Pakistan’s leading militants have called on fighters to honor an agreement not to attack the Pakistani military in the most important sanctuary for the Taliban and al-Qaida along the Afghan border.
Militants have long used the North Waziristan tribal area as a base to attack U.S.-led forces in neighboring Afghanistan. American officials have accused Pakistan of supporting some militants

 Karachi: 

The newest entrant in the market for tablets and eBook readers – dominated by the likes of Apple, Amazon and Samsung – is none other than the Pakistani military.

The Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) Kamra, whose self-described mission is “to produce and support weapon systems for a high state of operational readiness of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)”, has started up a new

Official Version: Pakistan Rejects NATO Report on Salala Attack

Rawalpindi January 23:The US Investigation Report into the Salala incident of 26th November 2011, involving aerial strikes by US aircraft and helicopters resulting into Shahadat (killing) of 24 Pakistani soldiers and injury to 13 others, was received by the General Headquarters (GHQ) Pakistan Army on the 24th of December 2011. The report received is the same unclassified version as available on the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Website. The analysis of the US Investigation Report has been carried out by Pakistan Military with a view to reiterate facts and correct the perspective.

Pakistan does not agree with several portions and findings of the Investigation Report as these are factually not correct. The fundamental cause of the incident of 26th November 2011 was the failure of US / ISAF to share its near-border operation with Pakistan at any level. This obviously was a major omission, as were several others, like the complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative / intricate Rules of Engagement as well as lack of unified military command in Afghanistan. In addition to the foregoing, US / ISAF violated all mutually agreed procedures with Pakistan for near-border operations put in place to avert such uncalled for actions. It also carried out unprovoked engagement of Pakistani Posts located inside Pakistan violating the US / ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone.

The US Investigation Report is structured around the argument of “self defence” and “proportional use of force”, an argument which is contrary to facts. Continued engagement by US / ISAF despite being informed about the incident at multiple levels by Pakistan Military within minutes of initiation of US / ISAF fire, belies the “self defence” and “proportional use of force” contention. Affixing partial responsibility of the incident on Pakistan is therefore, unjustified and unacceptable.

NADEEM MALIK

The United States has carried out more than 300 drone strikes since 2004 in pakistan, yet this operation has never been debated in US Congress; more than seven years after it began, there has not even been a single vote for or against it. This campaign is not carried out by the Air Force; it is being conducted by the CIA.
Under the War Powers Resolution — a Vietnam-era law that requires notifying …Congress of military operations within 48 hours and getting its authorization after 60 days, but not any more.
America does not declare war anymore; the last time Congress actually did so was in 1942 — against Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. “We don’t buy war bonds or pay war taxes anymore. During World War II, 85 million Americans purchased war bonds that brought the government $185 billion; in the last decade, we bought none and instead gave the richest 5 percent of Americans a tax break.” NYTSee More

NADEEM MALIK

Do you think Pakistan should open the doors once again for American Special Operation Forces (so called trainers and contractors) after what the country has experienced in recent years ? کیا پاکستان میں امریکی کمانڈوز اور سی آئی اے کے ایجنٹوں کو دوبارہ گھسنے کی اجازت دی جانی چاھیے ؟

Pakistan has lost almost 40 thousand lives since 9/11, over 4000 men of security forces were martyed and the whole country faced hundreds of sucide attacks and bomb blasts every year and hundreds of CIA-led drone strikes, NATO attacks on Pakistani posts like Salala, Abbottabad raid and Raymond Davis killings. Do we still need more ?

PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INVESTIGATION REPORT CONDUCTED BY BG STEPHEN CLARK INTO 26 TH NOVEMBER 2011 US LED ISAF / NATO FORCES ATTACK ON PAKISTANI VOLCANO AND BOULDER POSTS IN MOHMAND AGENCY

Note: This Report does not have any other versions

23 January 2012

PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INVESTIGATION REPORT CONDUCTED BY BG STEPHEN CLARK INTO 26NOVEMBER 2011 US LED ISAF / NATO FORCES ATTACK ON PAKISTANI VOLCANO AND BOULDER POSTS IN MOHMAND AGENCY

Note:

Quotes that have been taken directly from the US Investigation Report and reproduced in this document appear in red, followed by reference of each from the original US / ISAF Investigation Report.

General 1. The US Investigation Report into the Salala incident of 26
th November 2011, involving aerial strikes by US aircraft and helicopters resulting into Shahadat (killing) of 24 Pakistani soldiers and injury to 13 others, was received by the General Headquarters (GHQ) Pakistan Army on the 24th of December 2011. The report received is the same unclassified version as available on the Central Command (CENTCOM) Website. The analysis of the US Investigation Report conducted by Brigadier General (BG) Clark has been carried out hereafter with a view to reiterate facts and correct the perspective.

Mandate of the US / NATO Investigation Report
2. It is unfortunate to note that the mandate given to the US Investigating Officer (BG Stephen Clark), did not include affixing specific responsibility for the grave incident (Reference: General Mattis‟ letter to Brigadier General Stephen Clark dated 28 November 2011 appointing him as Investigating Officer, Page 3, Paras 9 and 10). Without this specific mandate the Investigation Report could not have been complete.

3. It is also revealing to read the mandate given to NATO‟s (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum team (headed by Brigadier General Michael Jorgensen) concurrently investigating the incident. In words of the US Investigation Report;
“The JFC Brunssum goal was to conduct an operationally focused fact-finding investigation into the circumstances surrounding the engagement between friendly forces and PAKMIL (Pakistan

Military) ……..”

. (Reference: Page 6, Para 1, Lines 11 through 15). Implicit in the mandate is the fact that, Pakistan was considered in an adversarial role and not part of friendly forces.

Background
4. For developing a correct perspective, it is important to give some background before going on to the specifics of the Incident (26
th November 2011) itself. The background is covered hereafter under three headings i.e. “Events Leading up to the Incident”, “Environment” and finally “Coordination Mechanism”.

Events Leading up to the Incident
5. Although the incident of 26
th November 2011, was the gravest, it unfortunately was not the first of its kind. The current incident was preceded by four others which happened between June 2008 and July 2011 and resulted in loss of 18 precious lives of our soldiers and injury to 10 others, including an incident at Ziarat Post (Mohmand Agency) on 17th June 2011 which happened close to the area of 26th November 2011 incident. The US / International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are well aware of these incidents and each time resolved to prevent recurrence. It is illuminating to mention the details of these incidents, the first of which took place on 10th June 2008 at Goraprai Post of Pakistan located in Mohmand Agency, in which US / ISAF carried out an unprovoked aerial strike resulting in Shahadat (death) of eleven Pakistani soldiers and injuries to seven others. The second such incident happened on 30th September 2010 in Kurram Agency at Kharlachi Post, where two US helicopters carried out unprovoked firing on Pakistani Post resulting in Shahadat (death) of three soldiers and serious injuries to three. The third incident took place on 19th July 2011 in Angoor Adda Sector of South Waziristan Agency, wherein; mortar and artillery fire suddenly erupted, initiated by US/ISAF against Pakistani Border Posts at 0945 hours (Pakistan Standard Time). Despite repeated contacts with ISAF, including Lieutenant General (LG) Keen and Major General (MG) Laster and activation of other coordination mechanisms, the fire which was proving fatal continued for several hours resulting in the Shahadat (death) of four Pakistani soldiers. As US / ISAF failed to bring the fire to an end, COAS General Kayani had to intervene personally with Chief ODRP (Office of the Defence

Representative Pakistan), LG Keen at the US Embassy Islamabad, warning, that if the fire did not stop immediately he would order an enhanced level of response, beyond the one which was already being given by Pakistan Military up until that time in the shape of small arms and mortar fire. This intervention finally brought the fire to a halt. The resultant US / ISAF inquiry into this, and other similar incidents remained shy of accepting responsibility and hence failed to hold anyone accountable, as far as we (Pakistanis) know.

Environment
6. Before going into the details of the incident of 26
th November 2011 and the US Investigation Report, it is important to understand the environment as well as the coordination mechanisms which existed to prevent exactly such an eventuality.

7. After an extensive nine months operation in Mohmand Agency, Pakistan Army cleared the entire area upto the border with Afghanistan and established several border posts including Volcano and Boulder at the end of September 2011. When the Pakistani forces were carrying out operations in Mohmand Agency, US / ISAF were kept informed and they carried out some supportive operations on the Afghan side, along and close to River Kunar. With no presence of US / ISAF / Afghan forces close to the border on Afghan side, these Pakistani Posts were critical for prevention of terrorists‟ infiltration from either side of the border. This is substantiated by the US Investigation Report, which when referring to the Area of Operation SAYAQA states,
“…….. there had been neither Coalition nor ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) presence in the area for some time” (Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Last Line). Pakistan has been experiencing infiltration of terrorists from Afghan Province of Kunar which had become a safe haven for terrorists of all hues including those who had escaped the Pakistan Army‟s operation in Mohmand. Since September 2011, no crossing from Pakistani side from Mohmand Agency into Afghanistan had taken place, however, unfortunately several large (and some small) scale attacks on Pakistani Border Posts and civilians had occurred regularly, emanating from Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan into Dir, Chitral, Bajaur and Mohmand areas of Pakistan. There were seven such major attacks by terrorists from Afghan side

resulting in loss of 102 personnel and injuries to 25 others (security forces and civilians). Pakistan has repeatedly provided specific information to US / ISAF about presence of hard-core terrorist elements including some High Value Targets located in the Afghanistan Province of Kunar and Nuristan.

8. The Pakistani Posts in question (Volcano and Boulder) are located approximately 1450 metres apart on a kidney shaped barren ridge, which is just under 8000 feet high
(Refer Figure 1 below). The posts were (and are) located 300-400 metres from the international border inside Pakistan. There are a few abandoned huts opposite Volcano Post. Village Maya {map references of which were asked for by Pakistan Military and received from ICEPAK-ODRP (ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan-ODRP) on 29 December 2011 and where ISAF ostensibly carried out operations on night 25/26 November 2011} lies approximately 1.5 kilometres from the Pakistani Boulder Post and 1.2 kilometres from the border. The Pakistani Posts and most of Maya Village are mutually inter-visible. Each of these Pakistani Posts had 5-6 bunkers none of which were underground, but were constructed above the surface of the 8000 feet high ridge which was devoid of vegetation. All these bunkers, therefore, were easily visible from afar. These bunkers and posts had been there for over two months. Volcano Post had 27 personnel while Boulder had 25. They belonged to 7 Azad Kashmir (AK) Regiment of Pakistan Army which had played a crucial role in clearing Mohmand Agency from terrorists and, therefore, were well familiar with the environment and their surroundings. In the absence of any ISAF / Afghan National Army (ANA) / Afghan Border Police (ABP) presence opposite these, and some of the other posts in Mohmand Agency, any movement which is not shared, especially at night close to the border, is assumed to be hostile. Fire, therefore, is carried out on such movement(s). This is true for both ISAF and Pakistan Military for entire Area of Responsibility of ISAF‟s Regional Command – East (RC-E) and that of Pakistan Military‟s 11 Corps. Fire is also carried out on suspected movement(s), such a fire is called “speculative fire”. On any given night several Pakistani Posts, if and when deemed necessary carry out speculative fire.

9. Opposite Mohmand Agency, where these posts were located, US / ISAF had carried out at least 1-2 operations in and around Village Maya prior to 26

th November incident in the months of October / November 2011, which involved ground forces and air support. Even when active ground operations are not taking place, an average of 2-3 US / ISAF aerial platforms operate opposite Mohmand Agency on daily basis; these include Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, fighter aircraft, helicopters and drones. Resultantly, it is inconceivable that these or any other Pakistani Posts in the area were / are not known to US / ISAF.

Coordination Mechanism
10. Having elaborated the environment, it is essential to understand the detailed coordination mechanism and mutually agreed procedures which existed between Pakistan and US / ISAF for effective, incident-free, near-border operations. The coordination mechanism includes a number of forums at three different tiers i.e. at strategic, operational and tactical, all meant to build redundancy by timely sharing of information and coordinating near-border operations. At the strategic level, Military Operations Directorate of GHQ interfaces with ODRP headed by (LG Keen) based at the US Embassy Islamabad. Within the US Embassy another setup called ICEPAK also interacts with Military Operations Directorate, GHQ. In addition to this interface, Military Operations Directorate also has communication through the office of the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), with the Headquarters ISAF represented by MG Nicholson, but more regularly with HQ ISAF Joint Command (IJC) represented by MG Laster. Pakistan‟s Air Headquarters also interacts/coordinates with Tactical Monitoring Cell (TMC) located within US Embassy Islamabad and working alongside ODRP. The strategic coordination mechanism is aided by exchange of Liaison Officers (LOs) at operational level.

11. These operational level measures are further reinforced by tactical level arrangements. These include Border Coordination Centres (BCCs) where Pakistan, US / ISAF and Afghanistan sides are represented by Liaison Officers

for tactical level coordination. One such centre is located opposite Mohmand Agency inside Afghanistan at a place called Nawa. It was this Centre which was responsible for the coordination of operations where the incident took place. These BCCs are centrally linked to Joint Operations Centre at RC-E Bagram through Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) at Torkham with the purpose of sharing operational information and assisting in resolving issues. Additionally, Border Flag Meetings are also organized at local / tactical levels to coordinate routine issues. There are a total of twenty six Pakistani Military LOs deputed for the aforementioned purposes.

12. There also exist mutually agreed procedures for near-border operations. These include; effective utilization of border coordination mechanism, sharing of information about impending operations and coordinating requests for establishing blocking position / conducting complementary operations on the other side of the border. Moreover, in case, if troops of one side come under fire which is originating from across the border, immediate sharing of information about point of origin of fire is done with the side wherefrom the fire is originating. The responsibility thereafter to bring the fire to a halt is of the country from where fire is originating. Finally, in the eventuality of both sides opening fire on each other, immediate cessation of fire must take place as soon as communication is established. Unfortunately, on 26
th November 2011, US / ISAF violated all these mutually agreed procedures.

Unfolding of Events
13. Having explained the background (Events leading up to the Incident, Environment, Coordination Mechanism), the details of the 26
th November 2011 incident are covered hereafter using the US Investigation Report.

14. The unfolding of events is explained in the succeeding paragraphs under the same three stages or sections {
Stage 1: Preparation and initial operation, Stage 2: Contact and lethal action, Stage 3: Reaction. (Reference: Page 11, Para 10)} as enunciated in the US Investigation Report, quoting from the report itself to highlight discrepancies and omissions in US/ISAF version of events so as to

bring facts to the fore. Although, Pakistan Military has differences with some of the timings of the unfolding of the events as given in the US Investigation Report, it has chosen to use the same timings (as given in the US Report) for analyzing, so as to avoid confusion and use a common basis. For the same reason Pakistan Military has also not questioned the existence of an operation called SAYAQA, planned and conducted on night 25/26 November 2011 by US / ISAF.

Stage 1: Preparation and Initial Operation by US / ISAF

(Preparation and Insertion through Helicopters upto Pre-Contact)

15. What we now know as Operation SAYAQA, was not shared at any level with the Pakistan Military despite multiple existing arrangements between the two sides to do so. The incident is even more regrettable because a few hours prior to it, Commander ISAF (General Allen) and at least two of his senior staff members were in GHQ to coordinate and share details of exactly such operations which ISAF now claims to have conducted on the night of 25/26 November 2011. Major Generals Nicholson and Laster who accompanied General Allen to GHQ on 25 November 2011, briefed DGMO about some other operations in another zone but chose not to share anything about an operation opposite Salala which was to happen the same night and so close to the border. MG Laster at the time of visiting GHQ had already been briefed by his staff about the operation opposite Salala area planned for night 25/26 November 2011. The operation was named SAYAQA. The US Investigation Report states that,
“The initial CONOP (Concept of Operations) proposed insertion at a Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ), which was within 1km (kilometre) of the Pakistan (PAK) border…… Accordingly, it was briefed to the IJC’s DCOS JOPS (ISAF Joint Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff – Joint Operations), U.S. Marine Corps Major General (MajGen) James Laster on 22 November 2011. He made two demands: move the HLZ further away from the border, effectively reducing this to a Level 1 CONOP; and, confirm the location of Pakistan’s border checkpoints (Pakistani Posts). The CONOP was rebriefed to him on 23 November 2011 with a HLZ (known as HLZ HOLDEM) 1.3km to the north of the objective (Maya Village) and

2.3km from the Pakistan border, and a map produced showing the known PAK border checkpoints (Pakistani Posts). The map did not show checkpoints (Pakistani Posts) in the area where the engagements took place. The CONOP was then approved by MajGen Laster in his separate capacity as USFOR-A DCOS Interoperability (United States Forces in Afghanistan’s Deputy Chief of Staff)”

(Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a. of US Investigation Report). MG Laster‟s one observation of moving the HLZ away from the border was addressed, the other i.e. “confirm the location of Pakistan’s border checkpoints” (Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a., Lines 6-7 of US Investigation Report) was not. It is clear from the foregoing that the Pakistani Posts were not verified, despite instructions by MG Laster. When MG Laster was re-briefed on the CONOP on 23 November 2011, he should have been told about the Pakistani Posts. As he wasn‟t told it implies the staff did not carry out adequate pre-mission preparation. This raises serious questions about the planning process because the confirmation of Pakistani posts could easily have been done by a simple ISR sweep. The Investigation Report has also recommended the same (Reference: Page 27, Para 43 of US Investigation Report).

16. The CONOP approved by MG Laster should have been shared at various levels in the existing elaborate coordination mechanism meant for this very purpose. It wasn‟t – intentionally so, due to the mistrust amongst the ISAF personnel towards Pakistan Military. In the words of the US Investigation Report,
“The REL (releasable) PAK CONOP was not released to the PAKMIL in a timely manner – contrary to SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures), order and directives – because of a prevailing sense of mistrust amongst the three forces (PAKMIL, ANSF and Coalition Forces)” (Reference: Page 28, Para 48, Lines 6 through 8 of US Investigation Report).

17. The US Investigation Report states,
“The NBCC (Nawa Border Coordination Centre) was not provided with a copy of the CONOP through official channels but received a “back channel” copy from an interested third party (reference is not understood)…… ICEPAK (ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan)

was not provided with a copy of the CONOP

“.(Reference: Page 12, Para 11.b., Lines 3 through 8). “The ODRP usually receives near-border CONOPs in advance; however, the CONOP for Operation SAYAQA had not been sent to the ODRP” (Reference: Page 14, Para 15, Lines 3 through 5 of US Investigation Report).

18. It is interesting to note that this was not the first time that operations in Maya Village were being carried out; US / ISAF had already conducted 1-2 operations in and around the area of Maya Village in the months of October / November, prior to 26
th November incident. It is not possible that even during the previous operation(s), US / ISAF made an innocent omission of not checking the details of the Pakistani Posts.

(Contact and Lethal Action by ISAF)

19. There is no doubt in the minds of Pakistan Military that US / ISAF troops were aware of the border alignment, as at least 1-2 operations had been carried out in and around the Maya Village prior to 26
th November incident during the months of October / November. According to the US Investigation Report “The GF (Ground Forces) were aware of the heightened threat as Coalition Forces had experienced several contacts (coming under fire) in this area, the last being 5 October 2011″ (Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Lines 4-5). This was the same area where operation was being carried out on 26th November 2011. Investigation Report further confirms the fact that US / ISAF troops were aware of the Border when it states, “At 2206 hours (Afghanistan Standard Time), all elements were “boots on the ground” at HLZ HOLDEM. The GFTL (Ground Forces Team Leader) noted that it was uncharacteristically quiet. As the special operators adjusted to their environment they looked up at a dark gray moonless sky and fixed their eyes upon the rocky ridgeline (the general location of Pakistani Posts) as a reference because it was the only contrasting image that they could see; they were aware that this was the border with Pakistan”. (Reference: Page 15, Para 20, Lines 1 through 5).

20. According to the US Investigation Report,
“The GF comprised a team of 14 U.S. Special Operations Forces …….. and an ANA CDO (Commando) Company (100 men)” (Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Lines 1 through 3). The Investigation Report goes on to state, “The CONOP was rebriefed to him (MG Laster) on 23 November 2011 with a HLZ (known as HLZ HOLDEM) 1.3km to the north of the objective and 2.3km from the Pakistan border” (Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a., Lines 7 through 9). The GF were, according to the Investigation Report, in Maya Village at 2309 hours, when they came under fire, “At 2309 hours the GF came under heavy machine gun fire, the tracer rounds indicating that it came from the eastern ridgeline near the border …. Following the initial contact of heavy machine gun fire, the rest of the ME (Main Elements) and SE1 (Supporting Elements) were engaged by effective mortar fire; …. coming from a point on the ridge…… the machine gun fire did not stop but increased and a second mortar round which landed only 50m (metres) from the group, divided the force” (Reference: Page 16, Paras 22,23 and 24). According to the Investigation Report, it was in response to this Pakistani fire and in self defence that the GF asked for air support. The aerial platforms then engaged the Pakistani Posts, according to the Report, for “a 90 minute period” (Reference: Page 4, Para 1, Line 9 of US Investigation Report) (factually Pakistani Posts had been engaged for two hours). In fact the Pakistani Posts had never fired in the direction where US / ISAF patrol (without sharing any information with Pakistan Military) was ostensibly operating. The speculative fire from Pakistan side was undertaken on a suspected militant movement by firing only three mortar and a few machine gun rounds at a location only 400 metres from the Volcano Post, a location which was already registered and which lay almost 1.5 to 2 kilometres away from Maya Village, and in a different direction. Therefore, there is absolutely no chance that this fire could have landed even close to US / ISAF GF, let alone being effective. It is, therefore, evident from the aforementioned detailed account that, by US / ISAF‟s own admission, the GF was in Maya Village at 2309 hours (The exact map references / LAT/LONGs of Maya Village were asked for, and provided to Pakistan Military by ICEPAK-ODRP, obviating any possibility of confusion). Even

if they were not in Maya Village at the time, they just could not have been at the location where Pakistani Posts carried out speculative fire, as this was temporally not possible. On any given night
several Pakistani posts carry out speculative fire if and when deemed necessary.

21.
Figure – 2 below is illuminating. The Figure highlights the distance of the HLZ to Maya Village based on what has been stated in the US / ISAF Investigation Report, “The CONOP was rebriefed to him (MG Laster) on 23 November 2011 with a HLZ (known as HLZ HOLDEM) 1.3km to the north of the objective (Maya Village) and 2.3km from the Pakistan border” (Reference: Page 11, Para 11.a., Lines 7 through 9). It also indicates the direction of Pakistani speculative fire which was in a totally different direction. If the GF were, as per timings quoted above, in Maya Village, busy in their operation when they allegedly came under Pakistani Fire; for the report to draw linkage of US / ISAF aerial response to this fire to justify its unprovoked attack is unjustified and violative of self defence ROE (Rules of Engagement).

22. As there are legal implications of using a force as the US / ISAF did, in the manner that it did, therefore, “self defence” has been used to justify an unwarranted and disproportionate response. The ROE of self defence could have only been used, if the fire had been effective, hence the Investigation Report goes to great lengths to assert that Pakistani fire was effective
“a second mortar round, which landed only 50m from the group, divided the force” (Reference: Page 16, Para 24, Lines 1-2). If the fire of mortar landed so close, there should have been casualties, but according to the US / ISAF Investigation Report itself, “…….by 0400 hours they were back at their base with no casualties” (Reference: Page 18, Para 31). Not only was the response, not in self defence, it was

disproportionate, excessive and sustained which resulted in death of 24 soldiers while 13 sustained injuries. The unprovoked engagement thus left behind 7 widows and 16 orphans. By the Investigation Report‟s own admission it continued for 90 minutes (actually it continued for two hours) and it involved two F – 15s, two Attack Helicopters (AH) – 64 Apaches, one Attack Cargo (AC) 130 and a Multi-mission Cargo (MC) – 12 Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. There were drones in the air as well. The F-15s, Apaches and AC-130 all unloaded full ordnance, including Hellfire missiles on the Pakistani Posts,
“At 0039 hours, an AH-64D engaged an identified tripod weapon inside a bunker in EA-1 (Engagement Area-1) and destroyed it with a HELLFIRE missile” (Reference: Page 13, Para 12, Lines 15 through 17 of US Investigation Report). These weapon platforms‟ continuous engagement, spread over as long as almost 2 hours, does not support the assertion that the force used was proportionate and in self defence. To justify the grave US / ISAF excesses committed on the night of 25/26 November, the Investigation Report tries to contort the facts and confuse the issue by stating that, “The explosions of the AC-130H engagement reverberated around the valleys. Despite the effectiveness of the engagement, the GF continued to be engaged by mortars and machine guns” (Reference: Page 17, Para 25, Lines 4-5, Para 26, Lines 1-2). Any person even with rudimentary understanding of military operations would know, that when under attack from aerial platforms, the ground troops – in this case Pakistani Border Posts personnel – would respond to the immediate threat i.e. aerial platforms firing on them rather than on a ground force one and a half to two kilometres away. This is exactly what the Pakistani Posts did – fired back at the helicopters, in self defence with all available weapons including artillery.

23. Despite being informed by Pakistan at 2340 Afghan Standard Time (AST) about the aggression by US forces, the engagement of Pakistani Posts continued until 0104 (AST) (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – References: Annex D, Page D-6, Serial N and Page 13, Para 12 of US Investigation Report) for as long as 1 hour and 24 minutes. In the process, every soldier on and around the posts, even on reverse slope of the Ridge, was individually targeted. This pattern of

engagement cannot be justified by calling it „self defence‟. According to the US Investigation Report, three main aerial fire engagements of Pakistani Posts by US / ISAF took place. Multiple fire engagements by US aerial platforms took place after information about US / ISAF aggression against the Pakistani Posts had been shared at multiple levels, by Pakistan Military, and after Pakistani Military was assured that the fire engagement was being stopped.

24. While this extended fire engagement of Pakistani Posts was going on, the Pakistani Liaison Officer at NBCC was informed about an incident “
just after midnight” (Reference: Page 14, Para 14, Line 11 of US Investigation Report). By this time both the Pakistani Border Posts had already been targeted by fire. Even when the information was shared, albeit extremely belatedly, with Liaison Officer NBCC, it was of a general area 14 kilometres north of the actual engagement area (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page 14, Para 14 of US Investigation Report).

25. It is evident from the US Investigation Report that Pakistani Liaison Officer was intentionally not provided with specific map references i.e. LAT/ LONGs “
The BSO (Battle Space Owner) (TF (Task Force) BRONCO), then called the NBCC to report the GF was being engaged. Per RC-E instructions, the BSO passed the exact grid location of the source of hostile fire to the NBCC but informed the NBCC to only pass a general location to the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO (Liaison Officer) as part of the NBCC’s effort to have the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO confirm whether or not PAKMIL were at the location of the hostile fire. The NBCC then passed a general location to their PAKMIL LNO using GIRoA (Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) district borders as a geographic reference” {Reference: Page 22, Para (3) & (4) of US Investigation Report }. At no stage did the Pakistani Liaison Officer say that there were no Pakistani Military Troops in the area. He just could not have said so without map references being provided to him. Therefore, the US Investigation Report is amiss when it states on Page 22, Para 4, Lines 4 and 5 that the Pakistani LO stated that there were no

Pakistani Military troops in the area. US / ISAF have overlooked the fact that by the time information was shared with Pakistani LO, both the Pakistani Posts had already been struck by US / ISAF fire making the whole argument irrelevant.

26. Precious lives could have been saved, had the US / ISAF chain of command / staff been more responsive and alive to the situation. There was no urgency whatsoever in a situation where due to use of overwhelming and disproportionate force by US, lives were being lost and where time was of extreme essence. This displays utter disregard for the lives of the Pakistani soldiers. In the words of the Investigation Report, “
time sensitive senior Command override measures for border area incidents are lacking” (Reference: Page 5, Para 3, Line 12).

Stage 3: Reaction

(Post Action Events)

27. The intelligence picture depicted in the Investigation Report is erroneous and biased wherein it states
“Reports have indicated INS (insurgents) have been wearing PAKMIL uniforms in order to move freely across the border. The ABP (Afghan Border Police) report indiscriminate shooting incidents against civilians and their livestock in the Maya Valley from the border” (Reference: Page 8, Para 5, Lines 4 through 7). The investigating officer has accepted without verification, the assertions of the Afghan Border Police especially because he and his Investigation Team, according to the Investigation Report, could not visit Village Maya and other areas close to the site of the incident. The US / ISAF Investigation Report states, “Security concerns did not allow the investigating teams to safely travel to the villages on either side of the Afghanistan – Pakistan border that were near the area of the incident” (Reference: Page 7, Footnote to Para 3.a., Lines 2 through 4). A few months back in October this year, the Afghan authorities at the highest level had blamed Pakistan publicly for firing hundreds of rounds / rockets and killing numerous civilians in Kunar. ISAF leadership having inquired into the matter confirmed to Pakistan Military leadership that Afghan assertions could not be substantiated and that these were

a result of misinformation originating from the Afghan Border. The allegation against Pakistan was later denied publicly by the Afghan President by agreeing to the ISAF‟s viewpoint that no artillery / rocket fire had originated from Pakistan. In this backdrop, for the investigating team to take the comments of some individuals located close to the international border on the Afghan side at “face value” and mention them in their report without thorough investigation brings into question the whole exercise.

28. Moreover, reports of discovery of Pakistani Law Enforcement Agencies‟ uniforms from Maya Village after the end of Operation SAYAQA is an unconvincing attempt to cover the US / ISAF attacks by giving a misleading impression that Pakistani soldiers on Volcano and Boulder posts may well have been mistaken by US / ISAF to be anyone else.

Summary of Pakistan’s Viewpoint
29. Pakistan does not agree with several portions and findings of the Investigation Report as these are not factually correct.

30. Pakistan expresses its regret over the mandate and terms of reference given to the Investigating Team which was not mandated to determine or affix responsibility for the incident. (Reference: General Mattis‟ letter to Brigadier General Stephen Clark dated 28 November 2011 appointing him as Investigating Officer, Page 3, Paras 9 and 10).

31. Pakistan has noted US / ISAF acceptance of its failures, which Pakistan believes were deep, varied and systemic. There have been several similar, though not as grave, US / ISAF failings in the past. Despite promises of thorough investigations, US / ISAF failed to hold anyone accountable after each of these incidents. (Details at Page 2, Para 5 of
this Report).

32. The fundamental cause of the incident of 26
th November 2011 was the failure of US / ISAF to share its near-border operation, with Pakistan at any level. It is highly regrettable that despite this major failing, the Investigation Report has tried to pin partial responsibility on Pakistan (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page 4, Para 3 of US Investigation Report). Establishing positive identification of the Pakistani Posts which was lacking and which has been acknowledged in the US / ISAF report, was the direct and clear responsibility of US / ISAF who were, by their own admission, carrying out a near-border operation. Positive identification could very conveniently have been done by a simple Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft sweep which the US Investigation Report itself has also recommended, (Reference: Page 27, Para 43, Lines 7-8).

33. US / ISAF violated all mutually agreed procedures with Pakistan for near-border operations put in place to avert such uncalled for actions. It is increasingly obvious to Pakistan Military that the entire coordination mechanism has been reduced to an exercise in futility, is more for the purposes of optics and that it has

repeatedly been undermined. There were instructions given to US personnel, as mentioned in the US / ISAF Investigation Report, wherein the
information to Pakistan Military was to be deliberately withheld. Had the disclosure been honest and as per the agreed procedures, the attacks could have been stopped at the earliest and precious lives saved. Even a cursory reading of Paragraph 38. b. (1) on Page 24 of US Investigation Report would confirm Pakistan‟s contention. The said sub-paragraph reads: “The TF (Task Force) BRONCO battle captain provided specific grid references to the ISAF LNO (ISAF Liaison Officer) at NBCC (Nawa Border Coordination Centre) with the stipulation that these specific coordinates were not to be provided to the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO (Pakistan Military Liaison Officer) and that only a general location was to be passed”. The very purpose of sharing information about fire originating from Pakistan was for Pakistan to suppress / stop it. Without giving exact map references (LAT / LONGs), how could this have been achieved?

34. According to well established mutually agreed procedures, in case of fire originating from across the border, the responsibility to suppress / stop it rests on the side from where the fire is originating. In the present instance, no such intimation was received from the US / ISAF. Such an intimation would have demonstrated the bona fides of the US / ISAF stance. The only intimation that was conveyed to the Pakistan Liaison Officer at Nawa Border Coordination Centre was
after both the posts had been struck by fire and even this late intimation was incorrect by as much as 14 kilometres. The US Investigation Report states, “It was later discovered that a misconfigured electronic CPOF (Command Post of the Future) map overlay was used by the NBCC (Nawa Border Coordination Centre), this caused the NBCC to refer the NBCC’s PAKMIL LNO (Pakistan Military Liaison Officer) to a “general location” that was 14km to the north of the actual engagement area” (Reference: Page 14, Para 14, Lines 13 through 15).

35. In an effort to provide justification for US / ISAF actions, the Investigation Report has gone to extreme lengths to construct the whole incident as an act of

“self defence” and the force used by US / ISAF / NATO as legal and proportionate. At no stage did the Pakistani Posts fire on, or in the direction of the Helicopter Landing Zone or the route from Helicopter Landing Zone to Maya Village. The sketch of the incident site at
Figure – 2 (Maya Village has been marked on the map as per the map references provided by ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan / ODRP) clearly belies the ISAF assertion about responding in self defence. The report accepts that there were no US / ISAF casualties, yet it still argues the self defence Rules of Engagement by stating that the “fire on GFs (Ground Forces) was effective” (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page F-2, Paras 6 and 7). In fact, it were the Pakistani Posts which were defending against an unprovoked attack. Pakistan, therefore, rejects the findings of the US Investigation Report that: “the catalyst for this tragedy ultimately was the initial and continuing engagement by PAKMIL (Pakistan Military) forces on Coalition Forces – who in turn responded accordingly and appropriately” (Reference: Page 29, Para 53, Lines 2 through 4). The US Investigation Report in fact ignores the sentiments and questions the intelligence of the Pakistani people by stating that “The LOAC (Law of Armed Conflict) was respected and the ROE (Rules of Engagement) were applied correctly and legally” (Reference: Annex I, Page I-1, Para 8).

36. The following facts and their sequence, strengthen the opinion that the said incident was
deliberate at some level:-

a. US / ISAF having carried out 1-2 operations in and around Maya Village prior to 26
th November incident in the months of October / November, (Paraphrased by Pakistan Military – Reference: Page 15, Para 18, Lines 4-5 of US Investigation Report), having seen and closely monitored Pakistan‟s nine months long operation in Mohmand Agency leading to the creation of Volcano and Boulder Posts, the location of the posts atop a barren ridge as high as approximately 8000 feet and the US / ISAF‟s cutting edge surveillance / observation technology, all defy US / ISAF contention

that they were unaware about the location of these Pakistani Posts. (There have been incidents in the past where as small an activity, as addition of new weapons on
existing Pakistani posts by Pakistan Military, were immediately noticed by US / ISAF and their purpose discussed with Pakistan).

b. The US aircraft / helicopters continued to target Pakistani Military personnel deliberately for two hours. Even the US Investigation Report admits the attack spread over
“90 minutes” - far too long a time for an “innocent” engagement. According to the US Investigation Report, three main aerial fire engagements of Pakistani Posts by US / ISAF took place. Multiple fire engagements by US aerial platforms took place after information about US / ISAF aggression against the Pakistani Posts had been shared at multiple levels, by Pakistan Military, and after Pakistani Military was assured that the fire engagement was being stopped.

c. Even if we assume that these posts were not known to US / ISAF, within minutes of initiation of unprovoked attack by US, US / ISAF had been informed at multiple levels by the Pakistani side, but they continued firing with impunity.

d. All Pakistani soldiers were in uniform and could not be mistaken for anyone else.

e. The failure in timely sharing of Concept of Operations even with concerned
US coordination staff at Nawa Border Coordination Centre and ISAF Coordination Element Pakistan (which is located in US Embassy Islamabad and manned exclusively by US personnel) raises serious doubts about the incident being “accidental“.

f. It is highly improbable that such a large number of mistakes (as acknowledged in the US Investigation Report) could have been coincidental.

37. Unfortunately the impartiality and transparency of the investigation was adversely affected when senior US officials repeatedly stated that the incident was “not intentional”, without waiting for completion of the Investigation. Pakistan believes that this stance may well have influenced the findings of the report.

38. Due to complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative / intricate Rules of Engagement (all acknowledged in US / ISAF Investigation Report), the responsibility for failing to stop the attack rests squarely on US / ISAF. Pakistan Army on its part had, on numerous occasions and at all levels, highlighted the potential problems associated with not having all the forces in the Afghan theatre under a unified command. The activities and operations of US Special Forces and Afghanistan Border Police are but two examples which have been raised consistently by the Pakistani side. The incident of 19
th July 2011 in Angoor Adda Sector of South Waziristan Agency, (details mentioned on Page 2, Para 5 of this Report) was also, we believe, a result of lack of unified military command in Afghanistan.

39. Pakistan Military is dismayed to learn that despite being ten years into the war, one reason to which the incident of 26
th November 2011 has been attributed is, “imprecise terminology between the RC-E JOC (Regional Command – East Joint Operations Centre) and SOTF-E JOC (Special Operations Task Force – East Joint Operations Centre)” (Reference: Page 24, sub-para e, Line 1 of US Investigation Report). This is disturbingly indicative of fundamental flaws in the US / ISAF / NATO procedures.

40. US / ISAF / NATO in knowingly targeting Pakistani Posts well inside Pakistan were in clear violation of the ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone.

41. The recommendation of the US / ISAF Investigating Report stating,
“train and practice procedures for cross-border and near-border operations including time-sensitive procedures” (Reference: Page 5, Para 4, Lines 4-5 of US Investigation Report) is maleficent. Investigating an incident which involves breach of Pakistan‟s territorial integrity and sovereignty and putting in a recommendation of how to do it better next time is potentially troublesome for any future cooperation and border coordination.

Additional Details Required
42. Following additional details are required, which may be provided for completing our analysis / assessment:-

a. The full and complete classified version of the US Investigation Report be made available.

b. Provision of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance picture of the complete incident along with all aerial platform videos and record of radio transmissions and communication between the crew(s) of the aerial platforms involved in the incident.

Concluding Remarks
43. The US / ISAF Investigation Report into the 26
th November 2011 incident, apart from being factually incorrect, also brings to fore the larger issue of lack of trust of US / ISAF towards the Pakistani Military. Moreover, the unprovoked engagement of Pakistani Posts located inside Pakistan was a clear violation of US / ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone. Unfortunately, this was not the first incident of this kind as US / ISAF / NATO have been involved in at least four similar incidents in the past, after each of which, US / ISAF regretted the incident and resolved to prevent recurrence. Not only did the recurrence of incidents continue but as far as we know, no one was ever actually held accountable.

44. The US Investigation Report, is structured around the argument of “self defence” and “proportional use of force”, an argument which is contrary to factsand therefore self serving. Sustained aggression which continued for as long as
“90 minutes” despite US / ISAF being informed about the incident at multiple levels by Pakistan Military within minutes of initiation of US / ISAF fire, belies the “self defence” and “proportional use of force” contention.

45. Failure to share information about a near-border operation with Pakistan at any level was a major US / ISAF / NATO omission, as were several others, like the complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative / intricate Rules of Engagement as well as lack of unified military command in Afghanistan.

46. There have clearly been several failures on the part of US / ISAF / NATO (as acknowledged in the US Investigation Report). Trying to affix partial responsibility of the incident on Pakistan (Reference: Page 29, Para 53, Lines 3-4 of US Investigation Report) is, therefore, unjustified and unacceptable.

Filed under: CURRENT AFFAIRS

NYT/AP. Gilani: I should just Expecto Patronum all of you! All of you! Kayani: Oh God.

The problem with blogging about Pakistan is that there’s no dearth of topics and issues to write about. Turning on the television hits you with drama, intrigue, and conspiracy theories as caricatures scream in vain and to no one in particular.

And that’s just on our news channels.

Rather than be overwhelmed by the multitude of things I could write about, and hence, um, not actually write anything, I decided to spare you the excuses and just package them as a list. With a bow. And a rainbow. You’re welcome.

1. Gilani went all Jadoogar on the military. If you don’t know why Harry Potter should be jealous of Gilani Sahib, check out this past post. This week, media outlets and Twitter feeds alike were abuzz after Prime Minister Gilani fired Pakistan’s Defense Secretary [retired] General Lodhi. (Poof! He was gone. Jadoogar! Ooh!) According to media outlets, the controversy resulted from Lodhi’s statements during his Memogate investigation, claiming the Ministry of Defense (MOD) had no control over the ISI or Pakistan military.

Not surprisingly, coup rumors were abound after said news went public, as the Express Tribune reported Gilani allegedly made a “panicky” phone call to a British diplomat to support the PPP government. The British Foreign Secretary appealed for calm today, urging that all parties respect “the constitution and help ensure stability.” So military coup in the making? The jury’s still out, but I highly doubt it given the proximity (hopefully) to elections as well as the military’s own capacity to perform a coup. Al Jazeera English quoted analyst Moeed Pirzada who further iterated, “The Pakistani military is not the political player it used to be. It knows it’s not in a position to capture political power in Islamabad … not with the Supreme Court being the biggest impediment.”

But why such a high octave of rumors now? There are obviously many reasons, but one factor [purposefully?] upping the notch is…

2. The controversy known as #Memogate. Gah. I recently wrote about the first iteration of the Memogate scandal here, when Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz alleged that he was asked by [now former] Amb. Haqqani to pass a memo to former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, asking for help in reigning in Pakistan’s military establishment. The military, particularly COAS Kayani & ISI chief Pasha claim there is truth to the document & urged the judiciary to investigate its origins. Gilani claimed that Kayani & Pasha were violating the Constitution by submitting statements to the Supreme Court. ISPR responded by calling Gilani’s statements false and could have “very serious ramifications.” Gilani responded by saying the Army’s statements were – wait for it – released with his consent, i.e. “Just kidding, guys! I totes let the Army make allusions to a military coup, that would hence usurp my power!” Hee! [Note: read this great piece by Mohammed Hanif on how the military uses rumors over force.]

As the three-member judiciary panel gears up to for the memo inquiry this coming Monday, “A separate bench of the Supreme Court is scheduled to convene that day to hear the government’s explanation for failing to comply with earlier court orders to reopen corruption cases against Mr. Zardari,” noted the NY Times. Raza Rumi said it well when he noted, “The real threat for the government is a proactive Supreme Court which has taken a serious notice of noncompliance with its orders. The civilian government is stuck between two powerful institutions, which are no longer comfortable with business as usual.”

The ironic thing, though, is that this cacaphony still is business as usual. Politicians are not the only players who reign over politics, they are joined and often challenged by the judiciary and the military. This politicized warring, this blurring between the lines, mean we are also distracted from *real* issues like…

3. The Gas Shortage. Hello, McFly! The gas crisis in Pakistan isn’t so much a shortage as much as it’s the result of horrendous management. Or as Khurram Hussain noted in his piece for Express, it’s the result of an addiction. As CNG stations ran short on fuel and/or shut down in the country, protests broke out as people voiced their discontent. The gas shortage became visual as you would drive past rows of cars waiting at the CNG stations. But beyond the lines, beyond the protests, the crisis goes much deeper. Take away gas, and citizens are immobilized. They can’t drive their cars, they can’t take buses to get to work, they can’t cook their food. This has impacted industries, where, in Punjab, rows of factories have had to shut down. It’s affected jobs and livelihoods. In my opinion, that more than coup rumors is worrisome.

Also while you were watching Memogate…

4. The Saleem Shahzad Report came out. And it was inconclusive. The Pakistani journalist was abducted, tortured and found dead outside Islamabad last year, two days after his report on connections between Al Qaeda and the Pakistan Navy was published. Although several facts pointed to an alleged connection to the ISI, the Saleem Shahzad Commission did “not hold any institution or individual responsible for his death,” instead blaming “belligerents” for the incident. Given this lack of accountability, it’s no wonder the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) once again said Pakistan was, for the second year in a row, the most dangerous place in the world to be a journalist. CPJ’s Bob Dietz told AJE,

[The media in Pakistan is] free and vibrant, but let me qualify that with saying that they are under tremendous amounts of pressure from all sides. There’s been a lot of emphasis on intelligence services attacking journalists, but the fact, if you look at the journalists slain in the last few years, is that the ISI is only one of the actors that is putting pressure on journalists, threatening them and responsible for their deaths as well.

The news about Pakistan is, as always, eventful. The negative developments couched in this list are a reflection of the ground reality, but they are also a snapshot of what’s in the news. My work convinces me every day that Pakistan is a country with tremendous potential that has been horrifically managed. We are the victims of poor leadership, institutions that care more about pointing fingers outwards than looking inward, and a number of inefficiencies in our national value chain. Peel back that rotten layer, and you see the positive stories of opportunity, innovation, and energy. It may not completely overcome the bad, but it’s enough to be the silver lining. At least in my opinion.

And if you ever need further proof of change, check out this preview for Pakistan’s Next Top Model (PNTM). Because nothing says “Pakistanis, they’re just like us! Yay!” quite like reality television franchises & model wannabes smizing. What ups, #FAT (Fashion Against the Taliban).:

Filed under: Op-Eds

Source:PKKH

ISLAMABAD: Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani militants have held a series of meetings aimed at containing what could soon be open warfare between the two most powerful Pakistani Taliban leaders, militant sources have said.

Hakimullah Mehsud, the head of the Pakistani Taliban, also known as the Tehreek-i-Taliban (TTP), and his deputy, Waliur Rehman, were at each other’s throats, the sources said.

“You will soon hear that one of them has eliminated the other, though hectic efforts are going on by other commanders and common friends to resolve differences between the two,” one TTP commander said.

Any division within the TTP could hinder the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda’s struggle in Afghanistan against the United States and its allies, making it more difficult to recruit young fighters and disrupting safe havens in Pakistan used by the Afghan militants.

Despite multiple reports of the Rehman-Mehsud split, Rehman told Reuters on Tuesday there was no problem between the two.

“There are no differences between us,” Rehman said.

The TTP, formed in 2007, is an umbrella group of various Pakistani militant factions operating in Pakistan’s unruly northwestern tribal areas along the porous border with Afghanistan.

It has long struggled with its choice of targets. Some factions are at war with the Pakistani state while others concentrate on the fight against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan.

There has been a noticeable decrease in militant attacks in Pakistan, but there continue to be random acts of violence across the country.

Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban commanders are asking the TTP to provide more men for the fight in Afghanistan and are looking to smooth over the dispute between Mehsud and Rehman.

Long-standing feuds

Taliban sources said Rehman had ordered his fighters to kill Mehsud because of his increasing closeness with al Qaeda and its Arab contingent.

Mehsud’s former deputy has also confirmed that the TTP chief received money from Pakistan’s arch-rival, India, to kill former ISI official Colonel Imam, who was acting as a mediator between the Pakistani Taliban, Afghan insurgents and the Pakistani government.

The reported enmity between Mehsud and Rehman is not the only conflict within the TTP ranks.

Mehsud has a long-standing feud with militant commanders Maulvi Nazeer in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan, both of whom have non-aggression agreements with the Pakistani military.

Mehsud’s men have also fought with the militia under the control of Fazal Saeed Haqqani, the former TTP head in the Kurram tribal region. He has accused Mehsud of killing his commanders and innocent people and kidnapping for ransom.

Haqqani, who is close to the militant Afghan Haqqani network, broke away from the TTP last year.

A pamphlet distributed by militants in North Waziristan this week announced the formation of a council to try to resolve the conflicts.

“All jihadi forces have jointly, on the recommendation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, formed a five-member commission which will be known as the Shura Muraqba,” the pamphlet said, using the term by which the Afghan Taliban describe themselves.

“The Shura Muraqba will be working to resolve differences and problems between mujahideen.”

It said that any “mujahideen” found to have committed an “unlawful” killing or kidnapping would be punished under Islamic law. It is likely any attack on a fellow “mujahideen” commander would be considered “unlawful”.

“All mujahideen should respect the decisions of the council that has been set up,” a senior commander of the Haqqani faction in Kurram said.

“If people continue to do as they like, the situation will not improve. Things will instead get much worse.”

Husain Haqqani: Pawn in a larger game?

There are numerous issues besides ‘Memogate’ that directly affect the people, like the shortage of gas, electricity, clean drinking water, housing, healthcare, employment and so on. But the issue gains significance because so far, no democratically elected civilian government in Pakistan has ever been allowed to complete its tenure and hand over power to the next one through democratic elections (as I outlined in this paper). There were hopes that this government would be the first to do so – a critical step towards the continuation of a democratic political that is necessary to move the country away from the military-dominated politics of the past – something, as it is now all too apparent, is not a thing of the past after all. In this context, it’s important to understand the current situation and its dangers. Myra MacDonald sums it up in an analysis for Reuters. Some insights were posted to this blog earlier (here and here). Additional facts are laid out in a document received today (reproduced below) that outlines some facts about Husain Haqqani and ‘memogate’. Also read this important article, ‘Treason? Under what Constitution? in the New Pakistan blog, which dissects the ‘memo’ contents and notes that each item in the document falls under the constitutional purview of the federal government…

Issue at hand: Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the US, Husain Haqqani, is currently a virtual prisoner as his life is under danger both from the extremists and from the security agencies. He is residing for his own safety at the Prime Minister’s residence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan imposed a travel ban on him on December 1, 2011 restricting him from leave the country. His wife, Member of Pakistan’s Parliament, Farahnaz Ispahani’s life is also in danger, which is why she is currently in the US where she had come for medical checkups.

This situation arose after the false allegations by an American businessman of Pakistani origin, Mansur Ijaz, who claimed that the Ambassador and President Zardari had sought American help to prevent a military coup in Pakistan. Ambassador Haqqani has flatly denied these allegations. Further, Ambassador Haqqani knew Admiral Mullen very well and could have contacted him directly anytime; it defies understanding why he would need Ijaz to convey a message to Admiral Mullen.

A history of false claims: Mansur Ijaz is well-known over the years for self-promotion and false claims. During the mid-1990s he claimed that he had close ties to the Sudanese government and would be able to help the Clinton administration get Osama Bin Laden. However, both Clinton NSA Sandy Berger and the 9/11 Commission that interviewed Ijaz found no credible evidence in what he said. In 1999 Ijaz claimed to be the American envoy to India and Pakistan to help resolve the Kashmir dispute but in the end neither side found him credible or someone who could deliver. In 2004 Ijaz claimed that chemical warheads were being smuggled into Iraq for an attack on American troops which he later denied.

The ‘memo’: Former US national security advisor General Jim Jones conveyed Ijaz’s memo to then Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen. Gen Jones in an affidavit has sworn that he believes Ambassador Haqqani had nothing to do with the memo. According to General Jones the language of the memo was akin to what Ijaz wrote.

Ijaz claims that soon after he wrote an OpEd about the ‘memo issue’ on October 10, 2011, Pakistan’s ISI chief, Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha flew to London, met him and examined the evidence and found it credible. However, Admiral Mullen has stated that when he received the memo from Gen Jones, he did not find it credible and took no action on it.

Threats: Asma Jahangir, leading human rights advocate and counsel to Ambassador Haqqani, has stated that Ambassador Haqqani is under threat from his own intelligence-security agencies. In this context Admiral Mullen in one of his final testimonies stated that Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI, and the Pakistani military have often lied to the Americans, and provide support to the extremist groups, including those who kill Americans.

Action required: Ambassador Haqqani needs to have his passport returned to him and have his name taken off the Exit Control List (ECL) so he can travel. The due process of law must be applied.

Background: The government’s opponents – in the media, political parties, military-intelligence establishment – have used this opportunity to attack the government and try to make Ambassador Haqqani a scapegoat. Some worrying facts:

• Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif (who in 1999 had Ambassador Haqqani imprisoned and tortured for writing OpEds against his regime)  is the leading petitioner before the Supreme Court.
• • The Supreme Court took up Mr Sharif’s petition instead of sending it to a trial court first.
• The Supreme Court ignored due process of law and immediately placed a travel ban on Ambassador Haqqani without letting him or his counsel appear before court.
• The head of the ISI himself conducted a forensic investigation and the army chief and head of ISI have stated in their affidavits that they believe the ‘memo’ was genuine – which points to an attempt to frame the Ambassador by institutions that have never agreed with his views.
• A political-media trial and witch-hunt has been ongoing since Ijaz’s OpEd first appeared in the Financial Times.

Detailed Background and Information

Background of Memo: The origins of the memo are in dispute. On October 10, 2011 an American businessman of Pakistani descent, Mansur Ijaz, wrote an OpEd in Financial Times alleging that in the aftermath of the Osama Bin Laden raid of May 2, 2011, he was approached by a senior Pakistani diplomat to pass on a memo to enlist the US military’s help to head off a feared military coup, in exchange for overhauling the country’s powerful top security leadership. He said he gave the memo to former NSA Gen (retd) Jim Jones who passed it on to then Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen.

In the ensuing weeks Ijaz claimed that Amb Husain Haqqani was that senior diplomat and that he and Amb Haqqani corresponded by Blackberry messenger messages, phone conversations and emails.

Amb Haqqani flatly denied these allegations. Admiral Mullen stated that he had received a memo but he did not find it ‘credible.’ According to Mullen’s spokesman “I have said this before and am saying again today. Nothing about that letter had the imprimatur on the Pakistani Government. It was not signed. And the contents of it Admiral Mullen did not find credible. So he took no action on it.” (November 22, 2011)

Amb Haqqani returned to Pakistan on November 19 and tendered his resignation in order to ensure a free and fair inquiry into the issue. The civilian government, while supporting Amb Haqqani’s account accepted his resignation. His passport was confiscated upon his return to Pakistan.

Supreme Court action: December 23, former Prime Minister and leader of the main opposition party, PML-N, Nawaz Sharif filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) claiming that under article 184(3) of the Constitution, the SCP could take up any issue of public importance which relates to fundamental rights. SCP accepted the petition along with other petitions.

On December 1, 2011 the Pakistan Supreme Court placed former ambassador Husain Haqqani on the Exit Control List (ECL) barring him from being able to leave the country, without giving the former ambassador or his lawyer to appear before the court. So due process of law was not followed and Mr Haqqani’s fundamental rights were violated.

Gen Jones in his affidavit to the Pakistan Supreme Court stated that while he did pass on the memo he does not believe Amb Haqqani had anything to do with the memo.

On December 30, Pakistan’s Supreme Court set up a 3-member judicial commission to investigate the issue. According to the SCP judgment a petition seeking an investigation into the affair had “succeeded in establishing that the issues involved are justiciable.” The court also upheld the travel ban on Amb Haqqani. Further, the court has ordered the attorney general of Pakistan, Foreign Ministry and the Pakistani High Commissioner in Canada to approach the parent company of Blackberry, Research In Motion (RIM).

The government maintains that since Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy the correct forum for any such inquiry should be the parliament. The Parliamentary Committee on National Security was already looking into the case and that should be the proper venue not the Supreme Court.

Counter arguments by Amb Haqqani’s lawyer, Asma Jahangir: According to Ambassador Haqqani’s lawyer, leading human rights advocate, Asma Jahangir, the verdict was the “darkest day for the judiciary because the apex court has subjected fundamental rights to national security.”

Terming the court’s judgment ‘disappointing’, she said, “today we feel that the military authority is superior to the civilian authority. Today, the struggle for the transition to democracy has been blocked.” And, “I am forced to think if it is the judiciary of the people or the judiciary of the establishment.” Ms Jahangir also expressed her deep regrets and said she was totally unprepared for this reward of sacrifices rendered by lawyers’ fraternity, as the Court ‘dimmed even a fraction of ray of hope’, while providing the petitioner with relief beyond what they had sought.

Ms Jahangir said the decision was against the rule of law and had compromised a citizen’s right to justice. The verdict reflected undue supremacy of national security and integrity over human rights. “When order came on 1st December, Husain Haqqani was not heard. He did not even have a lawyer,” she said. “Saying that there is a memo and linking it with Husain Haqqani are two different things, it’s more of a media trial that got hyped after Supreme Court’s order”.

DG ISI Shuja Pasha and Gen. Kayani: quick to accept Mansoor Ijaz's claims

Amb Haqqani’s lawyer and others have pointed to the role of Pakistan’s security services, especially its intelligence agency. Both the head of Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha and Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, submitted petitions before the Supreme Court insisting they believed the memo was genuine and needs to be investigated. Significantly, according to Mansur Ijaz, Lt Gen Pasha travelled to London in October and ascertained that the memo was genuine. Why was Lt Gen Pasha so eager to travel to London and agree with what Ijaz said? Whose permission did he obtain before doing so? Is he the person who should perform a forensic investigation? Mr Ijaz also alleged in an interview in December that soon after the Bin Laden raid Lt Gen Pasha travelled to the Gulf to muster support for a military coup.

Imminent danger to Mr Husain Haqqani: A media trial has been ongoing since Mansoor Ijaz’s OpEd published in FT in October. The involvement of opposition parties and their leaders in this political-media witchhunt.

The judiciary seems to be ruling on the basis of national security ideology instead of constitution and law.

All those individuals who are speaking out in Pakistan for democracy and human rights are being silenced one by one. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, former Governor Salman Taseer, former Minister Shahbaz Bhatti were assassinated. Former Amb Haqqani and his lawyer have received serious death threats.

On January 1, 2012, Ms Jahangir announced that she was quitting the case as she did not have faith in the commission been set up by the Supreme Court. According to Ms Jahangir, the Supreme Court’s decision on the petition was a victory for the country’s establishment, and it was being used to transform the country into a ‘security state.’

Ms Jahangir further stated that her client, Mr Haqqani, was under threat from the security agencies. She feared that the security forces-intelligence agencies would try to coerce a statement out of Mr Haqqani. That is why he first stayed at the President’s House and is currently residing at the Prime Minister’s residence.

(ends)

By Salman Masood for The New York Times

The military command in Pakistan issued an unusual refutation on Friday of rumors that it was planning to take power, publicizing a pledge by the top general that it is committed to democracy a day after the prime minister warned of conspiracies to subvert the civilian government.

But the pledge, by Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, did little to assuage anxieties about a possible coup in a country with a history of military interventions. The anxieties were reinforced on Thursday by an extraordinary outburst about just such a possibility from the normally soft-spoken prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, who also said the military generals in Pakistan behaved as though they were “a state within a state” and that they should be accountable to Parliament.

“The army will continue to support democratic process in the country,” General Kayani was quoted as saying in a statement issued by the military command. It said General Kayani had made that pledge on Thursday as he visited troops stationed in the northwestern regions of Mohmand and Kurram.

General Kayani “dispelled the speculations of any military takeover and said that these are misleading and are being used as a bogey to divert the focus from the real issues,” according to the statement by the military.

However, General Kayani stressed that “there can be no compromise on national security,” alluding to the differences with the civilian government over investigations into a contentious memo that suggested the civilian government had sought help from the United States in trying to constrain the Pakistani military.

The public back-and-forth came as the Pakistan military’s relations with the United States, already aggravated by the memo issue, have plunged to new lows over a deadly American-led airstrike on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border last month that killed 26 Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan’s military has rejected results of a Pentagon inquiry that said both sides were at fault but that Pakistani forces opened fire first. In a new sign of the Pakistani military’s anger, a senior official said Friday it had canceled a planned visit by the head of the United States Central Command, Gen. James Mattis, to brief his counterparts on the Pentagon inquiry.

The tensions over the memo began after Mansoor Ijaz, an American businessman of Pakistani origin, wrote an op-ed article for The Financial Times in October saying that a Pakistani diplomat had asked him to deliver a memo to Adm. Mike Mullen, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, after American commandos killed Osama bin Laden in a May raid on a Pakistan safe house. That raid, which deeply embarrassed Pakistan, raised questions about whether Bin Laden, the most-wanted fugitive Al Qaeda plotter of the Sept. 11 attacks, had been protected by elements of Pakistan’s military and intelligence service. Mr. Ijaz described the memo as saying that the civilian government sought help in preventing a possible coup, offering in exchange to dismantle part of the intelligence service.

Since then, the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party and the powerful military have been arguing over the veracity of the memo , which is seen as authentic by the military and as a conspiracy by the civilian government.

Husain Haqqani, the former ambassador to the United States, was forced to resign in November after allegations that he had orchestrated the memo, a charge he denies. Mr. Haqqani returned to the country and is barred from traveling abroad, a step seen as a violation of his fundamental rights, according to his lawyer.

The top generals have urged the country’s Supreme Court to investigate the origins of the memo. Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry said Friday that the court is pursuing those investigations but that it would not validate any army coup.

The statements by both Mr. Gilani and General Kayani signified that deep mistrust and tensions exist between the two sides.

“Things don’t look stable at all,” said Enver Baig, a former senator, who predicted that the “civil-military relations will not settle down peacefully.”

Filed under: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Pakistan Army, Pakistanis, United States, US Army Tagged: Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Mansoor Ijaz, Mike Mullen, Pakistan, Pakistani Army, Pakistanis, Yusuf Raza Gillani

By Shahan Mufti

The route from Karachi to Kabul was the best way to get supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and the main artery for a Pashtun trucking empire—until Pakistan shut it down.

Like a broker tracking the dips and spikes of a volatile but lucrative stock, Mohammad Shakir Afridi has kept a close eye on U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan since the first Americans landed in the country 10 years ago. As president of the Khyber Transport Assn., one of the largest associations of truck owners in Pakistan, Afridi’s biggest contract involves moving military equipment for American and coalition forces through Pakistan to military bases in Afghanistan. The slightest policy shift in Washington can carry major consequences for Afridi and his business.

Sitting on a rooftop in a leafy residential block in Peshawar, the largest city in northwest Pakistan, Afridi slaps the morning paper on the floor beside his mat. “Twenty-four of our boys in one go,” he spits out. A front page photograph shows a field full of coffins draped in Pakistani flags. The soldiers were killed on Nov. 26 when U.S. helicopters and jet fighters from Afghanistan fired on military outposts on the Pakistani side of the border. The relationship between Pakistan and the U.S., which has been rocky for years, hit a new low. While the U.S. military promised to investigate and the NATO chief regretted the “tragic, unintended” incident, the Pakistani Prime Minister said there would be “no more business as usual” with the U.S. Pakistan demanded the U.S. vacate an airbase it was using in the South and choked off all U.S. and coalition military supplies traveling through the country.

Afridi learned of the American attack before the Pakistan military or government had issued any statement; one of his truck drivers called to tell him the border was closed. Afridi was later given orders from the military to halt trucks near the border, and to direct all others to the southern port city of Karachi. He quickly obliged. “It’s serious this time,” Afridi says. “They’ll make the Americans sweat.”

U.S. and Allied forces in Afghanistan get the bulk of their supplies in two ways. The first is the Northern Distribution Network, a web through Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia that crosses through at least 16 countries, using a combination of roads, railway, air, and water to move supplies in from the north. The chain can be complex and circuitous. One path through the network, for example, might involve military cargo that arrives by sea in Istanbul. From there it travels the width of Turkey on truck and crosses the northern border into Poti, Georgia. In Georgia the equipment goes by rail to Baku in Azerbaijan, where it’s loaded onto a ship bound for the Kazakh Port of Aktau, across the Caspian Sea. Then it’s put on trucks for the 1,000-mile ride through Kazakhstan, then a train through Kyrgyzstan and, finally, into Afghanistan.

The second passage to Afghanistan, known as Pakistani Lines of Communication, begins at the port of Karachi and continues on one of two land routes, north toward the logistical hub at Bagram Airfield or west toward Kandahar. It has always been the primary option for American forces: It’s the shortest and cheapest, requires only one border crossing, and minimal time on the road inside Afghanistan. Nearly 60,000 trucks drive more than 1,200 miles through the length of Pakistan every year carrying supplies and fuel. According to varying figures provided by U.S. and NATO forces, 40 percent to 60 percent of all military supplies used by coalition forces in Afghanistan come through Pakistan.

Afridi doesn’t cut the figure of a man playing a key role in the U.S.’s long war in Afghanistan. The 46-year-old Pashtun is from the Khyber Agency, one of the seven Pakistani tribal sectors along the border with Afghanistan. He has a neatly trimmed salt and pepper beard and prefers to drape his rotund figure in a plain white shalwar kameez and a black vest. When he’s not too preoccupied, he wears a disarming smile. The only thing that makes him stand out from the legions of similarly dressed men on the streets of Peshawar are his dark tinted glasses and a cell phone that never stops ringing.

ven Afridi wouldn’t have dreamed of such a life a decade ago. His grandfather started the family transport business in the 1960s, buying a few trucks to move melons, grapes, and wheat from the fertile lands of the Punjab in Pakistan to largely arid Afghanistan. Afridi inherited the business in the 1980s. In 1996 he added a few tanker trucks to his fleet after signing a contract with Pakistan State Oil to transport fuel from refineries in Karachi. When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and coalition forces moved in to occupy the landlocked country, Afridi’s business took off. He says he orchestrates a fleet of nearly 4,000 flatbeds and more than 3,000 fuel tankers that haul military supplies into Afghanistan.

On a November morning, two days after the U.S. attack, Afridi rides around in a brand new black Toyota Hilux Vigo pickup. He’s just returned from the haj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, a prohibitively expensive ritual Muslims are required to do at least once in a lifetime—if they are able to afford it. Afridi says this year was his second haj. His first was in 2010.

Despite the prosperity, there are times he wishes he had never become involved with the Americans. After all, he is bringing fuel and supplies to forces fighting Pashtuns like himself in a neighboring country. In Peshawar, where his business is based—and where the Pashtuns are a majority—he’s a man on the run, constantly looking over his shoulder. As Pakistanis increasingly see the U.S. as the real enemy in the conflict in South Central Asia, Afridi feels like a target for doing business with them. “Can you believe it? They won’t even let my guards carry their guns here anymore,” Afridi gestures to the two unamused looking men, with no obviously displayed firearms, who have hung near him like a shadow ever since they jumped out of the cargo bed of the pickup.

The fallout from the Nov. 26 friendly fire incident means Afridi’s business is at a standstill, indefinitely. Still, he thinks the Pakistanis have done the right thing. He says he hates the sight of the American flag, and stands “shoulder to shoulder” with Pakistan’s army. “Your homeland is like your mother,” he says, pausing to turn off a ringing phone. “You can screw people here and there, that’s just business.” He peers over his dark glasses. “But you never, ever screw your mother.”

Of Afghanistan’s neighbors, Pakistan has the longest border and has historically wielded the most influence. It also provides the nearest seaport to Kabul. To leverage Pakistan’s strategic position, the U.S. has poured more than $20 billion into the country over the past decade. The money is not simply to strengthen Pakistan’s democracy against the threat from militants, as diplomats sometimes suggest. It has also been a way to buy Pakistan’s loyalty, aimed specifically at luring Pakistan away from the Taliban. Most important, the money is also for the continued use of Pakistan’s highway network. “If we want to be successful in Afghanistan,” as General James L. Jones Jr., former National Security Advisor to President Barack Obama, said in recent congressional testimony, “the roads to that success have a lot to do with Pakistan.”

The U.S. has worked hard to find an alternative. The Northern Distribution Network, running through Europe and Central Asia, was developed only in 2009. That was after the U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan had begun the previous year. Besides easing congestion on Pakistani ports and border crossings, it was also an opportunity to decrease dependence on Pakistan, which the U.S. increasingly suspected was collaborating with the Taliban inside Afghanistan and providing their fighters and leaders sanctuary in Pakistan. Today around half of U.S. military supplies to Afghanistan come in from the north, but the northern network comes with its own set of challenges. (About 10 percent to 20 percent of supplies are flown in.) Besides being very long and costing three times as much to use as the Pakistani route, it’s vulnerable to attack. Only days before the closure of the Pakistani Lines of Communication, a Russian news agency reported an explosion along the northern supply route in Uzbekistan.

Russia’s sphere of influence spreads across much of the northern route, which can cause complications. In 2009, for example, after Kyrgyzstan threatened to eject the U.S. from the Manas Air Base, a key node in the supply chain, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Russia was “working against us.” Two days after the Pakistanis closed the supply route in November, and the U.S. was left with only the northern route, Russia’s NATO envoy made loosely veiled threats at closing off the northern supply line as well if NATO didn’t begin to rethink its European missile defense shield.

Many countries along the northern route still don’t allow the passage of foreign military gear, so Pakistan was the only way for the U.S. to move nearly all of its combat equipment. At a congressional hearing in May, Lieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson, the U.S. Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, was asked what the “long term impact” would be if the supply route through Pakistan was “suddenly shut down.” After explaining that the Army kept a 45-day supply of reserve fuel on the ground in Afghanistan, the general said they could only “last several weeks” without any significant impact.

This is what Pakistan’s calculation appears to have been from Day One. According to Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister from 1999 to 2002, the evening after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001, General Pervez Musharraf, who then ruled Pakistan as an unelected Chief Executive, called a meeting at the military’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. He wanted to discuss his country’s response to the inevitable U.S. call for cooperation.

Abdul Sattar, one of only two people at that meeting not affiliated with the military, says that by midnight the group had decided on the broad outlines of Pakistan’s official response to the U.S. in case of a war in Afghanistan. Sattar suggested a “Yes, but…” approach to Musharraf, meaning Pakistan should agree in principle to whatever reasonable demands the U.S. would make, then secure strategic advantages while negotiating the fine details.

Sattar was soon sidelined though, as were many others, and decision-making shifted into an insulated and small circle of generals closest to the dictator. “I would not hear much after that, a memo here or there, months after the fact,” says Sattar, now retired and living in a quiet corner of Islamabad. The agreements the U.S. reached with Musharraf were never fully revealed, but information trickled out over the years.

The most important part of Pakistan’s role in America’s war was impossible to conceal: The country’s highway network would be the route along which the U.S. military’s supply chain would run. On this issue, Pakistan had taken the “Yes, but…” path. The country did not allow American military vessels on its waters. The U.S. Transport Command handed out massive contracts to international shipping lines such as Singapore’s APL (NPTOF), the Danish company Maersk (AMKAF), and Germany’s Hapag-Lloyd. Since the beginning of the war, APL has received more than $700 million in defense-related contracts and has moved more than 300,000 shipping containers for the U.S. military. Maersk has won nearly $2 billion in contracts. The goods transported through Pakistan include everything from blankets and microwave dinners to armored Humvees and Kevlar vests, and even shipping containers full of frozen food.

Getting all the overseas crude oil and other supplies to the port city of Karachi has proven to be the easy part. Once the cargo is unloaded in Karachi, however, the international shipping lines subcontract the job of getting it to Afghanistan to local agencies. Those agencies in turn hire local truckers like Shakir Afridi. And so the lifeline for one of the largest deployments of U.S. forces in American history falls into the hands of a loose association of truck drivers and owners from the tribal areas of Pakistan.

The nerve center of the transport business in Karachi is in Shireen Jinnah Colony, a smoggy and rusty seaside neighborhood with an apocalyptic landscape. Flatbed trucks are assembled from scratch on the side of the road. These “jingle trucks” are painted in every color of the spectrum and decorated with hundreds of intricate metal, wooden, plastic, and glass trinkets. In the background, monstrous oil refineries pump thick smoke into the air. From a small room in an office block abutting the Port of Karachi, Muntazir Afridi, Shakir’s younger brother, deals with the southern end of the Afridi family business.

The trucking industry in Karachi, which is as far away as you can get in the country from Afghanistan, is in the hands of the city’s large minority Pashtun population. Mostly immigrants from Peshawar and the tribal areas on the Afghan frontier, the Pashtuns arrived in the 1950s and ’60s in flocks, looking for jobs. Largely uneducated and unskilled, 1,000 miles from home, they slowly acquired transport contracts to supply Pakistan’s north. Their deep cultural ties to Afghanistan’s majority Pashtun population also made them favorites for transport jobs for Afghan trade. In a city where ethnic groups battle and bloody the streets over slices of the local economy, two tribes in particular have an unshakable grip on the trucking business: the Shinwaris and the Afridis.

Muntazir Afridi’s office is sparse. Taped to the wall are photos of the holy mosque in Mecca and the prophet’s mosque in Medina. A desk sits in a corner, and on a rickety coffee table is an overflowing ashtray. “In Bombay they have their film industry,” Muntazir proclaims with a smile, while sipping his morning green tea on a stained couch. “In Karachi we have the trucking industry.”

With NATO transport shut down, the office block, which houses logistics companies, trucking companies, insurers, and customs clearing agents, is quiet. In an adjacent room, a group of men, mostly truck drivers, lie on soft rugs watching a Pashto film on television. The smell of Afghan hash hangs thick in the air. Other men, clearly stranded, shuttle between offices in the block with fists of crumpled papers, asking for loans, food, and lodging.

Muntazir is in his mid-20s and dressed, like his brother, in a plain white shalwar kameez. His beard is long and neat. He points outside at the sheer scale of the enterprise. Stretching for miles, from the walls of the office block below all the way to where the large cranes of Karachi’s port are visible through the smog, is a patchwork of hundreds of oil tankers and flatbed trucks in yellow and red and green. “On a regular day they would all be on the move like ants,” Muntazir says, but instead the trucks are parked, overflowing from the terminal lots. Lines of jingle trucks are parked, sometimes double parked, for miles along the roads of Karachi. The entire southern quarter of the city looks like it’s been invaded by trucks.

The Afridi family is only one of hundreds that have enjoyed the boom from the steady flow of American military supplies through Pakistan after 2001. The real gold rush started with the troop surge in Afghanistan that began soon after Obama won the election in 2008. When he took office there were just over 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. By January 2010, the number had more than doubled to nearly 70,000. In May of this year, troop levels peaked at nearly 100,000.

More troops naturally meant more supplies. Figures issued by the Pakistan Federal Tax Ombudsman illustrate the spike in traffic at Karachi’s port. U.S. military equipment received at the port rose from nearly 16,000 shipping containers in 2005 to more than 54,000 in 2009. Halfway through 2010 the U.S. military had already shipped nearly 30,000 containers to Karachi.

In Pakistan the demand for trucks skyrocketed. “Everyone who had nothing to lose took out a loan and bought a truck,” Muntazir says. He invited many of his extended relatives from the tribal areas to come to Karachi and start driving. The local “third party vendor” transport companies, to whom the international shipping lines subcontracted, were so desperate for drivers that Muntazir says they began lending money to people they had just met, so they would buy a truck and get supplies moving. “There was just no way the companies would be able to deal with truckers,” Muntazir says. “They couldn’t keep track of a thing.” Entire truckloads started going missing. Drivers would take the wheel of a brand new truck and simply drive off, never to return. The supply chain was coming undone.

This is where Shakir, the elder brother, began to do work he describes as “brokering,” placing himself between truck owners and the local transport companies. He takes responsibility for the cargo and ensures it gets to U.S. and other ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Acting as a guarantor, Afridi receives a cut from the logistics companies when the cargo is picked up and again when it’s dropped off. The work has proved so profitable that Afridi has sold his entire fleet.
In November 2008, Hakimullah Mehsud, a commander of the newly formed Taliban Movement of Pakistan, invited the news media to Orakzai, a tribal agency in Pakistan, for his first press conference. Mehsud arrived riding in a brand new armored U.S. military Humvee. As he posed for photographs, he told reporters he had captured a few American vehicles after attacking and looting a military convoy traveling through Pakistan. He boasted he would increase these attacks.

Such attacks started at the same time as the U.S. troop surge in late 2008. Fuel tankers began getting torched regularly and shipping containers were ripped open, looted, and left empty along highways. In the local press, Pakistani military officials told of groups in the tribal areas stealing helicopter parts. Militants who couldn’t get to the trucks took to bombing bridges and roads along the route, at times shutting the supply route for days.

The supply line was not just vulnerable to militants. In the past several years, the Pakistani and American visions for Afghanistan’s future have diverged so far that the relationship has turned hostile. Pakistan first cut off NATO’s supplies in September 2008, in response to the first-ever reported incursion of U.S. troops into Pakistan. Two months later, after a drone aircraft targeted Pakistan’s “settled,” nontribal lands for the first and only time, 160 NATO trucks were burned in a nightlong rampage in Peshawar. Many believed the event was staged by the Pakistani military and meant to send a clear signal. Vice Admiral Mark D. Harnitchek, deputy commander of the U.S. Transportation Command, said in a 2009 speech that 12 percent of the freight bound for Bagram in December 2008 had disappeared.

The supply line has been under consistent fire ever since. In 2009 there were 25 attacks on NATO supply lines in Pakistan, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, an online database tracking terror incidents in the region. In 2011, before the supply line was closed in November, there had already been a total of 111 reported incidents, destroying hundreds of supply vehicles. Even in times of relative calm, the Pakistani military has had its hand on the valve, as it alone decides how many trucks carrying U.S. military equipment to let through on any given day.

The spike in attacks is partly because drivers and truck owners have jumped into the action. Drivers in particular, discouraged by the high risks involved, have taken to selling their loads of fuel on the black market, then setting fire to the tankers and collecting insurance money. They can earn a nice profit, even after paying off local collaborators. Though the scam is a pain for the brokers, Muntazir says he feels for the truckers. “These guys risk their lives, and they get what? Thirty thousand, maybe forty thousand rupees for a trip?” That’s about four hundred dollars. Peanuts, says Muntazir. “Anyway, you can’t blame them trying to make their little bit,” he adds. “The real money is being made by those guys dealing in dollars”—meaning Pakistani transport companies, the Americans, and others higher up the food chain.

In June 2010, after an unsourced news report on Pakistani TV claimed that nearly 11,000 Afghanistan-bound shipping containers that had arrived in Karachi had gone missing, the Supreme Court of Pakistan asked another agency, the Federal Tax Ombudsman’s office, to investigate. The case landed on the desk of Shoaib Suddle. A career police officer, Suddle was Karachi’s police chief at the height of a war between several ethnic groups in the mid-1990s. He has a doctorate in white-collar criminology from the University of Wales and has also served as the chief of Pakistan’s Intelligence Bureau.

When Suddle first began his investigation, he received little encouragement from his colleagues. It’s made-up news, people would say. How can thousands of shipping containers go missing without anyone noticing? Then he had a breakthrough. The Pakistani ports and customs authorities were not keeping track, but he found that private container terminals in Karachi were keeping detailed records of the exact time containers would depart and return. Some trucks would never check back in. But thousands of mostly empty trucks were coming back too soon, sometimes a few hours after departing for Afghanistan.

“We found the mother of all scams,” Suddle said. In a report published by his office earlier this year, he described complex transnational networks bribing local customs agents and using crooked bureaucrats in Pakistan to forge documents and create fake companies. The intent of that corruption was to get goods labeled as Afghanistan-bound into the country, and then divert them for resale on the black market.

In total, Suddle estimated that at least 7,992 shipping containers had never reached Afghanistan. The report called this “the tip of the iceberg.” A follow-up investigation, also ordered by the Pakistani Supreme Court, revealed that close to 29,000 cargo loads have gone missing in the country. There is no way of knowing precisely what disappeared. While many of these containers were loaded with commercial cargo destined for Afghanistan, military equipment for coalition forces accounts for nearly 40 percent of all trade to Afghanistan through Pakistan. Pakistan’s Federal Board of Revenue estimates that 3,300 shipping containers full of military equipment were among those missing.

According to an agreement between the Pakistani and British ministries of defense, signed in June 2002 and made public only recently, Pakistan allows ISAF military equipment to arrive in Pakistan without inspection. The U.S. military is not even required to file a customs declaration form describing contents inside shipping containers. Much of the lost military gear finds its way into the Pakistani black market. Some of it might even make it across the border into Afghanistan—but into the wrong hands.
In the Khyber Agency, not far from Peshawar, the hemorrhaging U.S. supply line stocks a long bazaar the locals call Karkhano Market. Among the haphazard corrugated-iron storefronts and randomly arranged merchandise, middle-aged women are shopping for “USA” branded oil and soap bars with the American flag printed on them. Crisply clothed young men in dark glasses who walk in and out of back doors make hushed deals with suppliers. Scruffy fighters drop in from Afghanistan to sample the latest in the military technology available on roadside tables.

Alongside old British rifles and Soviet AK-47s, American military gear like Kevlar vests, boots, camouflage suits, night-vision goggles, and knives hang from hooks. Tall stacks of large boxes carrying ammunition and weapons parts will not be opened without a good reference. In the bargain bins, thrown in with used fleece socks and shrink-wrapped copies of The Book of Mormon, are U.S. military operation manuals that restrict distribution to “DoD and DoD contractors only,” and carry instructions to destroy “by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of documents.” A large sign for a shop on the second floor reads, “Haji M. Ikhlas USA traders,” with crude paintings of a U.S. military helmet and army boots. In 2009 a U.S. military laptop that the U.S. Army’s 864th Engineer Combat Battalion used for diagnostics and maintenance of military weapons systems and vehicles was found in this same market. It contained restricted U.S. military information, as well as software for military platforms, the identities of numerous military personnel, and information about vulnerabilities in American military vehicles used in Afghanistan. All that for $650.

Shopkeepers say that much of their stock comes from Afghanistan or is brought in from elsewhere in Pakistan—they don’t differentiate. From whatever direction, it’s clear that the stuff is stolen from the U.S. military supply chain, and here in the open black market it fetches a good price.

This is an enterprise that none of the subcontractors in the U.S. military supply chain—the international shipping lines, the local logistics agencies, the truck owners and drivers, and brokers like Shakir Afridi—lose much sleep over. After all, it doesn’t affect their bottom line.
Back inside the city limits of Peshawar, Shakir Afridi is attending a lunch at the house of a truck owner he represents. There are more than a dozen guests, some of whom introduce themselves as truck owners, others as drivers. There are local officials from towns along the supply route who might help out with paperwork in case of an accident, and reps from the transporters’ union, too.

Afridi sits at the head of a decadent spread of goat meat and Kabuli pulao rice. “When I was in Mecca last month, I prayed and begged Allah to finish this war,” he says, sinking his teeth into a leg of goat, coated in dripping salty fat. A truck owner sitting next to him pours himself a glass of Pepsi and passes Afridi his phone. He wants to share a photograph of one of his drivers, whose eyes had been gouged out, he explains, by Taliban who attacked his truck as he drove along the western route to Kandahar. “This is a dirty, dirty business,” says Afridi shaking his head sadly.

Afridi says he’s not worried about revenue should the war end. He’s confident other contracts will come through. After all, he’s been cooperating with Pakistan’s military for years now, “standing shoulder to shoulder.” He talks about the Central Asian “stans”—all landlocked, growing, and looking to trade. He thinks Pakistan will start moving goods into Central and East Asia. Most important, he is convinced that “Allah, not America, is the one who provides sustenance to man.”

As Pakistan and the U.S. drift apart, Afridi’s prayers for an end to the war may soon be answered. As of Dec. 13, the supply route remains closed. President Obama has ordered a military investigation into the events of Nov. 26. In the meantime the blame game continues. While Obama has called President Asif Ali Zardari to offer condolences, the U.S. has yet to apologize. To the contrary, some U.S. officials are saying Pakistan was warned of the operation in advance. On Dec. 8, 32 oil tankers and 10 shipping containers full of NATO military supplies parked at a poorly protected terminal in Quetta were burned and destroyed. A day later the Pakistani Senate heard testimony about how the country had incurred nearly half a billion dollars in road damage over a decade because of NATO supply trucks. Pakistan’s government pulled out of the Bonn conference held to plan the last stages of the conflict in Afghanistan. Pakistan, it seems, wanted to make the point that while it is consistently asked to do more to help in the war in Afghanistan, it can do less, too.

“America has been trying to get out of this for years now,” says Afridi as he pushes away his empty plate and sticks a toothpick in his mouth. Dessert and green tea are served. “We have them so badly hemmed in that they can’t go anywhere,” he chuckles. By helping supply the U.S. with enough to keep busy in Afghanistan, but not enough to win, Afridi believes he is killing two birds with one stone. He is turning a profit and bleeding the country he hates most in the world. “They want out, but we’re still not done with them yet,” he says as he dips a spoon into a bowl of custard. “There’s still a little more to go.”

Mufti is a Bloomberg Businessweek contributor.

Source : Business Week