Saying that Quran is not inherently a patriarchal text does not automatically imply that Quran is inherently feminist either. Of course, feminist interpretations of Islam are possible but patriarchal interpretations are not just possible, they are already existing and dominant, and one cannot see much objective reason as to why a feminist interpretation should have more theological validity than a patriarchal interpretation as being the true interpretation, apart from the fact that it corresponds to feminist morality. If Quran cannot be read and understood at all without some sort of interpretation being imposed on it during the process, as the enthusiastic liberal Muslims who play the interpretation card would like to believe, then it implies that the text alone is devoid of meaning and there is nothing inherent to the Quran. It is inherently neither patriarchal nor feminist; it becomes either of these by virtue of the interpretation we choose to see it through. Yet this conclusion is something that would make most Muslims feminists uncomfortable, because they would like to believe that the “true Islam” conforms to their moral values of feminism. Apart from the uncommon Islamic variants which de-emphasize the centrality of textual interpretation in religion, such a deconstructed view of scripture is indeed awkward for most practising Muslims.

Some Islamic feminists say that Islam recognizes men and women as equal but prescribes different gender roles for them given their biological differences. Sounds neat, but it is a problematic position from a feminist point of view. It is not entirely clear how much biological gender can determine social gender roles. The tendency has been to view gender as primarily a socio-cultural construct (‘One is not born a woman, but becomes one’) and feminism has been in many ways a rebellion against the social norms of what women are and aren’t supposed to do. If Islam does indeed prescribe different gender roles, and it is a conclusion hard to avoid unless you resort to radical leaps of interpretations, then it is rendering itself an easy target for feminist attacks. All prescriptions of gender roles have a certain oppression about them. Furthermore, this is guilty of a binary conception of gender and ignores androgyny in its entirety.

The problem of reconciling Islam and Feminism becomes all the more apparent when we consider a topic like homosexuality. In this case Islamic feminists who support homosexuality have to explain away many Quranic verses (story of Lot, for instance) and hadiths which admonish against homosexuality, and even if we presume that this explaining away can be done successfully, there is still nothing left that is in favor of homosexuality. It may be possible to say that Islam can be interpreted in a way that makes it compatible with homosexuality, yet no one can demonstrate that Islam supports homosexuality, that Islam argues for homosexual rights. There is simply no textual evidence in positive acceptance of homosexuality, and this leaves a big chasm at the very heart of Islamic feminism. Clearly, the justified and well-cherished feminist support of homosexuality cannot be derived from the Quran. Therefore, feminism has at least some moral values on which Quran is, at best, silent.

Another example that can be brought up is that of the moral status of pre-marital consensual sex. Western Feminists are vastly accepting of consensual sex regardless of the marital status and do not deem it to be morally objectionable. Islamic Feminists tend to tip-toe around this. We may see them arguing that Islam doesn’t treat fornication as a legal crime, even though it does; the 4 witnesses requirement may be an unlikely possibility to fulfill in practice but it exists in theory. Let us give the benefit of doubt to the Islamic feminists and suppose that this can be successfully explained away and consensual sex is de-criminalized. Nonetheless, there is still no moral approval or acceptance of a casual sexual encounter in Islam. Islam morally prohibits pre-marital sex and all Islamic feminists who may believe that consensual sex is not to be morally judged and disapproved have a lot of explaining to do. And all Islamic feminists who disapprove of consensual sex also have a lot of explaining to do because it is a seemingly un-feminist stance to morally restrict sex to marriage.

These examples can be used to demonstrate the two grades of Islamic Feminism: 

Weak Islamic Feminism: Islam and feminism are not mutually exclusive.

Strong Islamic Feminism: The feminist principles and values are already present in Islam and can be derived from them.

The feminist support of homosexuality and consensual sex, among other things, is in my view a refutation of Strong Islamic Feminism. Weak Islamic Feminism is a position that can be consistently argued for, though it still requires feats of creative interpretations, and has the accompanying (awkward) conclusions that Islam is not inherently feminist and that there are at least some feminist moral values that are meta-Quranic. Either way it shows that Islamic Feminism is yet to explore these questions in philosophical depth and is not likely to be successful unless it is accompanied by a broader reformative theology that tackles the problems of textual interpretation.

@AfiaAslam raised a question on twitter whether it is ethical to preserve diaries after the death of their writers. Here are my thoughts on the matter:

While some may say that a diary is, by default, meant to be for author’s eyes only, the situation is not entirely so clear in real life, where people attach different degrees of privacy to their diaries. Some may wish to guard them obsessively, others may not be so averse to their being read, especially after they are dead. In situations where the wishes of the author are not known, and in the absence of any clues that may indicate what the author would have preferred, or if such a desire is not evident through the contents of the diary, and the material in the diary is not of a personal and sensitive nature, then I do not see any reason why it should constitute a moral violation.

If the writer had expressed a desire that the contents of the diary be kept private and/or the material in the diary is of a personal and sensitive nature, then the ethical thing would be to honor that wish.

However, if the contents of the diary are of potentially great literary worth (such as Kafka’s or Plath’s) then it would put the custodian in a utilitarian dilemma, where he would have to weigh respecting the wishes of the deceased against benefitting humanity with the work of a literary genius. If the work is sufficiently valuable, one may treat the wishes of the author as we treat their self-destructive tendencies while they are alive — that is, just as we think it morally justified to attempt to save a man from killing himself, we may consider it morally justified to save a literary masterpiece from destruction.

‘It is so,’ says religion. ‘It could not be so,’ says humanity. Eventually, religion yields. When it doesn’t, it produces monstrosities.

We are fortunate that even those who believe that everything is permitted in theory are in majority of cases not capable of everything in practice. 

The research of Kiley Hamlin from the University of British Columbia demonstrates how infants possess almost adult-like moral understanding, developed somewhere between fifth and eighth months of life.

This is yet another bit of evidence in favor of universal moral grammar.

(See my previous post: Universal Moral Grammar and Implications)

A few days back during a conversion with my friend Qasim we started discussing Plato’s philosophy of virtue, and Qasim expressed how sometimes he felt strongly drawn by the notion that all wrongdoing springs from ignorance, and if one really knew something was wrong, he would not do it. I must admit, the idea is not without appeal to me as well. It’s a question I’ve often asked myself as well; if I wholeheartedly believe an act to be wrong, if I know that one ought not act in such and such manner, can I then knowingly act in such and such manner?

Plato says all sin is caused by ignorance of the good. If you had known better, you would have done differently. As a immediate objection, I brought up the case of a psychopath. Apparently, I thought, a psychopath can knowingly do something wrong. Qasim was quick to point out, however, that it is only apparently so. It is not at all obvious whether a psychopath actually knows that one ought not act so and so.

Imagine a psychopath who is planning to murder his wife, because she is annoying and he’d rather get rid of her and take all her money too. The psychopath is well-aware that what he is about to do is believed by all around him to be a morally heinous act. He knows that it is believed to be an immoral act, but he feels no guilt, feels no pang of conscience, feels no inner tug of war against the temptation. Does a psychopath know that it is wrong to murder one’s wife?

There is a certain ambiguity in the word ‘know‘ here. I can separate out two usages.

A) A psychopath knows that one ought not murder one’s wife, but he lacks the internal motivation to avoid doing so.

B) A psychopath does not know that one ought not murder one’s wife.

There is a subtle difference in the knowing in A and B. The knowing in A is the ordinary and common sense use of the word. A psychopath knows (A) that one ought not murder one’s wife because he understands the imperative. The knowing in B is in the Platonic sense.

If we consider sentence A to be equivalent to sentence B, then it means that

Let us see if the case of the psychopath (P) is different from that of a “normal” individual (N) when it comes to Platonic moral knowledge.

A psychopath is consciously planning to murder his wife. He does not know that what he is doing is morally wrong.

A normal individual is consciously planning to murder his wife. He does not know that what he is doing is morally wrong.

What then is the difference between the two? Is there no difference at all between the murder committed by a psychopath and murder committed by a normal person? If there is, where does it lie?

It needs to qualified, I’d say. Perhaps the difference is that a normal person actually does believe that what he is doing is morally wrong, but he is able to suppress and ignore it long enough to commit the act. The not-knowing of N resides in a suppression of his internal imperative to do good and avoid evil. This is supported by the fact that a normal person is capable of guilt and regret over his crime. If a normal person did know better, he would not have committed the act. A psychopath, on the other hand, has no such belief; he is not suppressing or ignoring anything. He is not capable of guilt and regret over what he did. The not-knowing of P is in the absence of an internal imperative. For the psychopath, there is nothing to know better.

For my previous ruminations on applying moral philosophy to psychopathy, see the tag Morality and Psychopathy