor the international agreements that it signed. However, a rigorous examination of the two parties’ stances indicates a totally different tendency: namely, the two parties seek to cast off the Camp David accords in a manner that will cause Egypt the minimal possible diplomatic and economic damage.

The issue of Egyptian adherence to the Camp David agreement was brought up during discussions that Senator John Kerry conducted together with the American Ambassador to Cairo, Anne Patterson, with leaders of the Freedom and Justice party on December 10, 2011. Dr. Mohammed Morsi, the party chairman, referred to the issue in general terms. A report on the meeting by the official website of the Muslim Brotherhood stated:

Morsi noted that Egypt is a large country with a deep-rooted history that fulfills an important role in the Arab, Islamic and international arenas and therefore it honors the agreements and contracts which it has signed. He demanded that the American administration listen directly to the people rather than listen to what is said about them, while emphasizing that the United States could play a role in facilitating economic stability and prosperity for all peoples should it choose to do so.1

New Egyptian Conditions

The Muslim Brotherhood set a number of criteria for examining international agreements, including the Camp David agreement. First, there is Islamic canon law (Sharia); second, one must take into account the Egyptian people’s position which Morsi mentioned in his talk with Senator Kerry; and third, one must weigh the degree of compliance by the other party to any agreement that was signed with Egypt.

The platform of the Freedom and Justice party determines that it will honor international human rights agreements, provided that they do not contradict the Islamic Sharia. Regarding the peace agreement with Israel, the platform states that agreements between countries must be acceptable to the people and conform to the principles of justice and the interests of the parties. Respect for these agreements is conditional upon an obligation by the parties to fulfill them in full, as is the norm in international relations. “Therefore, the party considers it obligatory to reappraise many of the agreements that were signed in various fields by the old regime.”2

Calls to Re-examine the Treaty with Israel

Senior leaders of the Freedom and Justice party have on numerous occasions in recent months favored amending or abrogating the Camp David accords and severing diplomatic and economic relations with Israel. On August 25, 2011, party chairman Dr. Mohammed Morsi demanded a re-examination of the Camp David agreement, and contended that Israel’s “attack” on an Egyptian army border position (that was in response to terrorist fire at the IDF from this position) exemplified Israel’s systematic violation of the agreement.3

Dr. Ahmed Abu Baraka, the Freedom and Justice party’s legal advisor and a senior leader of the party, said on August 28 that it was necessary to re-examine all the clauses of the Camp David agreement to see whether its abrogation was mandated. He emphasized the importance of deploying Egyptian army forces in the Sinai, equipped with heavy and advanced weaponry, in order to deter Israel.4

Dr. Mohammed Gamal Hismat, a senior leader of the Freedom and Justice party and a former parliament member, proposed on August 24 to establish a legal committee that would examine the Camp David agreement in light of Israel’s “continued violation” of the agreement.5

Dr. Essam El-Arian, the deputy leader of the Freedom and Justice party, on August 23 minimized the importance of American threats to terminate assistance to Egypt if it were to disown the Camp David agreement, and contended that Israel was violating the agreement “in a blatant fashion.”6

Dr. Hamdy Ismail, the party secretary in the Ismailiya district, explained on October 31 that the issue of the Camp David agreement directly affected the Egyptian citizenry, and therefore raised a proposal within the party to submit the decision on the issue to a referendum.7

Dr. Ahmed Rami, a senior Freedom and Justice party leader in the Qalyubiya district, called on August 27 for a re-examination of the Camp David agreement, noting that the revolution in Egypt marked the outset of a journey to liberate Jerusalem in view of the fact that the “Zionist entity is near collapse.”8

These positions received additional validation from the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Dr. Mohammed Badie, who in his weekly letters to movement activists elaborates his doctrine and positions with regard to the United States and Israel following the revolutions in Egypt and the Arab world. Badie terms the Camp David accord “a surrender” agreement and he presents a list of demands on this issue. In his letter of May 5, 2011, Badie wrote:

We vociferously call for the termination of normalization, that provided our enemy [Israel] with stability, putting an end to securing the Zionist borders and the killing of infiltrators into the enemy’s [territory], the abrogation of the issues of economic interests such as the QIZ,9 a [halt] to gas exports that wrought damage to our national security, urgent action to complete the opening of the Rafah crossing on a permanent basis and a re-examination of the Camp David agreement so it can be presented to the National Assembly elected in free elections, thus allowing it to have its say after it was denied this for years.10

Badie defines Israel and the United States as Egypt’s principal adversaries. In his weekly letter of October 6, 2011, he reaches the clear conclusion that “our main enemy is the Zionist-American plan, which aspires to take over the entire region in order to establish Greater Israel and the New Middle East.”11

Badie does not mention any option for cooperation with Israel or the United States, but, on the contrary, in his evaluation these two countries, that represent the most dangerous threat to Egypt, are currently in a state of historic decline:

The global forces, the Zionists and Americans, are absorbing a succession of debacles and defeats, commencing with Israel’s isolation and loss of its regional supporters, and the American failures in the military realm (in Iraq and Afghanistan), and in the economic arena that threaten the collapse of the capitalist regime as a result of failed policy and the huge expenses and wars prosecuted under the pretext of liquidating what they call terror. They’ve forfeited their credibility among peoples and now they’ve lost their financial sources, and we do not rule out the possibility that their fate will approximate the Soviet Union’s fate….At the same time the blessed revolutions of the Arab Spring presage a total change in the Arab national map.12

The irrelevance of the Camp David agreement finds expression in the Muslim Brotherhood movement’s overt aspiration to bring about the “liberation” of the entire territory of “Palestine,” a concept that dovetails with its Islamic ideological platform, and which finds expression in the current optimistic assessment by the Muslim Brotherhood leader on the prospects for realizing this vision in practice. In his weekly letter of June 9, 2011, Badie writes:

Victory is near with the help of Allah, it is definite and there can be no doubt about it. The restoration of Palestine, al Quds [Jerusalem], the Golan, and all the lands that Israel conquered is no longer feverish imagination, but a hope that will soon be realized after the [Arab] nations have revolted….The era of “Israeli” superiority has ended and “Israel” has begun to doubt its continuity and survival.13

The official position of the Salafist al-Nur party resembles that of the Muslim Brotherhood. Dr. Emad Abdel Ghafour, the party leader, says:

It is obligatory to honor the agreements to which Egypt is affiliated, and we demand that they be met. There are many passages in the peace agreement that were not implemented [by Israel], such as a solution to the Palestinian problem, the right of self-determination [for the Palestinian people], and the autonomy of a Palestinian state on Palestinian soil. There are many issues that must be implemented so that the Palestinian people will sense that it has benefited from the peace process….The peace agreement of Camp David requires a re-examination.14

Dr. Yousry Hamad, the spokesperson for the al-Nur party, explained that the party’s position on the Camp David agreement would be adopted on the basis of Sharia,15 and vigorously denied journalistic reports that the party was ostensibly prepared to maintain contacts with the Israeli ambassador in Cairo.16

Unfounded Optimism

The optimism regarding a radical change in the positions of these extreme Egyptian Islamic movements regarding Israel grasps at the straws of general statements that do not attest to an ideological reversal, but convey the tactics for obtaining the strategic objective: casting off the Camp David agreement and transforming Egypt into a prime regional force that will lead the diplomatic and military battle against Israel.

The Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the al-Nur party, is seeking a convenient exit point from the Camp David agreement, due to an awareness of the implications of violating a binding diplomatic treaty under international law and the immediate damage that the Egyptian economy is likely to absorb as a direct result of an initiated abrogation of the Camp David accords.

Egypt receives $1.3 billion annually in U.S. military assistance, while in 2010 American economic assistance totaled $250 million. The Egyptian army’s main strength is predicated on American weapons systems including F-16 and F 14 aircraft, Apache helicopters, M1A1 and M60A3 tanks, surface-to-air missiles, spy planes, and more. In the framework of bilateral military cooperation, the armies of the two countries customarily conduct joint training and maneuvers.

How to Nullify the Peace Treaty

Yet the die has been cast and the strategic choice has already been made. The only question on the agenda is how to implement this decision at a minimal diplomatic and economic cost. We can infer from comments by senior Muslim Brotherhood members that they are interested in playing the “democratic game” to the hilt on this issue as well. This means re-examining the Camp David agreement and submitting it to the decision of the new parliament that will be controlled by the Islamic parties or to a referendum – thereby alleviating the responsibility of any future Egyptian government for cancelling the peace treaty. The immediate pretext will be Israel’s noncompliance with clauses in the agreement, in order to attribute to Israel the blame for the treaty’s abrogation.

It would appear that the Muslim Brotherhood’s appraisal is that following their seizure of power and additional achievements of the Arab Spring, the U.S. will be compelled to accept the new reality, just as it has made peace with the situation up to now. American leaders have even reiterated their praise for the democratic process, although this process has elevated the radical Islamic forces to new positions of power. These forces aspire to drain democracy of content and gradually (the Muslim Brotherhood strategy) or immediately (the al-Nur party approach) implement Islamic religious law.

From Israel’s standpoint, the revolution in Egypt and its translation at the ballot box into the Islamic Revolution carries the serious potential for transforming Egypt in the foreseeable future into an enemy and restoring it to the circle of confrontation states. Israel is doing its utmost to preserve the Camp David agreement even for appearances sake. However, developments in Egypt will inevitably lead to the creation of a serious security challenge on Israel’s southern border. The new Egypt will try to exercise its full sovereignty in Sinai and deploy regular forces there, employing various pretexts, beginning with Israeli “violations” of the Camp David agreement, proceeding with the need to defend itself against an Israeli attack, and concluding with Egypt’s obligation to protect its Palestinian brothers in Gaza.

Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, the parent movement of Hamas, provides ongoing assistance to Hamas and furnishes it with strategic backing that is growing more potent due to the Brotherhood’s increased strength in the recent elections. A high proportion of Izzedine al Qassam Brigade activists who were killed in recent years in Gaza were simultaneously Muslim Brotherhood activists and Hamas members. The plausible assumption is that one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s first objectives after it assumes the reins of power will be to guarantee an open border crossing between Gaza and Egypt, and to provide comprehensive economic and military assistance to Hamas that will pose new security risks for Israel.

Furthermore, the strategic alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas may constrain Israel’s freedom of military action in Gaza (as well as in the West Bank) because this could provoke an Egyptian military response, including the transfer of aid, weapons, and intelligence to Hamas, the deployment of Egyptian forces in Sinai and/or in Gaza, stationing Egyptian antiaircraft systems on the border of Gaza, and threats of direct military action.

These developments can be averted if the U.S. and its allies take a firm position against any initiative to undermine the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, and all echelons of the Egyptian establishment are made to understand the implications of any such action.

* * *

Notes:

1. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?ArtID=96953&SecID=0

2. http://www.hurryh.com/Party_Program.aspx

3. http://www.hurryh.com/Provinces/Our_news_Details.aspx?News_ID=1933&ID=23

4. http://www.hurryh.com/Provinces/Our_news_Details.aspx?News_ID=2000

5. http://www.hurryh.com/Party_Article_Details.aspx?News_ID=1872

6. http://www.hurryh.com/Our_news_Details.aspx?News_ID=1850

7. http://www.hurryh.com/ar_print.aspx?print_ID=4579

8. http://www.hurryh.com/Our_news_Details.aspx?News_ID=1954

9. The QIZ Agreement (QIZ-Qualified Industrial Zones) was signed in 2005 between the governments of the United States, Israel and Egypt. The agreement defined industrial zones whose factories would receive a customs exemption on their exports to the United States if a certain percentage of the raw materials originated in Israel.

10. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?ArtID=83759&SecID=0

11. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?SecID=213&ArtID=92523

12. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?SecID=213&ArtID=92523

13. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?ArtID=85754&SecID=0

14. http://www.tayyar.org/Tayyar/News/PoliticalNews/ar-LB/salafi-egypte-pb-5363323219.htm

15. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8tCfUs6upxQ&feature=youtu.be

16. http://www.facebook.com/AlnourParty/posts/211082628974957

2011 has been a year filled with change, reform, progress and challenges across the Middle East and North Africa, Morocco included. As we anticipate what 2012 holds for the region, here’s a recap of key moments in 2011 for Morocco:

February 20 – Thousands demonstrated across Morocco in solidarity with protesters in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as to call for an acceleration of reforms in Morocco. The demonstrations were called for by the Freedom and Democracy Now movement, which used Facebook and other social media to mobilize followers. This date became the name of the protest movement that later challenged the democratic reform process. The group was handicapped by inconsistent messaging, internal disputes and, in the end, a refusal to participate in consultations for the proposed constitutional reforms.

March 9 – King Mohammed VI addresses the nation and calls for unprecedented reforms to the Constitution. He assembles a consultative constitutional commission, made up of academics, policymakers, civil society and political party leaders, trade unions and youth and charges the group with drafting the reformed Constitution.

March 19 – Morocco, represented by Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri and Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi, participated in the high-level International Conference in support of the new Libya, co-chaired by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron. Morocco pledged to “support the Libyan brotherly people at the multilateral level, notably within the UN, so that Libya can regain its stature among nations through its legitimate representatives from the National Transitional Council (NTC).”

March 23 – Morocco’s Foreign Minister, Taieb Fassi Fihri, visited the US to meet with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. (Minister Fassi Fihri was the first Arab foreign minister to visit the US since the beginning of the Arab Spring.) During the visit, Minister Fassi Fihri and his US counterpart discussed strengthening bilateral relations through a strategic partnership, reiterated the US and Moroccan commitment to resolving the Western Sahara conflict through autonomy for the disputed territory under Moroccan sovereignty and pledged to work together to promote stability in the region, particularly as conditions worsened in Libya.

April 28 – A young Moroccan man, dressed as a “Western Hippie,” walked into Cafe Argana, very popular among tourists and Moroccans, in Marrakesh’s Jamaa el Fna square (which is a UNESCO World Heritage site), left a suitcase filled with explosives and remote detonated the device. Seventeen people, Moroccans and European tourists, were killed and injured more than 20 others. Moroccan authorities claim that those responsible for the bombing were linked with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), though AQIM denied responsibility. In late October, the alleged mastermind of the attacks, Adel al-Othmani, was convicted and sentenced to death and his co-conspirators received sentences ranging from two years to life.

June 17 – In a speech to the nation, King Mohammed VI announces historic reforms to the Constitution presented to him by the consultative commission. Among the reforms: the role of Prime Minister is greatly enhanced and the King must appoint the Prime Minister from the party which wins the most seats in the elections, stronger mechanisms for the promotion and protection of women’s equality, human rights, recognition of Amazigh (Berber) as an official language, the King must make key appointments in consultation with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and the judiciary is restructured to increase independence and transparency.

July 1 – The proposed reforms are put to a national referendum. Voter turnout is 73% and 98% vote in favor of the reforms.

September 4 – Princess Lalla Aicha, sister of the late King Hassan II and aunt of King Mohammed VI, died at the age of 81 in Rabat. Lalla Aicha was the first female Arab Ambassador (United Kingdom, 1965-69) and was very active throughout her life as a women’s rights activist and vocal advocate for the Red Crescent.

October 21 – Morocco is elected to a two year term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2012-13.

October 22 – Three European aid workers were kidnapped by members of AQIM from within the Polisario-controlled refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. The Polisario Front, whose members reportedly assisted the kidnappers, currently challenges Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara.

November 25 – Morocco holds first parliamentary elections since the adoption of broad constitutional reforms approved by referendum in July. The elections were also the first parliamentary elections in the region since the Arab Spring began. (Egypt’s parliamentary elections began the following Monday and the Tunisian elections which preceded Morocco’s were to choose a constituent assembly to write the country’s new constitution.) Voter turnout was 45%, up from 37% for the 2007 national Parliamentary elections. The winning party in the elections were the moderate Islamist party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), which won 107 of the 395 seats in the Lower House of Parliament. Shy of a majority, the PJD was required to form a governing coalition with other major parties.

November 29 – King Mohammed VI appoints Abdelilah Benkirane, leader of the Islamist Party of Justice and Development as Prime Minister of the newly elected parliament.

December 2 – “Morocco Mall” in Casablanca, the largest shopping mall in Africa, opens its doors. The opening of the $260 million project brought drew Moroccan royalty, Princess Lalla Meryem (the sister of King Mohammed VI) and American pop culture royalty, Jennifer Lopez.

December 23 – President Obama signs the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Omnibus) for which Congress’ report language, for the first time, authorizes US assistance monies to be used in all regions of Morocco, included the Moroccan-administered Western Sahara. Congress also called on the State Department to make resolving the Western Sahara conflict a “ priority.”

This past Sunday was Christmas Day, PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif‘s birthday, and the 135th birth anniversary of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the father of Pakistan.

This past Sunday was also Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (“Movement for Justice”)’s much-anticipated political rally in Karachi. For those of us not physically at the Minar-e-Quaid (Jinnah’s Mausoleum), the PTI jalsa was cause to gather at friends’ houses, tweet feverishly, and offer sideline commentary to no one in particular. Or maybe that was just me.

By this time, you have undoubtedly read a flurry of news coverage on said jalsa. But for those who haven’t, here is the rundown. PTI leader Imran Khan – the oft-labeled “cricketer-turned-politician” – has gained much political traction and popularity in the last year, after launching his political party officially in 1996. Fahad Desmukh, in his radio piece for PRI’s The World, noted,

The PTI attracted mostly urban educated professionals, but failed to get a mainstream following. In fact, in the 2002 parliamentary elections, Imran Khan was the only candidate from his party to win a seat…But now Khan has managed to mobilize enough young urban professionals to become a rising political force. In the past, this demographic shunned politics as a dishonorable activity. But young people are coming out now out of frustration with the current leadership.

Last month, PTI’s jalsa in Lahore garnered between 100,000 to 200,000 supporters – one of the largest political rallies in the country. This past Sunday, thousands of people came out on the streets of Karachi. Although PTI estimated the number at 500,000, news agencies report that the number in attendance was closer to 100,000, still making it one of the largest rallies in Karachi in recent years. Mutahir Ahmed, a professor at the University of Karachi, told Dawn, “He is riding a wave of popular politics right now. There is a lot of frustration among ordinary people, as well as political workers right now, which he is cashing on.”

In an article for the Express Tribune entitled, “Imran Khan Wins Hearts & Minds at Karachi Rally,” Shaheryar Mirza and Saad Hasan interviewed one rally attendee, who said, “I don’t know why but Imran Khan gives me hope. I want change, security and a better future for my children.”

Ah, the psychological underpinnings of hope and change. We saw it work with the Obama 2008 presidential campaign, and leveraged again by Afghanistan’s Abdullah Abdullah during his recent presidential run.  It’s the promise of something different. And though it may just be semantics, words like hope and change induce positive associations with absolute ideals of happiness, progress, and prosperity.  For a fatigued and frustrated Pakistani populace, that is a fuzzy but welcome option.

I don’t claim to be an expert on our political system (I actually don’t claim to be an expert on anything), but I have been fascinated with the perceived rise of PTI & Imran Khan in recent months. Here are a few observations both on the lead-up to the December 25th jalsa, the rally itself, and subsequent reactions post-rally.

1. PTI Snakes on a Plane: You have to give it to Tehreek-e-Insaf. They know how to market their vision to urban masses & millennials alike. Prior to the Dec 25th jalsa, the party generated buzz by launching a telemarketing scheme akin to Snakes on a Plane (if you received a phone call from Samuel L. Jackson telling you about those mother**** snakes on the mother**** plane, then you know what I’m talkin’ about). Many Karachiites received a 30-second phone call from Imran Khan inviting them to the rally. Although the call was pre-recorded, many almost believed they were receiving a personal call from the man himself. Insert swoons here. The strategy is a reflection on the party’s overarching marketing approach – the use of choice words (hope, change & the like), leveraging social media, telemarketing all enforce a broader theme: Imran Khan & PTI offer something new, something approachable, something hip, something different from the status quo.
2. Imran Khan Cricket Hero, Imran Khan Politican = Same, Same: I don’t think I’ve ever heard so many cricket analogies. Oh my goodness. In a BBC interview prior to the jalsa he noted, “It’s like playing a World Cup final…this could be a defining moment in Pakistan.” In the lead-up to the rally, Imran reportedly called PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif a club cricketer “flexing muscles with a Test cricketer.” The list goes on. And while I think cricket & “tsunami” references could form its own drinking (coke! hee!) game, the analogies further raise positive associations of Imran circa 1992 World Cup. Imran the politician + Imran cricket hero = Imran heroic politician.
   
3. Rally like it’s a Britney Spears Concert: When the band-formerly-known-as-Junoon’s lead singer Salman Ahmed started singing Junoon songs, all I could think was, Wow he sounds just like Ali Azmat! And then I realized he was lip-synching. It was, in fact, Ali Azmat. Such a Britney move, dude. In their post on the rally, Cafe Pyala noted, “With more ‘heavyweights’ joining, PTI youth may have to live with the fact that the music has died with the Lahore jalsa.”
   
4. PTI – Stragglers Welcome: Ahsan over at Five Rupees had a great post on the politicians who have crossed over from their own parties to join PTI, and what it all means: “…when the potential for success for [insert party here] ticket goes down, and PTI’s chances of success go up, we’re more likely to see politicians from [insert party here] to leave for the PTI,” though this may not be the case for MQM or Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). The new additions to PTI are relative heavyweights, including Javed Hashmi from PML-N & Shah Mehmood Qureshi from PPP. Before watching the jalsa, I thought they were sure to help PTI’s clout. But then I watched SMQ talking like a wannabe Shakespeare (community) theater actor about nuclear policy during the rally, and am now grumpy and undecided.
5. Insecurity is the Best Form of Flattery: You can tell other political parties (namely the PPP & PML-N) are beginning to feel threatened when they start resorting to petty mudslinging and banding together. PM Gilani, who reportedly also made a statement that Zardari was actually younger than Imran, also told media outlets, “Those people who are talking of revolution – are there any new people among the revolutionaries or are they mostly those who wanted to bring revolution along with Musharraf?” Curiously absent from those critiques – the MQM. Curious indeed.

Don’t get me wrong. I’ve been impressed with the perceived meteoric rise of Imran & his party. His speech, especially in comparison with the other speeches at the jalsa, was powerful & hit all the right notes – from wishing Pakistani Christians a Merry Christmas to addressing the Balochistan issue. And though the PTI Manifesto can and should be a better representation of how PTI aims to do much of what they promise (including, ahem, ending corruption in 90 days! Eee!), I do think Imran has steadily moved away from the days where he stood against everything and for nothing. Does that mean I still have my reservations? Hell yes. Does he really have the establishment on his side and what ramifications will that hold? What does an Islamic Welfare State mean in reality? What does all of this mean in reality?

Every political leader in our country has set out to prove that they can undertake the ideals laid out in Jinnah’s vision. Every leader makes vague promises, tugs on our heart strings that this time, dear citizens, they will be different. The difference with Imran is that he is an option we have not tried before.

Does that merit my vote? I’m still undecided, but at least his campaign has spurred me to vote. You should too.

Other blog posts/related pieces you should read:

A Reluctant Mind – Pedaling Obscurantism (esp. on the female dress issue)

Obama Says Do More – The PTI Rally in Karachi or Democracy is Alive & Well in Pakistan But Not Really

Dawn – Cowasjee’s Open Letter to Imran Khan (from 1996)

Filed under: Op-Eds

Another year is coming to a close. It’s time to look back, recap and rewind 2011 in Central Asia. Let’s start with elections: two Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, held elections this year.

Kazakhstan’s presidential election took place on April 3, 2011.

Guess who won? Not surprising to anybody who follows Kazakhstan in the news, it’s Nursultan Nazarbayev who garnered 95.5% of the vote (with a total turn out of 89.5%) outperforming his earlier achievement of 91% in the previous election in 2005. Nazarbayev began his fourth term in office and thanks to the amendments to the constitution that makes an exception for him as “the leader of the nation,” he can run for the highest office in the country an unlimited number of times. Read the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report here. Kazakhstan is due to hold early parliamentary elections on January 15, 2012. The snap election was expected following the April presidential poll, but was just announced last month.

Kyrgyzstan also held a vote for the country’s president. Prime Minister Almazbek Atambaev won an overwhelming share of votes on October 30, 2011 obviating the need for a run off. There was a gag on foreign press during the campaign, a strange thing by Western standards. According to the Guardian, “International observers had largely praised the runup to the election but some complained of counting irregularities. They said the scale of Atambayev’s apparent win indicated he may have benefited from reliance on state resources.”

Here’s a quick glance at year in review in Central Asia.

Kazakhstan:

U.S. Peace Corps Quits Kazakhstan. The exact reason is not clear, but Kazakhstan is definitely a loser in this situation as the opportunity for the Kazakh people to interact with foreigners and learn English got much smaller. It’s interesting that Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are now the only countries in the Central Asia region with a Peace Corps presence.

In November, Kazakhstan witnessed one of the worst terrorist attacks the country has ever seen. A suspected militant shot dead four members of the security forces and two civilians before blowing himself up, killing another police officer, in the city of Taraz.

In October, two explosions hit the oil city of Atyrau in western Kazakhstan, killing a suspected suicide bomber.

Kyrgyzstan:

For Kyrgyzstan, the most important evens of the year were the presidential elections and healing the wounds of ethnic violence of 2010.

On May 3, 2011, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry or the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC) released its final report on the interethnic violence and clashes between the country’s ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities last year. Read more about the findings here.

Tajikistan:

In January, the Tajik government ratified a 1999 deal handing over 386 square miles (1,000 sq km) of land in the remote Pamir mountain range to China.

The women’s lot in Tajikistan remains abysmal as is the situation with the freedom of speech and press.

The case of Urunboy Usumov’s is probably the most infamous this year. The 60 year old BBC reporter was arrested in June and sentenced to three years in jail over alleged connections to the Hizb ut-Tahrir group, but the judge granted him an amnesty and ordered his release. After his release, he told the BBC’s Uzbek Service he would appeal against his conviction. The BBC has strongly condemned the verdict, insisting Mr Usmonov was carrying out journalistic duties.

Last month a court in Tajikistan released two pilots, one Russian and one Estonian whose sentencing of 8.5 years in prison escalated the Tajik-Russian tension and caused a retaliation by the former.

By and large, the shenanigans between Russia and Tajikistan is not something new as it tried to raise petroleum tariffs for Tajikistan earlier this year.

Turkmenistan:

This year, Turkmenistan’s leadership received ample attention in the press and in the blogosphere along with other Central Asian leaders given the region’s democratic credentials.

Linking articles and news would probably make a long list…Just a few examples: here and here.

In other news, TAPI has been a bumpy road.

Uzbekistan:

In March of this year, for an unspecified reason, the Uzbek government shut down the Human Rights Watch offices in Tashkent. It is the first time in the organization’s 33 year history that it was kicked out from a country where it was operating. This ends HRW’s 15 year presence in Uzbekistan, since its established its offices following the country’s independence from the Soviet Union.

Much was written in the press and on the Internet about Lola Karimova, the youngest daughter of Uzbek president Islam Karimov, who in May of this year filed a law suit seeking €30,000 (US$43,000) in damages against a French news website Rue89, claiming that it described her as a “dictator’s daughter” and stated that she paid Monica Bellucci, the Italian actress, €190,000 (US$272,000) to appear at a charity event. On July 1, 2011, the French court ruled that the article was both fair and true, and could not be taken as a personal attack – the judge found that there was not sufficient evidence for the charge of libel under French law. But the issue of alleged payments to Belluci was not resolved. Ironically, the opposite of what Karimov’s daughter was trying to accomplish became obvious. The trial exposed human rights violations and the brutality with which the regime deals with opposition as two well-known exiled human rights defenders from Uzbekistan testified for the defense.

Ah,  Uzbek cotton, always creates a stir in the news every year starting in September when the cotton harvesting season begins in Central Asia. This year was no exception, although some welcoming developments took place. Sixty of the world’s major retailers, including Walmart, Walt Disney, H&M and Adidas agreed to boycott all products known to contain Uzbek cotton. In addition, The European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee unanimously blocked a trade deal that would have lowered the tariffs on EU imports of Uzbek cotton, citing objections to that country’s continued use of forced child labor in its cotton harvests. These are all promising steps.

Don’t forget about U.S. dealings with Uzbekistan. Despite it’s poor human rights record, the West depends on this Central Asian country for supply roots to Afghanistan.

Natural Disasters in the Region:

On January 24 a 6.1 magnitude earthquake struck a remote mountainous region of Tajikistan near the Chinese boarder. There were no reported deaths.

On July 19 a 6.2 magnitude earthquake with an epicenter just inside Kyrgyzstan shook the Fergana Valley affecting Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, killing at least 14 people.

Russia and Central Asia:

In October Russia signed a free trade agreement with seven other former Soviet republics among which are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. There are reports that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan might join next year.

Kyrgyzstan named a mountain peak after Putin earlier this year – perhaps they had a feeling.

It’s not surprising that Putin lost his 2/3 majority in parliament today. Many people have turned against him and his party for many reasons: his inability to improve living standards, deal with corruption and reform the military, police, health and education systems.

But perhaps most damning: his inability to get more than 50% of the vote despite controlling all the media, silencing the opposition, stuffing thousands of ballots, blackmailing scores of regional governors, and even detaining the head election monitor! Under similar conditions, his Communist predecessors never allowed themselves to win by anything less than 95%.

Decisive proof, if any more were needed, of his and United Russia’s total incompetence.
After all, this must have been Russia’s dirtiest parliamentary elections even by the country’s world-leading standards of virtual politics, and they still managed to screw it up.

*United Russia apparatchiks working in industry, schools and local bureaucracies DEMANDED THEIR SUBORDINATES SHOW THEM CAMERAPHONE PHOTOS OF THEIR BALLOTS AS PROOF THAT THEY VOTED “THE RIGHT WAY”. No joke! Who says Russia has no transparency??!

*Several regional governors threaten voters that their benefits would be cut and that industry would leave if they do not vote UR.

*A Gazeta.ru journalist infiltrated an organised ballot stuffing ring on the outskirts of Moscow
*Independent election monitoring group Golos (“Voice”, or “Vote”) found over 9000 different electoral violations and logged them onto an interactive online map.

* Shortly after that, Golos’s website is taken down by a cyberattack; Golos’s director Lilya Shibanova is detained at an airport and her laptop is confiscated.

Will the election become Putin’s Waterloo? Who knows? But one thing’s for sure: Russians can endure many things, but one thing we can’t take is incompetent authoritarianism.

Georgia

2011 was the year when former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze put the finishing touches on her long campaign to discredit former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze.

Ms. Burjanadze began her re-branding effort from responsible, clear-headed opposition leader to uncompromising radical after forming her own political party in 2008. The disastrous Russo-Georgian War in the same year fueled her embrace of confrontational rhetoric and what appeared to be acquiescence to occasional violent tactics by her allies at demonstrations.

The arrest of a number of her inner circle on weapons charges in 2009, which Burjanadze referred to as a government “campaign of terror” against her was a blow to her image, as were her visits to Moscow last year in attempt to look statesmanlike.

2011 was probably the final chapter for Burjanadze in her role as opposition leader. Beginning early this year, she called for another round in an endless series of demonstrations against President Saakashvili, whom she has begun to refer to as “a dictator” and a leader who is “terrorizing the people.”

Thus like Armenia (and to a lesser extent, Azerbaijan), Georgia experienced a number of demonstrations in the spring. But the character of the rallies in Georgia was of an altogether different nature, consisting of a hodgepodge of fringe political groups hankering for a fight, which is precisely what they got.

The tragedy at the tail end of the rallies was the random death of two men—a policeman and a bystander—on the evening of 26 May, when they were run down by someone in Burjanadze’s motorcade as it sped away, east on Rustavelli Avenue, at the conclusion of a violent demonstration.

The arrest and conviction of Burjandze’s husband Badri Bitsadze on charges stemming from the violent demonstrations that month probably closes the book on Nino’s political future. Badri, who went into hiding, was convicted in absentia, and his last reported whereabouts were Vienna, where he was spotted by journalists in September.

With Nino excluded as a major political actor, there are now two or three figures poised to lead any unified opposition that may eventually emerge. One is Levan Gachechiladze, who was trounced by President Saakashvili in the special presidential election in 2008. A more serious contender is former Georgian ambassador to the United Nations Irakli Alasania, although he too was easily brushed aside when he ran for mayor of Tbilsi in 2010.

That leaves us with Bidzina Ivanishvili, the “reclusive” (which seems to be the operative term for Ivanishvili these days) billionaire who in November announced his plans to enter politics.

Ivanishvili will be the man to watch in Georgia’s near-term future. Stripped of his (lapsed) Georgian citizenship by the authorities due to his dual Russian-French nationality, Ivanishvili has said that he intends to renounce his dual citizenship and appeal to the president. (That’s a mildly ironic tactic, since Ivanishvili is reported to have blamed Saakashvili for starting the 2008 war with Russia.)

Saakashvili’s allies have attacked Ivanishvili as a tool of Moscow, where he made his fortune, and the police have not at all coincidentally launched a money laundering investigation of the Cartu Bank, owned by Ivanishvili.

His new political movement, still in incubation, is called “Georgian Dream,” which he will use to spearhead his effort to wrest power from the ruling party in the 2012 parliamentary elections.

Ivanishvili’s platform is still a little unclear beyond the ritual denunciations of the president, of whom he said, “In my view, reality today is such that even his own mother would not vote for Saakashvili.”

His personal web site is here.

Armenia

The biggest story for Armenia was probably the rallies in February through April staged by the Armenian National Congress (HAK) and its leader, former president Levon Ter-Petrossian (often referred to in shorthand as “LTP”).

The demonstrations were designed to force a number of concessions from the government, including the release of detainees held since Armenia’s 2008 civil unrest, the resignation of President Sargsyan, and early elections. The rhetoric borrowed, somewhat superficially, from the Arab Spring template, with LTP speaking of a “Mubarakization” process underway in Armenia.

The rallies never attracted more than 30,000 or so participants, although HAK claimed a turnout of 50,000 at one demonstration in early March.

As of early April, Ter-Petrossian had climbed down somewhat, telling supporters at a rally that he was now demanding merely that President Sargsyan free all “political prisoners,” agree to an inquiry into the 2008 political unrest, and guarantee access to Freedom Square in downtown Yerevan for further demonstrations.

By May, the government had released many HAK supporters who had languished in prison since the violence of 2008, and agreed to establishing the commission that Ter-Petrossian had demanded. While these were two key premises behind the rallies, it was clear then—and after the more recent demonstrations in October—that the president would not resign and that new elections were not in the offing.

To many observers, the rallies constituted a trial balloon for LTP’s efforts to retool himself and become a political force once again. I would tend to agree, and in my view this strategy has failed.

Ter-Petrossian has intimated recently that he hasn’t abandoned the cycle of demonstrations, but some observers believe that his day in the sun is over. Intriguingly, a Wikileaks cable released this year cast the former president in a rather unflattering light.

The cable, written in late 2008 and released this year, details a wide-ranging conversation in Yerevan between LTP and then-US ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, and reveals a sometimes exasperated Yovanovitch expressing her astonishment at charges Ter-Petrossian had leveled against the United States at a rally two weeks earlier:

“[The ambassador] took strong exception…to LTP’s
October 17 speech in which he had argued in the most
provocative terms the exact opposite of what he was now
saying to the Ambassador privately, and had called the
United States “doubly immoral” for allegedly taking unfair
advantage of Serzh Sargsian,s supposed political weakness
to push for a deal counter to Armenia’s national interests.”

Defending himself, Ter-Petrosian told the ambassador that his polarizing comments were meant only to placate his more radical cadres:

“…LTP assured the Ambassador that his rhetoric was meant only
to mollify the radical elements in his opposition movement — to
provide them with a viable explanation for his decision to suspend
protest activities.

“LTP said he “had no other way to get people off the streets
and back in their homes.”

But Yovanovitch wasn’t quite buying it:

“The Ambassador replied that the problem with such
rhetoric — even if it is meant to satisfy LTP’s constituents –
is that the U.S. has no way of knowing what LTP truly thinks, and
that painting the United States in an immoral light on resolving NK
is intellectually dishonest no matter the motive.”

The cable then summed up with a cold, hard look at Ter-Petrossian’s tactics:

“LTP saw support for public rallies dwindling with each passing month,
and was desperate to find a face-saving tactic. Empty-handed after
months of a stridently rejectionist strategy, LTP chose to cloak himself
in nationalism and concoct a conspiracy theory of great power
machinations to cover his political retreat.”

Ter-Petrossian isn’t exactly President Sargsyan’s biggest worry, because it looks like Robert Kocharian, Sargyan’s former ally, is maneuvering for a comeback. And Sargsyan is taking the threat seriously.

The dominant theory explaining the recent sackings and resignations of key government personnel, including the mayor of Yerevan, is that the president is engaging in a pre-emptive move to weaken Kocharian’s power base. That may be true, but I’ll leave you with the waggish analysis of Kocharian and Sargsyan from the New Times party leader, who last month dismissed the notion that there is any substantive difference between the two men:

“They are Siamese twins,” he said.

There’s a LOT going on in the Middle East/North Africa this week—elections in Morocco and Egypt, unrest in Syria, crackdown on protesters in Bahrain…the list goes on.  Don’t have time to sift through all the commentaries and coverage?  No problem.  Let me break it down for you and give some highlights about what’s being said by the media about Morocco’s parliamentary elections last Friday.

Today, the Washington Post’s “Right Turn” blogger Jen Rubin (@JRubinBlogger) put the Moroccan election in the greater regional context of how it can be compared/contrasted to other reform efforts, particularly Egypt.  (Thankfully, she clarified up front that Morocco isn’t Egypt and vice-versa, but that they “face common challenges.”) What I found most interesting was when Jen wrote,

“The United States has a limited but critical role to play in these sorts of situations. While it is likely not effective for Washington to insert itself by demanding a specific timetable, the U.S. government can certainly apply diplomatic pressure and hold out the lure of improved relations, trade and investment if Egypt moves toward a more democratic system.”

I agree that the role the US could play is limited and it would appear that US policymakers are taking a “hands-off” approach to developments in the region, careful not appear that they are trying to influence outcomes. (I actually think that US policymakers are all over the place when it comes to US policy in the region and this lack of a cohesive, clear policy just gives the appearance that they actually know what’s going on and have decided to take the “hands-off” approach.) The US SHOULD use its influence—diplomatic, economic, etc.—to encourage democracy in the region.  I would just add that the US officials should do a better job at publicly and strongly praising examples in the region, like Morocco, who are making genuine reforms and “getting it right.”

Daphne McCurdy, a senior research associate at the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), who was one of the 4,000 US, Moroccan and international elections observers in Morocco last week, shared her perspective on Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel.  I was really anxious to hear what an American elections observer had to say, but I was disappointed in some of her characterizations, which were a bit pessimistic and a tad unfair.  Daphne writes,

“Like the rest of the Middle East and North Africa, Morocco was faced with popular protests earlier this year. However, in contrast to other rulers who responded to demonstrations with force and refused to make concessions until too late, King Mohammad VI quickly promised constitutional reforms, getting ahead of protesters and effectively undermining their influence. Democracy activists saw this as little more than the king’s tried and true strategy of implementing superficial changes to appease the public without changing the country’s fundamental power structure.”

I believe in holding political leaders accountable for sure, but cut the King some slack. If he had moved too slowly, then haters would have said he didn’t genuinely want reform. (I was in Rabat, Morocco in late January of this year and watched Ben Ali’s speech when he told Tunisians that he would make his exit by…2014. Tunisians were like, “Umm, how about you leave now?”) So, the fact that he moved “quickly” means he was just trying to “undermine” the protesters with “superficial changes”?

And I totally disagree that the changes are superficial.  Yes, the King still maintains significant powers and control, but for the first time, he must choose a Prime Minister from the party which wins the most seats in the election AND key appointments (ministers, ambassadors, etc.) are to be done in consultation with the Parliament—which has NEVER been done before in Morocco. I guess I just see the mint tea glass half full.

I do wholeheartedly agree with Daphne’s conclusion that “political parties [should] take more ownership of the political process.” I believe that is what the King is attempting to do with the recent reforms…to empower Morocco’s historically weak political parties to be real actors and representatives held accountable by the Moroccan electorate.

Also today, on Forbes.com, author Richard Miniter did a good job dispelling many misconceptions/false assumptions about the PJD (Islamists) who won the most seats in Friday’s election.  Miniter correctly notes that the PJD didn’t win the most votes because of some radical, religious agenda.  Rather, they focused on education, jobs and economic reform.  THIS is what the Moroccan people want and need and their support of the PJD demonstrates this.  Miniter writes,

“The PJD won them [voters] over by focusing on fighting corruption and creating jobs. If they fail at either one, they will lose the next election.”

If that’s not good ol’ democracy at work, then I don’t know what is.

Miniter also makes the point I made earlier,

“President Obama should take a moment to congratulate Morocco on a successful election and urge the Islamists to stick to their platform of economic hope and change.”

Exactly.

By the way, The Christian Science Monitor published a really bizarre, confusing and lop-sided opinion piece by Ellen Lust on the Moroccan elections.  Don’t even get me started.

The one article that I have yet to see—but would love to—is a look at how Morocco held free and fair democratic elections in the Western Sahara.  (In the refugee camps controlled by the Polisario Front, there’s only one allowed political party—the Polisario Front—which makes vote tallying REALLY easy.) Any takers?

Stay tuned later in the week for “W.W.(P).J.D?: Facts, Fears & Fortune-telling about Islamists in Morocco, Egypt & Tunisia.”

Yesterday, Moroccans went to the polls for the first parliamentary elections after the Constitutional referendum earlier this summer. As I mentioned last week, there would be three questions to answer after the elections, so let’s see

1) What was the turnout?
The official figure is 45%, which is definitely decent. (). The big fear was that low voter turnout would mean that Moroccans were not truly behind the recent Constitutional reforms. However, this turnout is higher than the last parliamentary elections in 2007 (37%), so, while it would be great if it was higher, this turnout does signal that Moroccans ARE increasingly becoming more a part of the democratic process.

2) Was it peaceful, free/fair/transparent?
The official elections observers have yet to come out with their report (I’m waiting to see what the National Democratic Institute has to say.) But, from all I have heard from official and unofficial sources, in the US and Morocco, everything went fairly smoothly, with some small isolated incidents between clashing party supporters/campaigners. One party, PJD, has alleged fraud and irregularities

3) Did the Islamists win?
Yes, this is the biggie and, it appears that, yes, they won. Who are “they”? Morocco’s Justice & Development Party (PJD) (For more about them, check out my last post.) And they apparently won big. This morning, the Minister of Interior announced that they had won 80 seats, nearly double the number of seats they held previously, making them the party with the most seats in the new Parliament.

So, what does this mean? Well, under the new Constitution, the King must appoint a Prime Minister from the party that won the most seats, which means that Morocco will most likely have an Islamist PM. (The Sec. Gen of the PJD has already said that he is willing to compromise and work with others in Parliament to form a strong coalition.

Of course, what’s more interesting is what this will mean for Morocco and how does it changes (or not) the vision of the King and Moroccans on how they move forward, progress and increase democracy. As someone with a professional and personal interest in Morocco, my first worry last night was that an Islamist –led Parliament would mean that there would be an attempt to roll-back many of the reforms that have set Morocco apart over the last decade, most notably in the areas of women’s rights, religious tolerance and interfaith dialogue and greater international cooperation and involvement. But then, I remembered that these unprecedented strides didn’t come about because of a particular political agenda. Rather, they were the result of a national consensus, led by the King, to move forward. These changes did NOT come without debate, great controversy and compromise. I believe these changes transcend political affiliations and are a part of a modern, Morocco that all parties, groups, ideologies, etc in the country wanted to see and are not considering “turning back.”

It is also interesting to note that the PJD made its announcement claiming victory to international reporters before even semi-official results were in. (According to many on Twitter, this was hasty and a bit odd.) But I think it is a real reminder that the PJD realizes that the world is watching. Is there such thing as a moderate Islamist party and would such a leadership conflict with principles of increased democracy? This is one of the major questions of the Arab Spring.

It’s also clear that the world is watching because what’s happening in Morocco is such a contrast from the events in Tahrir Square. As Egypt prepares to go to the polls on Monday, under MUCH different circumstances, this question of Islamists as democrats? will be raised again.

Of course, Morocco isn’t Egypt for many reasons and, even Moroccans, would shun such a comparison or suggestion that Egypt could take a page from Morocco’s book. But, what is happening in Morocco is proof that, if done correctly, with input and buy-in from all parts of society, and an open space for debate and dialogue, democracy is not only “possible” in the Arab world, but it’s what the voting citizens in the region are calling for.

Even though yesterday’s vote represents a major accomplishment in Morocco, it’s only the beginning. The real question will be how the new Parliament will form its new government and assume its new, more powerful role AND if the Moroccan people will truly hold their elected officials accountable.

Just before the elections, I was listening to a Moroccan radio call-in show about the elections and, when asked if she would boycott, a caller said, “I’m seriously considering it. Not because I don’t love my country…I do. But we have a system that works, even with its flaws. I’d rather have a monarchy that works than a democracy that might not.”

Amen, sister.

Guest post by Anouar Boukhars

On Friday, Morocco will hold highly anticipated parliamentary elections. The contest is widely seen as a test of royal reforms. Mohammed VI has clearly placed his bet on measured reforms to reduce social tensions and lift the country’s political malaise. By organizing early elections, the palace hopes that an influx of new faces into government and parliament will convince the majority of Moroccans that credible steps towards reforms are underway and real political and economic change is on the horizon. After all, the country has not seen this kind of momentum for change for decades. To prove the cynics wrong will of course require more than a minor change in the cast of characters. The plurality of Moroccan voters is still skeptical that the election will bring change they can believe in. Political parties have so far failed to inspire hope for real political change and the Herculean task of gaining voters’ confidence and trust is amply visible in the current campaigning for the November 25 legislative elections. Many Moroccans remain doubtful that Morocco’s established political parties can take advantage of the opportunities that the new Moroccan political pact offers. Morocco is at a crossroads.

Despite its failure to significantly limit Mohammed VI’s powers, the 2011 constitution does provide a margin of political maneuverability that did not previously exist. Most importantly, it enhances legislative capacity and access to the policy realm, and puts limits on the sovereign’s acts and power. Under these reforms, parliament—which had long been relatively weak—now has the potential to play a more assertive role. The key question, then, is whether Morocco’s political parties and leaders are up to the task and ready to push the democratic envelope to exercise their new constitutionally authorized powers. Constitutions matter, but what matters more is what people do with them.

Thus far, most political parties have failed to generate popular enthusiasm and interest. Even the most credible opposition political party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), pains to convince voters of its capacity to effectively shape the development and governance trajectories of the Kingdom. Senior figures in the Islamist party have expressed to me their concern about low voter turnout. Low participation would seriously impact the party’s chances of winning the parliamentary contest. The electoral law with its complex proportional representation system favors rural areas, where the Islamists have almost no support and where turnout is always much higher than in urban areas. The PJD cannot compensate for this weakness unless it over-performs on Election Day in its urban strongholds. That probably cannot happen without higher turnout.

The regime must also be concerned about low turnouts and the impact that it might have on popular perceptions of the meaningfulness of elections. It is important to note, however, that low popular participation will not signify support for the dwindling February 20 protest movement. The latter has called for boycott of the electoral contest, but the main reason many Moroccan voters might stay home is due to the ineptitude of the political class, but this is no reason for complacency. Confidence in electoral processes is critical to the success of the political reforms recently inaugurated in Morocco. Despite broad support for the King’s reform effort, most Moroccans expect that the reform process will lead quickly to accountable and responsible governance, and low level of economic inequality. Unless immediate remedial measures are taken to prevent corruption in the public sphere and redress the glaring social and economic disparities, Morocco is poised to experience tough times ahead. Unemployment figures are already dangerously high, standing at 31.4 percent for those under 35. Young people in this age bracket also constitute 57% of the thirteen million Moroccans that are registered to vote.

As it stands, it would be unrealistic to expect an unusually high turnout in Friday’s election. Morocco is just emerging from the twin legacy of monarchical dominance of politics and subservience to a self-serving political class. The electoral schedule has complicated the parties’ task as it left little time for them to hold their conventions, hone their electoral programs, and showcase that in this historic time of regional change, they are determined to renew themselves. Despite these challenges, it is extremely crucial that the elections are perceived as fair and free from the manipulative practices of vote buying and other undue influences. The presence of more than 4,000 national and international observers for the Nov. 25 vote should help.

The integrity of the contest will boost the credibility of elections and legitimacy of the newly reformed institutions of the state. “Only free and fair elections,” Saadeddine Othmani, of the PJD, told me, “can produce the new political elite the country so badly needs.” It is also these elites that would be tasked with drafting the many “organic laws” that the new constitution stipulates. In other words, transitional periods, as Morocco is currently experiencing, are naturally characterized by limited levels of democracy and low levels of popular participation, but as civic consciousness rises and free and fair political competition becomes fully routinized, potent political parties and civil society actors are bound to emerge, strengthening the institutions of government and driving up levels of democratic participation.

The Moroccan regime has navigated quite successfully the treacherous times of the Arab awakening, though its institutional reforms did not gain the acquiescence of the February 20th protest movement, which remains fractured, disorganized, and lacking popular support. Nevertheless, the monarchy would be advised to take seriously the demands of the protesters, especially those dealing with corruption, rule of law, and public accountability. That starts with the November 25th elections where over 30 parties are competing for 395 seats, ninety of which are reserved for women and younger deputies. The palace must resist the urge to intervene in the affairs of the upcoming elected government, even one led or bolstered by the PJD.

King Mohammed has declared his commitment to substantive reform and democratization. The constitution’s provisions allow the monarch to use his significant prerogatives to advance or block real changes. What he does, and chooses not to do, is critical. Whether or not Morocco’s political parties and leaders step up and exercise their new-found powers is just as critical, as is the public’s willingness to engage. The stakes are considerable. If constitutional reforms consecrate the separation of powers and independence of the legislature and judiciary, and if Moroccans willingness to seize the moment matches the desire they have expressed for change, the regional implications would indeed be significant. Morocco has the potential to become a model of top-down reforms and a role model for the Arab Spring.

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Anouar Boukhars is a former visiting fellow with the Brookings Doha Center. Boukhars specialized in Arab democratization, U.S. policy in the Middle East, and international security. He currently holds the position of assistant professor of international relations at McDaniel College.