Pakistan’s high commissioner warned the Britain warned that Pakistan would be left with no choice but to support Iran if Israel attacks Iran.

In an interview to British newspaper he also added that Britain must to help to stop American drone attacks causing killings of many innocents.

“We know the damage — destroyed schools, communities, hospitals. They are civilians — children, women,

Antwerpen  (UNN) A  European based “Diplomatic Mediator” in  Belgium reject the idea that Pakistan will support Iran or involve in war if  Israel attacked on Iran, talking with Indian news …

This is the first episode of a new video blog that I am starting, “Understanding Israel.”

Over the last month and a half Israel has found itself in an emerging cyber war with individuals from its neighboring countries.  In this video, I speak with Jerusalem Post reporter Yaakov Lappin about the cyber war’s ramifications, how it might develop in the future, and how Israel is dealing with this increasingly prevalent threat.

If you have any questions or feel you have something to contribute to this conversation either post on the site or email me directly at rob.s.lattin@gmail.com.

Credit: Newsweek/The Daily Beast

There is currently a bill before the Knesset that seeks to offer financial assistance to Haredi youth leaving the ultra-Orthodox world. The proposed law would offer them the same sort of assistance that is currently offered to new immigrants. These benefits can cover everything from tax breaks on homes and cars to tuition remission for University and even a monthly living stipend.

While the bill has not yet passed, it is an interesting commentary on just how far removed Israel has allowed the Haredi community to get from its mainstream community. A star pupil in the Haredi community, should he choose to leave the fold and attempt to study in the secular world, is guaranteed hardships that most mediocre student from the secular world will not face. Primarily amongst these is that the Haredi education, which applies a high importance to studying Torah and Talmud, does not prepare its students for a secular Israeli University.

Haaretz reports that one such student, who has abandoned the Haredi world and is now striving to attend Tel Aviv University’s Law School, first has to qualify for a high school diploma. Their story is not about a lazy boy who could not be bothered to attend classes in the religious world and found an easier way in the secular world. Before leaving his religious community, he was studying at a “prestigious” Yeshiva in Bnei Brak.

There is much talk about how removed the ultra-Orthodox in Israel have become from mainstream Israeli society. Many do not work, very few serve in the military. They are subsidized by the state, both for their studies and their way of life (remember those segregated busses 222 everyone was talking about a few months ago? Those are heavily subsidized by the government). But how far has Israel allowed this community to deviate that to graduate with a religious secondary school education does not make one eligible to even apply to an Israeli University?

At one point in my life, I lived in a small desert town in Southern Israel. While there, I volunteered at a Democratic School. The notion is a strange one, but it is akin to a Montessori School. The students have an equal say to the teachers, and the teachers an equal say to the principal. There were no daily, or semesterly, requirements. If students wanted to spend all day in the sandbox, the art room, or the fully equipped music room, that was their decision to make. They chose when they were ready to learn to read, to do basic math, to learn a foreign language and so on. Needless to say, it was an interesting place to spend some time.

Despite very impressive test results that seem to imply that this outside-the-box education was working more than okay, the school had many problems with the state. The state was uncomfortable with their model. Coming up with issues that the state might have had with such a model would not be difficult. But it is suffice to say that this educational experiment was always under a watchful eye.

This was a school of maybe a hundred children. So the question is, how is Israel not keeping a watchful eye on the schooling the children of a population that makes up such a large number of Israelis? Estimates put the Haredi population in Israel as low one-in-ten and as high as one-in-six. And it must be remembered that this number is their population as a whole. Due to their high birth rates, when broken down by age group, the Haredi make up an even larger sizable proportion to secular children currently studying in an Israeli primary or secondary school. It is reported that as few as 40% of these Haredi schools are even teaching English or math. Israel is currently a leader in the world of hi-tech and innovation. But what kind of society will Israel be in 20 years, if such a large proportion of its population cannot even demand correct change at the market, much less learn how to work a computer?

Israel has a say in the education of the small Democratic School in the south of Israel. They have a say in the education of the Russian and Ethiopian communities of Israel. They have a say in the education of the Israeli Arab community in Israel. For the sake of the ultra-Orthodox, Israel must also have a say in the education of their community. Anything less is a disservice to the hundreds of thousands of children currently trusting their parents, their community and their state, to prepare them for life in the 21st century.

By Mario Toneguzzi for The Calgary Herald

Calgary’s Jewish community is honouring Muslims who rescued Jews during the Holocaust.

In commemoration of International Holocaust Remembrance Day, the Calgary Jewish Federation, in association with the Canadian Society for Yad Vashem, is presenting the Yad Vashem exhibition Besa: A Code of Honor — Muslim Albanians who Rescued Jews During the Holocaust.

The photographic exhibition opened Friday and will remain open through Feb. 11 at the Calgary Jewish Community Centre, 1607 90th Ave. S.W.

“We are very pleased to be sharing this inspiring and visually stunning exhibit with the Calgary community at large,” said Adam Singer, president of the Calgary Jewish Federation.

“Historically, there have been many examples of Jews and Muslims living side by side as neighbours and friends. The 17 Albanian Muslims featured in the exhibit are among 63 who have been recognized by the state of Israel as Righteous Among the Nations. The courageous acts of all rescuers, carried out under perilous circumstances, set a moving example. We want to get the message out that every one of us has the potential to emulate the humanity and bravery celebrated by renowned photographer Norman Gershman in the Besa exhibit.”

The Calgary showing of Besa was made possible through grants from the Calgary Foundation and Citizenship and Immigration Canada.

Singer said Besa means “to keep the promise” by taking responsibility for others, especially in peril.

Close to 24,000 individuals from around the world have been named Righteous Among the Nations by Yad Vashem, Israel’s world centre for Holocaust research, documentation, education and commemoration.

Admission is free to the exhibit and everyone is welcome.

“One message, obviously, is that the Holocaust happened and it’s been recognized by the United Nations,” Singer said. “It’s important to bear in mind that as years pass and the Second World War becomes more distant in time from the present, we lose, of course, first-hand accounts. The survivors are dying off and at some point will no longer be with us. And there’s a tendency to not want to remember things like the Holocaust. That’s a natural and even normal human desire not to think about bad things that happened in the past.

“So it’s critical that we take active steps to ensure that there is collective recollection of what happened. And collective recollection not only of the terrible things that were done, but also the great things.

“The other thing is that there seems to be a narrative these days that Jews and Muslims are enemies and this exhibit helps remind us that that’s only a small part of a centuries-old narrative in which Jews and Muslims are not enemies, but in fact are neighbours and friends and people who help each other.”

Filed under: Islam, Muslims, Peace Tagged: Calgary Jewish Federation, Canadian Jews, Canadian Society for Yad Vashem, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Holocaust, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, Muslim Albanians, Muslim-Jewish Relations

United States Defense Secretary Leon Panetta believes there is a growing possibility Israel will attack Iran as early as April to stop Tehran from building a nuclear bomb, according to reports. 

 The Washington Post first reported that Panetta was concerned about the increased likelihood Israel would launch an attack over the next few months. CNN said it confirmed the report, citing a senior
Obama administration official, who declined to be identified. 

 

"Panetta believes there is a strong likelihood that Israel will strike Iran in
April, May or June – before Iran enters what Israelis described as a 'zone
of immunity' to commence building a nuclear bomb," Washington Post columnist
David Ignatius wrote.

"Very soon, the Israelis fear, the Iranians will have stored enough enriched
uranium in deep underground facilities to make a weapon – and only the
United States could then stop them militarily," Ignatius wrote.

Ignatius did not cite a source. He was writing from Brussels where Panetta was
attending a NATO defense ministers' meeting. 

READ MORE

The leading Israeli
manufacturer of tankers, aircraft refuelers, fire fighting trucks,
armored vehicles and special purpose trailers, Hatehof Ltd., reportedly
provides Pakistan's Air Force with military equipment under a
clandestine contract.

Nearly a month ago, 11 aircraft refueling trucks departed Hatehof's
plant in the Tzippori industrial zone in Galilee region, situated 6
kilometers (3.7 miles) northwest of Nazareth, for the Port of Ashdod,
located about 40 kilometers (24 miles) south of Tel Aviv, in the dead of
the night.

The trucks were later boarded on a cargo ship in the Ashdod Port and
dispatched to Turkey from where they were transported to Pakistan,
according to a recent report aired on Israel's Channel 2 television
network.

The report comes as the Israeli firm has sent several convoys of
aircraft refueling trucks to Pakistan in order to equip the Muslim
states' Air Force.

READ MORE

Currently, we can see tensions all around the globe. We hear the news of US striking to Pakistan, India striking to China or Israel striking to Iran.

No doubt, if these are not just rumors then there is going to be WW3. WW3 might not destroy the world but can bring a great change to economy of world and might cause complete destruction of any country.

Take a look at the following articles.

US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s assertion that Israel is preparing to attack Iran in either April, May, or June has added more speculation and fuel to the sensitive situation surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. David Ignatius’ article in The Washington Post provides us with a bit of evidence that Israel may be preparing for war, demonstrated by its cancelation of a military exercise with US forces that would conclude in May. News that the IAEA was not as pleased with its most recent trip to Iran may also further erode the chances for peace.

Returning to Ignatius’ article, one should pay special attention to Israeli’s thoughts on how Iran would likely respond to a strike on its nuclear facilities. Ignatius notes that some Israelis opine Israel’s attack on Syria’s suspected nuclear facility is an exemplar for how Iran will respond: mainly, do nothing. Moreover, some assert that the Iranian government would be ousted, similar to what occurred in 1976 following Israeli’s hostage rescue in Uganda. If these are honest opinions of important decision makers in Israel, we should be gravely concerned.

Iran would likely not sit back and allow Israel to escape unscathed, nor would the regime be toppled. Evidently it would leverage non-state assets, such as its relationships with Hezbollah, HAMAS, and other Palestinian actors, to pummel Israel, and its populace would unite behind it. It would also likely use IRGC-Quds Force hit squads to target Israeli interests abroad. The US would face a complex dilemma if Iran uses the Quds Force in such a manner, as well as if Iran counter-attacked by striking Israel overtly.

The state of diplomacy between Iran, Israel, and the US demonstrates how the West and Israel’s attempts to use the IAEA, UN, and sanctions against Iran have failed to encourage cooperation. Apparent diplomatic road rage has set in between at least Iran and Israel, which will likely prove deleterious for peace.

Thursday, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak again sought to frame the debate as one of preemptive action to safeguard Israel: ”Whoever says ‘later’, could find that it is too late”, Barak stated. Additionally, the head of the Shin Bet, while not admitting Israel’s culpability, said on Thursday that Iran will likely seek retaliation for recent assassinations of Iranian civilian and military personnel involved in its nuclear program so that it can deter future Israeli action.

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, countered in his televised Friday speech that Iran will respond in kind when appropriate, and that sanctions will not alter Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Khamenei furthered that sanctions, in fact, have encouraged Iran’s military to become more self-reliant. It does not appear that Iran will be backing into any corner, furthermore, in light of its intention to double defense spending and expand its diplomatic (and hence intelligence) presence in Africa, as well as its new Spanish speaking television channel, “Hispan TV”.

(Photo Credit: Behrouz Mehri from AFP/Getty Images, 3 June 2011).

With sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran gaining greater momentum and the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran looming large in the global economy, a key question remains whether or not the Islamic Republic will ink a deal to extricate itself from increasingly biting sanctions and ensure its survival, or will it inch toward an inevitable military confrontation with the West? 

Houshang Hassan-Yari sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, senior writer at Foreign Policy Association, to answer the above questions and discuss what’s in store for the greater Middle East.
Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari is Professor of international relations and strategic military studies at Royal Military College of Canada.

In the current geopolitical climate involving Iran and the West marked by loud and reciprocal threats, intensifying sanctions, non-dollar trade paradigms, and an apparent shadow war, what do you think is in store for the region as it pertains to Iranian-Western rivalries?

Hassan-Yari: I think the current situation cannot continue for too long. If there is no peaceful solution in the nuclear issue of Iran, the cul-de-sac will be opened in another way. The war will be the most plausible. Iran is very much isolated in the region.
The United States and Israel have been successful in creating an association between the Iranian nuclear program and nuclear weapons. They were also able to join the vast majority of Arab countries to their perception of the danger that Iran poses to stability in these countries. The sum of U.S. efforts and concerns of the militarily weak Arab regimes have resulted in the necessity to contain a dangerous Iran. If there is a rivalry between Iran and West in the Middle East, it is clearly favourable to the West.

Iran has recently conducted a number of naval and air drills in the Persian Gulf in the course of which it has put on display new surface-to-sea and surface-to-surface missile capabilities. It has also threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. How do you assess Iran’s military capabilities in countering U.S. Navy presence in the Persian Gulf and in closing the Strait of Hormuz? What do you think would galvanize the U.S. and its allies into concrete military action against Iran?

Hassan-Yari: In this climate of distrust and suspicion which prevails in the Persian Gulf, a miscalculation by the parties involved could lead to a war that nobody wants. The threat of Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, a threat that is taken lightly by the Iranian authorities, will lead to war.
Any aggression aiming international navigation in the Strait may trigger hostilities. It seems to me that the majority of the Persian Gulf Arab countries want to settle once and for all the “Iranian issue”. The problem is that they are unable to do so themselves. This is where the utility of American military power comes in. In other words, Arabs are pushing Americans to a war they want but cannot perform. Israelis also are in a similar situation.

Since taking office, and in particular during his second term, the policies of President Ahmadinejad and his administration have been synonymous with the rise of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iranian politics and economy. Given the prominence of the IRGC in the socio-political and economic management of the country, has it been an effective and capable force in formulating various policies and in executing those policies?

Hassan-Yari: President Ahmadinejad is only one factor that facilitated the rise in the status of the IRGC. The indispensable actor that greatly opened the door to the predominance of the IRGC in all aspects of Iranian life is the leader himself. The latter could not do so under Mohammad Khatami because of the popularity and the resistance of the reformist president. We should not forget that Ahmadinejad is one of them and owes his presidency largely to the intervention of the IRGC in the electoral process of 2005.
The multifaceted IRGC is not a homogenous force. Nor is it a force formed to formulate and implement policies for the common good. The main concern of the Force is to protect the leader and the revolution as it intends to do. Everything it does in the field of security, political, economic and social serves this purpose. In other words, its allegiance is first and foremost the Leader.
Dependency of political power to the military force of the IRGC has forced the former to give exclusive mega contracts to latter in all economic sectors. But as the Guardians do not have expertise in all these areas, they often fail to deliver a good quality product. However, the poor quality of their work was never an obstacle to prevent the IRGC to receive new contracts worth billions of dollars.
Their imprint is deeply engraved in all aspects of life from sport to aviation to missile technology to nuclear programme of Iran.

Recent statements made by former high-ranking officials and parliamentarians (Hossein Alaei of IRGC and Emad Afrough of Majles) appear to be part of a new paradigm in directly challenging the clerical establishment. Do you think these statements signify a new rupture in Iran’s power structure? If that is the case, how could this new rupture play itself out in the upcoming Majlis elections?

Hassan-Yari: What Alaei, Afrough and other rightwing moderates (Principalists /Ossoulgarayaan) pose as a question today are after-shocks of the popular protests of 2009 and the tremors of the recent Arab awakening. These individuals are also very sensitive to preserve intact the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini which is fast eroding since the coming to power of Ahmadinejad and the unconditional support he received from the Leader. They attempt to salvage the Islamic Republic by returning to the values of the 1979 Revolution. They directly challenge the entourage of the Leader and indirectly the Leader himself who has created a propitious environment for the growth of political immorality and toadyism.
This new phenomena is certainly a break with the established order since coming to power of Ayatollah Khamenei in 1989. It is expected to expand gradually as the gap in the conservative camp is widening, a situation that Khamenei is incapable of controling effectively.
A number of scenarios for the outcome of Majles election could be envisaged. If the elections are carried by the camp of Ahmadinejad, the status of the leader will be further weakened and the consequences could be fatal to the Republic as we know it today. A possible victory by the leader’s entourage should not be interpreted as the return to normality.
I think that a return to the former situation when the leader was not objectionable is impossible without resorting to brutal force. Even then, the lull is only temporary. The sanctity of the Leader is broken and with it the unchallenged position of the clergy close to the government. It is quite possible that we witness a return of the clergy in its religious schools leaving power to the ‘civilian’. In Iran, people break the personality before breaking the person.

Iran and Israel seem locked in a strategic rivalry that has gone through different stages, each stage with its own narrative. What are the key aspects of this strategic rivalry that have made the U.S. an indispensable player in it? Do you envision a point at which security establishments from the U.S., Iran, and Israel would decide to negotiate (most likely secret negotiations) as a way out of the current atmosphere of brinkmanship to avert a potentially large-scale regional conflict and save the global economy from spiralling down a path of sever instability?

Hassan-Yari: First, on Iran-Israel rivalry. From the perspective of the Iranian political elite in power, this rivalry has a clear ideological pronouncement. It goes back to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s epoch and the pre-1979 revolutionary romanticism when Iranian islamists received their military training in Lebanon and sympathized with the Palestinian cause. For them, Israel is a colonial creation, artificial and usurper. It is an illegitimate entity, so to disappear. For Israel, Iran was an opportunity to lessen the Arab pressure.
Since the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran, this rivalry has taken on new dimensions. Israel remains not only as an ideological enemy, but also a military obstacle that challenges Tehran’s supremacist claim on the regional leadership. In addition, since the Israeli danger to Iran’s nuclear program has become more pressing, Tehran uses its Lebanese and Palestinian allies to keep Israel concerned about its own safety and away from the Iranian border.
On the other hand, Iran is the only country in the Middle East that poses a challenge to the qualitative predominance of Israel’s powerful military machine in the region. In the final analysis, if Israel can live with a non-militant Iran, Tehran cannot co-exist with a ubiquitous ‘Zionist danger’ in the region. This is where the United States enters into the equation as a moderating force. While Washington would prefer a more cooperative Iran, it seeks to remain the final arbiter of the regional game. It seems that neither Iran nor Israel want their regional importance overshadowed by the American omnipotence.
In regard to a possible “ménage à trios”, Iran-Israel-U.S., in the field of regional security, this hypothesis seems very unrealistic under current conditions. If the United States and Israel can provide manageable compromise to Iran over its security considerations without losing face, the latter, on the contrary, has everything to lose by entering into this game that goes against its identity as “defender” of the dispossessed. The only situation, in which the Islamic Republic will make painful compromise, is if it concludes that its own survival is at risk by persisting in its belligerent posture in regional and international security issues.

Russian officials have repeatedly made it clear that they are fiercely opposed to any military confrontation between the West and Iran. From geo-political and geo-energy perspectives, what are at stake for Russia? Do you think a political tilt by Iran toward the West would change the geo-political equation in Eurasia/Middle East?

Hassan-Yari: Russian resistance to any military intervention in Iran is not a matter of principle, nor is it aimed at preventing another catastrophic war in the region. The Russian calculation is based on geopolitical considerations. Russia is still looking for the lost place of the Soviet Union on the world stage. Any U.S. military intervention in the region further isolates Russia. It is also in this context that we must understand the resistance from Moscow to any foreign military intervention in Syria. For Russia, this is a zero sum game. In addition, an isolated Iran strengthens the position of Russia as an intermediary between this country and the West. Iran’s isolation and demonization has helped Russia develop advanced military and commercial relations with Iran. The same is true for China, with more emphasis on the economic relations with Iran.
A dominant U.S. presence in Iran could compromise Russian’s not too comfortable authority in the Caspian Sea basin. One of the reasons for creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was to counterbalance the U. S. presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The fall of the Islamic Republic could revive the spectrum of Soviet containment through a new security belt connecting Europe to Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

This year Russia and Iran started doing trade in their respective national currencies, replacing the U.S. dollar and Euro. Similarly, trade has been taking place between Iran and China in Chinese Renminbi and between Iran and Japan in Japanese Yen including for the sale of Iranian oil. Do you think the exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by these trade partners could hold geopolitical implications? If so, in what ways?

Hassan-Yari: Since the day after the revolution Iran has tried to to break free from the yoke of the dollar, without much success. The currencies of Russia and China are not convertible, which reinforces the dependency of Iran on Russians and Chinese. It’s an ironic situation because Iran claims to want to break from the grip of the U. S. dollar and to free itself of turbulence of American imperialism by creating more dependency on secondary powers like Russia and China. In its business dealings with Moscow and Beijing, Iran is forced to buy Sino-Russian merchandise. However, the quality of those goods does not meet consumer expectations in Iran. The continuation of this trade policy increasingly limits Iran to two or three unreliable suppliers who put their own national interests ahead of Iranian welfare in any dispute with Americans. Russia in particular has demonstrated that it is not a feasible partner. There is no other country in the world that has hurt Iranian interests as much as Russia since the 19th century.
The recent currency crisis that deeply hit the value of Iran’s Rial showcased the significance of dollar as a safe currency for ordinary Iranians. During the crisis, no one was looking for Russian or Chinese currency. It is also ironic that some ministers in Iran use the dollar as reference when they talk about their non-petroleum exports, the value of the national economy or foreign investment. The language that the average Iranian better understands is that of Dollar, not the Rouble, or the Yuan. In addition, the Central Bank of Iran often manipulates the value of dollar to regulate the amount of liquidity in circulation.
The exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by Iran and its trade partners could hold geopolitical implications if Euro Zone dismantles itself and if China decided to dispose its massive dollar reserve. Among some other possibilities one can invoke the unlikely scenario of the Arab oil producers to join the Russia-China-Iran trio in replacing dollar by other currencies. Iran’s economy is too small to have a geopolitical impact on the dollar.

How stable is the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria? How Iran could be impacted by Assad’s fall?

Hassan-Yari: Assad’s regime is extremely weak. It has reached a point of no return and condemned to disappear. Its fall will have major implications for the safety and security of the Islamic Republic as well as the rest of the Middle East. The survival of the Syrian regime is so crucial to the Iranian theocratic system that it forced Tehran to denounce the Syrians protesting against Damascus as agents of Zionism and imperialism while praising Arabs in other countries as Islamist followers of Iran’s Islamic revolution. This position has highlighted the contradiction in the official discourse of the Iranian leadership by substantially weakening its claim to the universality of the Islamic revolution.
Syria is the only strategic ally of Iran in the Arab world. It also acts as a bridge between Iran and Lebanon. It gives Iran direct access to Israeli territory through the Hazbollah and some Palestinian groups. The fall of the Assad regime will also weaken the position of Shiite militants in the region. A regime change in Damascus further limits Iran’s ability to intervene on the regional scene. It will deprive Islamic Iran of a vital window to breathe. Finally, it will make Iran even more vulnerable in facing a possible foreign military attack. Within Iran itself, it will strengthen the resolve of opponents of the Islamic regime.

The Saudi government has made significant military hardware purchases from the United States. The Saudi diplomacy has been also active in countries impacted by the Arab Spring. How do you assess the future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and in light of Arab Spring, what are the chances of having a more representative leadership in Saudi Arabia?

Hassan-Yari: The Islamic Republic is not the only country embarrassed by the Arab awakening. The United States and Saudi Arabia have also taken contradictory positions to events in Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere.
The future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia depends largely on the Kingdom’s internal dynamics. A democratic Saudi Arabia will be more independent in its foreign policy. It will also have much less appetite for accommodating dictatorships in surrounding countries.
But since we are not there yet, I cannot envisage any strategic change in the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, even if there is a few sporadic surmountable bumps.
As for democratic changes in Saudi Arabia, they will be introduced very gradually in the absence of a popular revolution. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can not remain immune to the political and military changes that inflame its neighbourhood. The question is the degree and level of change that the descendants of Al-Saud are forced to introduce.

What are the prospects for a diplomatic settlement to the simmering dispute with Iran over its nuclear program, now threatening to boil over?
On the positive side of the ledger, as Peter Crail spelled out in an Arms Control Association issue brief on Jan. 25, is that the P5 + 1 group (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) is not insisting the Iran permanently forgo uranium enrichment–only that it agree to tighter safeguards that would guarantee its nuclear activities are purely peaceful.That position represents a welcome improvement on the Bush Administration’s pre-2006 position, which was the Iran had to give up enrichment for good.

Crail does a nice job of laying out ideas about how Iran might be persuaded to limit dubious activities in the near term, including a Russian “step by step” proposal, the elements of the proposed 2009 fuel swap agreement, and the 2006 and 2008 P5 + 1 proposals. At the same time, he says with some emphasis that “it will also be necessary to have some idea of what the end-goal of such engagement [with Iran] might be.”

Another somewhat positive element is Iran’s declared willingness to enter into talks about stopping 20 percent enrichment, though it still declines to discuss an agreed-upon mechanism that would allow it to resume enrichment following a suspension. Serious concerns linger about whether it is still just trying to “run out  the clock”–obtain relief from international pressure in the near term, leaving it free to build nuclear weapons when it is ready in the longer term.

Then too there is intelligence chief James Clapper’s recent congressional testimony, in which he declared that while Iran is continuing to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, there’s no evidence it has taken a final decision to actually build nuclear weapons as yet. That finding, as fellow blogger Jodi Lieberman pointed out this week, is sharply at variance with Israel’s assessment.

On the negative side of the ledge is Israel’s alleged readiness to take military action soon, having found that all conditions for such action are met, as reported in a lengthy New York Times magazine article by  Ronen Bergman on Sunday. What is curious about the article, let it be said, is that though Ronen claims conditions for action exist, he ends his article with a rather impressive list–albeit by no means an exhaustive one– of very bad things that might result from a raid.

What seems singularly disturbing about the Ronen article is that it appears to have been planted, Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak having summoned Ronen for lengthy conversations that led to the article. Might the Israeli government be trying to push the U.S. government into taking action itself, or at least acquiescing in an Israeli strike, calculating that a pre-election Obama will be easier to influence than a re-elected Obama?

One can only hope that the Obama Administration is impressing on Israel just how badly a raid could go wrong. Many influential Israeli defense and intelligence officials concede that military action at best will slow Iran’s nuclear program, not end it for good. Retaliation by Hamas and Hezbollah is almost taken for granted. But what if Iran struck back at Iraq, which Israeli fighter-bombers would have to fly over to reach Iran and return? What if Saudi Arabia, more heavily armed with sophisticated weaponry than ever before, got involved? Or Egypt, where the military is vying with the Muslim Brotherhood for control of the country? Or the beleaguered Syrian government?

All such considerations argue for continuing diplomatic efforts at reaching both interim agreements and a final comprehensive settlement, in which many highly loaded issues will likely come into play: not just lifting of sanctions but diplomatic recognition of Iran; diplomatic recognition of Israel and acknowledgment of its right to exist; understandings about contending influences in Iraq and Lebanon; Israel’s nuclear status and prospects for a Middle East nuclear free zone.

Admittedly, it would take diplomacy of the very highest order to somehow bundle a settlement of Iran’s nuclear status with resolution of just some of those other major issues. But that kind of diplomacy is what the occasion calls for.

Iran has already incurred very high costs in its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and that capability has become a major point of national pride. No Iranian government will not give up that ambition without being able to boast of having obtained substantial tangible benefits in return.

This week I met with an Israeli military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, about Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu’s leadership.  While he lauded his economic acumen and abilities as a politician, the official continually said that Bibi is insincere about peace with the Palestinians and unable to make the tough and unpopular decisions. “He says he wants peace and is willing to do what is necessary, but he doesn’t follow up.  His father believed in greater Israel and so does he.  Regardless of whether they are ready for a state, the Palestinians can’t be occupied forever.  Look at the Arab Spring.”  The official also commented that Bibi deflects the issue by hiding behind rhetoric of Israel’s strength, security dilemma with Iran, and his ability to standup to the Obama administration.

By comparison, this sounds very similar to what was transpiring with Golda Meir and her policy towards the Arab states in the lead up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  Golda felt very empowered and believed that her Arab counterparts wouldn’t dare strike against Israel given the outcome of the 1967 War.  She made comments about wanting to make peace but found reasons to evade it.   Like Bibi, she used Israeli security and strength as an excuse to not engage her enemies.  Like Bibi, she downplayed American pressures to make peace.  So what happened in the end?  She ignored the signs of an impending war and over 2,000 Israeli’s lost their lives.

For the sake of Israel, Bibi (left) needs to have more foresight than the late Golda Meir (right). If not, than Israeli society should vote him out of office in the next election.

It is also worth noting that like Bibi, Meir continually turned a blind eye and found meandering excuses for settlement construction, legal and illegal.

To return to the topic at hand, some believe peace with Egypt would not have been possible without the Yom Kippur War.  However, that suggests that it took a war to get Israeli leadership out of the clouds.  Had Golda and her advisors been more balanced and flexible, they may have accomplished the peace accord without the bloodshed.

There is of course no one definitive answer on how to make peace with the Palestinians; and not everything is within Israel’s, or Bibi’s, control (Hamas).  That does not change the fact, though, that he has proven unwilling to make the tough decisions needed to make progress with the Palestinians.  Bibi, and Israeli society, should reflect on the 1973 Yom Kippur War and take heed in the words of Spanish born poet and philosopher George Santayana, “those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”