February 13^th, 2012. Islamabad. For those of us still following the game of thrones taking place at the center, it appears that Prime Minister Gilani is running out of road. He’s taking a long walk off a short pier. Insert your own cliché here. The debate has overtaken the Prime Minister, the discussion is now focused on what Pakistan must do, post-Gilani. To write the letter or not? Will Senate elections go ahead or not? Will the PPP spin this ungraceful end to a five year term as a victory, will Gilani go back to Multan a living shaheed? Pity the constituency whose only claim to a fruitful five year term is a representative with a knack for getting stabbed in the stomach and making it look like he meant to fall on his sword. Gilani will end up being a sacrifice for an utterly worthless cause – twenty-eight million US dollars that will never be returned to the people of Pakistan. Ever.

The statute of limitations on the Swiss cases are rumored to be anywhere between April and August 2012. The time for reopening old cases is diminishing fast. Yet we insist that the court charade of the last few months was necessary – it’s not about the money, it’s about setting an institutional precedent.

It has been nearly two decades since our President and his late wife stole a mind-bubbling sum of money and squirreled it away into Swiss banks, mansions in Surrey, bank accounts in Dubai and trendy flats in London. Reading the famous 1998 New York Times article reinforces the idea that when politicians from very poor countries amass vast amounts of wealth, they are not likely to let go of it that easily. So forget fantasies of liquidating the Bhutto assets and paying off Pakistan’s international loans. The Pakistani Supreme Court can humiliate the Prime Minister, but it can’t overturn decades of sophisticated white collar crime, much of which takes place outside its judicial territory.

And surely impotence of this intensity is severely humiliating for Chief Justice Chaudhry himself. Having become the defacto arbitrator of every aggrieved party in Pakistan, he suddenly finds himself without any implementation power whatsoever. He is the supreme commander of a court system that is rotten at the foundation, fighting the country’s largest and most public corruption scandal while his own lower court clerks accept petty bribes to tie up litigation for years. His own middle-class biases against the landed elite of the PPP notwithstanding, Chaudhary now faces the task of living up to the dubious honor of being the sole institution in this country deemed impartial and uncorrupt. Which means that if he isn’t seen going after egregious acts of corruption, he will be immediately deemed implicit.

In the face of such impotence, charging and convicting a seated Prime Minister of contempt is a sufficiently bold task to secure Chaudhary’s tripod of potency: judicial independence, of having real power (as opposed to simply striking down the NRO and not being able to do a damn thing to implement it for a full two years), and of being a guardian of the people. Gilani’s removal, whenever it happens, will be sufficiently large to distract from the fact that the PM never stole the twenty-eight million. He never decided to write the letter, or not to write it, for that matter – any more than he decided to become Prime Minister. It will serve to silence those who suggest that post-reinstatement, the CJ has been “bought out” by the PPP, to outcry those who notice that investigations into sugar cartels, NILC, Hajj, Abbotabad,  and Karachi came to naught. It is eye candy for the myopic, a desperate sideshow to distract from a flaming circus of budget malfunctions, energy scams and policy fubars.

But lets not beat ourselves up too much. John Burns pointed out in 1998 that multilateral organizations such as the World Bank regularly support teetering Third World economies “bled dry” by corruption in exchange for weak promises of institutional reform. The last five years have been immensely lucrative for friends of the regime, for those individuals and institutions capable of buying out or bullying Mr. Hundered Percent. At last count, this included everyone from ARY Gold to the Pakistan Army, from AKD to NLC to the men who bring you fantastically overpriced imported cars at huge markups. Zardari did not invent corruption, but he’s a fine example (an institutional precedent, as it were) of just how successful some men and women become in countries with broken democratic systems. Where the Army can quietly wring the neck of anyone attempting to infringe on its economic and political territory. Where an entire Parliament – incumbent, opposition and all – routes all decision-making through the Supreme Court. Where a judge is deeply contemptuous of men who take advantage of their office for personal aggrandizement – and then goes and does exactly the same.

What are the prospects for a diplomatic settlement to the simmering dispute with Iran over its nuclear program, now threatening to boil over?
On the positive side of the ledger, as Peter Crail spelled out in an Arms Control Association issue brief on Jan. 25, is that the P5 + 1 group (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) is not insisting the Iran permanently forgo uranium enrichment–only that it agree to tighter safeguards that would guarantee its nuclear activities are purely peaceful.That position represents a welcome improvement on the Bush Administration’s pre-2006 position, which was the Iran had to give up enrichment for good.

Crail does a nice job of laying out ideas about how Iran might be persuaded to limit dubious activities in the near term, including a Russian “step by step” proposal, the elements of the proposed 2009 fuel swap agreement, and the 2006 and 2008 P5 + 1 proposals. At the same time, he says with some emphasis that “it will also be necessary to have some idea of what the end-goal of such engagement [with Iran] might be.”

Another somewhat positive element is Iran’s declared willingness to enter into talks about stopping 20 percent enrichment, though it still declines to discuss an agreed-upon mechanism that would allow it to resume enrichment following a suspension. Serious concerns linger about whether it is still just trying to “run out  the clock”–obtain relief from international pressure in the near term, leaving it free to build nuclear weapons when it is ready in the longer term.

Then too there is intelligence chief James Clapper’s recent congressional testimony, in which he declared that while Iran is continuing to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, there’s no evidence it has taken a final decision to actually build nuclear weapons as yet. That finding, as fellow blogger Jodi Lieberman pointed out this week, is sharply at variance with Israel’s assessment.

On the negative side of the ledge is Israel’s alleged readiness to take military action soon, having found that all conditions for such action are met, as reported in a lengthy New York Times magazine article by  Ronen Bergman on Sunday. What is curious about the article, let it be said, is that though Ronen claims conditions for action exist, he ends his article with a rather impressive list–albeit by no means an exhaustive one– of very bad things that might result from a raid.

What seems singularly disturbing about the Ronen article is that it appears to have been planted, Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak having summoned Ronen for lengthy conversations that led to the article. Might the Israeli government be trying to push the U.S. government into taking action itself, or at least acquiescing in an Israeli strike, calculating that a pre-election Obama will be easier to influence than a re-elected Obama?

One can only hope that the Obama Administration is impressing on Israel just how badly a raid could go wrong. Many influential Israeli defense and intelligence officials concede that military action at best will slow Iran’s nuclear program, not end it for good. Retaliation by Hamas and Hezbollah is almost taken for granted. But what if Iran struck back at Iraq, which Israeli fighter-bombers would have to fly over to reach Iran and return? What if Saudi Arabia, more heavily armed with sophisticated weaponry than ever before, got involved? Or Egypt, where the military is vying with the Muslim Brotherhood for control of the country? Or the beleaguered Syrian government?

All such considerations argue for continuing diplomatic efforts at reaching both interim agreements and a final comprehensive settlement, in which many highly loaded issues will likely come into play: not just lifting of sanctions but diplomatic recognition of Iran; diplomatic recognition of Israel and acknowledgment of its right to exist; understandings about contending influences in Iraq and Lebanon; Israel’s nuclear status and prospects for a Middle East nuclear free zone.

Admittedly, it would take diplomacy of the very highest order to somehow bundle a settlement of Iran’s nuclear status with resolution of just some of those other major issues. But that kind of diplomacy is what the occasion calls for.

Iran has already incurred very high costs in its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and that capability has become a major point of national pride. No Iranian government will not give up that ambition without being able to boast of having obtained substantial tangible benefits in return.

Israeli and American politicians alike are using the same playbook — attacking the media and often diverting attention from the real problems at hand.

In U.S. politics, GOP presidential candidate Newt Gingrich gave a stunning rebuke to CNN anchor John King during the South Carolina Republican debate last night, drawing applause and a standing ovation from the largely conservative crowd.

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu might have done the Israeli equivalent, as news reports suggest that he pegged the New York Times and left-leaning Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz  as Israel’s two greatest threats. (While Netanyahu’s alleged comments have been denied, the anti-media rhetoric is most certainly real, as has been demonstrated by a letter from the Prime Minister’s Office declining an invitation to submit an op-ed to the New York Times last year.)

That’s right. Israel, a country surrounded by enemies that want nothing more than to push its citizens into the sea, is scared of “left-wing” journalists. Israel, a nation who’s only regional friends — such as Egypt and Turkey — are quickly turning their backs on it, is terrified of editorial writers. Israelis, a people who have overcome adversity and built a thriving, democratic and Western country in less than a hundred years, is trembling at the thought of a mustached columnist.

The contention that the press and the influence of the media over populations are Israel’s biggest threats is patronizing to Israelis, diminishes the country’s successes, and understates the very real challenge of ensuring bombs don’t rattle Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, the Galil and the Negev at any second.

The New York Times is clearly the “paper of record,” but it has a challenge to overcome its alleged left-wing bias to garner credibility. While Ha’aretz  only captures approximately 6 percent of the Israeli audience, it has a far wider international reach and credibility. The paper is distributed along with the International Herald Tribune, which is, effectively, the international New York Times. Further, Ha’aretz visually looks similar to many credible U.S. papers — like the Washington Post and New York Times – and unlike it’s main competitors Yediot Achronot and Ma’ariv, which both have extensive pictures, graphics and more New York Daily News-type feels.

Ha’aretz and the New York Times clearly have in-roads with the U.S. and international communities and influence public policy, which can impact aid to Israel, pressure on the Arab world, and the prospects of interventions preventing the development of an Iranian nuclear warhead. Therefore, the true threat of these publications are their impact on public officials, which could lead to major changes in Israel-related policies.

However, the allegiance between Israel and its closest friend, the United States, is still rock-solid, where U.S. policymakers have overwhelmingly expressed their support for a safe and secure Israel. Both the New York Times and Ha’aretz have been in business for quite some time and been unable to derail that relationship.

Israelis for decades have been forging that strong bond, which is based on shared values and mutual interests. To suggest that all that hard work can be unraveled by editorial bias discounts the long-standing relationship and mutual concerns, effectively characterizing the two countries’ bond as superficial — which it most certainly is not.

Further, Israelis transformed what was once largely swamp and desert into a thriving economic and military powerhouse that has maintained freedoms and democracy. That achievement, forged from the sweat of the first kibbutz worker to the blood of today’s most recent army draftee, will not be decimated by a few choice journalistic words or the influence of a snarky columnist. Israelis’ perseverance will continue defeating all odds, even if so-called liberal publications sway opinion.

Lastly, the perception of fear from these publications largely undercuts arguments that Iran, terrorists, and Muslim extremists are very tangible threats that could cause the deaths of hundred or thousands of Israelis. From extremists in Egypt transforming a former Israeli ally into a threat to the prospects of a nuclear Middle East to rockets from terrorists on Israel’s borders, the country faces substantial security challenges. Solutions to those problems, whether military or economic, would benefit from policymakers’ accurate understanding of these threats, which are far more dangerous than a bad pun or a critical headline.

The declaration of the “liberal” media being more threatening merely diminishes the correct assertions that these very real dangers could jeopardize Israel’s security at any minute.

Elected officials’ obsession with attacking the so-called liberal media merely skirts the real issues of today, and threatens to downplay the most serious threats facing their country.  Netanyahu has thus far been a champion building international understanding of the true threat Iran and Muslim extremists face to Israel and the world at-large.  He should maintain that path and not let political kowtowing unravel his year’s of effective advocacy on behalf of Israel.

In his NYT op-ed today entitled ‘Don’t Do It, Bibi,’ Roger Cohen issued another stern warning to his favorite target, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. In his piece, he warns about the grave repercussions if Israel were to attack Iran without political support from the United States.

This article is the latest installment in Cohen’s crusade against Netanyahu and the Likud-led governing coalition in Israel. Cohen solemnly recites all the ways in which Netanyahu has mistreated President Obama before he settles down and proceeds with his analysis of Iran’s nuclear threat.

Cohen argues that Netanyahu has stalled in his negotiations with the Palestinians because he foresees a rabidly pro-Israel Republican nominee beating Obama in the 2012 presidential elections. Yet in the next paragraph Cohen contends that Netanyahu is sorely tempted to bomb Iran before the elections because he and his advisors increasingly believe Obama can win in November.

Now, almost everybody following the Middle East understands that Netanyahu is a savvy politician who is not oblivious to American election cycles. Perhaps even more than most politicians, Netanyahu may be better characterized as “cynical” than “shrewd” in formulating his political agenda. And it may be true that Netanyahu indeed forecasts a Republican victory in 2012, but wants to hedge his bets by bombing Iran’s nuclear reactors while Obama courts the Jewish vote in the swing state of Florida.

However, Cohen makes the same mistakes in this article that he has consistently made throughout his analysis of the Iranian threat.

First, he implies that any attack by Israel would be a massive bombing campaign that would instantly and irreversibly unite all of Iran’s people under their oppressive regime and against the West. For starters, any aerial attack would be limited to the nuclear reactor sites and would probably result in few civilian casualties. With the possible tacit support of the US, in the last few years Israel has already attacked Iran’s nuclear program with a computer virus, assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, and sabotaged missile bases in Iran that resulted in dozens of Iranian deaths. Meanwhile, less than three years ago Iran’s regime was strongly challenged by its populace. While the theocratic government may have suppressed the mass protests in 2009, there is still a strong anti-regime sentiment among Iranians. Moreover, the “regime” itself is an uneasy coalition between Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that is showing highly visible signs of strain. I’m not sure how Cohen can absorb these facts and compute that an attack by Israel “locks in the Iranian Republic for a generation.”

Second (and he is not alone in this truly bizarre line of argumentation), he reckons that Israel’s security is threatened more by the status of the occupied territories than by Iran. I fully agree that Israel must keep striving to find a way to ensure that Palestinians have a fully functioning state. While the on and off again courtship between Hamas and Fatah certainly complicates matters, it is also reasonable to argue that the Netanyahu administration has shown a distinct lack of urgency in its approach toward negotiations with the Palestinians. I am also gravely aware of the risks that any aerial attack by Israel on Iranian reactor sites would entail (although per above I disagree with Cohen about their nature.) However, I struggle to comprehend how the Israeli-Palestinian quagmire, which is grinding toward its 45th year of existence, can be compared to the existential threat posed by the nuclear program of a country whose stated intention is to destroy Israel.

The East Point Lighthouse in New Jersey photographed during one of the first meteor showers of 2012.

Still sticking to those new year’s resolutions? Me neither. That’s why I’m looking forward to living vicariously through the 2012 “resolutions” of some major players in space. So what lies ahead – or above – in 2012?

Space Junk 2.0

Keep your head up on January 15th. Literally. That’s when the failed Russian Mars probe, Phobos-Grunt, is expected to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere. For those who thought 2011 was, “The Year of Space Junk,” think again.  It appears as if we should get used to the idea of things falling from the sky. It was only a few months ago when the world braced for the re-entry of NASA’s UARS climate satellite and Germany’s ROSAT satellite. Now it’s the Russians’ turn. Launched on November 8, 2011, Phobos-Grunt has been stuck in the Earth’s orbit ever since. The nearly 15-ton behemoth is expected to land (read as “crash”) anywhere between a latitude of 51 degrees north and 51 degrees south – roughly as far north as England and as far south as Argentina – and at an unpredictable longitude.

Astronaut Candidate Class of 2013

For those men and women who have not yet given up on their dream of becoming an astronaut, 2012 is your year. NASA will accept applications for the Astronaut Class of 2013 until January 27, 2012. Finalists will be selected in October 2012 and announced to the public in March 2013. In June 2013, it’s time to report to Johnson Space Center for duty.

The Commercialization of Space

If 2011 was the year we began to question American supremacy in the cosmos, then 2012 is shaping up to be the year we reinvent ourselves. On February 7th, Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) is expected to launch its Falcon 9 rocket, the first (ever) commercial spacecraft to rendezvous with the International Space Station. If successful, this will be a major step forward for commercial space exploration – and for America’s space program. The mission is meant to serve as a test run for future missions that will carry cargo and crew to the ISS.

SpaceX isn’t the only game in town either. The Dream Chaser, a product of Sierra Nevada Corporation, will make similar attempts. Instead of direct surface-to-station launches, Dream Chaser will hitch a ride aboard Virgin Galactic’s WhiteKnightTwo before attempting a high-altitude takeoff en route to the ISS. LightSail-1, a solar sail spacecraft produced by the Planetary Society, will also launch in 2012 to explore ways in which future spacecraft can utilize the energy of the Sun to go faster and deeper into space.

Finally, for those who have an extra $200,000 sitting around, why not book a flight to space with Virgin Galactic? Nearly 400 people have already made their reservations and paid in full (that’s $80 million for those counting). Virgin Galactic is expected to begin these flights in 2012, barring no setbacks, officially kicking off the space tourism industry.

Major Milestones

Government-sponsored projects are also expected to make headlines in 2012. China’s manned space laboratory will potentially welcome its first visitors in 2012 as China continues to push itself into elite status in space.

NASA is also expected to make headlines in more ways than one. First, GRAIL (Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory) is already circling the Moon. Its mission? Measure in detail the Moon’s gravitational pull to a degree that has never been done before.

In August 2012, NASA’s multi-billion dollar baby, the Curiosity rover, will attempt to land on Mars using a new technological approach that appears to be as risky (and rewarding) as it is innovative. When Buzz Aldrin talks about, “a permanent presence on Mars,” this is the kind of thing he wants to see.

Intellectual Property and Historical Preservation

Jim Lovell (Apollo 13) and NASA are at odds with one another over ownership of the handwritten emergency manual written by Lovell during the Apollo 13 mission.  In November 2011, the manual was auctioned off for $388,000.  Who owned it (and could thus auction it off), Lovell or NASA?  We’ll likely find out in 2012. The result could say a lot about if / how intellectual property rights pertain to space-related materials produced and artifacts found by individuals with the support of government and corporate funding.

On a related note, with the increase in space exploration comes the need to preserve some of mankind’s greatest accomplishments. Tranquility Base, where Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin first step foot on the Moon, is one place that is already listed in the “global history registry.” The question of whether federal preservation laws apply to off-world places was first posed in 1999. “That started the ball rolling,” says Dr. Beth L. O’Leary, a professor at New Mexico State University who has spent a lot of time thinking about how national and international legal systems apply to space. As this New York Times article mentions, over 100 countries have signed the Outer Space Treaty, agreeing not to claim sovereignty over any part of the Moon. With so many new actors in space, 2012 could be the year in which greater attention is paid, either out of necessity or foresight, to the agreed upon laws governing space.

So between rising and falling spacecrafts, a new batch of astronauts, landing on Mars, commercial competition, and an increasing need for legal clarity, 2012 promises to be an interesting year.

Just a heads up.

(Photo Source: Jack Fusco, My Shot, National Geographic)

Today is the first of January 2012, a new year has begun. It will bring joy and happiness for many, some will suffer and some will struggle. That is the reality of life.

2012 will be a challenging year for small businesses across the globe. With deepening economic crisis in Europe, threat of Euro zone and Euro, possibility of Greece and Italy defaulting and push to convince Germany to take the hit by paying for financially strangled nations in Europe, things are not promising!

The US Economy continued in depression since 2007. Although, US economists and the media, including New York Times. Los-Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal, Herald Tribune have acknowledged US economic growth in 2011, the consumer market still looks dull!

Middle East remained a turbulent region during 2011; it is highly unlikely for this region to perform well in the New Year.

According to Moody’s, Asia Pacific economies are going to see some slowdown mainly reflecting upon the economic crisis in Europe. There are chances of recovery in the second half of 2012, but a lot depends on how well the US and European economies perform!

The situation is alarming and a number of businesses particularly domestic businesses in smaller economies will be required to play safe. To be able to survive, small businesses must focus avoiding four major mistakes during 2012:

Expansion without growth:

A number of enthusiasts consider expansion as a tool to increase revenue. A major misconception! Before expansion starts brining revenue, a lot needs to be spent on hiring people, capital expenditure, benefits, marketing etc. If the market does not offer some growth potential in the normal course, expansion will be self-destructive!

Underutilized resources:

It is often seen that companies fail to optimize their resources. Spend time and energy in identifying the right potential of your human and other resources and engage them at an optimal level to achieve maximum output. Any underutilized resources, is money going down the drain!

Increasing Cost of Doing Business:

Cost of doing business increases exponentially for companies that are not managing their accounts well. One of the ways to keep the cost of doing business low is by balancing the receivables and payables. This reduces the financial cost of your businesses. Save energy, manage productivity and reduce cost of inventory – somehow keep strong focus on reducing your cost of doing business.

Saying no to technology:

In this world of social networking, digital marketing and technological advancement, it is highly lethal to delay integrating technology in your business model. Small or big, businesses need to learn how best they can deploy technology.. Social Media and Digital marketing is particularly supportive in case of local retail businesses. Technology is something cannot be ignored in 2012!

I wish you all a very Happy and prosperous 2012!

And you thought your biggest social media worry was being defriended.

Last week, the New York Times published an interesting piece on the use of social media by terrorist groups.  They focused on a recent Twitter battle instigated by the Somalia-based, loosely al-Qaeda linked, al-Shabab.  Their target…African Union peacekeeping forces and the Kenyan army.  The Times writes,

“[T]errorism experts say that Twitter terrorism is part of an emerging trend and that several other Qaeda franchises — a few years ago the Shabab pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda — are increasingly using social media like Facebook, MySpace, YouTube and Twitter. The Qaeda branch in Yemen has proved especially adept at disseminating teachings and commentary through several different social media networks.

“Social media has helped terrorist groups recruit individuals, fund-raise and distribute propaganda more efficiently than they have in the past,” said Seth G. Jones, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation.”

But wait, al-Shabab decries all things Western, right? (As the Times points out, al-Shabab forbids everything from Western movies to bras.)  However, “Western or not,” Al-Shabab has realized what hundreds of millions of us have…social media is a super effective tool. (And given that, just this week, Saudi billionaire Prince Alwaleed bin Talal invested $300 million in Twitter,  what is and isn’t Western is becoming less and less clear. )

Tools like Twitter and Facebook 1) are cheap and accessible, 2) facilitate quick, broad dissemination of messages 3) allow for unfettered communication with an audience without the filter or “selectivity” of mainstream news outlets. (No longer do we have to depend on CNN or Al-Jazeera to tell us what terrorists groups are plotting and why… we can check out their latest tweets.) As the Times notes, much of the messaging from al-Shabab is in “colloquial, often clever, English” using expressions like “Think long. Think hard.”—a clear indication that their trying to reach broad, possibly American or expat community audiences in the US and Europe.

But in the case of al-Shabab and other tech-savvy terrorist groups, shouldn’t we blame the messenger and NOT the message service?  One of the lessons learned from the Arab Spring is that social media is an amazing tool for organizing, reporting and informing.  I was in Morocco most of last January and the best source of updates for the quickly evolving situations in Tunisia and Egypt were friends in the region on Facebook and tweeting journalists and activists on the ground. (Even as I write this post near the OccupyDC tents in McPherson Square in Washington, DC, my iPhone asks me every few minutes if I want to connect to the protesters’ “OccupyDC” wireless network.)

So, where do we go from here? (THAT’S the 140-character question.) How do we non-terrorists share this new uncharted ‘space’ created by social media with those who would turn our helpful tools into tactical weapons?  What are the rules for engaging with groups like al-Shabab via social media? (Threatening video diatribes clandestinely sent to news stations are one-sided messages, but social media is about dialogue and two-way communication.) Does responding, retweeting, rebutting, condemning or, [gasp!], “liking” messages from terrorists groups via social media give them a platform or, like it or not, do they already have it?  Is it possible that the ease of communicating via social media may actually work AGAINST terrorist groups in that once-menacing, clearly articulated agendas by a central figure become jumbled, inconsistent 140 character quips that few take seriously, posted by anyone with a Twitter handle and the temerity to self-associate themselves with established terrorists groups?

A Salon article today by Glenn Greenwald takes the NY Times to task for some of its assertions from last week article and asks some of the same questions I raise. Greenwald also explores unclear role that governments can/should have in shutting down suspected terrorist groups’ social media accounts (and the possible futility of doing so.)

Do you have the answers?  Just direct message me or write on my wall…

 (Btw, If you want to really understand what is happening in Somalia, Dr. J. Peter Pham just published a really well-done paper in the Journal of the Middle East and Africa, “State Collapse, Insurgency, and Famine in the Horn of Africa: Legitimacy and the Ongoing Somali Crisis.”   As always, Dr. Pham lays out a very clear description of the history, players and stakes of the crisis.)

The end of 2011 is fast approaching and with it the departure of U.S. forces and equipment from Iraq by December 31st so thought I’d pass on some of my thoughts. In November, I participated in two Department of Defense sponsored Bloggers Roundtables on our force drawdown efforts there. One was with Army Brigadier General Bradley A. Becker, deputy commanding general for U.S. Division Center, Baghdad. He is responsible for the oversight of support and sustainment to U.S. forces in support of Operation New Dawn. The second was with Major General Russell Handy, commander, 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Iraq and director, Air Component Coordination Element-Iraq, who discussed the contributions and legacy of the USAF in training the Iraq — Iraqi Air Force and ongoing air defense training as that mission is transferred to the Iraqis.

I think the first thing that jumps out at me is the continuing disconnect between the American public and the 1% of the nation that has and is participating in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. If you just look at most of the media reports, one is under the impression the timing of the departure is a sole initiative of the Obama administration. If you look into it you discover the timeline for the departure actually was set up by the Bush administration as part of a Status of Forces agreement. A little background is in order. According to the Council for Foreign Relations, “the status of forces agreement is a legal framework that defines how foreign militaries operate in a host country. Typically established by executive agreement, there is no uniform or standard format for the document, which can vary in length and specificity.”

According to an article in the December 12, 2011 New York Times/International Herald: “On Nov. 27, 2008, the Iraqi Parliament ratified a Status of Forces agreement with the United States that set a course for an end to the United States’ role in the war and marks the beginning of a new relationship between the countries. The pact called for American troops to pull out of most Iraqi cities by the summer of 2009 and set the end of 2011 as the date by which the last American troops must leave the country.”

Why is this important? It is not my intent to down play the considerable achievements of the Obama administration in Iraq, simply to provide some additional information in order to put the event in the right context. Why is this important? One of the questions being asked is what happens after the U.S. troops leave? Can the Iraqi security forces handle the expected levels of violence? In order to understand the question and answer, it’s important to gain a sense of how involved have the Iraqis been in providing their security up to this point. Here is how General Becker replied when asked that question:

“I think the Iraqi security forces are capable of managing the violence from both the violent extremist organizations such as al-Qaida and JRTN as well as some of the Iranian-backed militias such as Asaba al-Haq (ph). Those organizations will still be able to conduct attacks. They’ll be able to conduct high-profile attacks periodically. But the Iraqi security forces have shown all the way back to June 2009 when U.S. forces came out of the cities that they are capable of being able to disrupt these organizations to prevent them from, you know, getting away with major sustained attacks and really enforce these organizations to just be able to conduct high-profile attacks that make — that make the headlines, but they don’t really have any impact on the government, and they have really limited impact on the people. In fact, most of the people have, you know, completely rejected these organizations.
So I think the Iraqi — I think there may be a spike in violence…But the Iraqi security forces have been in the lead since Operation New Dawn and since really out of the cities in 2009. So the Iraqi security forces have already shown that they’re capable. They did it during the elections. They did it, you know, during the Arab Spring when there were protests around the region and small protests within Iraq. But the Iraqi security forces have shown that they’re capable for that type of a threat.”

Concerning the Iraqi Air Force, Major General Handy stated:

“Since the president’s comments last month (October 2011) highlighting our current path to compliance with the security agreement to have all of our military forces out by December 31st, we’ve really seen a renewed interest in these efforts from the States. And I’m proud to be able to talk about where we are in that process… The president’s remarks, though, only punctuated what we are already doing, was already under way, and that is our obligation to living up to our commitment of complying with the security agreement.
From an airman’s perspective, this stage of the operation takes on a particularly unique importance and represents unique challenges. Some of our tasks remain constant. We’re clearly still performing all of those air component missions you’ve become accustomed to hearing of: intelligence; surveillance; reconnaissance and close-air support, to keep overwatch and protect our forces; air mobility, to include air lifts and air refueling; search and rescue and personnel recovery; and operating and securing airfields, to name a few.
What is evolving here is how our airmen continue to do all this while they transition bases back to the authority and control of GOI, and assist U.S. Mission-Iraq in their efforts. And we do continue to do this in a dangerous place. We are, regrettably, reminded here on a regular basis there are still those out there who would seek to do us harm and would seek to do our Iraqi partners harm.
Our plans for what we’re doing now, how we’ve postured our force in this phase, have really been in the works for the better part of a year now. This has taken a tremendous amount of collective effort from our entire joint team to be ready for this, and there is still much to be done. But I will tell you, we are ready; it’s under way. And one thing you can be sure of: Our airmen will be here, overhead, keeping watch, protecting our forces until the last convoy, the last soldier, sailor, airman, Marine, Coast Guardsman or civilian departs the country from USF-I.”

Time will tell how successful the Iraqi security forces will be but since they’ve been more involved since 2009 it shows they’ve gained some experience. General Becker provided some interesting background summarizing the drawdown stating:

“At the height of coalition operations in 2007 and 2008, we had 505 bases in Iraq and 165,000 service members. As you can imagine, it’s a monumental task to properly account for all of this property, retrograde what has to be moved out of Iraq and transfer it to the Department of State and the government of Iraq properly designated for transfer to them.
What’s truly impressive, at least to me, is that our soldiers have set the conditions to professionally complete this massive drawdown of people and equipment while continuing to partner with Iraqi security forces and to make them better and successfully transition responsibility to the Department of State to ensure their success in the future…In August of 2010, we developed a very detailed and thoughtful plan for how we would execute this mission. We made adjustments to the plan during to and prior to our arrival in December and have continued to improve the plan since we arrived.
So where we are now in November 2011 with seven bases remaining to transfer, only 1700 truckloads of equipment to retrograde and less than 20,000 soldiers still in Iraq, is a result of a really thoughtful and well-executed plan and, of course, the hard work of thousands of great soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines.”

Think I’ll end here. As always my views are my own.

Events last week illustrated that the true fault line in India-China relations remains the 60 year-old acrimony over the Tibetan frontier.

From India’s increasing presence in the disputed waters of the South China Sea to the duel over diplomatic influence in Myanmar, developments in recent months amply illustrate how India and China will bump into each other as they grow in power and aspiration. But events last week illustrate that the true fault line in bilateral relations remains the 60 year-old acrimony over the Indo-Tibetan frontier. The border area was the site for the month-long war between the countries in 1962, as well as serious military crises in 1967 and 1987. It is the only place where the outbreak of armed conflict is a realistic possibility, as well as the focus for much of India’s expansive plans for military modernization. And the chances are good that the frictions here will only intensify in the years ahead.

The border was to be the stage for an act of India-China cooperation last week, when high-level talks were to convene in New Delhi aimed at managing the increasing quarrels along the Himalayan boundary. The meeting was also intended to prepare the way for a visit to India early next year by Xi Jinping, China’s vice president who is heir apparent to Hu Jintao. But the Chinese side abruptly pulled out of the talks after failing to persuade New Delhi to prevent the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader who is much reviled in Beijing as a separatist, from giving the valedictory address at an international Buddhist conclave that was meeting in the Indian capital at the same time.

The border talks will likely be rescheduled in the coming weeks. Both governments were circumspect in their official comments about the postponement. Notably, the Global Times, a Beijing-based tabloid that is an unfailing tribune of bemusing jingoism including recent fulminations aimed at New Delhi, reacted cautiously. In an editorial titled “China and India mustn’t go for the throat,” it counseled that:

“Both sides must keep the border issue from worsening by focusing on keeping good will talks alive and being mindful of the consequences of a sudden breakdown.”

A high-level defense dialogue between the two countries will also go ahead as scheduled in New Delhi this week. With the United States becoming more strategically assertive in East Asia – punctuated by President Barack Obama’s tour in the region last month – Beijing has high incentive to stabilize relations with India while it turns its attention to the challenges raised by Washington. The Global Times underscored this priority when it noted that even though India “appears to be highly interested in facing off with China,” the rivalry with New Delhi “is not the primary focus of Chinese society.”

With its own plate piled high with economic and governance challenges, not to mention the multiple insurgencies underway in its northeastern region, India also is keen to tamp down border ructions. Indeed, in deference to Chinese sensitivities, Pratibha Patil, India’s president who was supposed to inaugurate the Buddhist assembly, cancelled her participation, while Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, also scheduled to make an appearance, likewise stayed away.

But events are conspiring to upend each side’s preferences. As last week’s contretemps demonstrate, the border dispute is not simply a matter of contested claims over real estate. It also is bound up with the increasingly volatile issue of Tibetan nationalism. It is no coincidence that Beijing in recent years has turned up the volume about its territorial claims on the northeastern Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh (the latter of which China has taken to calling “South Tibet”) at the same moment that the ethnic Tibetan population inside China has become more restive. Beijing views the agitations as the handiwork of the Dalai Lama, who has been especially effective in making Tibet an international cause célèbre, as well as the Tibetan government-in-exile. Both the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan exile core are based in Dharamsala in northern India.

Adding to the combustible mix is the location of Tawang Monastery, a revered site in Tibetan Buddhism that is just inside the Indian side of the contested border. The monastery is close to the birthplace of a 17th-century Dalai Lama who remains an immensely popular historical figure among Tibetans. Its significance has greatly increased after the current Dalai Lama stated that he might be reincarnated outside of Chinese-controlled territory and that the selection process for his successor might break with precedent, such as being hand-picked by him or chosen by popular acclaim. With Tawang likely to play an important role in the selection, Beijing is keen to assert control over it.

Beijing’s apoplexy over the Dalai Lama, once again on display last week in New Delhi, is a measure of its insecurity on the Tibet issue. This hypersensitivity has impelled the People’s Republic, officially an atheistic party-state, to entangle itself in deeply into the affairs of Tibetan religious institutions, including absurdly banning the current Dalai Lama from being reborn anywhere but inside China and insisting that it alone has the definitive word on the selection of his successor. It drove Beijing in 1995 to kidnap a six year-old Tibetan boy who the Dalai Lama proclaimed as the Panchen Lama, the second-ranking figure in Tibetan Buddhism. The boy’s fate remains unknown; Beijing has promoted its own candidate as the true Panchen Lama. While many Tibetans see this person as a pretender, he provides Beijing a key opening to manipulate the selection for the next Dalai Lama, since the Panchen Lama traditionally has a central part in the process.

China has also embarked on a charm offensive (here and here) to win the hearts and minds of the international Buddhist community, including plans to build a multi-billion dollar pilgrimage and tourism complex at the Buddha’s birthplace in Lumbini, Nepal, which is right on the border with India. New Delhi is counter-punching by sponsoring Buddhist gatherings, including the one last week that raised Beijing’s ire and which in one of its final acts decided to create an International Buddhist Confederation that will be headquartered in the Indian capital.

Given the volatility of the Tibetan issue, one could envision without much imagination scenarios that result in a military confrontation along the frontier. One might involve the outbreak of serious unrest within Tibet, leading to a Chinese crackdown that spills into India. Beijing could bring military pressure on New Delhi to clamp down on the Dalai Lama and his compatriots in Dharamsala, setting off a dangerous spiral of misperception and miscalculation. Alternatively, the passing of the Dalai Lama, who is now 76, could spark a tumultuous search for his successor, leading China to seize Tawang so it can control the outcome.

Unfortunately, there is ample historical precedent for such scenarios. Indian support of the abortive Tibetan uprising in 1959, for example, colored Beijing’s perceptions in the lead-up to the 1962 border war. And in the mid-1980s, an isolated incident in the Sumdurong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh led to a serious military stand-off in early 1987. As one of the WikiLeaks dispatches from the U.S. embassy in Beijing reported, some Chinese observers believe that policy on Tibet is even more inflexible than toward Taiwan, where Beijing at least tolerates some U.S. interference. And concern among Chinese leaders over internal discontent is rising.

A New York Times article has called Tawang “the biggest tinderbox” in relations between India and China. Expect to hear more about it in the coming years.

(An earlier version of this post appeared at http://www.usinpac.com)

Well, the sordid saga is finally over. Husain Haqqani has resigned as Ambassador to the U.S. and, notwithstanding demands for inquiries and follow ups, I am resting assured that this matter will be forgotten relatively soon. At the very least, the inquiries and commissions and investigations will be buried in paperwork and bureaucraticese to the point where no one will care anymore. This is what happens with every single inquiry or commission into something controversial, and I suspect this will be the same.

Who are angry right wing Pakistanis going to send abusive tweets to now? Photo: AP

Here are some questions I’ve been mulling over the last few days:

1. What exactly happened here?

Obviously, nobody knows for sure. Well, correction: two people know for sure. But really, nobody knows for sure.

Of course, that shouldn’t stop us from speculation. Here’s my best guess:

The Blackberry exchange is real. The memo, however, was not written by Husain Haqqani (the language and writing is terrible; Haqqani is Zardari’s go-to man for all those fake op-eds in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post… go and read the memo and see for yourself if it reads by someone who’s written for those publications, albeit under someone else’s name).

The memo was probably written by Mansoor Ijaz himself, and its contents were probably agreed upon by the two. That’s my guess.

Of course, this sets up a series of follow up questions. Such as…

1a Why would Haqqani go through someone so clearly untrustworthy and unreliable?

On the one hand, it makes absolutely no sense. Haqqani is a street-smart guy who knows about the daily practice of politics better than most people alive. It wouldn’t make sense for him to commit such a rookie mistake. And because it seems so unlikely, people seem eager to believe that this entire thing is an elaborate conspiracy.

I’m not so sure. If the best defense is “why would he do something so stupid?” then I’m sorry, that’s not up to the mark. My view is that smart people do stupid things all the time. One of my favorite books ever is David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest, a book that shines a light on smart people committing one strategic blunder after another in Vietnam.

Let’s not pretend that people good at their job are immune to mistakes of judgment. Napoleon was a pretty good military commander, then committed a pretty big mistake. His cost him all but 10,000 soldiers in an army of half a million. An ambassadorship is chump change compared to that, I’m sure you’ll agree. People screw up. It happens.

1b Was Ijaz playing Haqqani?

By the end of it, Ijaz was obviously firmly in the GHQ-ISI camp. The question is: when did he join them? Was at some point during the crisis? Or was it before the entire thing began? If it’s the latter, then that is essentially another way of saying that Ijaz played Haqqani the whole frigging time.

I don’t buy that. Haqqani is clearly an order of magnitude brighter than this guy. I can’t believe that Ijaz was acting on behalf of the ISI in some conspiracy the whole time and not once did Haqqani suspect what was going on. That just strikes me as highly unlikely. More likely, Ijaz flipped somewhere in the middle, when the controversy was just gathering apace and the khakis probably presented him with an offer he couldn’t refuse.

2. How will this move impact US-Pakistan relations?

Not very seriously, in my opinion. On the list of things that matter to US-Pakistan relations, the personality of the ambassador from one of the countries to the other country is pretty low down on the totem pole.

Another way of thinking about this is to accept this disjuncture: Haqqani was, by almost all accounts, a fantastic ambassador and brilliant diplomat. And yet US-Pakistan relations are about as bad as they’ve been in a decade.

What does that mean? Well, for me, it means that individuals don’t matter a great deal when it comes to figuring out outcomes and processes between states. Institutions, interests, geography, the balance of power — these are the things that clearly matter a lot.

I’m sure Haqqani’s excellence in his role mattered a little bit on the margins, maybe a billion dollars of aid here or there. But individuals simply don’t impact the overarching trajectory of interstate relations. If Kayani was replaced by a generic khaki tomorrow, the US-Pakistan relationship would be largely the same. Bob Gates was replaced by Panetta, and the relationship was largely the same. Haqqani will be replaced, and the relationship will be largely the same.

3. Is this a win for the khakis and a loss for the civvies?

On the surface, sure. And that’s certainly how it was being played up by the liberal twitterati. The basic tenor of this analysis was: woe is us, the khakis have pulled a fast one, the poor civvies lose again.

I think that analysis is lazy. Sure, this is a win for the khakis, they’ve hated Haqqani since he lobbied against Musharraf in DC and wrote a book heavily criticizing the military and its role in Pakistani politics and society (and probably well before then actually). They would obviously prefer to live in a world where someone they don’t trust and don’t like is not the primary face of the Pakistan government in Washington.

That said, the belief that this was some elaborate conspiracy and the poor PPP is once again the victims of the dastardly GHQ is dumb. Understand this: there is not a single democracy in the world, even (especially?) the ones in which the civilians rule the roost, where someone who did what Haqqani allegedly did would survive. Not a single one. In our rush to decry the civilian-military (im)balance in Pakistan, this fact seems to have gotten lost. What Haqqani is accused of doing is a really, really big deal!

Even if you agree with the larger goals of the memo and the intellectual basis behind it, this was a really stupid and bad way to go about it. No reasonable person can disagree that this is a fireable offense, all over the world, democracy or not.

Of course, the question then becomes: was he actually party to the fireable offense, or was this an elaborate plan concocted by the GHQ-ISI from the beginning? I have very serious doubts about the latter proposition — I think we sometimes give too much credit to the military for strategic adroitness and tactical brilliance that it doesn’t really have.

The bottom line is: none of us can know for sure. I think that my belief that there’s no smoke without fire here is a reasonable one. Others may disagree. That’s fine. Just be aware that angrily and decisively asserting that this was an unjustified or unfair move rests on the supposition that he is absolutely not guilty. And there is no way that all the Haqqani defenders out there know that for sure. So why are they pretending that they do?

I would also add that I don’t think Haqqani would have gone away so easily, or that Zardari would have let him go so easily, if there wasn’t some evidence backing up his involvement that they have both seen. This, after all, is not the first time the military has wanted to get rid of one of Zardari’s men. How long, for instance, have they tried to get rid of that fool Rehman Malik? And unlike Haqqani, Rehman Malik is terrible at his job, so he can’t even play the competence card. Or what about Haqqani himself, who was rumored to be on the chopping block post-Kerry/Lugar?

And yet, Malik has survived, despite the odds, and Haqqani hasn’t, not this time anyway. That tells me that there was something different about this case that forced Zardari’s hand in a way the other cases did not.

4. If Haqqani can be fired for a fireable offense, why can’t the military brass be fired for a fireable offense?

This is the key issue for me. Post Osama raid, I (along with others) urged the government to form a consensus on cutting the military down to size, to strike while the going was good. The military was thoroughly discredited and there would be no better opportunity for true accountability.

Unfortunately, the khakis got away with their mistake (as they often do) while the civvy got stuck with his. That’s obviously not an ideal set of circumstances for the state’s development.

The ironic or tragic thing about this whole episode is that Haqqani was — if you believe he is somehow involved in this — trying to achieve something that we all wanted, at the same time as we all wanted, but in a way very, very different to what we wanted. The correct way would have been to try to get the two big parties and a couple others on board for a thorough parliamentary inquiry. I wonder if he tried that way at all, and whether he was rebuffed by Zardari and Gilani if he did.

Either way, my point is that Haqqani is suffering for a mistake he allegedly made. But the khakis are not suffering for a mistake they definitely and incontrovertibly made. That’s a problem.

Here’s the thing though: only the civilians can solve that problem. Relying on the goodwill of the khakis for self-accountability is a strategy doomed to failure. Getting a collective backbone, and getting a critical mass of politicians together who feel more comfortable taking the military on than they do taking each other on, would be two good steps. In a weird way, we need our civilians to act more like the khakis: ready to strike when they have to, taking no prisoners, and showing no mercy.

I recently came across two worthwhile pieces on Persian Gulf states punching above their weight. The first is a New York Times analysis of Qatar, the lil’ oil rich country that could:

Qatar is smaller than Connecticut, and its native population, at 225,000, wouldn’t fill Cairo’s bigger neighborhoods. But for a country that inspires equal parts irritation and admiration, here is its résumé, so far, in the Arab revolts: It has proved decisive in isolating Syria’s leader, helped topple Libya’s, offered itself as a mediator in Yemen and counts Tunisia’s most powerful figure as a friend.

This thumb-shaped spit of sand on the Persian Gulf has emerged as the most dynamic Arab country in the tumult realigning the region. Its intentions remain murky to its neighbors and even allies — some say Qatar has a Napoleon complex, others say it has an Islamist agenda. But its clout is a lesson in what can be gained with some of the world’s largest gas reserves, the region’s most influential news network in Al Jazeera, an array of contacts (many with an Islamist bent), and policy-making in an absolute monarchy vested in the hands of one man, its emir, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani.

Qatar has become a vital counterpoint in an Arab world where traditional powers are roiled by revolution, ossified by aging leaderships, or still reeling from civil war, and where the United States is increasingly viewed as a power in decline.

The next one is about the big boy of the Gulf, Saudia Arabia, and it comes from the Washington Post’s David Ignatius, who sees the House of Saud filling a power gap left by a ‘declining’ United States:

The more-assertive Saudi role has been clear in its open support for the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who is Iran’s crucial Arab ally. The Saudis were decisive backers of last weekend’s Arab League decision to suspend Syria‘s membership (though they also supported the organization’s waffling decision on Wednesday to send another mediation team to Damascus).

Money is always the Saudis’ biggest resource, and they are planning to spend it more aggressively as a regional power broker — roughly double their armed forces over the next 10 years and spend at least $15 billion annually to support countries weakened economically by this year’s turmoil.

Saudi sources provided an unofficial summary of the defense buildup. The army will add 125,000 to its estimated current force of 150,000; the national guard will grow by 125,000 from an estimated 100,000; the navy will spend more than $30 billion buying new ships and sea-skimming missiles; the air force will add 450 to 500 planes; and the Ministry of Interior is boosting its police and special forces by about 60,000. The Saudis are also developing their own version of the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command.

There’s a lot of talk about an American pivot to the Pacific and East Asia, and rightly so, but the Middle East has a way of drawing you back in. In the recent actions and strategic maneuvers of Saudi Arabia and Qatar we can see why.