It would be my first blog on the great transformation taking place in the Arab World, and it is a transformation long overdue. What’s happening is not a freak moment in history but it is rather a natural reaction to what has been a long suppression of Arabs by other fortunate Arab oligarchs and bands of opportunists. Leaders, they were not. I remember when Omar Suleiman, the supposed Vice President of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, announced the latter’s resignation; I screamed of joy, I was ecstatic. It can happen! It just happened! I said to myself; Arabs can remove a president if that president betrays their trust, if he deprives them from basic dignity and freedoms. It first happened in Tunisia, but it was fast and it surprised everyone, even intelligence agencies that were supposed to be intelligent in gathering intelligence were unprepared for what was brewing. We did not it see it unfold day-by–day in Tunisia, Zine-Albidine Ben Ali rushed and fled the country, leaving everyone in a state of shock. I remember listening to the prophets of CNN and MSNBC dismissing rumors of contagion of this small revolution. They were wrong; the symptoms for the political and economic ills of Tunisia were prevalent in all Arab countries, hence, the revolution spread from the Atlantic to the Gulf, shaking the throne of some kings and toppling the self-appointed king of kings Muammar Qaddafi.
Egypt, January 25th, 2010 I was home all day glued to my TV watching Aljazeera Arabic. Hoping for a repeat, I see the hallmarks, but I am not sure. I read books describing revolutions of past history but I’ve never lived during or witnessed one, will the Egyptians do what their neighbors did two weeks before them, I have to stay tuned, I am. Every time Hosni Mubarak appears on TV, I say, this is it, only to have my hopes dashed and despair overtake me. During the three weeks, starting January 25th a struggle was taking place between the forces of the despot and the forces of the common weal. Sunday through Thursday momentum subsides and remains so until Friday, bringing another meaning to TGI Fridays, when the Egyptians come out in force after Friday prayers to demand the removal of the regime.
Egyptians did remove the regime, so did the Libyans, but with a heavy price. Moroccan compromised for greater transparency and accountability to the Parliament and elected representatives of the people. Yemenis deposed of the head of the regime but not the regime. Gulf countries bought the people’s hearts and tolerance of the regimes with an expensive and expansive social safety net. The Libyans suffered huge number of fatalities in their quest for freedom. Freedom has a price. Unfortunately for Muammar Gaddafi, he miscalculated, had he shown mercy to his people and spared them the months of bombing and killing by mercenaries, they could’ve been reciprocal toward him after his capture. Alas, as the common wisdom taught us: you reap what you sow. Arrogance is blinding. Wittingly or unwittingly, Bashar El-Assad is following in Gadhafi’s footsteps, believing that mass murder will save his dynasty.
Bashar El-assad is betting on the strategic alliance his country has with the republic of Iran and the complex make-up of the sectarian allegiances in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. The Middle East have seen the disastrous consequences of a civil war in Iraq, and it is trying by all means to avoid a repeat of such a scenario that could engulf the region. Russia will try it’s hardest not to break with its last ally in the Middle East. If the regime in Syria falls, Russia will lose its last totalitarian friend in the region. The people of Syria, however, are betting on their determination and the tectonic movements around them. Just like no one has predicted the spontenous start of these revolutions, no one can foretell how will they end. One year on, The transformation is still progress.

Dear FPB Readers,

My name’s Adil Elassali and I just like to take a quick moment to announce my return from my long absence. I am happy and excited to resume blogging again along with my colleagues for the Middle East region.

This World is changing, Resistance is futile!

Brazil has been affected in recent weeks by suggestions of a slow down in Brazil’s usually hot economy. Inflation in China also has received some attention. The result was that some market studies have been done on the BRICS and emerging economies showing that countries like Mexico, South Africa and Vietnam are doing quite well and that China keeps on moving along to attract investment, even with signs of inflationary pressures. In a Bloomberg article on the top emerging markets, China was the only one of the BRICS to make the medal round, with Thailand and Chile taking the silver and bronze positions. Frontier markets, those who are not BRICS or possible future BRICS but had noticeable growth, also made their own listing with Vietnam at the top of the list. South Africa and Mexico made the top ten of emerging markets, South Africa already being seen as one of the BRICS and Mexico achieving record reserves despite slow growth in the US and local narcotics violence.

This year Mexico will elect a new President and Senate and the parties are slowly presenting their candidates for the upcoming six-year Presidential term. President Calderon has served his one and only legislated term in office of six years and it will remain to be seen whether his PAN party will be re-elected. With excellent economic numbers in a slow global economy, the PAN has a good chance of being re-elected. What might hurt the party is the open drug war in Mexico currently taking place that was a result of Mr. Calderon pressing for drug security in Mexico and the entrenched drug networks that have been established in Mexico over the last few decades. With former PAN President Vicente Fox pushing for a legalisation of the narcotics trade to reduce violence in Mexico, the PAN may have some soul searching to do before putting the Presidential campaign into full force.

A decent market measure for all economies can often been seen in the aviation industries response to different national economies. In Mexico, the now defunct Mexicana Airlines is showing some signs of re-emerging in Mexico after its financial collapse a few years ago. Emerging markets in general has seen some attention from the aviation industry in general as many companies seek customers in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, a result of region market growth in general through to 2016. While the aviation industry is not being displaced in North America and Europe, it does show that BRICS and other emerging and frontier markets will produce trade expansion while the US and eventually the EU drag themselves out of economic paralysis. A conference on competitiveness and innovation addressing the aviation industry by GE named “GE American Competitiveness: What Works” will deal with issues of expansion to emerging markets and strategies in the current US market slowdown next week in Washington DC. Anyone who wishes to see how one industry is handling expansion to emerging markets and growth in the time of economic slowdown should seek information from the conference presenters and organizers. With the possible re-birth of Mexicana and troubles in Asia with the A380, it is certain to be an interesting week of presentations. Information on the conference can be found here.

As I write these words, demonstrations are unfolding in the public squares of Syrian cities and towns, as they have done every Friday for the last eleven months, since the people of Dir’a first took to the streets to manifest their discontent at the indignities imposed upon them by the Asad regime.

Grainy scenes of crowds heaving, swaying, chanting slogans, singing revolutionary songs flash across the screens of Arab satellite channels, scenes of jubilant defiance and anger.

And, as I write, the violent repression of these protests continues. The London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and al-Jazeera (in Arabic) report that 25 individuals have been killed already in the besieged city of Homs and the countryside of Damascus. Another 83 died yesterday across Syria, according to the Observatory, while the Local Coordination Councils put the figure higher still, at 126 – 107 of them in Homs alone.

Overnight, army tanks entered the Insha’at neighbourhood of Homs, prompting fears of a broader ground assault, to follow the week-long artillery campaign on the city, which activists estimate has led to the loss of more than 400 lives.

Reports emerging from the city testify to the use of long-range shells and mortar to pound the residential neighbourhoods of Bab ‘Amru, al-Khalidiyya, al-Insha’at, and Bayyada, and to a worsening humanitarian situation. Human Rights Watch reports that hospitals are unable to cope with the number of casualties, while Al-Jazeera’s Beirut correspondent Rula al-Amin reports that medical supplies and food are running dangerously low (see links above).

There is no doubt that armed contingents of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are present in several neighbourhoods of Homs. However, these deserters number no more than a few hundred or thousand men – a stark reminder of the deep asymmetries of power between these dissident forces and the Syrian regime, which has insistently claimed that it is faced an uprising by ‘armed bands’ (‘isabat), while using to the fullest its military superiority.

In other places, including the coastal cities of Banias and Latakia, in the ‘Alawi heartlands, and the Damascus suburbs of Duma and Daraya, troops have deployed to prevent demonstrators from congregating after Friday prayers.

Meanwhile, several car explosions went off in the northern city of Aleppo, killing 25 and injuring more than 175 according to Syrian state television, which has blamed the attacks on “armed terrorist gangs”.

The General Council for the Syrian Revolution, for its part, has accused the regime of plotting the attacks to foment unrest. This claim was echoed by an activist in the city itself who, citing ‘suspicious activity by security personnel’ in the moments before the explosion, told the BBC that “we hold the Syrian regime entirely responsible for this action”.

Further confusion has arisen from the conflicting claims of different contingents within the FSA. While one officer reportedly told Al-Jazeera’s Beirut correspondent Rula al-Amin that the FSA was responsible for the attacks, the Syrian National Council has issued a statement from the FSA in which it categorically denies any role in the attacks.

This latest blast will only increase the virulent controversy in the blogosphere between supporters of the regime, who see in them confirmation of government claims that the protests of the past year are born of a ‘terrorist’ ‘conspiracy’, and its opponents, who believe that they are one more cynical act of official violence, designed to keep the populations of first Damascus, and now Aleppo, quiescent.

Syria, it is clear, has entered a vicious spiral of violence. The spectre of instability, which the Baathist regimes of Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad have long boasted of holding at bay while neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq were consumed by internecine strife, is now at the door.

Many within the country, of course, had already resigned themselves to protracted unrest before the failure of the UN Security Council to reach agreement on a Draft Resolution supporting the Arab League’s efforts to secure a negotiated transition of power in Syria on the Yemeni model.

However, it does seem that the decision of Russia and China to veto this Draft Resolution has galvanized both the regime and the opposition to ramp up their activities.

While the regime has seen this veto as a license to continue in its repression, the continuing division of the international community on the vexed question of Syria has only added to the intransigence of many activists; despairing at their enforced isolation, they have become more obdurate still in their desire not to give in.

Thus, in a video message circulated on social networks on 6 February, the Humsi activist Khalid Abu Salah allied a call for assistance with a message of resilience. After appealing to ‘every noble human being to save us here in Baba ‘Amr, to save the children and the women in Baba ‘Amr’, he turns away from the camera for a brief moment, as gunfire resounds outside, and the clip seems to draw to an end.

Then, turning back, he addresses words of defiance to the Syrian president: ‘Ya Bashar, don’t think we’re going to surrender, if you killed all of us we wouldn’t surrender … if you killed all of us we wouldn’t surrender’.

Khalid Abu Salah’s “Appeal to the Free World”

There is no doubt whom Syrian opposition activists blame for the lack of support they receive. While the Local Coordination Committees have in the past berated the general inaction of the international community, naming one of their Friday demonstrations, in a sharp rejoinder to the international community, ‘Your silence is killing us’, they have chosen to call this Friday ‘Russia is killing our children’.

Russia has responded in kind to this deliberately emotive message. In a statement issued earlier today, its Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, accused the West of being “accomplices in the process of inflaming the crisis”, and insisted that the opposition’s refusal to enter into talks with the regime of Bashar al-Asad meant that it “bears full responsibility for improving the situation”.

It is clear that Russia feels stung by what it regards as a deliberate manipulation of the Security Council to prosecute regime change in Libya, and many critics of intervention have echoed its claims that any international action in Syria would be ruinous.

In a particularly caustic piece, the Columbia professor Joseph Massad has claimed that intervention of one kind or another would only serve what he calls ‘American imperialism in the Middle East’, berating the ‘exile opposition’ for having ‘hijacked the popular uprising against the Asad dynasty’.

But such claims overlook two crucial factors.

The first is that there exists no stark divide between opponents of the regime within the country and those in the Syrian mahjar, or diaspora. Opposition activists certainly disagree on key issues – not least that of international intervention – but the schism does not run along geographical lines.

The Syrian National Council itself, despite repeated assertions to the contrary, is not simply an exilic organization with few ties to those within Syria. While its figurehead, Barhun Ghaliun, has long been settled in France, other members of its executive committee, like Samir Nachar, have only very recently left Syria.

In a note posted on its Facebook page a few weeks before the official announcement of its formation on 1 October 2011, the SNC itself claimed that while 60% of its members were abroad, another 40% remained within Syria itself.

Moreover, it is clear that the SNC, far from the pipe-dream of ambitious émigré schemers, developed from reformist trends within Syria in the early to mid-2000s, such as the Damascus Declaration of 2005.

The second is that Russia and China, by blocking the proposed resolution, have themselves intervened in this internal conflict. Though some have justified their claims by pointing to the need to respect the sovereignty of the Syrian state, the notion that the West is, alone, contemplating intervention is harder to countenance.

To intervene, one need not put troops on the ground, send fighter planes or frigates – though, of course, Russia has already done so, having despatched a naval flotilla led by the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov to its own naval base in Tartus in November 2011, in a show of support for the regime of Bashar al-Asad…

Mere days after sobering official ceremonies marked the end of the U.S. mission in Iraq, America’s most dubious partner – Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki – charged his Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi with aiding and abetting terrorism and sought to remove his Deputy Prime Minister, Saleh al-Mutlaq from office. In short order, sectarian violence spread rapidly from the capital city of Baghdad, further south into Basra and north towards Mosul. Within a month, nearly 450 Iraqis had lost their lives – one of the highest tolls for short an amount of time in years.

However, the physical violence that rocked the struggling democracy concealed a major political crisis simmering below the superficial horrors of car bombs and death squads. Iraqis now face a new crisis as the fragile government juggles uncertain national unity under pressure of sectarian tension and raw competition for political leverage.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is holding a special forum, “The State of Iraq” to discuss the growing political crisis left behind in the wake of America’s military occupation. Ad Melkert, former UN Special Representative in Iraq, and Carnegie’s Marina Ottoway will discuss the prospects for quelling the gathering storm.

The United States has exited Iraq, stage left, but for the second time since the 2003 invasion disrupted Saddam’s autocracy, the state finds itself on the verge of disintegration. Thank goodness some folks haven’t forgotten our obligation to help clean up the mess we left behind.

A couple of weeks shy of the scheduled presidential elections, Vice-President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi announced in an official ceremony that he would run for president, adding that he hoped Yemenis would entrust him with the responsibility of running the affairs of the state.
On Tuesday, Yemenis across the country woke up to find that a number of posters advocating their electoral participation had been hung throughout their towns and villages, reminding them of their democratic, constitutional and civic duties. But since VP Hadi is the only candidate running for president, and no matter how few people decide to show up to cast their vote the veteran politician will still be pronounced the winner, many Yemenis are wondering whether the whole thing is a farce and if they should indulge in such a travesty of the democratic system.
From Sana’a to Aden, the eastern shore of the Red Sea to the leafy hills of Hadramaut, Yemenis from all faiths and political denominations are asking the same question: “What does this have to do with us?”

Flash Back

At the beginning of it all, when Yemenis decided during the ousting of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak to rise against their own dictator, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, they wanted to bring about real democracy, turning their country into a civil state where justice, freedom and equality would be revered notions, not just ink on paper. But as Saleh held on to his presidential seat and as blood started flowing through the streets of Sana’a, the capital and Taiz, a flash point of the Revolution, foreign nations scrambled to save Yemen from the precipice, too aware of its strategic importance within the region.

From that moment on, revolutionaries were put aside, ignored by the politicians, as diplomats and high ranking statesmen worked at finding a solution to the conundrum that had become Yemen. In between its many overlapping conflicts, widespread poverty and the threat of terror groups looming in the shadows, Yemen is unlike any other land. Very much like President Saleh put it himself, ruling over Yemen equates to “dancing over the heads of snakes”. But for one who truly understands the essence of Yemen, there is an order to the apparent chaos.

The GCC proposal that enunciated the terms of the power-transfer and its mechanisms never actually took into account the will of the people, but rather it was tailored around Saleh’s will, ensuring him an honorable exit with the promise of immunity. In other words, the fate of Yemen’s presidency was sealed by a group of technocrats and politicians, while the good people of Yemen were completely put on the back burner for it was “better this way.”

Democracy

VP Hadi, who is a member of the ruling party, was chosen by both the General People’s Congress and the Opposition as the candidate of the coalition, ensuring that no other contender would enter the presidential race.
And if even Western diplomats have argued that the move was intended to preserve the country’s unity and avoid a bitter battle for power from the various political factions, Yemenis saw no sense in it. Revolutionaries actually contested the legitimacy of the power-transfer deal from the very second it was inked in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, warning that they would continue to fight until Yemen power players would acknowledge their demands.

And although there was no further violent confrontation between the armed forces and the revolutionaries, at least not in the magnitude manifested before the agreement, hundreds of thousands of Yemenis across the nation are still demanding to be heard, rejecting as a whole “Saleh tailored plan.”

“Are you seriously telling me that a one-man-election can be called democratic? Are you telling me that after a year of suffering, blood spilled and all around misery, that the best the West and its minions could come up with is Hadi? Are Yemenis so stupid that the West does not trust them to choose their own leader? Why couldn’t we have a normal presidential elections like in Egypt based on the principle of political pluralism? Is it so hard to understand that Yemen wants a real civil state… not a make believe one where the old regime is still present but with a new face?” a leader of the Independent Youth argued.

Another sore point, which Yemeni are finding hard to swallow, lies in the fact that the United Nations, through its multitude of agencies, is currently throwing away several millions of dollars to organize the elections. “Millions of us are going hungry for we have lost everything in our struggle for freedom and rather than pull all the country’s resources together to bring some relief to war-torn areas, the government prefers to spend the UN money on stupid posters and presidential campaign? It is insulting to the nation. We don’t need posters but we need bread. So kindly Hadi, cash out your checks and feed your country,” said an English teacher in “Change Square”, the epicenter of the revolutionary movement.
Yemen is said to have spent 8 million dollars on Hadi’s campaign, with all the funds provided by Japan, Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom. Given that the majority of the population lives on under $2 per day, this money could have prevented 4 million of people from going hungry or could have provided 80,000 families with an average salary of $100 for a month. Many are warning that in spite of the coalition government’s claims that all will be fixed after February 21st with Saleh’s departure from power, one might want to have a look at who is leading Yemen’s military. With his sons, nephews and brother still very much in charge of the nation’s fire power, Saleh might not have yet said his last goodbye to Yemen. In which case, the GCC proposal will only allow the autocrat to regroup and plan his comeback.

Nigeria polio campaign gains momentum
Dozens of governors across Nigeria have signed up to support the Nigeria Immunization Challenge started by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to combat polio. The immunization initiative is part of the foundation’s efforts to support Nigeria’s fight against top priority public health concerns, such as HIV/AIDS prevention and providing safe drinking water.

Indian student helps others resist child marriage
Anjali Burman, a 21-year-old resident of the remote Indian village of Malda, has taken up the fight against child marriage, forming a small community group that works to prevent the forced marriages of girls under the age of 18. The youngster faced the prospect of marriage at the age of 15 and now helps others by raising awareness and bringing efforts to stop cases to officials.

New Zealand rejects concerns on child marriage
Current laws in New Zealand are sufficient to discourage child marriage, the country’s government has told UNICEF, despite reports of the forced marriage of a 17-year-old Pakistani girl, and appeals for help by girls as young as 13 and 14. Justice Minister Judith Collins said the government would continue to educate ethnic communities about existing law.

Shot at Life chief talks vaccination progress
Vaccines can help prevent many of the 1.7 million deaths of children every year from preventable diseases such as pneumonia, Peg Willingham, executive director of the United Nations Foundation program Shot at Life, says in this interview. Willingham recently traveled to Honduras where an ambitious vaccination program targeting 99% of the country’s children is helping slash child-mortality rates.

Cote d’Ivoire pulls plug on free health care experiment
Cote d’Ivoire has scaled back its public health program to cover only women and young children as theft and mismanagement contribute to rapidly rising costs. “As long as women and children continue to receive care we are satisfied, because they are among the most vulnerable,” said Louis Vigneault-Dubois, head of communications for UNICEF in the country.

Calvin: Family-planning access is a key priority
Increasing access to family-planning services for women around the world remains an integral element to improving women’s health and achieving Millennium Development Goals related to maternal mortality, writes Kathy Calvin, CEO of the United Nations Foundation. 

Breast cancer awareness is still lagging
Despite the efforts of global health community to draw attention to and raise awareness of chronic noncommunicable disease, breast cancer remains widely misunderstood and under-diagnosed in developing countries. Health care professionals diagnose more than 1 million cases annually, and the disease claims about a half-million lives each year. 

 Yemen faces malnutrition emergency
The number of children under the age of five suffering from malnutrition across Yemen has reached 750,000, doubling in some regions over the past decade. Maria Calivis, UNICEF’s director for Middle East and North Africa, said the figure crosses the “emergency threshold” for urgent action, especially in the country’s remote areas.

This is the first episode of a new video blog that I am starting, “Understanding Israel.”

Over the last month and a half Israel has found itself in an emerging cyber war with individuals from its neighboring countries.  In this video, I speak with Jerusalem Post reporter Yaakov Lappin about the cyber war’s ramifications, how it might develop in the future, and how Israel is dealing with this increasingly prevalent threat.

If you have any questions or feel you have something to contribute to this conversation either post on the site or email me directly at rob.s.lattin@gmail.com.

Caricature: A Jewish man, called 'the Zionist thing,' holding an ax, stands on an island of skeletons of Palestinians in a sea of blood. (Source: Vakit)

A textbook case of hate speech in Turkish media: The story, entitled ‘Mishcon Indecency,’ suggests that “Zionists, who have been doing ethnic cleansing in Palestine for over a century” show that “they have no limit to indecency (or moral corruption)” because some members of the Israeli lobby in the United States supported a U.S. House of Representatives Resolution that was against Turkish interests. Note that the title includes the Turkish version of the common Hebrew name, Mişon (Mishcon), in an attempt to symbolize and generalize Jews. Although it is the Jewish lobby that supported the resolution in the U.S. Congress, the article uses ‘Mischon’ and ‘Zionists,’ not Jewish lobby or Israeli lobby. It also has the hidden message that suggests that ‘it was already known that Jews have no decency’ and ‘their’ decision to support the anti-Turkey resolution in the U.S. Congress ‘proves it’.

Although there is no universally accepted definition of the term hate speech, most states have adopted legislation to address the problems caused by it. Prejudice, racism, xenophobia, homophobia, Antisemitism and discrimination are all underlying motives of hate discourse. According to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation 97(20),

“hate speech covers all forms of expression which spread, incite and promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, or other forms of hatred based on intolerance including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.”[i]

The European Commission 2011 Progress Report on Turkey emphasizes that Antisemitism and hate speech in the media (targeting missionaries or Christians in general) remain an important issue. Despite national and international calls, the Turkish government has not addressed hate speech and hate crimes in the country. Therefore, Turkish media has absolute freedom in publishing reports and commentaries full of insulting and defamatory content. Not only are the issues reported with extreme manipulation of the facts (based on ideological and political affiliations of the newspaper), they often include hate speech.

For example, in the country’s ultraconservative Islamist newspapers Milli Gazete and Vakit (known as Yeni Akit since 2010), the staunch supporters of the ruling AK Party, one can find defamatory content about Armenians, Christians, Jews, gays, and AK Party’s political opponents. Moreover, these papers use ‘being of Jewish/Armenian/Greek origin’ or ‘having a Jewish relative’ or even ‘allegedly being of Jewish/Armenian/Greek origin’ as defamatory phrases to ‘vilify’ the targeted group or individuals (often political opponents of conservative groups, the AK Party and their allies):

(Source: Yeni Akit)

A commentary appeared in Yeni Akit in November 2011, entitled ’Generals’ Jewish Son-in-laws,’ aims to vilify and defame the Turkish military, because some of its generals have son-in-laws who happened to be of Jewish origin. According to the article, it is “strange” that after the “discovery” of footage showing high ranking Army officers at the Wailing Wall (Western Wall), which is accepted as a holy site by the “Zionists,” it is now “discovered’ that “some generals have Jewish son-in-laws.” Here, the purposes is to attack the presumed opponents of the AK Party (and  the Islamist ideology the newspaper represents) by associating them with something or someone that is “Jewish,” as if it is something threatening, immoral or bad. 

In another story, the same newspaper attempts to vilify Büşra Ersanlı (a Turkish academic who has been detained on the charges of being a member of the KCK, the alleged urban wing of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK). The article’s title is ‘Ersanlı’s Jewish lover (Ersanlı’nın yahudi aşkı), in reference to Ersanlı’s former husband who is a Turkish-Jew. There is a clear effort to associate Ersanlı with something ‘Jewish,’ and more importantly, the article suggests that ‘the Jewish link’ shows the “truth about Ersanlı,” again, as if it is something concerning for the reader.  

What people see in the media has influence on their perceptions. Therefore, hate content shouldn’t be seen as just mere propaganda – it may actually provoke and incite violence:

(Source: Vakit)

In 11 July 2009, a group of youngsters from the youth movement of the far-right Grand Union Party (BBP) disrupted a concert organized at Istanbul’s Topkapı Palace. The main sponsor of the event, a local wine company, had promoted the concert with banners saying ‘Take your wine and come enjoy the full moon,’ and ‘Tchaikovsky, wine and sunset: What else is there to say?’ A week before the event, Vakit began publishing commentaries (in its print and online editions) emphasizing that wine was to be served “right next to Prophet’s belongings” at Topkapı Palace which was “once filled with the voices of Ottoman soldiers reciting Quran before going to battle.” “This is how a country is destroyed” and “wine audacity in sacred courtyard,” read the titles of the newspaper.

In its latest report on the subject (Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: Incidents and Responses), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) underlines ‘intolerant discourse’ as an important factor contributing to the occurrence of hate crimes. Moreover, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights stresses that hate crimes “pose a serious threat to domestic and international security, thus undermining societal cohesion by sowing the seeds of conflict and wider-scale violence.”[ii] Therefore, they not only harm the individual or group targeted in the crime, but affect the entire community to which the victim belongs.

The Association for Social Change (ASC, Sosyal Değişim Derneği in Turkish) is a leading organization focusing on the hate issue in Turkish media. Their 2009 report, entitled ‘Hate Crimes in National Media: 10 Years, 10 Cases,’ covers the years between 1998 and 2008 and focuses on a large selection of newspapers that represents most political and ideological sides in Turkey.[iii] The ASC researchers investigated hate speech instances in ten categories including ethnic background, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, and religious affiliation. Of the 30,000 articles and commentaries investigated, the researchers analyzed 200 pieces in detail and provided ten ‘textbook cases of hate speech’ for each category.

(Source: Association for Social Change)

According to this study, 79 percent of all material analyzed is characterized as ‘hate crimes’ leaving the hate speech with 21 percent. 24 percent of all hate crimes are related to ethnic identity, followed by those related to political identity (19 percent), sexual identity (16 percent), and religion (16 percent). Moreover, a staggering 47 percent of all hate speech instances are related to ethnic identity. Categorized as a single unit, ‘hate crimes and hate speech’ related to ethnic identity tops the list of ten categories with 42 percent. It is followed by religion (20 percent), national identity (11 percent), and political affiliation (11 percent). Of all the newspapers studied, Yeni Şafak, Milli Gazete, Vakit and Zaman – all conservative newspapers and staunch supporters of the AK Party – have the highest number of hate speech content about religious identity.[iv]

The study also revealed that there is more hate speech against certain groups in certain dates. For instance, before or on April 24 (Genocide Remembrance Day in Armenia) of every year, there was a recognizable increase in the negative and discriminatory discourse against the Armenians. Similarly, before or on March 21^st (Nevruz), discourse against the Kurds and the Kurdish identity was more offensive. Another important finding that must be mentioned here is that hate speech about sexual orientation and identity is common in almost all newspapers regardless of their political and ideological affiliation.

The headline reads "PKK feeds on pork," and the article suggests that "the PKK members who 'slay Imams' and 'want Churches' in the East, are 'apparently' feeding on pork." Here the purpose is to associate the PKK with Christianity, as if it is a bad thing, to curtail the organization's influence among Muslim Kurds. (Source: Yeni Akit)

Hrant Dink Foundation is another organization that is focusing on the hate issue in Turkish media. The foundation has an ongoing project called ‘media watch on hate speech’. The project allows readers to submit hate speech cases via the Internet to the project website. According to their latest reports, there is an increasing hate speech against missionaries and Christians in Turkey.[v]

I think part of the increase in hate speech against missionaries may be related to the emergence of “PKK is against Islam” themed reports and commentaries. Since early 2011, there has been a visible increase in stories in which PKK members ‘eat pork’ and ‘exercise shamanic rituals,’ while the security forces find ‘bodies of uncircumcised PKK members.’  Reports about ’PKK members converting in masses to Christianity to obtain financial support from Christian aid and missionary organizations’ are also being circulated regularly in Yeni Akit, Milli Gazete and Sabah. It is known that the government has been trying to counter PKK’s influence in country’s eastern provinces by a strategy, which I call 3D+I, or Defense, Diplomacy, Development and Islam. There is strong resistance to this policy among the Kurds, but the pro-government media seems to catch up with it.

Another organization, Kaos GL, the most active NGO promoting the rights of LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) community in Turkey, is focusing on homophobia in Turkish media. The organization has recently won a legal case over ‘perverts’ insult (in an article appeared in Yeni Akit) on Turkey’s High Court of Appeals (Yargıtay). Kaos GL’s lawsuit against Yeni Akit was initially rejected by two Ankara courts on the grounds that the newspaper was ‘within the limits of criticism.’ The Supreme Court of Appeals, however, overruled the previous decision stressing that ‘the freedom of the press does not encompass the freedom to insult the personal freedoms of individuals.’ Since the Supreme Court of Appeals is the highest court for reviewing verdicts given by courts of criminal and civil justice, its decision sets a precedent for future lawsuits.

The good news is, there is growing public attention on hate speech and hate crimes in Turkey. In January 2012, more than fifty NGOs announced that they have come together in a campaign to demand hate crimes legislation in the new Turkish constitution. The Campaign for Hate Crime Legislation (Nefret Suçları Yasası Kampanyası) is perhaps the most important step to date in Turkey for addressing hate speech and hate crimes. However, the AK Party, which has the majority in the parliament, has not taken any step for such legislation yet.

I think the hate speech problem in the Islamist and pro-government media shows yet another shortcoming of ‘Turkey as a model to the Middle East’ concept. It is very confusing that, the AK Party, which has been promoted as the ‘champion of democracy’ in Turkey and the ‘model political movement for democracy and development in the Middle East,’ has not addressed the problems caused by hate crimes. More interestingly, the newspapers, which have the highest Antisemitic, homophobic, racist, insulting, and defamatory content, are the ones that have been the closest media allies of the AK Party government.

UPDATE, February 6, 2012:

As I was doing my daily readings of Turkish media, I saw an article on habervaktim.com discussing the hate speech legislation campaign I mentioned above.

Here is a quick translation of what the article suggests:

Lately, while the so-called ‘hate speech legislation’ campaign has been introduced as if there is a hate speech problem in Turkey, it is discovered that Jews’ newspaper Şalom is behind provocative activities. Although hate crimes legislation is not in the agenda of the majority of the people, marginal groups are working to introduce the so-called problem in West’s agenda. Marginal groups such as those which portray sexual perversion in their activities are supported by those who claim to be the representatives of Jews, Greeks and Armenians in Turkey.

Here, the message is “the majority” doesn’t have a problem with hate speech and only “marginal groups such as those who portray sexual perversion” are supporting this issue because, in the background, “the Jew” supports them. It is important to note that the concept of “support/will of the majority” is used to “justify” certain policies by ultraconservative newspapers. The newspaper tries to avoid calling gays “perverts,” but make use of another homophobic phrase “sexual perversion,” while it also attempts to discredit those who support the hate crime legislation as if they are not the ‘real the representatives’ of the minorities in the country. The article also openly calls Şalom as the ‘behind-the-curtain’ mastermind of the ‘so-called hate crimes issue’ in Turkey, which the newspaper suggests is an attempt to discredit Turkey in the West.

_____________________

With sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran gaining greater momentum and the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran looming large in the global economy, a key question remains whether or not the Islamic Republic will ink a deal to extricate itself from increasingly biting sanctions and ensure its survival, or will it inch toward an inevitable military confrontation with the West? 

Houshang Hassan-Yari sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, senior writer at Foreign Policy Association, to answer the above questions and discuss what’s in store for the greater Middle East.
Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari is Professor of international relations and strategic military studies at Royal Military College of Canada.

In the current geopolitical climate involving Iran and the West marked by loud and reciprocal threats, intensifying sanctions, non-dollar trade paradigms, and an apparent shadow war, what do you think is in store for the region as it pertains to Iranian-Western rivalries?

Hassan-Yari: I think the current situation cannot continue for too long. If there is no peaceful solution in the nuclear issue of Iran, the cul-de-sac will be opened in another way. The war will be the most plausible. Iran is very much isolated in the region.
The United States and Israel have been successful in creating an association between the Iranian nuclear program and nuclear weapons. They were also able to join the vast majority of Arab countries to their perception of the danger that Iran poses to stability in these countries. The sum of U.S. efforts and concerns of the militarily weak Arab regimes have resulted in the necessity to contain a dangerous Iran. If there is a rivalry between Iran and West in the Middle East, it is clearly favourable to the West.

Iran has recently conducted a number of naval and air drills in the Persian Gulf in the course of which it has put on display new surface-to-sea and surface-to-surface missile capabilities. It has also threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. How do you assess Iran’s military capabilities in countering U.S. Navy presence in the Persian Gulf and in closing the Strait of Hormuz? What do you think would galvanize the U.S. and its allies into concrete military action against Iran?

Hassan-Yari: In this climate of distrust and suspicion which prevails in the Persian Gulf, a miscalculation by the parties involved could lead to a war that nobody wants. The threat of Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, a threat that is taken lightly by the Iranian authorities, will lead to war.
Any aggression aiming international navigation in the Strait may trigger hostilities. It seems to me that the majority of the Persian Gulf Arab countries want to settle once and for all the “Iranian issue”. The problem is that they are unable to do so themselves. This is where the utility of American military power comes in. In other words, Arabs are pushing Americans to a war they want but cannot perform. Israelis also are in a similar situation.

Since taking office, and in particular during his second term, the policies of President Ahmadinejad and his administration have been synonymous with the rise of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iranian politics and economy. Given the prominence of the IRGC in the socio-political and economic management of the country, has it been an effective and capable force in formulating various policies and in executing those policies?

Hassan-Yari: President Ahmadinejad is only one factor that facilitated the rise in the status of the IRGC. The indispensable actor that greatly opened the door to the predominance of the IRGC in all aspects of Iranian life is the leader himself. The latter could not do so under Mohammad Khatami because of the popularity and the resistance of the reformist president. We should not forget that Ahmadinejad is one of them and owes his presidency largely to the intervention of the IRGC in the electoral process of 2005.
The multifaceted IRGC is not a homogenous force. Nor is it a force formed to formulate and implement policies for the common good. The main concern of the Force is to protect the leader and the revolution as it intends to do. Everything it does in the field of security, political, economic and social serves this purpose. In other words, its allegiance is first and foremost the Leader.
Dependency of political power to the military force of the IRGC has forced the former to give exclusive mega contracts to latter in all economic sectors. But as the Guardians do not have expertise in all these areas, they often fail to deliver a good quality product. However, the poor quality of their work was never an obstacle to prevent the IRGC to receive new contracts worth billions of dollars.
Their imprint is deeply engraved in all aspects of life from sport to aviation to missile technology to nuclear programme of Iran.

Recent statements made by former high-ranking officials and parliamentarians (Hossein Alaei of IRGC and Emad Afrough of Majles) appear to be part of a new paradigm in directly challenging the clerical establishment. Do you think these statements signify a new rupture in Iran’s power structure? If that is the case, how could this new rupture play itself out in the upcoming Majlis elections?

Hassan-Yari: What Alaei, Afrough and other rightwing moderates (Principalists /Ossoulgarayaan) pose as a question today are after-shocks of the popular protests of 2009 and the tremors of the recent Arab awakening. These individuals are also very sensitive to preserve intact the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini which is fast eroding since the coming to power of Ahmadinejad and the unconditional support he received from the Leader. They attempt to salvage the Islamic Republic by returning to the values of the 1979 Revolution. They directly challenge the entourage of the Leader and indirectly the Leader himself who has created a propitious environment for the growth of political immorality and toadyism.
This new phenomena is certainly a break with the established order since coming to power of Ayatollah Khamenei in 1989. It is expected to expand gradually as the gap in the conservative camp is widening, a situation that Khamenei is incapable of controling effectively.
A number of scenarios for the outcome of Majles election could be envisaged. If the elections are carried by the camp of Ahmadinejad, the status of the leader will be further weakened and the consequences could be fatal to the Republic as we know it today. A possible victory by the leader’s entourage should not be interpreted as the return to normality.
I think that a return to the former situation when the leader was not objectionable is impossible without resorting to brutal force. Even then, the lull is only temporary. The sanctity of the Leader is broken and with it the unchallenged position of the clergy close to the government. It is quite possible that we witness a return of the clergy in its religious schools leaving power to the ‘civilian’. In Iran, people break the personality before breaking the person.

Iran and Israel seem locked in a strategic rivalry that has gone through different stages, each stage with its own narrative. What are the key aspects of this strategic rivalry that have made the U.S. an indispensable player in it? Do you envision a point at which security establishments from the U.S., Iran, and Israel would decide to negotiate (most likely secret negotiations) as a way out of the current atmosphere of brinkmanship to avert a potentially large-scale regional conflict and save the global economy from spiralling down a path of sever instability?

Hassan-Yari: First, on Iran-Israel rivalry. From the perspective of the Iranian political elite in power, this rivalry has a clear ideological pronouncement. It goes back to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s epoch and the pre-1979 revolutionary romanticism when Iranian islamists received their military training in Lebanon and sympathized with the Palestinian cause. For them, Israel is a colonial creation, artificial and usurper. It is an illegitimate entity, so to disappear. For Israel, Iran was an opportunity to lessen the Arab pressure.
Since the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran, this rivalry has taken on new dimensions. Israel remains not only as an ideological enemy, but also a military obstacle that challenges Tehran’s supremacist claim on the regional leadership. In addition, since the Israeli danger to Iran’s nuclear program has become more pressing, Tehran uses its Lebanese and Palestinian allies to keep Israel concerned about its own safety and away from the Iranian border.
On the other hand, Iran is the only country in the Middle East that poses a challenge to the qualitative predominance of Israel’s powerful military machine in the region. In the final analysis, if Israel can live with a non-militant Iran, Tehran cannot co-exist with a ubiquitous ‘Zionist danger’ in the region. This is where the United States enters into the equation as a moderating force. While Washington would prefer a more cooperative Iran, it seeks to remain the final arbiter of the regional game. It seems that neither Iran nor Israel want their regional importance overshadowed by the American omnipotence.
In regard to a possible “ménage à trios”, Iran-Israel-U.S., in the field of regional security, this hypothesis seems very unrealistic under current conditions. If the United States and Israel can provide manageable compromise to Iran over its security considerations without losing face, the latter, on the contrary, has everything to lose by entering into this game that goes against its identity as “defender” of the dispossessed. The only situation, in which the Islamic Republic will make painful compromise, is if it concludes that its own survival is at risk by persisting in its belligerent posture in regional and international security issues.

Russian officials have repeatedly made it clear that they are fiercely opposed to any military confrontation between the West and Iran. From geo-political and geo-energy perspectives, what are at stake for Russia? Do you think a political tilt by Iran toward the West would change the geo-political equation in Eurasia/Middle East?

Hassan-Yari: Russian resistance to any military intervention in Iran is not a matter of principle, nor is it aimed at preventing another catastrophic war in the region. The Russian calculation is based on geopolitical considerations. Russia is still looking for the lost place of the Soviet Union on the world stage. Any U.S. military intervention in the region further isolates Russia. It is also in this context that we must understand the resistance from Moscow to any foreign military intervention in Syria. For Russia, this is a zero sum game. In addition, an isolated Iran strengthens the position of Russia as an intermediary between this country and the West. Iran’s isolation and demonization has helped Russia develop advanced military and commercial relations with Iran. The same is true for China, with more emphasis on the economic relations with Iran.
A dominant U.S. presence in Iran could compromise Russian’s not too comfortable authority in the Caspian Sea basin. One of the reasons for creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was to counterbalance the U. S. presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The fall of the Islamic Republic could revive the spectrum of Soviet containment through a new security belt connecting Europe to Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

This year Russia and Iran started doing trade in their respective national currencies, replacing the U.S. dollar and Euro. Similarly, trade has been taking place between Iran and China in Chinese Renminbi and between Iran and Japan in Japanese Yen including for the sale of Iranian oil. Do you think the exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by these trade partners could hold geopolitical implications? If so, in what ways?

Hassan-Yari: Since the day after the revolution Iran has tried to to break free from the yoke of the dollar, without much success. The currencies of Russia and China are not convertible, which reinforces the dependency of Iran on Russians and Chinese. It’s an ironic situation because Iran claims to want to break from the grip of the U. S. dollar and to free itself of turbulence of American imperialism by creating more dependency on secondary powers like Russia and China. In its business dealings with Moscow and Beijing, Iran is forced to buy Sino-Russian merchandise. However, the quality of those goods does not meet consumer expectations in Iran. The continuation of this trade policy increasingly limits Iran to two or three unreliable suppliers who put their own national interests ahead of Iranian welfare in any dispute with Americans. Russia in particular has demonstrated that it is not a feasible partner. There is no other country in the world that has hurt Iranian interests as much as Russia since the 19th century.
The recent currency crisis that deeply hit the value of Iran’s Rial showcased the significance of dollar as a safe currency for ordinary Iranians. During the crisis, no one was looking for Russian or Chinese currency. It is also ironic that some ministers in Iran use the dollar as reference when they talk about their non-petroleum exports, the value of the national economy or foreign investment. The language that the average Iranian better understands is that of Dollar, not the Rouble, or the Yuan. In addition, the Central Bank of Iran often manipulates the value of dollar to regulate the amount of liquidity in circulation.
The exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by Iran and its trade partners could hold geopolitical implications if Euro Zone dismantles itself and if China decided to dispose its massive dollar reserve. Among some other possibilities one can invoke the unlikely scenario of the Arab oil producers to join the Russia-China-Iran trio in replacing dollar by other currencies. Iran’s economy is too small to have a geopolitical impact on the dollar.

How stable is the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria? How Iran could be impacted by Assad’s fall?

Hassan-Yari: Assad’s regime is extremely weak. It has reached a point of no return and condemned to disappear. Its fall will have major implications for the safety and security of the Islamic Republic as well as the rest of the Middle East. The survival of the Syrian regime is so crucial to the Iranian theocratic system that it forced Tehran to denounce the Syrians protesting against Damascus as agents of Zionism and imperialism while praising Arabs in other countries as Islamist followers of Iran’s Islamic revolution. This position has highlighted the contradiction in the official discourse of the Iranian leadership by substantially weakening its claim to the universality of the Islamic revolution.
Syria is the only strategic ally of Iran in the Arab world. It also acts as a bridge between Iran and Lebanon. It gives Iran direct access to Israeli territory through the Hazbollah and some Palestinian groups. The fall of the Assad regime will also weaken the position of Shiite militants in the region. A regime change in Damascus further limits Iran’s ability to intervene on the regional scene. It will deprive Islamic Iran of a vital window to breathe. Finally, it will make Iran even more vulnerable in facing a possible foreign military attack. Within Iran itself, it will strengthen the resolve of opponents of the Islamic regime.

The Saudi government has made significant military hardware purchases from the United States. The Saudi diplomacy has been also active in countries impacted by the Arab Spring. How do you assess the future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and in light of Arab Spring, what are the chances of having a more representative leadership in Saudi Arabia?

Hassan-Yari: The Islamic Republic is not the only country embarrassed by the Arab awakening. The United States and Saudi Arabia have also taken contradictory positions to events in Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere.
The future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia depends largely on the Kingdom’s internal dynamics. A democratic Saudi Arabia will be more independent in its foreign policy. It will also have much less appetite for accommodating dictatorships in surrounding countries.
But since we are not there yet, I cannot envisage any strategic change in the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, even if there is a few sporadic surmountable bumps.
As for democratic changes in Saudi Arabia, they will be introduced very gradually in the absence of a popular revolution. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can not remain immune to the political and military changes that inflame its neighbourhood. The question is the degree and level of change that the descendants of Al-Saud are forced to introduce.

Anniversaries are dangerous days and dangerous moments. There is often a lot of celebrating, a flash of attention and then the sun goes down and life goes on as before. We properly celebrate an accomplishment from the past without real thought or determination on how to preserve and build on the celebrated triumph.

So now we are in the run of anniversaries of the Arab Spring, where elections have been held in Tunisia and Egypt, disarray and uncertainty pervades Libya and the bloody battle continues in Syria. In places like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Yemen there are different murmurs of dissent and muddle of just what direction the movements and the reforms will go forth.

Are the elections of Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt the teaching moments that shine on this first anniversary? Or is the true result that woman with the blue bra, being beaten in Cairo coupled with a ramp up on as sexual assaults on journalists? Is the complete confusion and uncertainty of Yemen the harbinger, or the frustrating stagnation of political movement in Lebanon? Or is another wave of self-immolations in Tunisia the true elements of the story?

Perhaps it is perfect symbolism that again people are lighting themselves on fire in Tunisia. That says the circle has now been completed. Back to the beginning, the first tipping points that Tunisia — whose previous impact in the modern Arab world was designed by its dictator to be quiet at best — found itself launching a political dynamic unlike any in the area’s history, since perhaps the first great wave of Islam swept over the region.

Yet there is a difference.

In Tunisia, we saw a rapid fruition of the power to speak and demonstrate – for the moment.

In late October, nearly 90 percent of Tunisians cast their votes in historic democratic elections. The Islamist Ennahdha party received 42 percent of the vote, displayed the discipline of a political party with sophisticated machinery while demonstrating sensitivity to the concerns of the public, as half of its elected officials were women. That was counter to is perceived image of being an anti-women party by virtue of its religious affiliation.

Going further it formed a coalition with the leftist-leaning and nationalist-liberal parties. The three blocs divied up the top three positions in government. The biggest losers of the elections were the secularist, anti-religion parties as well as the remnants of the Ben Ali regime – seemingly a public shout out in favor of an alliance between parties that preserved the Arab and Muslim identity of society, and respected the principles of democratic governance, political pluralism and civil and human rights.

Now Tunisia grabbles with the impact of free speech, inexperience in running a nation and other challenges that are faced by an infant representative government. The likely scenario next for the Tunisian revolution is that a new constitution will be written and offered as a referendum in the fall, followed by new parliamentary elections at the end of the year. If the current government is able to reduce the economic hardships on the poor and the middle class, reform the security agencies and the judiciary as promised, then they may repeat its victory – and show that the nation that went first continues to lead.

That all looks good.

One year out it is worth recalling the longtime saying that revolutionaries are not the ones who reap the fruits of the revolution. After the revolutionaries comes the time of the opportunists and the time of failed hopes.

Egypt shows just that. Those who viewed the events from afar, and thus did not drink in the elixir of street joy after the rapid revolutionary results, suspected it would be a long, difficult and puzzling challenge to wrest control from the military and other longtime power brokers. Those chess players may not be seen but they know how to move the pieces.

The past year in Egypt has been marked by brutal suppression of peaceful protests by army officials. Instead of protecting Egyptians, the Supreme Council on Armed Forces used extremely violent tactics such as tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition to disperse protesters. They are responsible for the deaths of at least 41 civilians over the past year.

The SCAF also renewed emergency law, a 30-year-old mainstay of the Mubarak regime that allows for abuse and detention of any citizen who is critical of the government. There are prison terms witing under the law for any person whose speech it deems to be ‘insulting’ or ‘defaming’. According to Human Rights Watch, SCAF has tried more than 12,000 civilians under military tribunals since January 2011, including children under the age of 15. Emergency law hinders all types of freedoms of expression in Egypt, and suppresses the freedom of all citizens to voice their opinion without fear of prosecution.

The power to speak has many repercussion. While each nation is different, the seeds of humanness are the same. Preventing them always lends itself to cruel creativity.

These are teaching moments in the countries of the Arab restiveness. Spring turned to summer and fall and winter, a full year of seasons. Unleashed, untethered, unscripted at the beginning, it is no surprise it has propelled those to success: those who has the organization, the plan, and the ability to drive that plan.

As some nations now wiser than they were a year ago? On the surface, it seems not in a region where freefall and fluid change now seems to be the script for the near future. Even in Tunisia, journalists are facing increasing assaults, Human Rights Watch reports, noting that the trial of a television director on morality charges for airing a controversial animated film is a disturbing turn for the infant democracy.

Free speech was the cry a year ago, but perhaps today only free to a certain degree. The cries are in the shattering of dreams. In the Arab world, it may be the second anniversary that tells a much more true story.

What are the prospects for a diplomatic settlement to the simmering dispute with Iran over its nuclear program, now threatening to boil over?
On the positive side of the ledger, as Peter Crail spelled out in an Arms Control Association issue brief on Jan. 25, is that the P5 + 1 group (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) is not insisting the Iran permanently forgo uranium enrichment–only that it agree to tighter safeguards that would guarantee its nuclear activities are purely peaceful.That position represents a welcome improvement on the Bush Administration’s pre-2006 position, which was the Iran had to give up enrichment for good.

Crail does a nice job of laying out ideas about how Iran might be persuaded to limit dubious activities in the near term, including a Russian “step by step” proposal, the elements of the proposed 2009 fuel swap agreement, and the 2006 and 2008 P5 + 1 proposals. At the same time, he says with some emphasis that “it will also be necessary to have some idea of what the end-goal of such engagement [with Iran] might be.”

Another somewhat positive element is Iran’s declared willingness to enter into talks about stopping 20 percent enrichment, though it still declines to discuss an agreed-upon mechanism that would allow it to resume enrichment following a suspension. Serious concerns linger about whether it is still just trying to “run out  the clock”–obtain relief from international pressure in the near term, leaving it free to build nuclear weapons when it is ready in the longer term.

Then too there is intelligence chief James Clapper’s recent congressional testimony, in which he declared that while Iran is continuing to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, there’s no evidence it has taken a final decision to actually build nuclear weapons as yet. That finding, as fellow blogger Jodi Lieberman pointed out this week, is sharply at variance with Israel’s assessment.

On the negative side of the ledge is Israel’s alleged readiness to take military action soon, having found that all conditions for such action are met, as reported in a lengthy New York Times magazine article by  Ronen Bergman on Sunday. What is curious about the article, let it be said, is that though Ronen claims conditions for action exist, he ends his article with a rather impressive list–albeit by no means an exhaustive one– of very bad things that might result from a raid.

What seems singularly disturbing about the Ronen article is that it appears to have been planted, Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak having summoned Ronen for lengthy conversations that led to the article. Might the Israeli government be trying to push the U.S. government into taking action itself, or at least acquiescing in an Israeli strike, calculating that a pre-election Obama will be easier to influence than a re-elected Obama?

One can only hope that the Obama Administration is impressing on Israel just how badly a raid could go wrong. Many influential Israeli defense and intelligence officials concede that military action at best will slow Iran’s nuclear program, not end it for good. Retaliation by Hamas and Hezbollah is almost taken for granted. But what if Iran struck back at Iraq, which Israeli fighter-bombers would have to fly over to reach Iran and return? What if Saudi Arabia, more heavily armed with sophisticated weaponry than ever before, got involved? Or Egypt, where the military is vying with the Muslim Brotherhood for control of the country? Or the beleaguered Syrian government?

All such considerations argue for continuing diplomatic efforts at reaching both interim agreements and a final comprehensive settlement, in which many highly loaded issues will likely come into play: not just lifting of sanctions but diplomatic recognition of Iran; diplomatic recognition of Israel and acknowledgment of its right to exist; understandings about contending influences in Iraq and Lebanon; Israel’s nuclear status and prospects for a Middle East nuclear free zone.

Admittedly, it would take diplomacy of the very highest order to somehow bundle a settlement of Iran’s nuclear status with resolution of just some of those other major issues. But that kind of diplomacy is what the occasion calls for.

Iran has already incurred very high costs in its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and that capability has become a major point of national pride. No Iranian government will not give up that ambition without being able to boast of having obtained substantial tangible benefits in return.

A recent article by Nathan Brown in the FP (Americans, put away your quills), argues very eloquently against the advocacy and promotion of ‘American constitutional ideas’ (and ideals) in Arab countries currently in transition due to the Arab Spring.  Although the history of U.S. constitutional transplantation is mixed at best (failed in Latin America in the eighteen hundreds, was somewhat more successful in Germany-Japan-Italy after WWII, remains to be seen what happens in Iraq), I respectfully disagree with Mr. Brown’s assertion that “much of our advice will be bad and most will be irrelevant.”

The Middle East – North Africa (MENA) region represents that last remaining undemocratic region of the world.  No other region has the highest concentration of authoritarian regimes and absolute monarchies.  Although the U.S. has a lot of baggage on its side, especially when it comes to its foreign policy during the past 60 years, the one thing that America can still brag about is its system of governance.  The one thing that the U.S. can still educate the rest of the world is governance!  [Do as I say, not as I do!]

Mr. Brown is right in pointing out that the U.S. constitutional experience is very idiosyncratic.  On the other hand, I would venture to say that the U.S. system of governance is what has contributed immensely to the longevity of the republic and the overall success of the American economy.

For comparison, consider Greece (my home-country, with a population of similar temperament but only slightly better luck then the Arab people) and its current sovereign debt crisis.  The true reason of Greece’s economic misfortunes (the high government spending and low tax collection) is DUE TO (what I like to call) the dictatorship of the Prime-minister.  For the majority of the past 30 years, the office of the Prime-minister exercised complete control over the Greek government – no checks and balances, no divided government between different parties, just a Westminster model tailored to the ‘idiosyncratic needs’ of the Greek society where the prevailing political philosophy/ideology demands a strong executive branch with enhanced legislative powers in order to ‘swiftly pass vital reforms.’  Greece’s system of governance, in itself a foreign transplant that has now become part of the Greek political identity, is primarily responsible for the current state of overall disrepair.

The right form of governance for the right society has never been easy to identify.  A lot of times, societies have adopted forms of governance that were imposed to them by past colonial masters or short sighted revolutionary uprisings.  The MENA region, with its long set of constitutional traditions, is no different.

The prevailing parliamentary system of governance currently in effect in most North African countries, which Mr. Brown argues should be respected because of its long routes in the various societies and the familiarity of local actors (politicians, academics, judges) with it, is also a transplant of European origin.  Parliamentary democracy where the executive and the legislature come from the same body (united against ‘the crown’) is not indigenous to Egypt or Tunisia, let alone Jordan or Morocco (not to mention Libya!).

Instead of tweaking around the edges of the current political/constitutional systems (as Mr. Brown suggests), the people of the region might be better served if their opted for a whole new system of governance!

It is time to end the experiment with the Westminster model: of government being derived, depended and tethered of the legislative branch.  American federalism is hard to implement because it demands too much from both the people and politicians – constant participation on the part of the people (at multiple levels of government) and mature restrain on the part of politicians.  However, the world has changed since Latin American countries tried to implement U.S.-style federalism, and I believe young people are now better prepared to adopt a system of governance that demands much but can deliver even more!

Constitutional Suggestions for the ‘Arab Spring’

When federalism at the national level is applied properly it leads to multiple centres of power (and thus multiple leaders), not just one strongman (a president or a prime-minister with all the power).  What could be more appropriate for the people of North Africa and the Middle East, which have suffered so much at the hands of a few dictators, than to adopt a political system that does not deify one person or one family?  The U.S. federal system of governance provides an excellent starting point for any discussion about constitutional reform in the region.

The most fundamental tenet of the U.S. federal system of governance is the complete institutional separation of powers at the national level, while at the same time every decision at the national level requires the consent of all the branches of government.  Therefore, Legislative (Congress), Executive (President) and Judiciary (Supreme Court) branches are completely separate, but laws passed by the legislature need the approval of the President), and are subject to review by the Courts.

Second, the legislative process is performed by a bi-cameral legislature, where one chamber represents the people (House of Representatives) while the other (Senate) represents the sub-national units (States), and both chambers are equal in power and responsibility.  Furthermore, by staggering the terms of legislators (2 years for House members, 6 years for Senate members) and staggering the election of Senators (one third up for re-election every two years), the legislature is being renewed every two years while being insulated from dramatic swings in popular opinion.

Third, Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials, Ambassadors, and Judges have to be considered and approved by the legislature.  This oversight role of Congress continues after Cabinet members are appointed, when they are required by law to appear in front of select legislative committees and report on their departments activities, answer questions, and make available to legislators any and all information’s that legislators deem relevant.

Finally, the independence of the judiciary branch is guaranteed through life-time appointments.  Although judges are selected by the President and approved by the legislature, they are appointed for life, and their removal is exceptional and very hard to achieve.  Furthermore, judges have the power to review the constitutionality of laws, and through the years have many times struck down laws which were not consistent with the letter or the spirit of the Constitution.

Add to these fundamental elements of the U.S. system, term limits for politician, clear provisions for amending the constitution and removing the President, an independent Electoral Commission, and an independent and competent Office for the protection of Human Rights, and you have a recipe for political stability and economic success.

The Right Form of Governance

The history of modern economic development is full of successes and failures.  The failures appear to be more than the successes; from the many African nations that have never truly improved their condition since independence 60 years ago, to the Middle East, rich with oil but stagnant economically and democratically.  Now, the nations of the Arab world are going through some major changes to their regimes and future systems of governance.  Identifying the right form of governance for the right society has never been easy, but federalism could be the most appropriate of all possible choices for the nations of the ‘Arab Spring’!

During the 19^th century, the exportation of U.S.-style federalism was deemed detrimental to the political development of Latin America nations.  I believe the times have change, and U.S.-style federalism could serve as a future system of governance for the ‘Arab Spring’ nations.  Furthermore, by advocating for constitutional reforms that promote federalism and good governance, and by rewording those nations that truly adopt such changes, the U.S. can restore its role in the world stage as a champion of democratic principles.

We owe it to the world, whether they need our advice or not!

This week I met with an Israeli military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, about Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu’s leadership.  While he lauded his economic acumen and abilities as a politician, the official continually said that Bibi is insincere about peace with the Palestinians and unable to make the tough and unpopular decisions. “He says he wants peace and is willing to do what is necessary, but he doesn’t follow up.  His father believed in greater Israel and so does he.  Regardless of whether they are ready for a state, the Palestinians can’t be occupied forever.  Look at the Arab Spring.”  The official also commented that Bibi deflects the issue by hiding behind rhetoric of Israel’s strength, security dilemma with Iran, and his ability to standup to the Obama administration.

By comparison, this sounds very similar to what was transpiring with Golda Meir and her policy towards the Arab states in the lead up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  Golda felt very empowered and believed that her Arab counterparts wouldn’t dare strike against Israel given the outcome of the 1967 War.  She made comments about wanting to make peace but found reasons to evade it.   Like Bibi, she used Israeli security and strength as an excuse to not engage her enemies.  Like Bibi, she downplayed American pressures to make peace.  So what happened in the end?  She ignored the signs of an impending war and over 2,000 Israeli’s lost their lives.

For the sake of Israel, Bibi (left) needs to have more foresight than the late Golda Meir (right). If not, than Israeli society should vote him out of office in the next election.

It is also worth noting that like Bibi, Meir continually turned a blind eye and found meandering excuses for settlement construction, legal and illegal.

To return to the topic at hand, some believe peace with Egypt would not have been possible without the Yom Kippur War.  However, that suggests that it took a war to get Israeli leadership out of the clouds.  Had Golda and her advisors been more balanced and flexible, they may have accomplished the peace accord without the bloodshed.

There is of course no one definitive answer on how to make peace with the Palestinians; and not everything is within Israel’s, or Bibi’s, control (Hamas).  That does not change the fact, though, that he has proven unwilling to make the tough decisions needed to make progress with the Palestinians.  Bibi, and Israeli society, should reflect on the 1973 Yom Kippur War and take heed in the words of Spanish born poet and philosopher George Santayana, “those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”