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Finally, Some Good News from South Asia…. But Will It Last?

Posted on 28 February 2012 by Tea Server

For all of the discouraging news coming out of South Asia – Afghanistan’s escalating turmoil, the breakdown in U.S.-Pakistani relations, and growing political instability in Islamabad – there is one heartening development: India and Pakistan have restarted their peace dialogue following a three-year hiatus caused by the 2008 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. As a leading Pakistani daily puts it, “there is a discernible defrosting of relations with our neighbor to the east.”

The annals of India-Pakistan relations are filled with numerous false dawns and the current moves could well founder upon the sharp historical animosities that regularly bedevil bilateral affairs. But things may be different this time. Reports out of Islamabad indicate that the Pakistani government realizes the country is in desperate economic straits and that closer ties with its ever-richer sibling constitute a much needed lifeline. The military establishment is also said to understand that the eastern border needs to be stabilized so resources can be focused on combating rising internal security threats.

In a potentially significant development, Islamabad is reportedly even willing to put the perennially-inflamed dispute over the Kashmir region on the back burner. If these media accounts prove accurate – and if the beleaguered civilian government in Islamabad is able to sustain this stance in the face of vigorous domestic opposition – the event would represent an important breakthrough in the India-Pakistan rivalry. It would pick up where the intensive back-channel peace process both sides undertook in 2004-07 left off. Although those negotiations ultimately collapsed due to Pervez Musharraf’s political travails, they may have come tantalizing close to defusing the volatile Kashmir issue.

Things are already rolling along on the economic engagement front. Last summer, Pakistan’s Bollywood-esque foreign minister, the 34-year-old Hina Rabbani Khar, held unexpectedly warm talks in New Delhi, where she emphasized that a “mind-set change” was occurring among younger Indians and Pakistanis. This was quickly followed by a trip to New Delhi by Pakistan’s commerce minister, who brought with him a notably large business delegation.

The trip was especially productive. The two countries pledged to more than double their two-way trade flows – to the $6 billion annual level – by 2015. They agreed to ease visa rules for business travel and to open a new customs post at the Attari-Wagah border crossing that lies midway between Lahore and Amritsar. Islamabad also committed to extending “most favored nation” trade status to New Delhi, reciprocating the status India earlier conferred upon Pakistan. This last development promises to enliven the 2006 South Asia Free Trade Agreement which up until this point has been all but a dead letter. India’s commerce minister, Anand Sharma, captured the spirit of the meeting when he exclaimed that “only shared prosperity can bring lasting peace.”

Mr. Sharma, with his own high-profile business delegation in tow, paid a reciprocal visit to Islamabad earlier this month, where he signed several agreements to further reduce impediments to bilateral trade. The Indian and Pakistani central banks have announced plans to open branch offices in the other country, a move that will help facilitate cross-border transactions. Both countries have also advanced initiatives to enhance energy cooperation, including joint development of a natural gas field in Turkmenistan. Expert talks on expanding commerce in the electrical power and petroleum sectors are scheduled to take place in the coming weeks.

If enhanced trade ties were to develop between South Asia’s largest economies, they would produce significant commercial and (eventually) security dividends for both countries. Despite the common civilizational and historical bonds that permeate South Asia, as well as the unified market forged by the British Raj, the region today is remarkably fragmented economically. Trade flows between India and Pakistan, for instance, represent a miniscule fraction of each country’s overall trade portfolio. Attari-Wagah is the only vehicle crossing along the 1,800-mile-long international border. The two-lane road there is only open a mere eight hours a day and the cargo that passes through it must be unloaded and transferred to local trucks. Indeed, the crossing, which some refer to as the “Checkpoint Charlie of South Asia,” is better known for the Kabuki-like displays put on by the border guards than as an efficient transit point.

The pervasive barriers to bilateral economic cooperation have also spurred circuitous and highly inefficient trade patterns. A booming India requires cement for its construction sector yet is forced to import it from Africa instead of Pakistan, where the cement industry has excess capacity. Off-the-books trade – the value of which easily rivals official levels – is also conducted via third countries like Dubai, Singapore and Afghanistan. According to various studies, a more liberalized trade regime would increase bilateral exchange at least 20 times above current figures as well as boost economic prosperity in both countries. A new report by the Confederation of Indian Industries argues that cross-border trade could easily quadruple in just a few years if both governments moved to increase economic linkages.

(This commentator has argued elsewhere that the United States would be wise to reinforce the current stirrings by launching a Marshall Plan-like initiative geared toward bolstering cross-border economic cooperation between the two countries. This effort would dovetail well with the Obama administration’s “New Silk Road” initiative that is designed to ensure Afghanistan’s economic viability by building it up as a regional trade and transit hub.)

To be sure, there is a surfeit of factors that could derail the thaw in India-Pakistan relations, such as political upheaval in Islamabad or a major terrorist attack in India that emanates from Pakistani soil. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s government has a tense arrangement with the army leadership and is under increasing fire from an emboldened Supreme Court; indeed, Gilani may in the coming months find himself in jail on contempt of court charges. Still, the Pakistan Peoples Party is expected to do well in the March 2nd Senate elections and this should provide enough political reinforcement for the government to continue, at least in the short term, with the push for improved relations with New Delhi.

A larger, if somewhat more distant, danger resides in the sharper security competition that is sure to erupt between the countries as the United States and its NATO allies hasten their departure from Afghanistan. Both India and Pakistan regard the country as a key theater for their strategic rivalry and the current defrosting in relations will likely be a casualty as the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates into a new civil war that has regional powers scrambling for influence.

Still, the present stirrings of peace demonstrate that despite its singularity intensity the India-Pakistan rivalry has always been a fluid admixture of cooperative impulses and competitive dynamics. Both governments would be smart to do what they now can to accentuate the former before the latter returns to the fore.

 

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24 February, 2012 10:22

Posted on 24 February 2012 by Tea Server

Watch Now Islamabad tonight on aaj news - 23rd febuary 2012 Watch Now Islamabad tonight on aaj news - 23rd febuary 2012 Islamabad Tonight - 23rd February 2012Islamabad Tonight - 23rd February 2012
http://www.awaztoday.com/playshow/20202/Islamabad-Tonight-23rd-February-2012.aspx
http://www.zemtv.com/2012/02/23/islamabad-tonight-on-aaj-news-23rd-febuary-2012/
http://www.friendskorner.com/forum/f247/video-islamabad-tonight-nadeem-malik-23rd-february-2012-a-265475/
http://www.pakistanherald.com/Program/Islamabad-Tonight-February-23-2012-Nadeem-Malik-9798

ISLAMABAD TONIGHT

WITH NADEEM MALIK

23-02-2012

TOPIC- BALOCHISTAN PROBLEM

GUESTS- HARBYAR MAREE, BARAHAMDAGH BUGTI, NISAR KHORRO, JAVED HASHMI

HARBYAR MAREE A BALOCH NATIONALIST LEADER said that he has no contact with the government of Pakistan. He said that he is trying to be in touch with every country of the world on Balochistan problem. He said that he has no relationship with Asif Ali Zardari. He said that he was hopeful that Balochistan problem will be resolved in the Peoples Party government but it is proven to be worst than military era. He said that Baloch used to be killed in ambush in the past but in the Peoples Party government they are being killed openly. He said that an action was taken against Baloch when ZA Bhutto was in the government and it is being repeated again. He said that the first condition to talk to Pakistani government is that they confess that they have taken over Balochistan by force. He said that the second condition is that they must leave Balochistan.

BARAHAMDAGH BUGTI A BALOCH NATIONALIST LEADER said that he does not like to have contact with non serious people (Rehman Malik). He said that he is not in contact with Pakistan government. He said that he will only talk to Pakistan government in the presence of America and NATO. He said that his elders talked to the Pakistan government but what was the result?

NISAR KHORRO OF PPPP said that the Balochistan problem is not new it is continuing from previous governments. He said that during Musharaf government Baloch problem went to the extreme. He said that Musharaf said that he will hit Baloch from where they can not even imagine. He said that Baloch leaders were part of the government during Peoples Party and PML-n governments in the past. He said that Baloch leaders made mistake by not participating in the elections of 2008. He said that Benazir Bhutto tried to take along all deprived sections but she did not survive. He said that the PPPP government has taken some positive steps by apologizing Baloch people and giving the provincial autonomy. He said that the situation is not improving because of mutilated corpses of Baloch people found every day. He said that up to some years ago Baloch were the part of the government but Musharaf turned it around. He said that it is easy to voice for separation but it is very difficult to actually achieve it. He said that the top leadership in the government should come forward and give message to Baloch people that we can get along together. He said that if the government and Baloch leaders will sit together the ways to move forward will be found.

JAVED HASHMI OF PTI said that the way we have treated Baloch people how they can trust us after that. He said that we made Baloch people realize that they are small unit and we can keep them suppressed. He said that the Baloch Sardars are talking the truth and we should face the reality. He said that America after defeat in Afghanistan is trying to ignite our region by giving statement of Balochistan problem. He said that Peoples Party is responsible for the wrong doings of Bhutto era and PML-N is responsible for its wrong doings. He said that the gas is found in Balochistan but they got it in 1985 as compare to Karachi and Lahore in 1953. He said that living with in Pakistan the rights of Baloch people have to be given.

Filed under: CURRENT AFFAIRS

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Testimony of Mansoor Ijaz in London

Posted on 22 February 2012 by Tea Server

Testimony of Mansoor Ijaz in London

NADEEM MALIK

OPENING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

I, Musawer Mansoor Ijaz (Ijaz), a citizen of the United States of America, do hereby solemnly swear that the testimony I present in this Witness Statement on oath to the Honourable Commission (the Commission)is the truth as I know it to have occurred based on the evidence in my possession and to the best of my recollection where physical or documentary evidence is not available in reference to the subject matter of this inquiry (the Inquiry).

I submit my testimony as a first person witness to the events herein. I appear in front of this Commission to present the physical evidence in my possession and to allow such evidence as I have to be forensically tested in any manner chosen by competent, independent and unbiased experts retained by the Commission so that the authenticity of these data can be ascertained with certainty. I duly submit this Witness Statement to the Commission as a private citizen of the United States, born in the State of Florida in the year 1961, and bound only by the laws of the United States of America. I state for the record that my loyalties are first and foremost to the national interests of my country of birth. I do not now nor have I ever served in any official position in the US government. I act at the behest of no person in government, outside of government, in any foreign country or in the United States of America.

CONTACT WITH PAKISTAN OFFICIALS

While I maintain high-level political and military/intelligence contacts in nearly two dozen countries around the world, during the past decade, I have had no contact with any Pakistani government official, civilian, judicial, military or intelligence with the following four exceptions (Amb. Haqqani excluded):

(a)2003 when I last interacted with the former director general of Inter-Services Intelligence, Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, shortly before he left the DG-ISI position in 2004; and,

(b)Nov. 2005 when my wife and I visited the prime minister of Pakistan and some military officers during and after our trip to Kashmir as the earthquake reconstruction period began; and,

(c)May 5, 2009 when I met with President Asif Ali Zardari for 45-50 minutes at the Willard Intercontinental Hotel in Washington DC at the invitation of Amb. Haqqani(Haqqani)to brief the president shortly before he met with US officials at the White House; and,

(d)Oct. 22, 2011 when I met alone with Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the current DG-ISI, a this request for approximately four hours in London to provide him with the same accounting of facts I provide to the Commission herein.

CONTACT WITH HAQQANI

Over the past decade, I have maintained regular contact with Haqqani through e-mail, BlackBerry chat exchanges, SMS, in-person meetings and telephonic discussions. Often, after the 9-11 attacks, when I was not available for media appearances due to calendar conflicts, I would refer producers to Haqqani as a qualified expert on Pakistan affairs. Haqqani was helpful

and supportive in other important matters, including speaking at one of my charity’s annual

fundraising dinners in June 2009 (please see Exhibit-A for examples of our communications).From the day Haqqani assumed his ambassadorship role, I had no involvement in his Congressional or White House lobbying efforts, no role in his development of the Pakistani-American community or any other aspect of his role as ambassador other than assisting in the ways we were able to after the 2005 Kashmir earthquake.

At no time during Haqqani’s ambassadorial tenure have I lobbied anyone for Pakistan, acted as an agent of the Pakistani government or represented any foreign interest lobbying for a particular outcome. I acted in this matter purely as a friend in my private capacity trying to assist Haqqani in communicating his message in ways that only he dictated, characterized and gave authority for, not in any way to be construed as diplomatic or official activity. Other than as disclosed above, I maintain no active relationships of any type electronic, e-mail contact, telephonic contact, BlackBerry messenger contact or SMS contact with anyone living in Pakistan. I have no close relatives living or alive in Pakistan. I have no business interests in Pakistan. I have no political interests in Pakistan. I have never been involved in any political party, political organization or given a single political contribution in Pakistan to any candidate for high office, or sitting elected official. In short, I have no material ties to Pakistan other than my birth parents.

EVENTS OF MAY 9, 2011 UNTIL MAY 12, 2011

The events I describe herein are a factual recantation of my interactions with Haqqani on the dates of May 9th, May 10th, May 11th and May 12th of 2011, and then again starting on October10, 2011, the date on which an opinion piece I authored was published in the Financial Times entitled “Time to take on Pakistan’s jihadist spies.”

The text of this opinion article has already been entered into the record on the date of the Court’s Order.

I had further material interactions with Haqqani on October 28, 2011 and November 1, 2011. At no time did I meet Haqqani in person. All communications were electronic / telephonic.

The events of the three and a half days in May will be summarized in Tabular form in order to show the type of communication (telephone, e-mail, BlackBerry chat, PIN message and handwritten notes), a brief description of each type of communication, and where a communication was evidenced by physical documentation or electronic messages those are attached hereto as labeled exhibits. My recollections of the discussions in telephone calls a replaced in quotations where attributed to Haqqani. Where the dialogue uses coded words or phraseology that may not be apparently clear to the Court, I have put annotations to explain what was intended by the language used.

RESERVATION NOTICE

I reserve the right to amend this Witness Statement at a future date once forensic examination of my electronic BlackBerry device is complete. There are certain messages (PIN, SMS, etc) that may be archived in backup volumes that I am presently unaware of, having not seen any of those messages since June 2011 when the last monthly backup was made. I have chosen not to retrieve these messages from my computer hard drives which normally roll off after a thirty (30) day period in the device until a certificate that my BlackBerry device has not been tampered with and contains original data in it can be provided. The backup data will only be reviewed once the forensic examination is complete. I would also ask the Commission’s permission to spend about20-30 minutes in explaining how BlackBerry handsets work and why the knowledge of BB operations are so critical to the analysis of data in this matter. Finally, certain Explanation comments that I have noted are for “In Camera” hear in gs only because the disclosures are not appropriate for this statement that can be viewed by others. Please note in the tabular formats set forth below, line numbered for convenience, the following legend: BBM = BlackBerry Messenger chat exchange SMS = Short Message exchangeE-M = E-MAIL sent or received CALL = Telephone OUT to recipient or received IN (numbers withheld for “In Camera” briefing)

TBA = To Be Announced (for those messages referenced but held on backup hard drives)All dates are shown in MONTH/DAY/YEAR format. All times given are Central European Time (CET) in military time format.

HAQQANI BLACKBERRY PIN NUMBERS

I submit for the Commission’s records the two PIN numbers that are unique in the BlackBerry system of communications that were used by Haqqani during our communications by BBM Messenger. The first one, 2326A31D, was used in May. The second, 287EF1E9, was used in the October and November exchanges up until at least November 5th or 6th when I noticed he had disabled me as a BBM contact. I wish to additionally inform the Commission that in the intervening weeks since Haqqani once again changed his BlackBerry PIN, I have been informed

by two important official sources (whom I shall identify “In Camera”) that attempts may have

been or are being made to manipulate, erase, delete or otherwise distort data in the electronic devices of Haqqani that could confirm the data I have provided herein as fact. Additionally, it may be noted by the Commission that both the Interior Minister of Pakistan as well as Haqqani have confirmed that some form of electronic messaging and commstook place with me. Yet Haqqani continues to deny the entirety of any exchanges, for example, as those set forth in this Statement. So which is it? Did he communicate with me or not? If so, where is that data and who has access to it today?

TELEPHONE CALL SUMMARIES

CALL #1

05/09/2011 IJAZ TO HAQQANI

12:35:49

DURATION 16:03

I called Haqqani at the London Intercontinental Hotel, Room 430 as he had requested a few minutes earlier by BlackBerry messenger. We had not spoken by telephone for some time, so we briefly exchanged pleasantries. I asked him what he was doing in London he simply said it was a private visit and moved on to the subject matter at hand. There was an elevated stress in his voice. He spoke rapidly, almost randomly at times. Several times I had to ask him during the call to slow down so I could get the notes down from what he was trying to tell me. He explained that the bin Laden raid had created severe stresses between the army/intelligence organs of Pakistan and the civilian branch of government. Referencing some meeting that had

taken place “72 hours ago” between the army chief, the prime minister and the president, he said there was a “collective jute chalak y” [my spelling phonetically because I do not know what these words mean as my
Urdu is quite rudimentary] between the army and ISI to pin the blame of the bin Laden failure on President Zardari’s administration.

He said the US and British were “beating the shit out of us” to get information in the raid’s aftermath about how bin Laden had been on Pakistani soil for so long. He said in clear words that I wrote on my notepad as he said them, “the Army wants to bring the government down”. He then said he needed my help.

I asked in which sense and he informed me that it was urgent to get a message verbally to “the Americans” that the Obama administration needed to back the army down. He said this was a “1971 moment” a reference I did not understand at all at the time he first made it and had to ask him at the end of the call to clarify for me because he repeatedly referred to this phrase during the call. He then immediately stated his preference for the right person to give this as yet undefined verbal message to was Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the US joints chiefs of staff because (a) he was one of the few people who Gen. Kayani would listen to and (b) he was about to chair a meeting with a Pakistani delegation a two days later in Washington (Wednesday, May 11, 2011).I informed him that I did not know Adm. Mullen. I asked him why he needed me to do this for him when he had so many other ways to do it and he said in his official position, it was impossible to get such a message to the Americans without risking the possibility of detection by

ISI or the military officers he had around him at the embassy in DC. He said I was “plausibly deniable” as a conduit and that no one would ever believe if this got public in those days he had come to me for such kind of help. I made it clear that I had long ago given up the role of a back-channel communicator and that I would do it for him as a friend only if I could get someone on the US side to agree to deliver a message to Adm Mullen in the timeframe Haqqani had requested.

I then asked him whose authority he was acting on behalf of. He was vague. Not evasive, just vague. He said there was a like-minded group of people in Islamabad that would be brought on board by “the boss” a reference I understood to mean President Asif Ali Zardari as the new national security team once tensions had dissipated. He mentioned two names I recognized (Jehangir Karamat and Mahmud Durrani) but added that they would be approached once this was all over a point I took to mean they were unaware of this operation in advance. I then asked him what the message was that he wanted delivered and by when exactly it had to be in Mullen’s hands. He dictated a series of points to me, many of which are contained on the two pages of handwritten notes, and the rest were typed into a blank e-mail template at the point I asked him to pause because I couldn’t keep handwritten pace with his verbal speed while holding the phone to my ear at the same time. The balance of notes, typewritten into the blank e-mail template, ultimately became the basis of the first draft of the written memorandum that I sent him at 18:32 on May 9, 2011. The handwritten notes are explained further under EXHIBIT B explanations. We concluded the 16-minute phone call by agreeing to use certain coded words in our BBM chat exchanges during the following two days until the effort was concluded. These are enumerated as each chat took place in the “Explanation” column of Table 1

CALL #2

05/09/2011 IJAZ TO GEN. JONES

12:58:06

DURATION 02:25

I called Gen. Jones at home. His wife picked up and said he was jogging. I explained the importance. As I rarely called at home that early in the morning, she understood it was important and said she would get in touch with him while he was running and get him to call me back in about an hour when he was in. I gave her a brief overview that the matter had to do with a rapidly devolving situation on the ground in Pakistan and that I had been asked to get an urgent message into a senior administration official. I did not go into details. I did not give names.

CALL #3

05/09/2011 IJAZ TO LAWYER #1

13:01:27

DURATION 04:47

As a parallel track, I immediately called my outside counsel, whose name I am withholding pending an “In Camera” hearing on this matter, in Washington DC he is a former senior government official from the administration of Pres. George H W Bush working at one of Washington’s most prominent and largest law firms. I called him because I knew he had a wide array of contacts available for us to explore how else we might approach Adm. Mullen if I was unable to persuade Gen. Jones to pass the message on. I explained the situation at hand inoutline form only. I explained under attorney-client privilege that Haqqani had asked me to assist him, that the tone of my earlier discussion with Haqqani indicated to me that something serious was amiss in Islamabad and that if we could help we should. His principal concern was under whose authority such a sensitive message was being delivered. I explained that Haqqani generally enjoyed the complete confidence of the president in Pakistan, and that I understood the impetus for this operation was coming from Pres. Zardari in the broader sense, if not operationally. He told me there were two options available to us through the law firm, one a senior US political figure now in private life and the other an acting officer of the US government who knew Adm. Mullen well. He told me he would get in touch with both andreport back to me later in the day (it was 7am in Washington at the time I reached him)

CALL #4

05/09/2011 GEN. JONES TO IJAZ

13:54:31

DURATION 19:26

Gen. Jones called me back from his private cell number around 8am his time in Virginia. I recapped the entire Haqqani call (please see summary of Call #1 for details). His first reaction was to say he didn’t particularly trust Pakistani officials (generally, not specifically), and that in his experience through government work with them, they often made verbal promises that they didn’t keep. He said he would not consider taking any message to Adm. Mullen if it wasn’t in writing. Gen. Jones also insisted on having higher political authority than Haqqani, whom he had grown to be somewhat skeptical of over time, if and when he decided to go ahead. We went through the points Haqqani wanted relayed, which took the bulk of the time on the call. He commented that while compelling, it sounded like an opposition group’s agenda. I made clear that it was morelike a change of players under a sitting head of state whose new ground rules and agenda were so diametrically different than the old that it (Haqqani’s desired message) could give off that impression. I gave Jones some background on my relationship with Haqqani and told him that Haqqani would never have come to me if it wasn’t serious because of my past tensions with the senior leaders of Pakistan, no matter whether military, intelligence, political of any party persuasion.

Jones’s skepticism remained throughout the call, but in the final analysis he said he would do it as a favor for me if I could get the message to him in writing with the appropriate political authority. We agreed to be in touch later in the day once I had gotten Haqqani on board with the NO VERBAL, ONLY WRITTEN demand and I had further explained to Haqqani that Jones wanted certain knowledge of the appropriate political authority and consent for this operation before delivering the message to Adm. Mullen.

CALL #5

05/09/2011 HAQQANI TO IJAZ

18:28:45

DURATION 02:34

During this call, I informed Haqqani that one of the three choices on the US side was insisting onhaving the message in writing, with higher political authority than Haqqani alone, to go forward. I informed him that I had taken the precautionary step, given the tight time constraints, to prepare a written draft based on the notes I took in the first call and that I had tried to reach him earlier in the day to let him know about the in-writing constraint. He agreed and told me to send him the draft in writing for his review. I then asked him to clarify what he meant by “discipline” in the nuclear program a point he had made in the written notes earlier and whether the point he made about US Vice President Biden on the “blank sheet” agreement on nukes and Kashmir should be included in the preamble paragraphs. He said no. I also asked him whether he wanted names included in the paragraph mentioning the new national security team he said no. Finally, I asked him whether he wanted any characterization of the army chief, prime minister, president’s meeting included this is when he gave me the information about the CIA station chief’s name being outed and the phraseology about “no central control being in place” as a result of the stresses in Islamabad during the previous days.After inserting a few of the necessary comments into the e-mail draft, I sent the draft to Haqqaniat 18:32. We closed the call by noting my mail to him would come in a few minutes as well as the message’s delivery timing and logistics.

CALL #6

05/09/2011 LAWYER #1 TO IJAZ

23:49:10 & 23:55:21

DURATION 05:28 & 09:58

During these two calls

the first with my outside general counsel, the second a conf call with a third party, we explored the requirements posed by two other possible candidates to deliver the message to Adm. Mullen. My counsel informed me that he had reached a close aide of the active US government officer who knew Adm. Mullen well, and that he wanted to have a conference call with me to listen to how we wanted to do this and what the US official wanted from us as performance parameters before agreeing to our request. We then agreed that the US political personality was out due to slow response. We followed up this call with a 10-minute conference call with the US official’s trusted friend.

We discussed two possibilities the first was to have the US official arrange a private meeting between myself and Adm. Mullen so I could deliver a verbal message as Haqqani had initially preferred. This approach had two problems

I was a nine hour airplane ride away from Washington and there simply wasn’t enough time to match Adm. Mullen’s busy schedule with my getting in the air before the Wed. meeting was to have taken place. The second problem was my personal hesitation to carry a verbal message given what Gen. Jones had told me in his first call about the unreliability of Pakistani officials saying one thing and doing another. The second possibility discussed was for us to have the US official deliver the message, in writing, to Adm. Mullen. This posed two different challenges the US official was unwilling to do it as a “non paper” (a message delivered in writing on paper without signature or letterhead between governments). He insisted on the message being on letterhead with appropriate signature. This conference call made it clear that the 2nd potential US interlocutor was simply not the right solution.

CALL #7

05/10/2011 HAQQANI TO IJAZ

00:30:55

DURATION 01:17

I informed Haqqani that two of the three options for transmission were out, why they were out

and that in order to proceed with the third option I needed him to confirm the memo’s draft form

or send me his changes, and I needed his confirmation that he had the Pakistani government’s highest political authority to proceed. He said he would review the memo during the night. On authority, he said something like “don’t worry about that, I’ve got it sorted out with the boss.”

Haqqani also quickly informed me at the end of the conversation that I needed to remove Point 6on the list because it was already agreed by the Pakistani authorities in the intervening hours since we had last spoken.

CALL #8

05/10/2011 IJAZ TO GEN. JONES

00:33:05

DURATION 01:39

I called Gen. Jones immediately to say that he would transmit the message, that I had confirmation from Haqqani of his authority to proceed from the highest political level and that I would be sending the memorandum over shortly with a request that he hold on to it until I had Haqqani’s final word in the morning (Tue, 10 May). I told Gen. Jones that given the fluidity of events on the ground, it was best that he waited until at least midday on Tuesday before puttingthe Memo in Adm. Mullen’s hands. I recall asking him whether he preferred WORD.DOC files or .PDF files for printing purposes and I sent him both types of files later in the night so that if there were last minute changes and I was not in front of a computer, he could make the necessary changes himself with me giving him Haqqani’s changes by telephone.

CALL #9

05/10/2011 IJAZ TO HAQQANI

09:06:16

DURATION 11:16

During this call on the morning of May 10th, I asked Haqqani if he had any last minute changes to the Memorandum, and then informed him that I had sent it to the US interlocutor earlier in the night so that if there were no changes, we were ready to deliver to Mullen later that day, before Haqqani had planned to leave London .We went through the architecture of the Memo, focusing this time on the opening paragraph and confirming the new signature paragraph (from whom did this document come) that had been added in. We reviewed briefly the six agenda points.I then asked him one last time to confirm he had the authority from the highest political level to proceed with the operation because Gen. Jones (who remained anonymous to Haqqani) would not proceed without that understanding from me and he said, “I’ve got the boss’s approval; go ahead”. I told him we would n

eed to wait until just after lunchtime for me to reach the US interlocutor and give the final delivery instruction.We discussed briefly his schedule for return to the US and next contact time, and when I wouldbe given the time of the Wednesday meeting with Mullen.

CALL #10

05/12/2011 IJAZ TO HAQQANI

01:09 ON MMI US CELL

DURATION 04:00

Haqqani informed me about the results of the meeting with Mullen. He said a “call will go outfrom Washington to Pindi [Rawalpindi?] tonight.” and that he was sa

tisfied the intervention hadworked. We clarified the M remark in my BBMs, he thanked me and the call ended.

RATIONALE FOR WRITING THE Financial Times ARTICLE

Much confusion has been introduced by media analysts, critics and supporters alike about the motivations and agendas that may have led me to publish the initial FT article on October 10,2011. I state for the record that there was no external impetus given to me to write the initial article, neither from any individual, nor from any governmental body US or foreign nor anyother source in any manner whatsoever. Since 1996, when I published my first article in The Wall Street Journal, I have published over 125 opinion pieces in only the most reputable journals and newspapers around the world, and have appeared extensively on television and radio as ananalyst regarding political, security and business issues. I have also had numerous articles written about my citizen diplomacy initiatives in Sudan, Kashmir, Pakistan and elsewhere.In recent years, I have reduced my writings dramatically, writing only a few times a year when a major political or geopolitical event takes place that bears consequence on subject matters thatinterest me. Pakistan generally, and more specifically the struggle to bring a secure and stable democracy to the fore without hidden agendas, corrupt practices and the venality that is so often present in modern day Pakistani rulers military and civilian alike is a major topic on which I have written often in the past. If the Commission so wishes, I am happy to provide a full reference list for my past writings on Pakistan.

I further state for the record that my sole motivation in writing the Oct. 10th FT article was to enunciate a policy prescription I believed was in the best national security interests of the United States about how best to deal with Directorate S of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. The impetus for the article, which I drafted the first thoughts for on 24 September 2011, arose from testimony offered by Adm. Mullen in his final appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee in which he called the Haqqani network of terrorists a “veritable arm” of the ISI, among other very strong comments.

The reaction in Pakistan’s media to Adm. Mullen’s statement was immediate, and as it has been in my case under the glare of the Mullen Memorandum controversy, was shrill and unabashed in lambasting a high-ranking military officer of the United States who served our country honorably for 43 years. While Adm. Mullen needed no defense from my writings, I felt it was important for US policymakers to know that an effort which involved Adm. Mullen himself back in May had been made to reign in Directorate S of ISI, and it so happened that to source this material for my

opinion piece, I referenced the memorandum as the “peg”

as it is called in journalism to base my opinions on. There was no malicious intent involved in bringing the memorandum into the opening paragraph. The description I gave was the bare minimum of facts that were needed in order to give my opinion piece the authenticity it required for the policy prescription to be given any weight. I had written more or less exactly the same opinion article on June 2, 2011 for Newsweek / Daily Beast Company

http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2011-06-02/pakistans-isi-spy-agency-s-wing-and-terrorism/

after learning of the death of Saleem Shahzad, without material effect in the inquiry of my arguments. Clearly, introducing the memorandum into the FT opinion article strengthened the argument because it gave it the needed authenticity. Editors at the FT who normally evaluate my opinion columns for publication have tended in the past to choose those articles of mine that begin with some historical anecdote to anchor the article’s policy prescriptions and opinions. This article was no different, other than the anecdote was in the form of a “first person” analysis.

If the Commission so requests, I will make available my internal correspondence with the FT editors to provide evidence of this fact. I would like to note, for the Commission’s interest, that Haqqani sent me the following BBMchat on June 4, 2011 to which I responded and he then wrote a reply please see the following screen shots:

I apologize to the Commission for the frank exchange of language between Haqqani and myself, but this is evidence of the type of relationship we shared together. Message time-stamped 02:18was first message from Haqqani. I replied the next day. Message in second screen time-stamped18:05 was his reply. One final point of note on this subject matter: some sections of the media have questioned why it took so long for the opinion piece to be published in the FT from the date of Adm. Mullen’s

statement. As you are most certainly aware, FT is a financial newspaper whose editorial pages are reserved primarily for finance discussions, not matters of security and foreign policy. As Europe has been engulfed in perhaps the most important financial crisis it has suffered since the introduction of the Euro, the Eurozone crisis dominated the editorial pages of the FT for those weeks, and my opinion article which dealt with matters much further away and unrelated to the major editorial thrust, simply was placed on a date that was convenient to the FT’s editorial calendar. I had no control over that decision and again, at the Commission’s request, I amprepared to make my internal communications with the editors available in this specific regard.

EVENTS OF NOTE AFTER THE Financial Times

ARTICLE APPEARS

Haqqani sent me a BlackBerry message around 21:50 GMT on the evening of October 10, 2011, shortly after my opinion article had been published on the FT’s website. It read: “This FT op-ed of yours is a disaster”. Before I had a chance to see it and respond, he telephoned me at 21:57GMT in a somewhat panicked voice, reiterating what he had just said by BBM message and then asking me whether there were any other “senior Pakistani diplomats” I knew in Islamabad that he could name to throw the “press hounds of my scent”. I responded by querying why the op-ed was such an issue for him and what he was so upset about. He replied simply by saying everyone would now assume it was he who was the brainchild of the Memorandum and that I understood nothing about Pakistan’s domestic situation. It was a short call lasting only 00:45.

At the time of this writing, I do not yet have the hard copy details of my October telephone bills to give the exact time and date of the second call I received from Haqqani

it was about 5 or 6days before I met with Gen. Shuja Pasha in London. My recollection of that call is as follows: Haqqani called to inform me he had just learned that Gen. Pasha was coming to London. I expressed disinterest and lack of knowledge. He expressed some anxiety over my disinterest and said something to the effect of “what’s going on here” a clear reference to his skepticism of my disinterest. He did not ask once during that call whether I had been approached to see Gen. Pasha. His only concern was whether Gen. Pasha would be meeting with the FT editors in London, whether I knew anything about it and whether I would do him the favor of intervening with the FT editors to insure they did not provide Gen. Pasha with a copy of the Memorandum or any other evidence that I had provided the editors when I wrote the opinion piece. I responded by again asking him, as I had on the night of May 10, 2011, why he was so paranoid about the Memorandum and whether we had done something wrong in delivering it to Adm. Mullen. His response was to simply reiterate that I understood nothing about Pakistan’s domestic political situation and that there were some who would say Haqqani “was playing for your [U.S.A.] side” if the content of the Memorandum was revealed in public. I told him that I did not believe the FT editors would take a meeting with Gen. Pasha without a lot of advance work being done about purpose, etc and the call ended.

SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF MEETING WITH DG-ISI LT. GEN. SHUJA PASHA

I was contacted by a person, whose real name I do not know to this day, on or about the 16th of October to see whether I would be willing to meet with Gen. Pasha. I inquired purpose and proposed location. Purpose: to determine the truthful facts surrounding the content of the Memorandum and its genesis (authorship, operational details of the effort to get it delivered to Adm. Mullen, etc). Location: London was the most convenient location for both of us to meet. After discussing the implications of such a meeting going ahead with my in-house legal counsel and my family, I agreed to take the meeting. We met on the evening of 22nd October in London at the Park Lane Intercontinental Hotel, Room210, from approximately 1830hrs until 2230hrs, according to my records. There was one person

I believe the logistics manager of the meeting with Gen. Pasha when I was shown into the room by a member of his security detail and that person shook hands with me and left the room promptly.

I brought my electronic devices and a notepad to the meeting. We both agreed to take batteries out of our telephones while we spoke. The telephones were stored in a drawer near the table we sat at. Gen. Pasha brought a notepad as well. After being seated face to face at a small dining table, Gen. Pasha opened the meeting by stating his purpose in asking to meet me. He made clear he was not there to interrogate but rather to understand with evidence supporting my statements what exactly had happened in the days in question. He made clear he was in London with the consent of the army chief, Gen. Kayani. He made clear he did not know who I was prior to the meeting, and had asked one of his researchers to prepare a dossier for his review. He asked me to give him my own summary of my background, partly to allow me to introduce myself, but also to separate fact from fiction in the dossier he held. Each comment I made was later backed up during the meeting by evidence I showed him on my computer about my background, life, family and businesses. I made clear to him at the outset of the meeting that I had agreed to the meeting on the basis that it was entirely possible in my mind given the adverse reactions Haqqani had shown me on the two telephone calls I had with him prior to this meeting that Haqqani did not properly inform the government of Pakistan of his activities, and that if anything he had done was against the laws of Pakistan, in violation of the Constitution of Pakistan or the rules of international diplomacy as agreed between the US and Pakistan, it was possible that myself, Gen. Jones and Adm. Mullen had become unwitting accessories to these possible wrongdoings. For that reason alone, whether I liked or disliked the ISI, whether I had written against it or the military or any other organ of the Pakistani state, I felt the responsibility to share the facts with him and to understand whether there was any possible wrongdoing on our part collectively as US citizens that had assisted Haqqani in transmitting the message to Adm. Mullen. I also made clear to Gen. Pasha that I did not want to personally be involved in any debriefing of

him that would lead to a disruption of the civilian government’s normal business he responded by making clear that it was his and Gen. Kayani’s deep desire to see a government complete its term, but that the rumors of what was contained in the Memorandum from a content perspective could simply not be ignored. On this basis, we agreed to start the meeting in good faith with him questioning openly without constraints and me answering in the most truthful and complete manner possible. He asked me about my relationship with Haqqani (length, frequency of contact, type of contact, etc). He queried me about my interactions with prior Pakistani ambassadors in the United States, as well as past political leaders (Bhutto, Sharif, Musharraf, etc). After my initial set of answers about 30 minutes into the meeting he went to the door of the room and informed the security person that “this is going to take a while”.

We then began the data debriefing. We went through the information that has been provided in this Witness Statement line by line so that I could explain what had happened in those three and a half days. He asked questions, at times looked a bit astonished at what he was seeing but at no time did he offer any assessment of the data other than to indicate that the records were “clear and convincing” evidence. We took the bulk of the four hour meeting to do the data debrief. In my recollection, Gen. Pasha read the Memorandum itself in about three or four minutes, demonstrated surprise and dismay at times disgust and disappointment over the content of the document. He did not ask a single question about the content of the document other than if I was willing to divulge the names of the others besides Haqqani that he had told me were to be part of the new national security team. I did so with the caveat that I did not believe either Karamat or Durrani knew anything about the plan to deliver the Memorandum, the contents of the Memorandum or the mindset of Haqqani and those behind him in dreaming up the scheme. At the point during the meeting where he learned of the three US people I had approached to deliver the Memorandum to Adm. Mullen, he asked me how I knew each of them, how well and to briefly summarize my requests of them in terms of why, who was involved, under what authority and in which modality such delivery might take place with each person. Intermittently during the data debrief, I would open my computer or my BlackBerry device and point out how the data was stored, transmitted, displayed, etc. He then carefully analyzed dates, times, “properties” of my Microsoft documents to see when the documents were created and how

they fit into the timeline I was stating, looked at the original telephone bill logs, checked the time at which each BBM message was sent or received and reviewed my handwritten notes. Contrary to media reports, at no time did Gen. Pasha try to send a BBM message to Haqqani from my handset. He recorded the PIN numbers that I had for Haqqani, both the old one and the new one Haqqani did not yet have the third PIN at that time that he would ultimately obtain. Gen. Pasha did ask to see how I stored e-mail addresses and to see the ones I had for Haqqani one from his private university mailbox (Boston Univ.) and one for official use at the embassy in Washington. There were no other issues relevant to this subject matter discussed during the meeting. It ended on a cordial note with Gen. Pasha thanking me for providing a clear record of events and asking if it was okay to follow up if other questions arose in the aftermath of his further investigation into the matter.

BBM CHAT EXCHANGES WITH HAQQANI ON 28 OCT 2011

approx 21:55 until 22:33 CET

Participants:Mansoor IJAZ, Husain HaqqaniMessages:

Husain Haqqani: you can keep saying you delivered a message and show bbm convos to prove it Husain Haqqani: Basically you don’t get itHusain Haqqani: You have given hardliners in Pak Mil reason to argue there

was an effort to get US to conspireagainst Pak MilHusain Haqqani: You are a US citizenHusain Haqqani: You are supposed to look after US interestsMansoor IJAZ: I wrote one article. Have not said one word on the record since then to anyone. I think your press isworking both sides against the middle, trying to force something out of anyone they can. Period. I don’t play in thatgameHusain Haqqani: In Pak political situation, getting burned as a US stooge undermines one’s effectivenessHusain Haqqani: I will make sure FO shuts upHusain Haqqani: Let this die downHusain Haqqani: We are in the rightHusain Haqqani: We will still make things happenMansoor IJAZ: Okay, well I know my IQ is pretty low so you are probably correct in saying I just don’t get it.Husain Haqqani: The Pak press be damnedHusain Haqqani: I stand by you as a man of integrity werving his countryHusain Haqqani: You don’t let ppl back home argue I play for your team, not oursMansoor IJAZ: But from my point of view, if there was a real threat, as you stated at the time, it is clear you weretrying to save a democratic structure from those hawksHusain Haqqani: You get to write the book on how you changed US-Pak dynamic and won the war in A’tan (w/ somehelp from a Paki nerd) :D Mansoor IJAZ: I was happy to get the message in the back door because it served American interests to preserve thedemocratic civilian setup and the offers made, if achieved, were very much congruent with American objectives inthe regionHusain Haqqani: True that, friend. But you know premature revelation ain’t goodMansoor IJAZ: As far as I can see, we did right. Unless there is something I don’t see here. But then I’m sorta dumbfrom down on the farm where them hillbillies liveHusain Haqqani: Hey! Don’t run down hillbilliesHusain Haqqani: Even the smartest can miss a piece of the puzzleHusain Haqqani: You are assuming there are no powerful men in Pak willing to break w/ US. Premature revelationgives those ppl reason to claim ‘conspiracy’, ‘treason’Husain Haqqani: That is all you missed. Period.Husain Haqqani: And no one else might tell you this, you’re becoming irritable and losing your sense of humor asyou grow oldHusain Haqqani: Let this one go. There is much to do. MUCH. And then, there’s the beach where I’ve been waitingto be invited, the slum boy visiting the millionaireMansoor IJAZ: I’m not a millionaire. But I do know a nice piece of beach!Husain Haqqani: I’m not a slum boy either but I know how to make friends with smart people with a sense of history:PMansoor IJAZ: Jesus, then what the fuck are you doing hanging around with me? =DHusain Haqqani: We’ll make things happen and if we can’t, we’ll write a book about itHusain Haqqani: Who said I was hanging around witjh you. A minute ago I thought you were about to hang me :D Mansoor IJAZ: :OMansoor IJAZ: Really?Husain Haqqani: Look, Isloo is a mess. Journos gone wild. Politicos scared of mil. Mil scared of Yanks.Mansoor IJAZ: Tell me one important thing. Who likes you and who hates you in the US establishment? Who wantsyou to stay and who wants to fuck you up?

Husain Haqqani: The debate abt your oped has caused my detractors to put pressure on my bossHusain Haqqani: In US estab, I can count on Leon and PetraeusMansoor IJAZ: I thought YOU were the boss!Mansoor IJAZ: Who is against you?Husain Haqqani: Folks at State don’t like meMansoor IJAZ: Why?Mansoor IJAZ: Too close to AZ?Husain Haqqani: They think I am too mixed up w/ DoD and others and do not help them cut deals w/ Pak milHusain Haqqani: Close to AZ bit tooHusain Haqqani: They are wrong re DoD and others.Husain Haqqani: It is just that becoz of A’tan, they are more imp than StateMansoor IJAZ: I always thought HRC was one of your fans. She even has a lady from our parts working with herHusain Haqqani: It is folks at State who got pissed off by your missionHusain Haqqani: She may be but I was Holbrooke’s buddy so everyone who hates him hates meHusain Haqqani: I have no time for just pushing paper aroundHusain Haqqani: State likes processMansoor IJAZ: Which mission? Sudan, Kashmir, there were so many they got pissed off about. I showed them howto do real American diplomacy and that was like a big pile of shit on their desk they couldn’t swallowHusain Haqqani: Conferences, statements–with nothing changingHusain Haqqani: The latest oneMansoor IJAZ: Yeah, I got it. You’re right!Mansoor IJAZ: Anyway, State will always hate me because I don’t accept their muddling way of doing thingsHusain Haqqani: I don’t know for a fact but I won’t be surprised if the FO statement was prompted by someone hereHusain Haqqani: Robin Raphel is back as Grossman’s deputyHusain Haqqani: You stepped on her toes w/ Kashmir missionMansoor IJAZ: That would be typical. But Grossman knows me and he knows how serious I am. Raphael still hatesme for the Kashmir intervention where she did everything she could to fuck me upHusain Haqqani: And now they hate me more when folks back home who hate me tell them you and I might havebeen together on s’thing (whether we were or not is irrelevant to them)Husain Haqqani: Grossman is good but he doesn’t like anyone playing a larger than life role. Old schoolHusain Haqqani: That’s why I have been requesting you to let this one goMansoor IJAZ: Yeah I know. Found that out when he was our lobbyist. But he’s a good guyHusain Haqqani: That takes attention off meMansoor IJAZ: Hmmmmmmmmm……. Not sure anything could take attention off youHusain Haqqani: I try and make peace with State and focus on battles at homeHusain Haqqani: HaHa :D Mansoor IJAZ: Diplomacy at its finest!!!Husain Haqqani: Yeah, right! But at least I shd not be painted as playing for your teamMansoor IJAZ: Why not? You were a good quarterback for those three days!!Husain Haqqani: I want to solve f***ing problems not fight a rearguard action all the timeHusain Haqqani: :x Husain Haqqani: Let us wait and see if Hillary’s latest foray changes things in any directionMansoor IJAZ: Did we really solve a true problem or was this all smoke and mirrors?Mansoor IJAZ: I mean on those days of stress…Husain Haqqani: View here is that everyone in Isloo sucks!Mansoor IJAZ: That’s pretty much true!!!!Husain Haqqani: Too early to say re solutionMansoor IJAZ: But if they all suck, then what did we save — a sinking ship that was going to sink anyway???Husain Haqqani: And there is a genetic problem at that end, predisposed to going round and round in circlesMansoor IJAZ: Yup!! That’s for damn sureHusain Haqqani: I think we save the situation from an extremely violent outcomeMansoor IJAZ: How can you solve the problems you understand so well from here if all the people in charge overthere are wrong? It’s only one year til we have a change in the US. Then you really won’t like who we have here!Husain Haqqani: I mean, Iran might have done better if the Shah had been saved AND some true reform introducedHusain Haqqani: Actually, I think the new ppl here might be better to deal with

Husain Haqqani: They won’t take lies easilyMansoor IJAZ: Don’t bet on it. We have a lot of extremists cropping up and seeping into the systemMansoor IJAZ: They don’t trust anything PakistaniMansoor IJAZ: Don’t matter what it isHusain Haqqani: Well, in that case find me a cheap piece of beachMansoor IJAZ: Cain, Romney (who hates Muslims), Perry — its all the same crapMansoor IJAZ: Hmmmmm, yes, I can arrange thatMansoor IJAZ: Why is Z such an idiot?Husain Haqqani: But don’t go off writing opeds abt arranging piece of beach w’out consulting first :P Husain Haqqani: HaHa! Tough questionHusain Haqqani: I have a speech in 20 mins so let’s keep that for laterHusain Haqqani: Bye for nowMansoor IJAZ: Okay. Good luck.Husain Haqqani: Thank you!

BBM CHAT EXCHANGES WITH HAQQANI ON 01 NOV 2011

22:06, then 22:31 until 23:03

Participants:Mansoor IJAZ, Husain Haqqani Messages:

Mansoor IJAZ: Hi buddy, I understand you/ your foreign office hacks are commissioning hatchet pieces against me.Unfortunate…. very unfortunate Husain Haqqani: I will enquire and stop them. There’s no need for any of this.Husain Haqqani: You haven’t helped by engaging so much w/ Pak media.Husain Haqqani: What happened to the ‘silent soldier’?Mansoor IJAZ: I issued a statement that was designed to put an end to all of this after Imran Khan’s rally nonsense.But be that as it may,I’m not going to tolerate character assassination in any of thisHusain Haqqani: I agreeHusain Haqqani: Will do my best to prevent itMansoor IJAZ: Roger thatHusain Haqqani: Focus on your policy message instead of who did what and we can turn this aroundMansoor IJAZ: Please remind your boss that his beloved wife, who later became a good friend of mine, tried thesame bullshit tactics in 1996 when Maleeha was envoy — result: her government was dismissed in Nov 1996.Mansoor IJAZ: I’m not someone he can mess around with. He better get that message from me and really understanditHusain Haqqani: My response to Imran was very simple and true: I did not write a treasonous letter and if Imran hasa copy, he should present itHusain Haqqani: I don’t think your threatening helpsMansoor IJAZ: That’s true from my point of view as well. But politicians are politiciansMansoor IJAZ: I don’t make threats. I state facts. Your boss needs reminding of the factsHusain Haqqani: Are you sure your side won’t deny?Mansoor IJAZ: No, maybe they will. But that would also be a mistake. Too much proof on that side as well.Husain Haqqani: But does “proving” help anything?Husain Haqqani: Is it not the nature of a private mission that officials deny it?Mansoor IJAZ: Don’t know. Don’t care. My point is simple — I’ve said what I was going to. Attacks on my personwill not be tolerated. And my statement stands. Stop telling lies about me and I might just stip telling the truth aboutyouHusain Haqqani: If you were to listen to my advice, you would let this blow over and prove yourself afterwards. Youare the one who will outlast the flying shit :) Husain Haqqani: That is usually my strategy: be there when the others have self-destructed or blown over

Mansoor IJAZ: I’ve kept to my word — if everyone wants to call it a fabrication and make me the fall guy, thengloves come off and it’s not going to be fun or pretty for anyoneMansoor IJAZ: You did something you thought was right outside channels because you felt it would be the mosteffective way to get the job done.I helped you execute. I haven’t thrown you under the bus. But be damn sure I won’t let anyone do that to meHusain Haqqani: I’ll do what I can to keep it prettyHusain Haqqani: I haven’t. I won’t.Mansoor IJAZ: By the way, I know a lot more than you give me credit for about the circumstances that led to May 1and your role in all that. Just FYIHusain Haqqani: Honorable ppl stick with one another. Take care.Mansoor IJAZ: ;)

BBM CHAT FROM HAQQANI ON 02 NOV 2011 at 03:42

Husain Haqqani: I am maintaining silence so pls check with me before reacting if some Pak journo attributes anything to me

This completes my Witness Statement to the Commission. I wish to thank this august body forpermitting me to be heard in completeness. I remain ready to answer any of your questions. Iwish the Commission

God’s speed in addressing the important issues raised by this matter.

Thank you, Chairman and the members of this Honourable Commission, for your time and yourattention in this matter of great national importance.

Submitted for the record this 16th day of February, 2012

Deponent Musawer Mansoor IJAZ

VERIFICATION:

Verifying on solemn affirmation on this 16th day of February, 2012 at London that all content of this affidavit, oral as well as printed in script from blackberry, email and other devices are absolutely true, honest and sincere to the best of my knowledge and nothing has been deposed falsely, ambiguously and wrongly. Deponent Musawer Mansoor IJAZ

NADEEM MALIK

Filed under: CURRENT AFFAIRS

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Rehman Malik Relied on Punjab Police Report on Bhutto Murder Briefing Sindh Assembly

Posted on 21 February 2012 by Tea Server

Rehman Malik Relied on Punjab Police Report on Bhutto Murder Briefing Sindh Assembly

NADEEM MALIK
It seems as though not much has been achieved in the Benazir Bhutto murder case as Interior Minister Rehman Malik on Tuesday not only admitted that planners of the murder are still at large, but also insisted that more time is required to collect further evidence.
Malik shared this and other details of the investigation of the former prime minister and Pakistan People’s Party chairperson’s murder case while briefing the Sindh Assembly session. He blamed Baitullah Mehsud, the Haqqani network and the banned Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for planning the murder and said 27 terrorist groups helped in executing the plan. (Dawn)

Reported News Details of the CID Reports
The United Nations Inquiry Commission, headed by Heraldo Munoz, was informed by the CID officials of Punjab Police during the course of its investigations that the assassination of Benazir Bhutto had been masterminded by the slain Ameer of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Commander Baitullah Mehsud and the bomber, who exploded himself outside the Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi, was one Saeed alias Bilal, a resident of South Waziristan Agency.
According to official documents provided to the UN Inquiry Commission by the CID Punjab, a group of 12 militants was actually dispatched to the garrison town of Rawalpindi, a day prior to Benazir Bhutto’s December 27, 2007 election rally, to physically eliminate the PPP leader, who was touring Punjab in connection with her party’s election campaign. The FIR of the Benazir Bhutto murder case was registered by the Rawalpindi police under sections 302/324,435,436,120-B/4/5ESA,7/ATA while investigations were carried out by the Additional Inspector General CID Punjab Chaudhry Abdul Majeed.
According to the CID documents, four of the 12 militants tasked to kill Benazir Bhutto belonged to Madrassa Haqqania in Akora Khattak near Peshawar, which is also referred to as Darul Uloom Haqqania. The Madrassa is being run by Maulana Samiul Haq, the pro-Taliban Ameer of his own faction of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. Three of the 12 TTP militants have been shown in the CID documents as already killed, including the suicide bomber. Of the remaining nine accused, five have already been arrested by police while the remaining four are still at large.
Additional Inspector General of the CID Punjab, Malik Mohammad Iqbal, when asked if the Punjab CID still owns its findings into the Benazir Bhutto murder case, said the assassination inquiry was actually conducted by a Joint Investigation Team (JIT), which was headed by the then additional DIG CID and representatives of the Rawalpindi police.
He said it was a joint probe on the basis of which the challan of Benazir Bhutto murder case had been submitted with a Rawalpindi anti-terrorism court, which still holds ground and the trial of the arrested accused is still on.
The three accused shown as already dead include the human bomb Saeed alias Bilal (r/o Waziristan), Nadir alias Qari Ismail (r/o Madrassa Haqqania, Akora Khattak) and Nasrullah r/o Madrassa Haqqania, Akora Khattak). Four other accused in the Benazir Bhutto murder, who are still at large and have already been declared proclaimed offenders include Ikramullah r/o South Waziristan, Abdullah alias Saddam r/o Mohmand Agency, Faiz alias Kiskit, an ex-student of Madrassa Haqqania, Akora Khattak and Abdur Rehman alias Noman alias Usman, an ex-student of Madrassa Haqqania.
The remaining five accused already in the custody of the Rawalpindi police and being tried for the Benazir Bhutto murder include Rafaqat, Hasnain Gul, Sher Zaman, Rasheed Ali and Aitzaz Shah.
According to the findings of the CID, Baitullah Mehsud had given Rs 400,000 to one Qari Ismail, who subsequently dispatched a group of suicide bombers and shooters to Rawalpindi to kill Benazir Bhutto.
The UN Commission was told by some senior CID officials that the TTP militants had planned to target Benazir Bhutto in different cities, wherever she was going in connection with her campaign, until she was finally killed.
According to the CID narrative, 15-year-old Aitzaz Shah from the Mansehra district of the NWFP, and his co-accomplice Sher Zaman, reportedly trained at Miramshah, were the first ones to be arrested after the Benazir Bhutto murder from Dera Ismail Khan by a joint investigation team of the Punjab police, headed by Chaudhry Abdul Majeed. Two more suspects, Hasnain Gul and Rafaqat, were later arrested from Rawalpindi. Rasheed Ali was the last one to be nabbed but Aitzaz was the first one to have furnished some vital information to his interrogators pertaining to the Benazir murder.
As the police obtained physical remand of the arrested accused and broadened the scope of investigations, it was learnt that Aitzaz Shah had actually obtained Jihadi training from a well known Deobandi religious school in Karachi — Jamia Binoria, also referred to as Jamia Islamia and known for its pro-Taliban leanings. As per the CID report, after being brainwashed and trained to kill, Aitzaz was sent to South Waziristan from where he had travelled to Darul Uloom Haqqania Madrassa in Akora Khattak. Afterwards, Aitzaz was taken to a Jihadi training centre in Akora Khattak – Wali Mohammad Markaz and tasked with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.
According to the CID findings, Baitullah had provided Rs 50,000, a suicide jacket and other necessary items to someone else, but he could not attack Benazir Bhutto. After his suicide bombers’ failure to hunt down the PPP chairperson in Karachi, Peshawar and other places, Baitullah Mehsud had assigned Qari Ismail of Akora Khattak and given him Rs 400,000 to execute the Benazir assassination plan. After reaching the Rawalpindi bus stand on December 26, the assailants had stayed at a Quaid-i-Azam colony house. In the evening, they visited the Liaquat Bagh site in a taxi and decided after surveying the area to hit their target from different directions during or after the public meeting.
As per the assassination plan, Saeed alias Bilal was to carry out the suicide attack in case he failed to shoot down Benazir while Ikramullah was to detonate himself if Saeed failed. Both Saeed and Ikramullah were provided logistics by Hasnain Gul, including an explosive-laden suicide jacket, a pistol and an optical device.
The assailants had reached the Committee Chowk in a taxi and later gone to the Liaquat Bagh via Iqbal Road and College Road. An unarmed militant went inside the Liaquat Bagh to give his accomplices updates about the movement of Benazir Bhutto, especially about her arrival and departure from the venue of the rally. As per the CID claims, the assailants had first attempted to enter the Liaquat Bagh to carry out a suicide attack close to the stage, but they had failed in their designs, chiefly due to foolproof security arrangements.
The UN Commission was further informed that several suicide bombers and sharp shooters were waiting for the PPP leader at the crime scene outside the Liaquat Bagh after their failure to enter the venue. Going by the CID account, the assailants had started chasing Benazir Bhutto as soon as she came out of the Liaquat Bagh and it was none other than the fearless PPP chairperson, who actually provided them with a golden opportunity to target her, when she decided to come out of her bullet proof vehicle Toyota Land Cruiser from its sunroof to wave to her cheerful supporters. That was the time gunshots were fired, aiming at Benazir Bhutto. As Saeed alias Bilal failed to hit Benazir Bhutto, he blew himself up, killing the PPP leader and 23 others, mostly on the spot. However, the Dopatta, which Benazir Bhutto was wearing at the time of the blast, could not be traced despite frantic efforts by the investigators.
Narrating the motivation of the crime, the CID findings say the accused had said during interrogations that they were annoyed over the pro-West approach of Benazir Bhutto who had returned to Pakistan at the behest of some foreign powers and, therefore, they feared a strong government action against the militants if she was allowed to come to power after the elections.
However, the fact remains that much before coming to power after the 2008 general elections; the PPP leadership had rejected the confession made by Aitzaz Shah and his other accomplices about their involvement in the Benazir Bhutto murder.
The then PPP spokesman and now presidential spokesman Farhatullah Babar had described Aitzaz’s confession a cock and bull story intended to reduce pressure on the Musharraf regime, saying the arrested youth, who has already been declared a juvenile by the court, had been made to narrate exactly the kind of things the Pakistani authorities wanted to hear, backing up their earlier conclusions reached within hours of the Benazir Bhutto killing.
The trial of the five accused in Benazir Bhutto murder case was deferred on August 22, 2009 by the Rawalpindi anti-terrorism court following a federal government request to transfer the case to the Federal Investigation Agency so as to enable it to arrive at a definitive conclusion. Subsequently, on August 25, 2009, the federal government had formed a high-level team to re-investigate the Benazir murder.
The Special Investigation Group of the FIA was assigned the task to fix criminal liability on the assassins and planners of the gun-and-bomb attack on Benazir Bhutto. It was announced that the SIG’s investigation would be parallel to the probe being carried out by the United Nations Inquiry Commission.
“The main reason for the fresh probe is that the inquiry report to be prepared by the UN Commission can’t be presented before any court of law as desired by the UN. The government requires a separate investigation report for a proper trial against the criminals in the court”, a senior FIA official had said on August 25 in Rawalpindi, adding that the United Nations report would have no legal standing and it could not be used for prosecution.
When this correspondent tried to take version of Jamia Binoria, Karachi, no responsible person was found. However, the person present there termed the Punjab police-CID report malicious and baseless. Expressing similar sentiments, a person in Madrassa Haqqania, Akora Khattak, said this report is part of the campaign to discredit religious schools.

Islamabad Tonight – 27th December 2011
Islamabad Tonight – 27th December 2011
Senator Dr. Safdar Ali Abbasi PPP and Naheed Khan PPP in fresh episode of Islamabad Tonight
Islamabad Tonight – 4th November 2010 :5 Ws of Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination
Islamabad Tonight – 4th November 2010 :5 Ws of Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination
5 Ws of Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination – such as Who, What, Why, Where, How, When
Naheed Khan and Safdar Abbasi in Islamabad Tonight with Nadeem Malik

UN report on Bhutto murder finds Pakistani officials ‘failed profoundly’

18-11-2009benazir.jpg

15 April 2010
Security arrangements by Pakistan’s federal and local authorities to protect assassinated Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto were “fatally insufficient and ineffective” and subsequent investigations into her death were prejudiced and involved a whitewash, an independent United Nations inquiry reported today.The UN Commission of Inquiry, appointed last year by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the request of the Pakistani Government, reached no conclusion as to the organizers and sponsors behind the attack in which a 15-year-old suicide bomber blew up Ms. Bhutto’s vehicle in the city of Rawalpindi on 27 December 2007.

But it found that the Government was quick to blame local Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud and Al-Qaida although Ms. Bhutto’s foes potentially included elements from the establishment itself.

“A range of Government officials failed profoundly in their efforts first to protect Ms. Bhutto and second to investigate with vigour all those responsible for her murder, not only in the execution of the attack, but also in its conception, planning and financing,” the Commission said.

“Responsibility for Ms. Bhutto’s security on the day of her assassination rested with the federal Government, the Government of Punjab and the Rawalpindi District Police. None of these entities took necessary measures to respond to the extraordinary, fresh and urgent security risks that they knew she faced.”

General Pervez Musharraf was president at the time of the suicide bombing in Rawalpindi. The report said the then federal Government lacked a comprehensive security plan, relying instead on provincial authorities, but then failed to issue to them the necessary instructions.

“Particularly inexcusable was the Government’s failure to direct provincial authorities to provide Ms. Bhutto the same stringent and specific security measures it ordered on 22 October 2007 for two other former prime ministers who belonged to the main political party supporting General Musharraf,” it stated.

“This discriminatory treatment is profoundly troubling given the devastating attempt on her life only three days earlier and the specific threats against her which were being tracked by the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence agency),” it added, stressing that her assassination could have been prevented if the Rawalpindi District Police had taken adequate security measures.

Turning to the immediate aftermath of the attack, the Commission found that police actions and omissions, including the hosing down of the crime scene and failure to collect and preserve evidence, inflicted irreparable damage to the investigation.

“The collection of 23 pieces of evidence was manifestly inadequate in a case that should have resulted in thousands,” it said. “The one instance in which the authorities reviewed these actions, the Punjab (provincial) committee of inquiry into the hosing down of the crime scene was a whitewash. Hosing down the crime scene so soon after the blast goes beyond mere incompetence; it is up to the relevant authorities to determine whether this amounts to criminal responsibility.”

It also found that City Police Officer Saud Aziz impeded investigators from conducting on-site investigations until two full days after the assassination and that the Government’s assertions that Mr. Mehsud and Al-Qaida were responsible were made well before any proper investigation had started, pre-empting, prejudicing and hindering the subsequent investigation.

“Ms. Bhutto faced serious threats in Pakistan from a number of sources,” the Commission said. “These included Al-Qaida, the Taliban and local jihadi groups, and potentially from elements in the Pakistani establishment. Notwithstanding these threats, the investigation into her assassination focused on pursuing lower-level operatives allegedly linked to Baitullah Mehsud.”

It stressed that investigators dismissed the possibility of involvement by elements of the Pakistani establishment, including the three persons identified by Ms. Bhutto as threats to her in her 16 October 2007 letter to General Musharraf. It also noted that investigations were severely hampered by intelligence agencies and other Government officials, which impeded an unfettered search for the truth.

“The Commission believes that the failures of the police and other officials to react effectively to Ms. Bhutto’s assassination were, in most cases, deliberate,” it declared.

The three-member panel, which was headed by Chilean Ambassador to UN Heraldo Muñoz and included Marzuki Darusman, former attorney-general of Indonesia, and Peter Fitzgerald, a veteran official of the Irish National Police, urged the Government to undertake police reform in view of its “deeply flawed performance and conduct.”

It also recommended the establishment of a fully independent Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate political killings, disappearances and terrorism in Pakistan in recent years in view of the backdrop of a history of political violence carried out with impunity.

Ms. Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, is the current Pakistani President.

In a statement issued by his spokesperson, Mr. Ban commended the commissioners and their staff for completing their challenging nine-and-a-half month-long task “expeditiously and in a professional manner.”

In a later news conference today, Mr. Muñoz stressed that the Commission interviewed more than 250 interviews with Pakistanis and others both inside and outside Pakistan, reviewed hundreds of documents, videos, photographs and other documentary material provided by federal and provincial authorities in Pakistan and others.

In the report, the Commission said it was “by the efforts of certain high-ranking Pakistani Government authorities to obstruct access to military and intelligence sources” but during an extension of its mandate until 31 March it was able eventually to meet with some past and present members of the Pakistani military and intelligence services.

Press Release

8 February 2008

BEGINS

SCOTLAND YARD REPORT INTO ASSASSINATION OF BENAZIR BHUTTO RELEASED

The findings of a Scotland Yard inquiry into how Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto died after being attacked during a political rally in Rawalpindi were presented to the Government of Pakistan today.

The conclusions of the inquiry were outlined in a detailed report handed over to interim Interior Minister Hamid Nawaz by Detective Superintendent John MacBrayne, accompanied by a senior official from the British High Commission, during a meeting in Islamabad.

The text of the executive summary of the report is as follows:

On the 27th December 2007, Mohtarma Benazir BHUTTO, the leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), died as a result of being attacked in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

Following discussions between the Prime Minister and President Musharraf, it was agreed that officers from the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) should support the investigation into Ms Bhutto’s death. The primary focus of the Scotland Yard team was to assist the Pakistani authorities in establishing the cause and circumstances of Ms Bhutto’s death. The wider investigation to establish culpability has remained entirely a matter for the Pakistani authorities.

The SO15 team was led by a Detective Superintendent Senior Investigating Officer, and comprised two forensic experts, an expert in analysing and assessing video media and an experienced investigating officer. The team arrived in Pakistan on 4th January 2008 and spent two and a half weeks conducting extensive enquiries. During the course of their work, the team were joined by other specialists from the United Kingdom.

The UK team were given extensive support and co-operation by the Pakistani authorities, Ms Bhutto’s family, and senior officials from Ms Bhutto’s party.

The task of establishing exactly what happened was complicated by the lack of an extended and detailed search of the crime scene, the absence of an autopsy, and the absence of recognised body recovery and victim identification processes. Nevertheless, the evidence that is available is sufficient for reliable conclusions to be drawn.

Within the overall objective, a particular focus has been placed on establishing the actual cause of death, and whether there were one or more attackers in the immediate vicinity of Ms Bhutto.

The cause of death

Considerable reliance has been placed upon the X-rays taken at Rawalpindi General Hospital following Ms Bhutto’s death. Given their importance, the x-rays have been independently verified as being of Ms Bhutto by comparison with her dental x-rays. Additionally, a valuable insight was gained from the accounts given by the medical staff involved in her treatment, and from those members of Ms Bhutto’s family who washed her body before burial.

Ms Bhutto’s only apparent injury was a major trauma to the right side of the head. The UK experts all exclude this injury being an entry or exit wound as a result of gunshot. The only X-ray records, taken after her death, were of Ms Bhutto’s head. However, the possibility of a bullet wound to her mid or lower trunk can reasonably be excluded. This is based upon the protection afforded by the armoured vehicle in which she was travelling at the time of the attack, and the accounts of her family and hospital staff who examined her.

The limited X-ray material, the absence of a full post mortem examination and CT scan, have meant that the UK Home Office pathologist, Dr Nathaniel Cary, who has been consulted in this case, is unable categorically to exclude the possibility of there being a gunshot wound to the upper trunk or neck. However when his findings are put alongside the accounts of those who had close contact with Ms Bhutto’s body, the available evidence suggests that there was no gunshot injury. Importantly, Dr Cary excludes the possibility of a bullet to the neck or upper trunk as being a relevant factor in the actual cause of death, when set against the nature and extent of her head injury.

In his report Dr Cary states:

  • “the only tenable cause for the rapidly fatal head injury in this case is that it occurred as the result of impact due to the effects of the bomb-blast.”
  • “in my opinion Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto died as a result of a severe head injury sustained as a consequence of the bomb-blast and due to head impact somewhere in the escape hatch of the vehicle.”

Given the severity of the injury to Ms Bhutto’s head, the prospect that she inadvertently hit her head whilst ducking down into the vehicle can be excluded as a reasonable possibility.

High explosives of the type typically used in this sort of device, detonate at a velocity between 6000 and 9000 metres per second. This means that when considering the explosive quantities and distances involved, such an explosion would generate significantly more force than would be necessary to provoke the consequences as occurred in this case.

It is also important to comment upon the construction of the vehicle. It was fitted with B6 grade armour and designed to withstand gunfire and bomb-blast. It is an unfortunate and misleading aspect of this case that the roof escape hatch has frequently been referred to as a sunroof. It is not. It is designed and intended to be used solely as a means of escape. It has a solid lip with a depth of 9cm.

Ms Bhutto’s injury is entirely consistent with her head impacting upon the lip of the escape hatch. Detailed analysis of the media footage provides supporting evidence. Ms Bhutto’s head did not completely disappear from view until 0.6 seconds before the blast. She can be seen moving forward and to the right as she ducked down into the vehicle. Whilst her exact head position at the time of the detonation can never be ascertained, the overwhelming conclusion must be that she did not succeed in getting her head entirely below the lip of the escape hatch when the explosion occurred.

How many people were involved in the immediate attack?

There has been speculation that two individuals were directly involved in the attack. The suggestion has been that one suspect fired shots, and a second detonated the bomb. All the available evidence points toward the person who fired shots and the person who detonated the explosives being one and the same person.

  • Body parts from only one individual remain unidentified. Expert opinion provides strong evidence that they originate from the suicide bomber.
  • Analysis of the media footage places the gunman at the rear of the vehicle and looking down immediately before the explosion. The footage does not show the presence of any other potential bomber.
  • This footage when considered alongside the findings of the forensic explosive expert, that the bombing suspect was within 1 to 2 metres of the vehicle towards it rear and with no person or other obstruction between him and the vehicle, strongly suggests that the bomber and gunman were at the same position. It is virtually inconceivable that anyone who was where the gunman can clearly be seen on the media footage, could have survived the blast and escaped.

The inevitable conclusion is that there was one attacker in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle in which Ms Bhutto was travelling.

In essence, all the evidence indicates that one suspect has fired the shots before detonating an improvised explosive device. At the time of the attack this person was standing close to the rear of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. The blast caused a violent collision between her head and the escape hatch area of the vehicle, causing a severe and fatal head injury.

John MacBrayne QPM

Detective Superintendent

Counter Terrorism Command

1st February 2008

Filed under: CURRENT AFFAIRS

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Punishing Pakistan Is Not The Way To Go

Posted on 04 February 2012 by Tea Server

By Nancy Birdall for Foreign Policy

In the January/February 2012 issue of Foreign Affairs, Stanford political scientist Stephen Krasner claims that “current U.S. policy toward Pakistan has failed” and recommends that the United States take a radically different approach: credibly threaten to sever all forms of cooperation, including all U.S. aid – military and civilian – to force Pakistan into cooperating with the United States on security matters. Center for Global Development President Nancy Birdsall responds.

Stephen Krasner (“Talk Tough to Pakistan: How to End Islamabad’s Defiance,” Jan/Feb 2012) wants to change the Pakistani government’s behavior. He argues that its failure to cooperate with the United States on Afghanistan and on terrorism is not due to its weakness as a state. Instead, it is a rational response of Pakistan’s military leadership, whose priority is to defend itself against India – with a nuclear deterrent and support for terrorists and the Afghan Taliban. Therefore, the only way the United States can win cooperation from Pakistan is to threaten “malign neglect”- cut off military and civilian assistance, sever intelligence cooperation, maintain and possibly escalate drone strikes and initiate unilateral cross-border raids. If that isn’t enough, then the U.S. could move on to “active isolation” — declare Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, making it a pariah, and impose sanctions.

If only it were this easy. Krasner fails to mention that the U.S. has tried this approach before. In the 1990s it cut off military and civilian assistance to Pakistan and imposed sanctions in an effort to dissuade Pakistan from developing a nuclear capability. We all know how that story ended. But let’s suppose this time the threats or the follow-through worked and brought the military and intelligence establishment to heel in Pakistan. Let’s suppose the United States got what it wanted on the security front – helping assure a timely U.S and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. Would that solve the problem Pakistan poses for America’s security in the long run? No.

What Krasner doesn’t say is that the U.S. wants something more than compliance from Pakistan’s military and intelligence communities with its immediate security needs. The U.S. wants a capable and stable civilian government that plays by the rules of the international community. It wants a democratic state that would not abuse and misuse its nuclear capability and that would find its way to peaceful relations with India.

In other words the U.S. has a long-run vision for Pakistan, very much in its own interests, as well as a set of short-term demands. In the 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (known as Kerry-Lugar Berman, or KLB) Congress recognized the resulting need for a two-track approach. That legislation made U.S. security assistance (not actually authorized in the legislation) conditional on Pakistani cooperation on security matters. But its fundamental purpose, and the money it authorized for civilian aid, was the rebuilding of a serious partnership with the civilian government and the people of Pakistan. With KLB as the framework, since 2009 the Obama Administration has engaged fully with the civilian government and with civil society and private sector leaders in Pakistan on a range of issues — energy, water, agriculture, macroeconomic issues, private investment and trade.

In short, the purpose of U.S. civilian aid to Pakistan is to help build a better state. It is not to bribe or reward the “government” (neither the military nor the civilian leadership). Withholding military aid would likely not punish the military anyway. It would, however, reduce the resources available to the civilian government, since the evidence is that the military can get what it wants from the government’s overall available resources. And withholding civilian aid obviously would not punish the military. It would, however, take away a modest tool of America – investing to educate kids, create jobs, and strengthen civil society and representative institutions and thus give Pakistan a better shot at becoming a stable, prosperous and democratic country in the long term.

There are of course real questions about the effectiveness of U.S engagement with the civilian government – with aid and dialogue – given the prevailing suspicion there of U.S. motives, the inherent difficulties of operating in a complex and insecure environment, and the bureaucratic shortcomings of the U.S. aid system itself. But then those are reasons to put relatively more emphasis on other forms of engagement: trade, investment, and encouraging the normalization of relations with India. They do not warrant bullying the weak civilian government that the U.S. wants to strengthen.

Krasner begins and ends his article by invoking the testimony of former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen during his last appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Krasner is right in pointing out that Mullen was critical of Pakistan’s role in supporting extremist organizations and the need to get tough with Pakistan. Yet, Krasner fails to mention the conclusion Mullen reached in his statement. Mullen recognized that the U.S. has a variety of objectives in Pakistan and the region, and that by focusing too intensely on short term interests, the U.S. will end up short-changing itself over the long haul: “We must also move beyond counter-terrorism to address long-term foundations of Pakistan’s success – to help the Pakistanis find realistic and productive ways to achieve their aspirations of prosperity and security.” Mullen concludes, “Isolating the people of Pakistan from the world right now would be counter-productive.”

Nancy Birdsall is the founding president of the Center for Global Development, a Washington, DC based think tank.

Filed under: Afghanistan, Nuclear, Pakistan, Pakistan Army, Pakistanis, Taliban, terrorism, United States, US Army, US-Pakistan Relations Tagged: Afghanistan, Islamabad, Kerry-Lugar Berman, NATO, Pakistan, Pakistanis, Senate Armed Services Committee, Taliban, United States, Washington

Syndicated from: Pakistanis for Peace

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26 January, 2012 07:38

Posted on 26 January 2012 by Tea Server

Islamabad Tonight - 25h January 2012 Islamabad Tonight - 25h January 2012
Watch Now Islamabad tonight - Mohammad hafeez - 25th january 2012
http://www.awaztoday.com/playshow/19453/Islamabad-Tonight-25h-January-2012.aspx
http://www.zemtv.com/2012/01/25/islamabad-tonight-mohammad-hafiz-25th-january-2012/
http://www.friendskorner.com/forum/f247/video-islamabad-tonight-nadeem-malik-25th-january-2011-hafiz-muhammad-saeed-261629/
http://www.pakistanherald.com/Program/Islamabad-Tonight-January-25-2012-Nadeem-Malik-9483

ISLAMABAD TONIGHT

WITH NADEEM MALIK

25-01-2012

TOPIC- JIHADI GROUPS IN PAKISTAN

GUEST- HAFIZ SAEED AHMED

HAFIZ SAEED AHMED OF JAMAT DAWA was the only guest on the show he said that the situation of the world has been changed but the reality is unchanged. He said that West is even targeting Islamic welfare organizations of their propaganda. He said that America is trying to control the world with might after 9/11. He said that Jamat-e- dawa helped people in earth quake hit areas. He said that even UNO handed over aid goods to Jamat-e-Dawa to deliver in earthquake hit areas. He said that his organization has been banned despite its outstanding social and welfare work for people.

He said that SC and LHC have given their verdict that his organization is not involved in Mumbai attacks. He said that India always continues its propaganda against his organization. He said that Ajmal Qasab has changed his statement many times. He said that he has offered to India that if they do not trust Pakistani courts let take the matter to international court.

He said that he condemns the killing of innocent people in suicide attacks. He said that India accused his organization for Mumbai attacks just after two hours of the incident. He said that his organization is only operating inside Pakistan only and not out side of the country.

He said that his organization is helping refugees and doing welfare work in Afghanistan. He said that he met Abdullah Izam only once in his life. He said that he has delivered edict against suicide attacks that they are against the Sharia law.

He said that the strategy of drone attacks was to pave the way for suicide attacks. He said that tribal people are lured in to suicide attacks saying that Pakistani government and military is helping America to attack on them. He said that if drone attacks stop suicide attacks stop with it. He said that drone attacks are going on at a well though strategy. He said that vast majority of seventy thousand people killed in drone attacks in tribal areas is common people. He said that people who attacked on GHQ and Mehran base are not the friends of Pakistan.

He said that his organization has a regular movement to educate people against suicide attacks.

He said that state is responsible for defense of the country but our government is helpless. He said that our roads have been used to transport American ammunition used against Afghanistan. He said that it is a torment of Allah that same ammunition is being used against our own country now.

He said that any terrorist attack takes place Taliban are accused for that with out confirmation. He said that it is commandment of Allah that confirm before telling any thing to others. He said that India is involved in terrorist attacks against Pakistan and that is why Indian terrorist Sarbasjeet Singh is in jail in Pakistan. He said that our interior minister accuses Lashker-e-Jhangvi for terrorism and later on release their accused people from jail.

He said that he admits that negligence on human rights is being committed. He said that he admits that religious Madrassa are getting foreign aid but he does not believe that the Madrassa are involved in terrorism. He said that India is giving training to the people for terrorist attacks against Pakistan inside Afghanistan. He said that he has been accused for many things but none has been proved against him.

He said that America malign same people it work with. He said that America is working in our area with the help of ISI and at the same time maligning it in the name of his organization.

He said that people who earned dollars during the war against Russia to train people were wrong and people making dollars today are wrong too. He said that he meets general (R) Hammed Gul pretty much every day now a days but he never met him when he was DGISI.

He said that it is a right of Afghan people to fight for their freedom. He said that Afghan Mujahideen do not need the help of Pakistani people and it is the propaganda against our country. He said that the terms of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Punjabi Taliban are different forms of propaganda against Pakistan.

He said that he advises America to quit attacks against Pakistan and Afghanistan and go back. He said that America must stop to try to give a role to India to play in Afghanistan. He said that peace can not be restored in our region as long America is present here. He said that America should go back and India should stay within its limits and do not interfere in Afghanistan. He said that Pakistani people should not get involved in militancy but both sides have to share responsibility.

Filed under: CURRENT AFFAIRS

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General Delusion Gul

Posted on 19 January 2012 by Tea Server

By Taha Kehar

Political acumen is a valuable asset which requires a sound understanding of current affairs and the rare ability to steer clear of false philosophy. But not everyone realises its benefits.

In an interview with Khushnood Ali Khan in 2008, Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul revealed that political acumen can be clouded by delusions of Taliban grandeur and US atrocity.

Some moot points presented in the interview include:

a)    The claim that Lashkar-e-Islam’s Amir Haji Mangal Bagh is ‘popular among the people’. While Gul does substantiate this belief, there is sufficient evidence to the contrary which he fails to account for. For instance, it cannot be assumed that the popularity of a leader corresponds with the fairness of his policies. After all, how can we forget that Mangal Bagh warned women in the Khyber Agency against voting in the 2008 elections?

b)   The argument that the Pakistani government cannot play an important role in thwarting the influence of NATO forces in the country. In 2008, Gul suggested rather foolishly that the NATO supply lines can only be closed if the labourers are asked to go on strike. While this tactic serves to explain Gul’s anti-US agenda, it also comes across as largely ineffective if we consider the fact that it took an attack of a particularly grave character in 2011 which prompted Pakistan to close the NATO supply lines to Afghanistan.

c)    The assumption that Baitullah Mehsud is among the truemujahideen who are waging a jihad that does not constitute religious or moral elements. Although the statement provides a shrewd commentary on a nation fighting a war against its own people, it mainly comes across as contradictory and unrealistic.

Call it bold, assertive or downright rebellious, General Hamid Gul has proved that political acumen is not a by-product of rational thought or judicious observation. To the contrary, it is riddled by emotions and delusions that produce naïve depictions of the status quo.

Syndicated from: Pak Tea House

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Pakistan High Court Launches Contempt Case Against Prime Minister

Posted on 17 January 2012 by Tea Server

By Alex Rodriguez for The Los Angeles Times

Dealing a heavy blow to Pakistan’s embattled government, the Supreme Court on Monday initiated contempt proceedings against Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani for refusing to revive a long-standing corruption case against the nation’s president.

Gilani, a top ally of President Asif Ali Zardari in the ruling Pakistan People’s Party, must appear before the court Thursday, when the justices will listen to his explanation for not going ahead with the case.

If the court moves forward with the contempt proceedings and Gilani is convicted, he could be disqualified from office and forced to step down. He also could be forced to serve up to six months in jail.

Zardari’s government is locked in battles with the Supreme Court and Pakistan’s powerful military, both of which have had an acrimonious relationship with the president since he took office in 2008. The crisis has stirred talk of the government’s possible ouster, though experts say it probably would happen through legal action taken by the high court rather than a military coup.

The military has ousted civilian leaders in coups four times in Pakistan’s 65-year history, but military generals have said they have no plans to mount a takeover.

Nevertheless, they were deeply angered by an unsigned memo that a Pakistani American businessman contends was engineered by a top Zardari ally to seek Washington’s help in preventing a military coup last spring. In exchange, the memo offered several concessions, including the elimination of a wing of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency that maintains links with Afghan insurgent groups.

The businessman, Mansoor Ijaz, says the then-ambassador to the U.S., Husain Haqqani, approached him with the idea. Haqqani, who was forced to resign after the allegations surfaced, denies any involvement in the creation or conveyance of the memo. A Supreme Court commission is investigating the case, and on Monday it ordered Ijaz to come to Pakistan and appear before the panel Jan. 24.

The high court’s move to start contempt proceedings against Gilani involves money-laundering charges in Switzerland that Zardari was convicted of in absentia in 2003. The case was appealed by Zardari and his late wife, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and was later dropped at the request of the Pakistani government in 2008.

Since 2009, Pakistan’s high court has repeatedly ordered the government to write a letter to Swiss authorities asking that the case be reopened. Gilani and government lawyers have refused, arguing that as president, Zardari enjoys constitutional immunity from prosecution.

Last week, the court warned Gilani that it could remove him from office if he did not abide by its demand. Government lawyers were supposed to appear in court Monday and explain why Gilani’s administration had ignored the court.

Instead, Atty. Gen. Maulvi Anwarul Haq appeared before a packed courtroom and told a high court panel that the government had not given him any instructions about what to say in court. The head of the panel, Justice Nasir Mulk, said Gilani’s inaction gave the court no recourse but to pursue a contempt case against him.

Outside the courtroom, Haq said that if the court eventually issues a contempt finding against Gilani, “this conviction has ramifications…. Under the constitution, with a conviction it’s disqualification from office.”

Before the court issues its findings, it probably would hold evidentiary hearings, Haq said. If Gilani on Thursday tells the court he will ask Swiss authorities to reopen the corruption case, the justices probably would consider dropping the contempt proceeding, said Tariq Mehmood, a lawyer and retired judge.

Gilani has given no indication he plans to give in. He will, however, appear in court Thursday to explain the government’s rationale, he told parliament late Monday. “We have always respected the courts,” he said. “The court has summoned me, and in respect of the court I will go there on Jan. 19.”

Zardari’s administration hopes to become the first civilian government to finish out its term, which ends in 2013. The political turmoil may thwart that plan, as opposition leaders increasingly push harder for early elections. Though Zardari is widely criticized in Pakistan for failing to revive the country’s moribund economy and tackle corruption, his party remains confident that it can weather the storm and retain power for a second term.

Even if Gilani is removed from office, Zardari continues to hold together a coalition that controls parliament’s lower house, which elects the prime minister. On Monday, however, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, a staunch ally of the president, doubted it would come to that.

“The prime minister will stay,” Malik told reporters outside parliament. “The government is in command. Our flight may be a little bumpy, but God willing, we will have a smooth landing in 2013.”

Filed under: Afghanistan, Democracy, Pakistan, Pakistan Army, Pakistanis Tagged: Asif Ali Zardari, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, Husain Haqqani, Mansoor Ijaz, Pakistan, Pakistan Peoples Party, Pakistan Supreme Court, PPP, Yousuf Raza Gilani

Syndicated from: Pakistanis for Peace

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Shuffling Deck Chairs on the Pitanic

Posted on 13 January 2012 by Tea Server

By  Saad Hafiz:

As the opposition gears up to challenge the incumbent government, it is worth examining the challenges any future Pakistani government will face at the helm of affairs.  It may become clear that a fundamental change in national priorities and not just a simple shuffling of deckchairs is required for a ship one feels is headed for disaster.

To put matters in context and not intended as a deep dive into statistics, Pakistan annually spends around 1.7% and 3.2 % of its GDP on education and health respectively and public sector development expenditure is about $8 billion. The debt to GDP ratio has climbed to 55% due to increased borrowing to finance the annual budget deficits.  Pakistan has been the third largest contributor to world population growth since 1950 and its population is set to increase from the present 180 million to 318 million people by 2050.  Pakistan is currently ranked 107 out of 110 countries on the Prosperity Index, with select sub-rankings for the economy – 96, education –105 and  health – 96.

In sharp contrast to poor human development indexes, Pakistan is ranked 33 out of 153 countries in terms of global military spending.  Official annual defense spending is 2.8% of GDP or $6 billion, with some unofficial estimates which place it as high as $8 billion.  Pakistan’s military is ranked as the 15th most powerful in the world with over 600,000 active troops, complemented by a significant nuclear weapons capability, a capable air force and a small but potent navy.

It would be a bit harsh but not unreasonable to suggest that a formidable Pakistani military machine is on an unsustainable path of protecting a bankrupt nation with a growing population of poorer, hungrier, sicker and barely educated people.  One also feels that mere electoral sloganeering and political posturing will not bring Pakistan’s deeply misguided militarist priorities back in order.  Pakistan’s voters must influence the country’s decision makers to refocus national priorities away from defense to human development to avoid the present suicidal course to self destruction. “Civilizations,” argued historian Arnold Toynbee, “die from suicide, not by murder.” That is, our future is dependent on the choices we make and the things we decide to value.”

We do not need a tsunami or cyclone to understand that the overall investment in human capital, such as improved health, education and living standards, will raise the productivity or output potential of a state, while simultaneously fostering stability. Political democracy must ensure that the government and military remains accountable to the society and that the government delivers equitable progress across the nation.  Civil society needs to push its leaders to expand their political horizons, and work with others towards agreements to redirect military spending to fund development so the rest of the country can partake in, and benefit from a fairer economic system.

The standard pushback when one questions military spending is that our enemies are spending more so we have to keep pace.  Among questions to ask in response are whether our enemies are financing their defense buildup by mortgaging their future generations which Pakistan clearly is or if our enemies have misplaced priorities should we follow suit?  As eloquently stated by Costa Rican Foreign Minister Bruno Stagno, “Security does not come from multiplying weapons; history has already proven this too many times. Security comes from remedying injustice, easing shortages and creating opportunities so that we can have collective prosperity on a par with collective security.”

We also have to remember that the justification given to demand a separate homeland was to ensure the physical security and economic progress for the Muslims of India.  It seems that fortress of Pakistan has succeeded in providing external security but has sadly failed in ensuring economic and social progress for its citizens, which may yet prove to be its undoing.

Syndicated from: Pak Tea House

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Mehsud’s Deputy Confirms Receiving Payment From India to Kill Colonel Imam

Posted on 04 January 2012 by Tea Server

Source:PKKH

Col ImamISLAMABAD: Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani militants have held a series of meetings aimed at containing what could soon be open warfare between the two most powerful Pakistani Taliban leaders, militant sources have said.

Hakimullah Mehsud, the head of the Pakistani Taliban, also known as the Tehreek-i-Taliban (TTP), and his deputy, Waliur Rehman, were at each other’s throats, the sources said.

“You will soon hear that one of them has eliminated the other, though hectic efforts are going on by other commanders and common friends to resolve differences between the two,” one TTP commander said.

Any division within the TTP could hinder the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda’s struggle in Afghanistan against the United States and its allies, making it more difficult to recruit young fighters and disrupting safe havens in Pakistan used by the Afghan militants.

Despite multiple reports of the Rehman-Mehsud split, Rehman told Reuters on Tuesday there was no problem between the two.

“There are no differences between us,” Rehman said.

The TTP, formed in 2007, is an umbrella group of various Pakistani militant factions operating in Pakistan’s unruly northwestern tribal areas along the porous border with Afghanistan.

It has long struggled with its choice of targets. Some factions are at war with the Pakistani state while others concentrate on the fight against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan.

There has been a noticeable decrease in militant attacks in Pakistan, but there continue to be random acts of violence across the country.

Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban commanders are asking the TTP to provide more men for the fight in Afghanistan and are looking to smooth over the dispute between Mehsud and Rehman.

Long-standing feuds

Taliban sources said Rehman had ordered his fighters to kill Mehsud because of his increasing closeness with al Qaeda and its Arab contingent.

Mehsud’s former deputy has also confirmed that the TTP chief received money from Pakistan’s arch-rival, India, to kill former ISI official Colonel Imam, who was acting as a mediator between the Pakistani Taliban, Afghan insurgents and the Pakistani government.

The reported enmity between Mehsud and Rehman is not the only conflict within the TTP ranks.

Mehsud has a long-standing feud with militant commanders Maulvi Nazeer in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan, both of whom have non-aggression agreements with the Pakistani military.

Mehsud’s men have also fought with the militia under the control of Fazal Saeed Haqqani, the former TTP head in the Kurram tribal region. He has accused Mehsud of killing his commanders and innocent people and kidnapping for ransom.

Haqqani, who is close to the militant Afghan Haqqani network, broke away from the TTP last year.

A pamphlet distributed by militants in North Waziristan this week announced the formation of a council to try to resolve the conflicts.

“All jihadi forces have jointly, on the recommendation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, formed a five-member commission which will be known as the Shura Muraqba,” the pamphlet said, using the term by which the Afghan Taliban describe themselves.

“The Shura Muraqba will be working to resolve differences and problems between mujahideen.”

It said that any “mujahideen” found to have committed an “unlawful” killing or kidnapping would be punished under Islamic law. It is likely any attack on a fellow “mujahideen” commander would be considered “unlawful”.

“All mujahideen should respect the decisions of the council that has been set up,” a senior commander of the Haqqani faction in Kurram said.

“If people continue to do as they like, the situation will not improve. Things will instead get much worse.”

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Syndicated from: Khudi.pk

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Some facts about Husain Haqqani and ‘memogate’

Posted on 04 January 2012 by Tea Server

Husain Haqqani: Pawn in a larger game?

There are numerous issues besides ‘Memogate’ that directly affect the people, like the shortage of gas, electricity, clean drinking water, housing, healthcare, employment and so on. But the issue gains significance because so far, no democratically elected civilian government in Pakistan has ever been allowed to complete its tenure and hand over power to the next one through democratic elections (as I outlined in this paper). There were hopes that this government would be the first to do so – a critical step towards the continuation of a democratic political that is necessary to move the country away from the military-dominated politics of the past – something, as it is now all too apparent, is not a thing of the past after all. In this context, it’s important to understand the current situation and its dangers. Myra MacDonald sums it up in an analysis for Reuters. Some insights were posted to this blog earlier (here and here). Additional facts are laid out in a document received today (reproduced below) that outlines some facts about Husain Haqqani and ‘memogate’. Also read this important article, ‘Treason? Under what Constitution? in the New Pakistan blog, which dissects the ‘memo’ contents and notes that each item in the document falls under the constitutional purview of the federal government…

Issue at hand: Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the US, Husain Haqqani, is currently a virtual prisoner as his life is under danger both from the extremists and from the security agencies. He is residing for his own safety at the Prime Minister’s residence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan imposed a travel ban on him on December 1, 2011 restricting him from leave the country. His wife, Member of Pakistan’s Parliament, Farahnaz Ispahani’s life is also in danger, which is why she is currently in the US where she had come for medical checkups.

This situation arose after the false allegations by an American businessman of Pakistani origin, Mansur Ijaz, who claimed that the Ambassador and President Zardari had sought American help to prevent a military coup in Pakistan. Ambassador Haqqani has flatly denied these allegations. Further, Ambassador Haqqani knew Admiral Mullen very well and could have contacted him directly anytime; it defies understanding why he would need Ijaz to convey a message to Admiral Mullen.

A history of false claims: Mansur Ijaz is well-known over the years for self-promotion and false claims. During the mid-1990s he claimed that he had close ties to the Sudanese government and would be able to help the Clinton administration get Osama Bin Laden. However, both Clinton NSA Sandy Berger and the 9/11 Commission that interviewed Ijaz found no credible evidence in what he said. In 1999 Ijaz claimed to be the American envoy to India and Pakistan to help resolve the Kashmir dispute but in the end neither side found him credible or someone who could deliver. In 2004 Ijaz claimed that chemical warheads were being smuggled into Iraq for an attack on American troops which he later denied.

The ‘memo’: Former US national security advisor General Jim Jones conveyed Ijaz’s memo to then Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen. Gen Jones in an affidavit has sworn that he believes Ambassador Haqqani had nothing to do with the memo. According to General Jones the language of the memo was akin to what Ijaz wrote.

Ijaz claims that soon after he wrote an OpEd about the ‘memo issue’ on October 10, 2011, Pakistan’s ISI chief, Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha flew to London, met him and examined the evidence and found it credible. However, Admiral Mullen has stated that when he received the memo from Gen Jones, he did not find it credible and took no action on it.

Threats: Asma Jahangir, leading human rights advocate and counsel to Ambassador Haqqani, has stated that Ambassador Haqqani is under threat from his own intelligence-security agencies. In this context Admiral Mullen in one of his final testimonies stated that Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI, and the Pakistani military have often lied to the Americans, and provide support to the extremist groups, including those who kill Americans.

Action required: Ambassador Haqqani needs to have his passport returned to him and have his name taken off the Exit Control List (ECL) so he can travel. The due process of law must be applied.

Background: The government’s opponents – in the media, political parties, military-intelligence establishment – have used this opportunity to attack the government and try to make Ambassador Haqqani a scapegoat. Some worrying facts:

  • Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif (who in 1999 had Ambassador Haqqani imprisoned and tortured for writing OpEds against his regime)  is the leading petitioner before the Supreme Court.
  • • The Supreme Court took up Mr Sharif’s petition instead of sending it to a trial court first.
  • The Supreme Court ignored due process of law and immediately placed a travel ban on Ambassador Haqqani without letting him or his counsel appear before court.
  • The head of the ISI himself conducted a forensic investigation and the army chief and head of ISI have stated in their affidavits that they believe the ‘memo’ was genuine – which points to an attempt to frame the Ambassador by institutions that have never agreed with his views.
  • A political-media trial and witch-hunt has been ongoing since Ijaz’s OpEd first appeared in the Financial Times.

Detailed Background and Information

Background of Memo: The origins of the memo are in dispute. On October 10, 2011 an American businessman of Pakistani descent, Mansur Ijaz, wrote an OpEd in Financial Times alleging that in the aftermath of the Osama Bin Laden raid of May 2, 2011, he was approached by a senior Pakistani diplomat to pass on a memo to enlist the US military’s help to head off a feared military coup, in exchange for overhauling the country’s powerful top security leadership. He said he gave the memo to former NSA Gen (retd) Jim Jones who passed it on to then Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen.

In the ensuing weeks Ijaz claimed that Amb Husain Haqqani was that senior diplomat and that he and Amb Haqqani corresponded by Blackberry messenger messages, phone conversations and emails.

Amb Haqqani flatly denied these allegations. Admiral Mullen stated that he had received a memo but he did not find it ‘credible.’ According to Mullen’s spokesman “I have said this before and am saying again today. Nothing about that letter had the imprimatur on the Pakistani Government. It was not signed. And the contents of it Admiral Mullen did not find credible. So he took no action on it.” (November 22, 2011)

Amb Haqqani returned to Pakistan on November 19 and tendered his resignation in order to ensure a free and fair inquiry into the issue. The civilian government, while supporting Amb Haqqani’s account accepted his resignation. His passport was confiscated upon his return to Pakistan.

Supreme Court action: December 23, former Prime Minister and leader of the main opposition party, PML-N, Nawaz Sharif filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) claiming that under article 184(3) of the Constitution, the SCP could take up any issue of public importance which relates to fundamental rights. SCP accepted the petition along with other petitions.

On December 1, 2011 the Pakistan Supreme Court placed former ambassador Husain Haqqani on the Exit Control List (ECL) barring him from being able to leave the country, without giving the former ambassador or his lawyer to appear before the court. So due process of law was not followed and Mr Haqqani’s fundamental rights were violated.

Gen Jones in his affidavit to the Pakistan Supreme Court stated that while he did pass on the memo he does not believe Amb Haqqani had anything to do with the memo.

On December 30, Pakistan’s Supreme Court set up a 3-member judicial commission to investigate the issue. According to the SCP judgment a petition seeking an investigation into the affair had “succeeded in establishing that the issues involved are justiciable.” The court also upheld the travel ban on Amb Haqqani. Further, the court has ordered the attorney general of Pakistan, Foreign Ministry and the Pakistani High Commissioner in Canada to approach the parent company of Blackberry, Research In Motion (RIM).

The government maintains that since Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy the correct forum for any such inquiry should be the parliament. The Parliamentary Committee on National Security was already looking into the case and that should be the proper venue not the Supreme Court.

Counter arguments by Amb Haqqani’s lawyer, Asma Jahangir: According to Ambassador Haqqani’s lawyer, leading human rights advocate, Asma Jahangir, the verdict was the “darkest day for the judiciary because the apex court has subjected fundamental rights to national security.”

Terming the court’s judgment ‘disappointing’, she said, “today we feel that the military authority is superior to the civilian authority. Today, the struggle for the transition to democracy has been blocked.” And, “I am forced to think if it is the judiciary of the people or the judiciary of the establishment.” Ms Jahangir also expressed her deep regrets and said she was totally unprepared for this reward of sacrifices rendered by lawyers’ fraternity, as the Court ‘dimmed even a fraction of ray of hope’, while providing the petitioner with relief beyond what they had sought.

Ms Jahangir said the decision was against the rule of law and had compromised a citizen’s right to justice. The verdict reflected undue supremacy of national security and integrity over human rights. “When order came on 1st December, Husain Haqqani was not heard. He did not even have a lawyer,” she said. “Saying that there is a memo and linking it with Husain Haqqani are two different things, it’s more of a media trial that got hyped after Supreme Court’s order”.

DG ISI Shuja Pasha and Gen. Kayani: quick to accept Mansoor Ijaz's claims

Amb Haqqani’s lawyer and others have pointed to the role of Pakistan’s security services, especially its intelligence agency. Both the head of Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha and Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, submitted petitions before the Supreme Court insisting they believed the memo was genuine and needs to be investigated. Significantly, according to Mansur Ijaz, Lt Gen Pasha travelled to London in October and ascertained that the memo was genuine. Why was Lt Gen Pasha so eager to travel to London and agree with what Ijaz said? Whose permission did he obtain before doing so? Is he the person who should perform a forensic investigation? Mr Ijaz also alleged in an interview in December that soon after the Bin Laden raid Lt Gen Pasha travelled to the Gulf to muster support for a military coup.

Imminent danger to Mr Husain Haqqani: A media trial has been ongoing since Mansoor Ijaz’s OpEd published in FT in October. The involvement of opposition parties and their leaders in this political-media witchhunt.

The judiciary seems to be ruling on the basis of national security ideology instead of constitution and law.

All those individuals who are speaking out in Pakistan for democracy and human rights are being silenced one by one. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, former Governor Salman Taseer, former Minister Shahbaz Bhatti were assassinated. Former Amb Haqqani and his lawyer have received serious death threats.

On January 1, 2012, Ms Jahangir announced that she was quitting the case as she did not have faith in the commission been set up by the Supreme Court. According to Ms Jahangir, the Supreme Court’s decision on the petition was a victory for the country’s establishment, and it was being used to transform the country into a ‘security state.’

Ms Jahangir further stated that her client, Mr Haqqani, was under threat from the security agencies. She feared that the security forces-intelligence agencies would try to coerce a statement out of Mr Haqqani. That is why he first stayed at the President’s House and is currently residing at the Prime Minister’s residence.

(ends)

Syndicated from: Journeys to democracy

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NATO is looking north

Posted on 26 December 2011 by Tea Server

Report By Ali K Chishti
US-Pakistan relations
Pakistan has played its trump card by stopping NATO supplies, but NATO may change the game by finding a new route
 

 
NATO is looking north
 
 

Pakistan stopped supplies from its Karachi port to NATO troops in Afghanistan after 24 of its soldiers were killed in a US air strike on a border post on November 26. But there was a consensus in a meeting of Pakistani envoys in Islamabad earlier this month that the move would not help improve coordination between the two allies in the war on terror.

A senior NATO commander in Afghanistan said the shutting down of the Southern Distribution Network had had “negligible effect on our mission, and we do not anticipate any effects except that it is more expensive to bring it in by other means”.

NATO is now increasing its reliance on supplies from the north, and if Pakistan persists with the embargo for too long, it will lose the leverage.

Afghan transit trade has increased by at least 40 percent after NATO supplies stopped last month

“Such maneuvering is counterproductive,” said Lawrence Alan Levine, former US Army trainer and strategic planner in Afghanistan. “There are no serious active operations in winter anyway,” he said, “so the embargo won’t have a significant impact.”

Carl Prine, a senior US military journalist who has served in Iraq, said there was frustration in the US over the embargo but that he had not heard of any shortages in Afghanistan yet. Speaking from Florida, he said cooperation between Pakistan and the US was imperative. “From predator drones to a settlement in Afghanistan, Pakistan is the key.”

Logistics expert Younas Ahmed, who has worked with NATO contractors from Dubai and Karachi, says an alternate route would cost NATO Rs10,000 to Rs13,000 per litre of oil.

“They have alternate routes set up and have ample supplies,” he said.

Article Box
Article Box
Afghan transit trade has increased by at least 40 percent after NATO supplies stopped last month. “Fourth-tier contractors are being hired by profiteers to bring in NATO supplies to Afghanistan,” Younas explained. Commercial consignments to Afghanistan are subjected to thorough checking at Torkham.

Trucks carrying NATO supplies are now more vulnerable to attacks within Pakistan, and that may be another reason why NATO is increasingly relying on the Northern Distribution Network. That would have its own set of problems. “Taliban have blown up a major bridge to Uzbekistan,” said John Islington, a private contractor based in Kabul.

“I know that they have been stockpiling, because this is not the first time the route has been blocked. So they can keep operating for weeks without new supplies,” said Carsten Michels, a German defence analyst who is an expert on AfPak.

“Taliban have blown up a major bridge to Uzbekistan”

Last year, the Pakistani government had stopped NATO supplies for 10 days after a similar attack on a Pakistani border post. It was resumed after a joint investigation.

Michels said German troops were in the north and their supplies came from Uzbekistan.

Even if the embargo affects NATO’s operations, its commanders believe it is a tactic by the Pakistani military to bring the Haqqanis on the table. “That is not acceptable to us.”

But at least one NATO commander was sympathetic to Pakistan. “If you are stationed in a Pakistan COP in that hostile area, I can imagine that everything around you is enemy,” he said. “It seems easy to confuse a joint patrol as enemy. In this case it is not even stated that the COP fired upon the patrol, but the joint patrol fired, and asked for fire support upon the Pakistani COP.”

Ali Chishti is a TFT reporter based in Karachi. He can be reached at akchishti@hotmail.com

 
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State abolished — no more ‘Mir’ or ‘Rani’ in Hunza

Posted on 21 December 2011 by Tea Server

The Terrorland Report

Late Jamal Khan – The Last Mir of Hunza
THE media is full of ignorant, half-literate and lazy people who misuse
words while writing or reporting. They often don’t care how sensitive their job
is as a ‘word’ can make or break carriers of people. Some terms are very
sensitive and people take them very seriously.
Hunza is a famous valley in Gilgit-Baltistan region. Most of the people
there are very angry whenever the media uses the terms: Mir of Hunza or Rani of Hunza.
“It seems as someone has fired a bullet into my heart,” says Fida Ali, whose
grandfather had lost his life while working for the ruler of the erstwhile
princely state Hunza. The despot ruler was known as ‘Mir of Hunza.’  
“Like others, my grandfather was also forced to take a government luggage to
the far-flung Shimshal village,” he said, “on the way, while crossing a river,
my grandfather lost his life and my father became an orphan at the tender age
of ten. I know how difficult it was for my father to live without a father and
sole male in a family of five. When the state was abolished, it was the happiest
day in the life of my father. But now when someone uses the word ‘Mir’ it hits
hard people like me.”   

According to Rehman, a member of The Terrorland
Team, someone from the former ruling family of Hunza, had commented in the
cyberspace: “most of the people hates me b’coz i’m toooooo good!!!!”
Rehman commented: Why people hate you, a shy-friend
has sent this link from a newspaper:

Not ‘Mir of Hunza’


Late Shams-un-Nahar,
The Last Rani of Hunza
I would like to draw attention to a term, ‘Mir of
Hunza’, which is often misused in the Pakistani media.

‘Mir’ is a Persian word, which means leader of a group
or tribe. In the tribal societies of the Indian subcontinent, many people used
this word with their names to denote their position as leader of a tribe or
group.

The rulers of Hunza used the word ‘Mir’ with their
names during their 950 years of despotic rule. The ruler of Hunza was known as
‘Mir of Hunza’ until 1974, when the state was abolished and formally became
part of the Northern Areas of Pakistan.

Mir Muhammad Jamal Khan (1912-76) was the last Mir of
Hunza. Thus the title ‘Mir of Hunza’ is no more a legal title in Pakistan
because Hunza is no more a separate state. It is a part of the sovereign state
of Pakistan.
Thus, anybody who uses this title can be charged, under the constitution, with
treason and inciting mutiny. The sentences for both of these crimes is capital
punishment.

Thus, many people find it shocking that some of our
media still uses this term. The people of Hunza fought for many years to
convince the Pakistani government to abolish the so-called state. I, therefore,
hope that Pakistan’s
media will be respectful of the sentiments of the majority of people from
Gilgit and Baltistan, and especially those from Hunza.

Rehman then asked: “According to Daily Times, when
there is no more any “Mir” it means there is no “Rani”
either… and when you claim to be a “Rani” they people of Hunza may
“hate” you…?”
There was no answer. However, a lady from the region says that if members of the former ruling family just be normal citizens of Pakistan without any tribal pride, then no one will hate them. “Instead of faking things, be yourselves, and get respect.”

Related Post

 Gilgit-Baltistan in search of hijacked independence for 64 years

Syndicated from: THE TERRORLAND

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Funding Pakistan’s Jihad.

Posted on 19 December 2011 by Tea Server

While it may be true that over the years the militants have developed a vast and effective network for raising funds by taking as much as a rupee from a poor man to millions from the rich, donations are pouring in for jihad from every segment of society

by Ali K.Chishti

All the commitment and fanaticism notwithstanding, terrorist operations cannot be run without funds. Funds for jihad are required for procuring weapons, financing training camps, providing logistical support, compensating the families of jihadis, paying instructors and also the wide networks of agents and running recruitment offices.

During the Afghan war, western governments were a major source of funding and weapons for the groups engaged in taking on the Soviet occupation army in Afghanistan. Much of these funds came from covert accounts of the states funding the Afghans. Islamic countries also poured in billions of dollars into the coffers of the jihadi groups. While the role of Saudi Arabia has been limited to the provision of funds to the Islamist and jihadi organisations, the Kingdom, to this day, is the biggest source of official and private funding to Islamist and jihadist organisations in Pakistan, and it is to their credit that certain Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith extremist organisations became so powerful with the growth in their size. 

One also has to see the Saudi financial support to Deobandi organisations in the context of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran post the Iranian revolution where both these countries had supported militant sectarian organisations to organise attacks and counter-attacks on each other’s sects and fought a proxy war inside Pakistan.

So open was Saudi support to Sipah-e-Sahaba (now the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jundullah) that the Saudi government, in 2000, gave out Rs 17 million to fund hardcore militant madrassas in Jhang alone. Another Saudi charity, called the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO), is an affiliate of the Saudi welfare organisation, Rabita Alam-e-Islami, which in turn helped to set up the Rabita Trust in Pakistan that was banned after 9/11 because of a strong bin Laden connection. The most interesting aspect of the Trust was that its chairman was none other than General Pervez Musharraf, the chief of army staff. To save embarrassment to a close ally, a state department official said, “We do not think the prominent people who have their names on it were aware of the infiltration.”

In fact, so murky is the source of funds coming from Saudi Arabia that the leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Maulana Fazlur Rahman Khalil said, “The US had instructed, through Rabita Alam-e-Islami that we should initiate jihad in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, to which I replied that we have grown up now. We do not do jihad at your bidding.” 

Lashkar-e-Tayyaba’s (LeT’s) parent organisation, the Dawat wal Irshad, initially also attracted the sympathy of certain Arab donors interested in purifying Islam in the subcontinent, which is considered to have been tainted by the influence of Hinduism. In fact, one such Saudi donor, Abu Abdul Aziz, who invested millions of dollars on LeT, LeJ and various jihadi organisations, even donated Rs 10 million to make a mosque at Markaz-e-Dawa’s headquarters. 

And while it may be true that over the years the militants have developed a vast and effective network for raising funds by taking as much as a rupee from a poor man to millions from the rich, donations are pouring in for jihad from every segment of society. And while many jihadi organisations collect sacrificial hides to raise funds, many have started raising their capital from publishing magazines to even the property business, and now, as a jihadi told me sheepishly, “the national disaster business”. In a report published by the Aga Khan Development Network in 1998, approximately 50 percent of Pakistanis gave an estimated amount of Rs 770 billion in money, goods and time, of which 90 percent of the surveyed donors cited religious faith as the motivation for giving. 

If all this foreign and local funding were not enough, the Pakistani government gives out an estimated Rs 20-35 billion in grants to madrassas and jihadi movements indirectly from government resources like zakat or iqra funds. Another funding source after the crackdown on Saudi sources and tighter monetary controls is the Afghan Transit Trade, which is a cash cow for jihadis and certain rogue establishment actors who exploit the trade for procuring weapons and narcotics smuggling, earning millions of dollars to be funnelled into proxy wars from Afghanistan to Pakistan. There was a reason why the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) offered $ 10 million to replace American aid. The hundi trade is another source that is ‘welcomed’ by the State Bank of Pakistan, as it has, over the years, been buying billions of dollars to shore up its balance of payment positions. The hundi trade helps launder money for jihadis but in the land of the pure, jihad is used as a weapon to further our so-called strategic plans. 

Even after 9/11, much of what is happening inside the tribal belt is a bit of a charade. In fact, what earlier used to be taking place openly has now been pushed behind the curtain, otherwise it is business as usual. Every time the Americans start getting impatient, the Pakistanis make a show of launching an operation in the tribal belt. There are arrests of Afghan and Arab jihadis or the killings of certain individuals until everything returns to normal. One big reason why our own Pakistani government will never really close the funding source and cut the roots of jihadis is because doing so would have a direct impact on the various jihads it is involved with to suit certain foreign policy goals. Moreover, by shutting down these rackets, the Pakistani state will lose an important leverage over deciding affairs inside Afghanistan. Often, the Pakistani state has used smuggling as a carrot for the various Afghan warlords and agents, and in return has managed to get them to do Pakistan’s bidding inside Afghanistan. This currency of power will be lost if Pakistan were to curb the illegal rackets. But, in the process of taking action on this trade, what will happen is that the Pakistani state will try to regain total and complete control over this trade, something it was gradually losing out on with the increasing privatisation of jihad. 

The writer is a political analyst. He can be reached at akchishti@hotmail.com
































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