Posted on 10 February 2012 by Tea Server
Pakistan’s high commissioner warned the Britain warned that Pakistan would be left with no choice but to support Iran if Israel attacks Iran.
In an interview to British newspaper he also added that Britain must to help to stop American drone attacks causing killings of many innocents.
“We know the damage — destroyed schools, communities, hospitals. They are civilians — children, women,
Posted on 09 February 2012 by Tea Server
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| Irani Anti Ship Zafar Cruise Missile |
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| Irani Anti Ship Zafar Cruise Missile |
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| Irani Anti Ship Zafar Cruise Missile |
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| Irani Anti Ship Zafar Cruise Missile |
The ceremony was also attended by Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Naval Force Brigadier General Ali Fadavi.
During the ceremony, the first cargo of Zafar missiles was delivered to the IRGC.
Speaking to reporters, Vahid said that "Zafar is a short-range,
anti-ship, radar guided missile capable of hitting and destroying small
and medium-sized targets with high precision".
He added that the missile can be mounted onto light and speed boats,
enjoys a high capability in anti-electronic warfare and is highly
destructive.
Iran has made giant progress in arms production, specially in area of missile technology, in the last decade.
Iran's latest cruise missile production, Qader (Mighty), was displayed
to the public during the military parades marking the Week of Sacred
Defense in September.
Posted on 04 February 2012 by Tea Server
Ignatius did not cite a source. He was writing from Brussels where Panetta was
attending a NATO defense ministers' meeting.
Posted on 04 February 2012 by Tea Server
US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s assertion that Israel is preparing to attack Iran in either April, May, or June has added more speculation and fuel to the sensitive situation surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. David Ignatius’ article in The Washington Post provides us with a bit of evidence that Israel may be preparing for war, demonstrated by its cancelation of a military exercise with US forces that would conclude in May. News that the IAEA was not as pleased with its most recent trip to Iran may also further erode the chances for peace.
Returning to Ignatius’ article, one should pay special attention to Israeli’s thoughts on how Iran would likely respond to a strike on its nuclear facilities. Ignatius notes that some Israelis opine Israel’s attack on Syria’s suspected nuclear facility is an exemplar for how Iran will respond: mainly, do nothing. Moreover, some assert that the Iranian government would be ousted, similar to what occurred in 1976 following Israeli’s hostage rescue in Uganda. If these are honest opinions of important decision makers in Israel, we should be gravely concerned.
Iran would likely not sit back and allow Israel to escape unscathed, nor would the regime be toppled. Evidently it would leverage non-state assets, such as its relationships with Hezbollah, HAMAS, and other Palestinian actors, to pummel Israel, and its populace would unite behind it. It would also likely use IRGC-Quds Force hit squads to target Israeli interests abroad. The US would face a complex dilemma if Iran uses the Quds Force in such a manner, as well as if Iran counter-attacked by striking Israel overtly.
The state of diplomacy between Iran, Israel, and the US demonstrates how the West and Israel’s attempts to use the IAEA, UN, and sanctions against Iran have failed to encourage cooperation. Apparent diplomatic road rage has set in between at least Iran and Israel, which will likely prove deleterious for peace.
Thursday, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak again sought to frame the debate as one of preemptive action to safeguard Israel: ”Whoever says ‘later’, could find that it is too late”, Barak stated. Additionally, the head of the Shin Bet, while not admitting Israel’s culpability, said on Thursday that Iran will likely seek retaliation for recent assassinations of Iranian civilian and military personnel involved in its nuclear program so that it can deter future Israeli action.
Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, countered in his televised Friday speech that Iran will respond in kind when appropriate, and that sanctions will not alter Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Khamenei furthered that sanctions, in fact, have encouraged Iran’s military to become more self-reliant. It does not appear that Iran will be backing into any corner, furthermore, in light of its intention to double defense spending and expand its diplomatic (and hence intelligence) presence in Africa, as well as its new Spanish speaking television channel, “Hispan TV”.
(Photo Credit: Behrouz Mehri from AFP/Getty Images, 3 June 2011).
Posted on 03 February 2012 by Tea Server
With sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran gaining greater momentum and the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran looming large in the global economy, a key question remains whether or not the Islamic Republic will ink a deal to extricate itself from increasingly biting sanctions and ensure its survival, or will it inch toward an inevitable military confrontation with the West?
Houshang Hassan-Yari sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, senior writer at Foreign Policy Association, to answer the above questions and discuss what’s in store for the greater Middle East.
Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari is Professor of international relations and strategic military studies at Royal Military College of Canada.
In the current geopolitical climate involving Iran and the West marked by loud and reciprocal threats, intensifying sanctions, non-dollar trade paradigms, and an apparent shadow war, what do you think is in store for the region as it pertains to Iranian-Western rivalries?
Hassan-Yari: I think the current situation cannot continue for too long. If there is no peaceful solution in the nuclear issue of Iran, the cul-de-sac will be opened in another way. The war will be the most plausible. Iran is very much isolated in the region.
The United States and Israel have been successful in creating an association between the Iranian nuclear program and nuclear weapons. They were also able to join the vast majority of Arab countries to their perception of the danger that Iran poses to stability in these countries. The sum of U.S. efforts and concerns of the militarily weak Arab regimes have resulted in the necessity to contain a dangerous Iran. If there is a rivalry between Iran and West in the Middle East, it is clearly favourable to the West.
Iran has recently conducted a number of naval and air drills in the Persian Gulf in the course of which it has put on display new surface-to-sea and surface-to-surface missile capabilities. It has also threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. How do you assess Iran’s military capabilities in countering U.S. Navy presence in the Persian Gulf and in closing the Strait of Hormuz? What do you think would galvanize the U.S. and its allies into concrete military action against Iran?
Hassan-Yari: In this climate of distrust and suspicion which prevails in the Persian Gulf, a miscalculation by the parties involved could lead to a war that nobody wants. The threat of Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, a threat that is taken lightly by the Iranian authorities, will lead to war.
Any aggression aiming international navigation in the Strait may trigger hostilities. It seems to me that the majority of the Persian Gulf Arab countries want to settle once and for all the “Iranian issue”. The problem is that they are unable to do so themselves. This is where the utility of American military power comes in. In other words, Arabs are pushing Americans to a war they want but cannot perform. Israelis also are in a similar situation.
Since taking office, and in particular during his second term, the policies of President Ahmadinejad and his administration have been synonymous with the rise of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iranian politics and economy. Given the prominence of the IRGC in the socio-political and economic management of the country, has it been an effective and capable force in formulating various policies and in executing those policies?
Hassan-Yari: President Ahmadinejad is only one factor that facilitated the rise in the status of the IRGC. The indispensable actor that greatly opened the door to the predominance of the IRGC in all aspects of Iranian life is the leader himself. The latter could not do so under Mohammad Khatami because of the popularity and the resistance of the reformist president. We should not forget that Ahmadinejad is one of them and owes his presidency largely to the intervention of the IRGC in the electoral process of 2005.
The multifaceted IRGC is not a homogenous force. Nor is it a force formed to formulate and implement policies for the common good. The main concern of the Force is to protect the leader and the revolution as it intends to do. Everything it does in the field of security, political, economic and social serves this purpose. In other words, its allegiance is first and foremost the Leader.
Dependency of political power to the military force of the IRGC has forced the former to give exclusive mega contracts to latter in all economic sectors. But as the Guardians do not have expertise in all these areas, they often fail to deliver a good quality product. However, the poor quality of their work was never an obstacle to prevent the IRGC to receive new contracts worth billions of dollars.
Their imprint is deeply engraved in all aspects of life from sport to aviation to missile technology to nuclear programme of Iran.
Recent statements made by former high-ranking officials and parliamentarians (Hossein Alaei of IRGC and Emad Afrough of Majles) appear to be part of a new paradigm in directly challenging the clerical establishment. Do you think these statements signify a new rupture in Iran’s power structure? If that is the case, how could this new rupture play itself out in the upcoming Majlis elections?
Hassan-Yari: What Alaei, Afrough and other rightwing moderates (Principalists /Ossoulgarayaan) pose as a question today are after-shocks of the popular protests of 2009 and the tremors of the recent Arab awakening. These individuals are also very sensitive to preserve intact the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini which is fast eroding since the coming to power of Ahmadinejad and the unconditional support he received from the Leader. They attempt to salvage the Islamic Republic by returning to the values of the 1979 Revolution. They directly challenge the entourage of the Leader and indirectly the Leader himself who has created a propitious environment for the growth of political immorality and toadyism.
This new phenomena is certainly a break with the established order since coming to power of Ayatollah Khamenei in 1989. It is expected to expand gradually as the gap in the conservative camp is widening, a situation that Khamenei is incapable of controling effectively.
A number of scenarios for the outcome of Majles election could be envisaged. If the elections are carried by the camp of Ahmadinejad, the status of the leader will be further weakened and the consequences could be fatal to the Republic as we know it today. A possible victory by the leader’s entourage should not be interpreted as the return to normality.
I think that a return to the former situation when the leader was not objectionable is impossible without resorting to brutal force. Even then, the lull is only temporary. The sanctity of the Leader is broken and with it the unchallenged position of the clergy close to the government. It is quite possible that we witness a return of the clergy in its religious schools leaving power to the ‘civilian’. In Iran, people break the personality before breaking the person.
Iran and Israel seem locked in a strategic rivalry that has gone through different stages, each stage with its own narrative. What are the key aspects of this strategic rivalry that have made the U.S. an indispensable player in it? Do you envision a point at which security establishments from the U.S., Iran, and Israel would decide to negotiate (most likely secret negotiations) as a way out of the current atmosphere of brinkmanship to avert a potentially large-scale regional conflict and save the global economy from spiralling down a path of sever instability?
Hassan-Yari: First, on Iran-Israel rivalry. From the perspective of the Iranian political elite in power, this rivalry has a clear ideological pronouncement. It goes back to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s epoch and the pre-1979 revolutionary romanticism when Iranian islamists received their military training in Lebanon and sympathized with the Palestinian cause. For them, Israel is a colonial creation, artificial and usurper. It is an illegitimate entity, so to disappear. For Israel, Iran was an opportunity to lessen the Arab pressure.
Since the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran, this rivalry has taken on new dimensions. Israel remains not only as an ideological enemy, but also a military obstacle that challenges Tehran’s supremacist claim on the regional leadership. In addition, since the Israeli danger to Iran’s nuclear program has become more pressing, Tehran uses its Lebanese and Palestinian allies to keep Israel concerned about its own safety and away from the Iranian border.
On the other hand, Iran is the only country in the Middle East that poses a challenge to the qualitative predominance of Israel’s powerful military machine in the region. In the final analysis, if Israel can live with a non-militant Iran, Tehran cannot co-exist with a ubiquitous ‘Zionist danger’ in the region. This is where the United States enters into the equation as a moderating force. While Washington would prefer a more cooperative Iran, it seeks to remain the final arbiter of the regional game. It seems that neither Iran nor Israel want their regional importance overshadowed by the American omnipotence.
In regard to a possible “ménage à trios”, Iran-Israel-U.S., in the field of regional security, this hypothesis seems very unrealistic under current conditions. If the United States and Israel can provide manageable compromise to Iran over its security considerations without losing face, the latter, on the contrary, has everything to lose by entering into this game that goes against its identity as “defender” of the dispossessed. The only situation, in which the Islamic Republic will make painful compromise, is if it concludes that its own survival is at risk by persisting in its belligerent posture in regional and international security issues.
Russian officials have repeatedly made it clear that they are fiercely opposed to any military confrontation between the West and Iran. From geo-political and geo-energy perspectives, what are at stake for Russia? Do you think a political tilt by Iran toward the West would change the geo-political equation in Eurasia/Middle East?
Hassan-Yari: Russian resistance to any military intervention in Iran is not a matter of principle, nor is it aimed at preventing another catastrophic war in the region. The Russian calculation is based on geopolitical considerations. Russia is still looking for the lost place of the Soviet Union on the world stage. Any U.S. military intervention in the region further isolates Russia. It is also in this context that we must understand the resistance from Moscow to any foreign military intervention in Syria. For Russia, this is a zero sum game. In addition, an isolated Iran strengthens the position of Russia as an intermediary between this country and the West. Iran’s isolation and demonization has helped Russia develop advanced military and commercial relations with Iran. The same is true for China, with more emphasis on the economic relations with Iran.
A dominant U.S. presence in Iran could compromise Russian’s not too comfortable authority in the Caspian Sea basin. One of the reasons for creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was to counterbalance the U. S. presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The fall of the Islamic Republic could revive the spectrum of Soviet containment through a new security belt connecting Europe to Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.
This year Russia and Iran started doing trade in their respective national currencies, replacing the U.S. dollar and Euro. Similarly, trade has been taking place between Iran and China in Chinese Renminbi and between Iran and Japan in Japanese Yen including for the sale of Iranian oil. Do you think the exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by these trade partners could hold geopolitical implications? If so, in what ways?
Hassan-Yari: Since the day after the revolution Iran has tried to to break free from the yoke of the dollar, without much success. The currencies of Russia and China are not convertible, which reinforces the dependency of Iran on Russians and Chinese. It’s an ironic situation because Iran claims to want to break from the grip of the U. S. dollar and to free itself of turbulence of American imperialism by creating more dependency on secondary powers like Russia and China. In its business dealings with Moscow and Beijing, Iran is forced to buy Sino-Russian merchandise. However, the quality of those goods does not meet consumer expectations in Iran. The continuation of this trade policy increasingly limits Iran to two or three unreliable suppliers who put their own national interests ahead of Iranian welfare in any dispute with Americans. Russia in particular has demonstrated that it is not a feasible partner. There is no other country in the world that has hurt Iranian interests as much as Russia since the 19th century.
The recent currency crisis that deeply hit the value of Iran’s Rial showcased the significance of dollar as a safe currency for ordinary Iranians. During the crisis, no one was looking for Russian or Chinese currency. It is also ironic that some ministers in Iran use the dollar as reference when they talk about their non-petroleum exports, the value of the national economy or foreign investment. The language that the average Iranian better understands is that of Dollar, not the Rouble, or the Yuan. In addition, the Central Bank of Iran often manipulates the value of dollar to regulate the amount of liquidity in circulation.
The exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by Iran and its trade partners could hold geopolitical implications if Euro Zone dismantles itself and if China decided to dispose its massive dollar reserve. Among some other possibilities one can invoke the unlikely scenario of the Arab oil producers to join the Russia-China-Iran trio in replacing dollar by other currencies. Iran’s economy is too small to have a geopolitical impact on the dollar.
How stable is the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria? How Iran could be impacted by Assad’s fall?
Hassan-Yari: Assad’s regime is extremely weak. It has reached a point of no return and condemned to disappear. Its fall will have major implications for the safety and security of the Islamic Republic as well as the rest of the Middle East. The survival of the Syrian regime is so crucial to the Iranian theocratic system that it forced Tehran to denounce the Syrians protesting against Damascus as agents of Zionism and imperialism while praising Arabs in other countries as Islamist followers of Iran’s Islamic revolution. This position has highlighted the contradiction in the official discourse of the Iranian leadership by substantially weakening its claim to the universality of the Islamic revolution.
Syria is the only strategic ally of Iran in the Arab world. It also acts as a bridge between Iran and Lebanon. It gives Iran direct access to Israeli territory through the Hazbollah and some Palestinian groups. The fall of the Assad regime will also weaken the position of Shiite militants in the region. A regime change in Damascus further limits Iran’s ability to intervene on the regional scene. It will deprive Islamic Iran of a vital window to breathe. Finally, it will make Iran even more vulnerable in facing a possible foreign military attack. Within Iran itself, it will strengthen the resolve of opponents of the Islamic regime.
The Saudi government has made significant military hardware purchases from the United States. The Saudi diplomacy has been also active in countries impacted by the Arab Spring. How do you assess the future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and in light of Arab Spring, what are the chances of having a more representative leadership in Saudi Arabia?
Hassan-Yari: The Islamic Republic is not the only country embarrassed by the Arab awakening. The United States and Saudi Arabia have also taken contradictory positions to events in Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere.
The future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia depends largely on the Kingdom’s internal dynamics. A democratic Saudi Arabia will be more independent in its foreign policy. It will also have much less appetite for accommodating dictatorships in surrounding countries.
But since we are not there yet, I cannot envisage any strategic change in the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, even if there is a few sporadic surmountable bumps.
As for democratic changes in Saudi Arabia, they will be introduced very gradually in the absence of a popular revolution. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can not remain immune to the political and military changes that inflame its neighbourhood. The question is the degree and level of change that the descendants of Al-Saud are forced to introduce.
Posted on 01 February 2012 by Tea Server
This is first part of a series of posts on Iran based on travel experiences in the country in 2011.
“Sir, can I ask why Iran?” asked the travel agent whom I called to book the flight for Tehran.
“I have an interest in the culture, people and language”, I respond.
“Hmmm but people would normally go to Dubai for that… anyway”, he conveys his lack of cultural knowledge.
Just like a lot of people confuse us Pakistanis as Arabs, the Iranians have to face the same misery.
The country is so diverse in terms of culture, lifestyle and landscape that planning the trip to Iran was itself an exciting experience – from LonelyPlanet to Iranian travel agents, books and travel documentaries; I explored everything to ensure my time in Iran is well spent and I return with a better understanding of the country and its people. With the variety it has got, its unfortunate Iran isn’t a hot tourist destination.
Getting a Visa
Iran Visa
Despite the bad press, the travel agency business seems booming in Iran. There are hundreds of them in the capital and tens in other bigger cities. They can help planning the trip, arranging accommodation, travel, guides and more. Most importantly, you may need them to get a visa. Although nationals of some countries can get a visa-on-arrival but the recommended option is to get in touch with a travel agency, email relevant documents (passport copy, itinerary etc), make the visa handling payment (30-50 Euro) and wait for them to get you a Visa Ref Number which you take to your local Iranian Embassy and get a visa stamped on the passport on-spot. I received my Visa Ref number in a week and didn’t even had to go to the Iranian Embassy. You can post your Passport, Visa Ref Number and payment details to the Embassy and they return passport with the visa fairly quick. The visa fee depends on your nationality.
I would highly recommend Shiraz based Pars Tourist Agency and specifically Marjan Owji in their Visa Department. She can help you in literally everything on your trip to Iran and she does that not from a customer-friendly-business perspective, its Persian hospitality at its best. She took only three working days to get back to me and the Embassy took another three days. The visa process was fairly straightforward. Everyone, except citizens of Israel can get an Iranian visa. The citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia and Turkey can stay for up to 3 months without a visa. The maximum duration of tourist visa is 30 days while for the visa-on-arrival its 15 days. Once in Iran, extension is possible fairly easy.
Visa fee for every country is available here and here. We had to pay something around £20 on a Pakistani passport and £120 on a British passport. More information can be obtained by calling the local Iranian Embassy or browsing the MFA Iran website.
As a notable exception, the 90sq-km beach resort of Kish Island, south of Iran, easily accessible from Dubai, does not require advance visas for visits of up to 14 days, including Americans. This is Iran’s response to the Emirates and the state is promoting trade (by making it free-trade-zone) and tourism on the island. The island has facilities for scuba diving, jet-skiing, sailing, fishing, parasailing, reef walking, coral viewing, boating and water-skiing and offers gorgeous white sandy beaches for relaxing walks and plenty of huge malls if you fancy a retail therapy.
Air-lines
Most of the major carriers have flights to Iran but the favourite for travelling to Iran are Iran’s national carrier Iran Air, Azerbaijan airlines with stopover in Baku, Aeroflot (Russian airlines) with stopover in Moscow, Air France and other Middle East based carriers. Other low-cost international carriers include Pegasus airlines (Istanbul-Tehran), Air Asia (Far East-Tehran), Air Arabia and Jazeera Airways both connecting through the middle East.
Launched in the mid of 20th century, Iran Air started with domestic flights between Tehran and Mashhad. By 1970s, Iran Air was ranked amongst the safest airlines in the world (second only to Qantas; being accident free for decades). However, things changed suddenly after the revolution. Because of the US imposed sanctions, the airline could not buy new planes and even had to cancel deals setup earlier. The sanctions meant the airline had to rely on older planes, risking the security of the passengers and the staff onboard. At present, majority of the fleet is decades old with average age nearing 25 years. The Fajr Aviation and Composites Industry in Tehran is responsible for overhauling existing fleet and designing new airplanes. Recently, there have been conflicts over refuelling Iran Air planes as well when UK CAA and the Abu Dhabi Airports Company refused to refuel Iran Air planes. The EU has also recently banned Iran Air’s fleet of Boeing and Airbus because of safety concerns.
I choose to fly with Aeroflot – cheaper, good connections and short stopovers. The flight originated from London Heathrow, serving nicely done Salmon and landing three hours later in Tehran’s primary IKA airport (30KM from city). The two-hour stopover at Moscow Sheremetyevo International Airport was an interesting experience – this was by far the best airport I have seen so far. It’s so huge it could take hours walking from one terminal to the other with duty free shops spread everywhere and the airport giving a fine, shiny, glossy clean look and feel. Plenty of Iranians on the airport – some praying, some gossiping or buying stuff; looks like this the favorite route from EU to get back home for them. It took another three hours for the flight from Moscow to Tehran with an amazing Omelet served for breakfast as we approached Iran.
Note that if not staying in Tehran and planning to get to any city other than Tehran upon your arrival, you would have to change airports, from Imam Khomeini to Mehrabad, 40 km away, to get to your domestic flight.
Accommodation in Iran
Courtyard of a traditional hotel in Iran
You do not necessarily need travel agents to book accommodation for you, although that’s the easiest way. Popular travel/hotel-booking websites like booking.com, venere.com, laterooms.com do not support Iranian hotels; again because of the economic sanctions. However, there are lots of websites voluntarily setup by Iranians who like to see more people visiting their country and these provide lots of information on hotels, pictures, locations, costs etc. You can use these websites, in addition to travel agent websites to choose hotels and then book by directly calling/emailing the hotel, many of which have their own websites as well.
There is no presence of international-chain-hotels like Marriot or Holiday Inn in Iran – if you have read this far, you should know why. The hotels in Iran come in three varieties:
(i) Cheap bed-n-breakfasts with private or shared accommodation – These can be found in pretty much every city and are generally located in city centre with good transport links. Tehran is scattered with hundreds of them.
(ii) Traditional hotels – These are Iranian version of premium-posh hotels. They are generally converted Inns, older mansions/houses, travellers and traders resting spots – called Sofrekhane Sonati in Farsi. Ponds, trees and fountains in the central lawn, tinted glass windows and beautifully lit at night, these are your best bet to experience Iranian culture.
(iii) Mid-range to top-notch modern hotels – Larger urban capitals and tourist destinations like Kish Islands have a few modern hotels to compete with multi-star international hotels. Generally, they are not located in city centre and price range vary on a large scale, so one needs to be cautious to check prices from several sources.
Travelling between cities
Transportation between cities in Iran is comfortable, safe, timely, reliable, well managed and cheap as chips. Cities and towns are connected through buses, rail network and domestic flights while port-cities and towns both in North and South also enjoy ferry connections. Depending on the distance, time available to travel and cost considerations, one can make use of flights, trains, buses or even hire comparatively cheaper private taxis.
Buses: Iran enjoys a pretty extensive and competitive bus network from most of its major cities. Major cities have bus terminals a few miles outside the city, planned on the model of airports with separate terminals and connected to city through local transport links. Buses can take you from anywhere to anywhere in Iran – pretty much anytime of the day (or night), normally without long stop-overs and running on time. Police checkpoints on the highways ensure safety. Tickets can be booked either in advance by calling the bus station or on-spot if you reach sometime before expected time of bus departure.
Iran Buses
The buses generally come in two classes: lux/Mercedes/2nd class and super/Volvo/1st class. First class buses are air-conditioned and you will be provided with a small snack during your trip, while second class services are more frequent. There is little financial incentive to opt for the second class tickets. Among the many bus operators, Royal Safar Iranian is the best, in terms of comfort and reliability, with a fleet of modern comfortable buses. They also run sleeper buses between major cities with reclining chairs, serving Iranian meals and sweets and movies on play – e.g. Shiraz to Isfahan all for $11; while regular buses cost $6. Apparently, you can book tickets online at http://www.royall.ir/ , if you can read their Farsi website or by calling the available phone numbers. Other bus operators are named Seir-o-Safar and Taavoni. Saipa Diesel, Iran’s leading manufacturer of trucks, trailer and mini-buses provides many of the buses you see on roads in Iran. The company also imported several hundred larger buses from China to serve on longer routes.
Trains: The train network is limited but comfortable, speedy and affordable. It has been expanding at 500KM every year for few years and major cities have been connected through contracts with Chinese companies. The under construction Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad railway line extending from northeast to southeast will enable Pakistan pilgrims to travel by train to Mashhad instead of the long bus journey from the border. Other international links include trains to Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Afghanistan and Central Asia. It is possible to travel from London to Tehran, by train!
Tehran Railway Station
The passenger rail system is called Raja Passenger Trains. The Sleeper berths in trains allow good night’s sleep specially on longer journeys like Tehran-Mashhad; will cost almost double the bus ticket but are worth it on longer journeys. The best of the trains are called 4 pax Ghazal or Plur train. The added benefit of travelling by train in Iran, like anywhere else, is that you get to see a lot of places on the way, sample food, see tourists and unlike many places, get a chance to meet, talk with and befriend locals. This is your best option to make a few good friends in Iran.
For Train timings, ticket prices and booking information, Google is your friend. If nothing helps, travel agencies can do it for you.
Domestic Flights: A leading oil producer can of course afford to have cheap domestic flights, sometimes dramatically cheap in comparison to international market. Planes are aging, and maintenance and safety procedures are sometimes well below western standards, but it still remains the safest way to get around Iran, given the huge death toll on the roads and longer distances between cities. The average price is in the range of $50 – $80.
Iran Air
Iran’s major domestic carriers Mahan Air, Iran Air, Kish Air and Aseman Air, all have websites and online booking system but you cannot make use of online ticket booking unless you have an Iranian bank account or a debit/credit card. The reason obviously is economic sanctions imposed on Iran means no international banking relationship with Iranian companies. The best way to book domestic flight tickets in Iran before landing in Iran is (i) find local office of above stated Iranian airlines in your city/country and they can do it for you or (ii) use an Iranian travel agent to book tickets for you, they will give you eticket and you pay them into their bank account normally setup somewhere in the EU.
Off Days in Iran
Thursday is generally half-day and Friday is the weekend break. Saturday and Sunday are normal working days. The biggest and most celebrated of all events in Iran is Nowrooz – the start of new year on Persian calendar which is marked with a week off. Other holidays are linked to the revolution and religious days (Muharram/Ramzan) as well as Eid festival.
Comparison Charts
Based on all the information I gathered from websites, Lonely Planet and talking to travel agents, I composed a comparative chart with compares price offers by four different travel agencies for hotel accomodation and travelling between cities (cab/train/flight). This helped me figure out which agency works best for me. The chart can be downloaded in image format here and more detailed Excel format here.
In the next posts, we’ll explore Iran from inside…. with pictures, videos and lots of interesting stories and interpersonal observations.
Some of the travel Agencies I spoke to….
Some of the websites I used for hotel search…
Posted on 01 February 2012 by Tea Server
Director of National Intelligence chief James Clapper testified today in front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on intelligence community conclusions contained in the DNI’s annual Worldwide Threat Assessment.
In unclassified testimony, Clapper stated that Iran is “keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. Iran nevertheless is expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities, which can be used for either civil or weapons purposes.” This conclusion is in marked contrast to what Israeli officials are saying.
Jacqueline Martin, AP
On North Korea, he said that it was too early to tell what Kim Jong Il’s successor, Kim Jong Un, had in store, but that as a proliferator, North Korea was still a threat. Said Clapper, “[North Korea's] export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria — now ended — illustrate the reach of the North’s proliferation activities. We remain alert to the possibility that North Korea might again export nuclear technology.” Clapper added that the North Korean nuclear weapons program is a continued threat to global security, though the program is intended for self-defense: “We judge that North Korea would consider using nuclear weapons only under narrow circumstances” and “probably would not attempt to use nuclear weapons against U.S. forces or territory, unless it perceived its regime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control.”
Posted on 31 January 2012 by Tea Server
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| Iran State TV Said IT Has Produced Laser-Guided Shells |
Posted on 28 January 2012 by Tea Server
By Mohammed Aasim Saleem for Deutsche Welle
Officials from India and Pakistan have announced they are moving closer to inking a deal to import gas from Turkmenistan via a pipeline through Afghanistan. The 1,700-kilometer “TAPI” duct will transport over 30 billion cubic meters of gas annually from fields in Dauletabad in southeastern Turkmenistan.
In high-level talks in New Delhi this week, Indian Oil Minister S. Jaipal Reddy said “considerable progress” has been made on the project. His Pakistani counterpart, Asim Hussain, added at the meeting that “the issue of transit fees is being discussed with Afghanistan. A joint strategy is also being created between India and Pakistan.”
When the four countries signed a framework agreement back in 2008, the Asian Development Bank estimated the cost of the TAPI pipeline project at around $7.6 billion.
After the talks in New Delhi, the Indian oil minister emphasized that the pipeline would help address the energy needs of the region. Reddy also clarified that security concerns were discussed with Afghan officials, who themselves sought to provide reassurance that necessary measures would be taken to protect the TAPI project.
“We consider it a pipeline of peace,” Reddy said. “Everyone needs gas.”
Improving cooperation between the nuclear armed and traditionally hostile neighbors is seen as a positive development towards establishing long term stability in South Asia.
Pakistan gave India a “Most Favored Nation” trading status when the countries’ commerce secretaries met in New Delhi in November last year to discuss energy and bilateral trade. Indian commerce chief Rahul Khullar expressed his desire to boost bilateral trade to $6 billion within the next three years. Currently, total trade amounts to $2.7 billion.
Reddy said that Pakistan had pledged to also consider a proposal to import Indian petroleum products, highlighting the cost advantages for Pakistan. India, meanwhile, offered electricity to Pakistan through its power plants in Punjab and Gujrat.
The Indian oil minister went on to express disappointment over a failed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project. With the US leaving no stone unturned in trying to corner Iran over its nuclear ambitions, any possibility of India, Afghanistan or Pakistan going against the Obama administration is somewhat remote. India imports 12 to 14 percent of its oil from Iran, making the Islamic Republic India’s second largest source of oil after Saudi Arabia.
There was significant domestic pressure in India as the analysts and masses called for a stern stand against the US in determining trade relations with Iran. With other regional countries, including China, also refusing to follow US directions, India is still continuing with the import of oil from Iran. In this regard, Reddy said that New Delhi would continue importing oil from Iran and was not bound by new sanctions imposed by the European Union on the Islamic Republic earlier this week.
“We, as a member of the UN, are obliged to follow UN sanctions. Other sanctions imposed by big blocs of countries, we can have some freedom there,” he added further.
Improving relations and cooperation in the energy sector between India and Pakistan will go a long way to establishing harmony and stability in the region. Pakistan is experiencing a severe energy crisis whilst India needs to feed its rapidly developing economy. Mutual dependency and cooperation in this sector with projects such as the TAPI pipeline can also ensure smoother political ties.
Pakistanis for Peace Editor’s Note- A Peace pipe was often used between the Native American tribes when they ended their wars and called a truce. A different sort of peace pipe between Turkmenistan and India via Pakistan can do great wonders for the bilateral relations of the two feuding neighbors and must be encouraged to fruition.
Filed under: Afghanistan, Desi, India, Iran, Pakistan, Pakistanis, Peace, United States, US-Pakistan Relations Tagged: Afghanistan, India, India-Pakistan Pipeline, Iran Sanctions, Iran-Pakistan pipeline, Most Favored Nation, Obama Administration, Pakistan, S Jaipal Reddy, Saudi Arabia, TAPI, Turkmenistan, United States
Posted on 26 January 2012 by Tea Server
PT Report Islamabad, January 25: Chief Minister of Gilgit – Baltistan, Syed Mehdi Shah, called on the Iranian envoy here in the capital city. Matters related to investment opportunities in the region were discussed. According to the Embassy’s website, the Chief Minister of while welcoming the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and referring to [...]
Posted on 24 January 2012 by Tea Server
Posted on 24 January 2012 by Tea Server
If you’re an Irani banking with Iran’s state owned Bank Tejarat and happen to own stocks in US markets, hey guess what, you’re SCREWED. The worlds greatest democracy – you know the one that spent 10 years and 4 trillion USD allegedly looking for ONE man – has decided to impose sanctions on Bank Tejarat [...]
Worlds Greatest Democracy Screws Anti-Nuclear Irani’s is a post from: PakMediaBlog All Rights Reserved.
Posted on 21 January 2012 by Tea Server
Guest Contribution by Reza Marashi
The following piece was written by Reza Marashi in Foreign Policy Magazine on January 19, 2012. Mr. Marashi is Director of Research at National Iranian American Council (NIAC) and a former Iran Desk Officer at the U.S. Department of State. The image in this piece, however, is a choice of FPA.
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by Reza Marashi
An eerily familiar drumbeat of war is intensifying across Washington, just as the United States ends its decade-long adventure in Iraq. The ghosts of America’s neoconservative past have dusted off their Iraq playbook to make the case for war with Iran. Their formula is simple but effective: Portray the Iranian government and its nuclear program as existential threats, insist that a chain of catastrophic events will result from inaction, and minimize the costs and risks of war.
If one looks back, however, neoconservative officials in the U.S. government weren’t alone in their push for war with Iraq. A crucial aspect of selling the war to the U.S. public was support within the Iraqi-American community. Iraqi dissidents living abroad, such as Ahmed Chalabi and Kanan Makiya, as well as supposed whistle-blowers turned known fabricators like the infamous “Curveball,” led a contingent of vocal Iraqis who pushed for steadily more aggressive actions to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. Their promise that the invasion would be a cakewalk and that U.S. soldiers would be greeted with flowers and candy didn’t quite pan out. Now, the fruits of their labor are clear for all to see — a broken country, devastated by war and sectarian strife, with no discernible end in sight.
Iranian-Americans, in stark contrast with the Iraqi diaspora, have largely opposed a rush to war. This is a fact that I have observed up close, while working in the State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs and now at the National Iranian American Council, where I maintain close and continuing contact with Iranian-Americans to ensure we accurately represent their views. Together, these two vantage points have crystallized one key takeaway: Iranian-Americans deeply resent the Iranian regime, but prefer U.S. policies that emphasize engagement and de-escalation.
Why have Iraqis and Iranians living abroad reached such drastically different conclusions? For more than three decades, the Iranian-American community has grappled with the paradox of wanting to make Iran a better place — but fearing success as much as defeat. Some worry that contributing to positive changes inside Iran will only strengthen a draconian system, extending its lease on life.
For many Iranian-Americans, this dilemma was resolved by their disastrous historical experience with revolutionary upheaval. Rather than laying the groundwork for democracy, Iran’s 1979 revolution simply replaced one dictatorship with another. As a result, Iranian-Americans strongly prefer to use the rule of law to alter not only the Iranian government’s behavior, but also the thinking of Iranians inside Iran.
Efforts by the Iranian-American community to promote engagement and oppose military intervention have been consistent and cohesive. The University of California, Berkeley, conducted a scientifically sound opinion survey that found that roughly 70 percent of Iranian-American respondents favored dialogue and negotiations between the United States and Iran. In 2008, the Iranian-American community mobilized this majority into a successful campaign to defeat a congressional resolution that would have taken a decisive step toward war.
The Iranian-American community’s overwhelming support for Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign is also a telling indicator of its political attitudes. For every dollar raised by Republican nominee John McCain from Iranian-Americans, Obama — who was running on a platform that promoted engagement with Iran — raised five.
Iranian-Americans understand from personal experience that abrupt political change is unlikely to produce the desired result. Retired ambassador John Limbert, the deputy assistant secretary of state for Iran during my tenure in Foggy Bottom, reflected poignantly on this understanding in a 1999 speech. “Our liberal-minded Iranian friends, whom we counted on to contain the [1979] revolution’s excesses, proved to be helpless in political turmoil,” he said. “They were too much like us: They could write penetrating analyses and biting editorials, but lacked the stomach for the brutality that wins revolutions.”
Despite the fact that a majority of Iranian-Americans favor a more tolerant, pluralistic, and democratic system in Iran, they see little evidence that U.S. efforts to topple the current regime would bring Iranian democrats to power. Within Iran, rampant popular dissatisfaction has yet to evolve into a sustainable and coherent challenge to the system. The Iranian government’s monopoly on violence has prevented such challenges, but has not ended the desire for change. Even the original leaders of Iran’s Green Movement, which emerged from the country’s contested 2009 presidential election, were attempting to push for peaceful change through the ballot box.
The ongoing death and destruction in Iraq and Afghanistan has made the Iranian-American community even warier about foreign efforts to “liberate” their ancestral homeland. Right or wrong, many in the Iranian diaspora see the U.S. invasion of Iraq as less about nuclear programs or democracy, and more as a gambit to seize oil resources. These conspiracy theories may seem absurd, but behind them lies a deeper reality that is very powerful in the minds of Iranian-Americans.
Few Iranian-Americans would welcome the prospects of a U.S. intervention under the auspices of democracy promotion that, in turn, shattered any semblance of stability and ignited a destructive cycle of conflict. Iran’s contested 2009 presidential election and the ongoing human rights abuses have left Iranian-Americans searching for new ways to help foster peaceful, indigenous change. Their ideas remain diverse, but there is near-unanimous consent that change should occur without bloodshed.
Like their Iraqi brethren, Iranian expatriates want to change their government — it is their methods that differ. A majority of Iranian-Americans would welcome an improvement of relations between Washington and Tehran because it increases the prospects for positive, peaceful change from within. The watershed event of the Islamic Republic’s nearly 33-year history — widespread protests in 2009 — occurred at the height of Obama’s “mutual interests and mutual respect” initiative. Many of the West’s Iran analysts and experts, both Iranian and American, assert that the regime needs a U.S. enemy for its survival. If true, wouldn’t sustained offers of friendship — which would put the Iranian regime’s domestic agenda at the forefront — provide the biggest threat to the regime?
Engagement with the Iranian government understandably spurs many moral dilemmas for Iranian-Americans. Most, however, understand the alternatives — particularly when juxtaposed with Iraq, where war has resulted in nearly 200,000 Iraqis dead (based on conservative estimates), 1.3 million Iraqis displaced, and decades’ worth of destroyed lives for those still living in a perpetual war zone.
Let’s not kid ourselves: There are Iranian-Americans who support U.S.-sponsored regime change in Iran — and in due time, American neoconservatives will find their kindred spirits. We undoubtedly have our Chalabis and Makiyas — some long-established, some coming of age. But it’s clear that most Iranian-Americans distrust anyone who welcomes foreign armies into the motherland.
There is no arguing that Iran must change. The Iranian government’s human rights record is appalling, people lack basic freedoms, and economic disarray prevents Iranians from managing the present or planning for the future. Few Iranian-Americans are calling for sitting idly by and waiting for the situation in Iran to improve on its own. But it’s a rare voice indeed that is calling for war.
Posted on 18 January 2012 by Tea Server
There’s a lot of rhetoric out there concerning Iran, so I wanted to draw attention to a few ideas that should better allow us to analyze Iran’s foreign policy in respect to the US and its nuclear program. First, I recommend that everyone reads the Non-Proliferation Treaty – it’s pretty short, but it lays out the principles that signatories to the treaty are supposed to adhere to and, hence, allows one to see arguments for or against the idea that Iran’s behavior has not been in keeping with the treaty.
Second, I recommend that anyone interested in Iran definitely follows FRONTLINE’s Tehran Bureau because of its many insightful pieces on Iran, especially discord surrounding its nuclear program. One of the Tehran Bureau’s recent pieces is a solid re-cap of the covert war that has been persisting against Iran – once you read it, you’ll be reminded of how lucky we are things haven’t really spiraled out of control much earlier.
A third point I would like to draw attention to is the recent conviction of Amir Mirzaei Hekmati for attempting to conduct espionage in Iran on behalf of the CIA. Hekmati’s case has received a great deal of attention in the press, so I will not discuss its merit – it’s most likely entirely baseless, though. Rather, what I find interesting is Iran’s policy towards using Iranian-Americans, or other Iranian diaspora, in its war with the West. (Evidently, I won’t be visiting Iran anytime soon). Contrary to most popular narratives, Iran is very calculative about national or international-level steps that it takes. We definitely can assume that the decisions to utilize Hekmati and countless others as pawns in Iran’s tug-of-war with the West have received continual sign-off from Khamenei and the Pasdaran. My question, however, is how does Iran’s intelligence ministry – the MOIS – feel about it?
Any seasoned intelligence professional can look at Iran’s behavior in respect to its diaspora and certify that it greatly damages Iran’s ability to recruit diaspora as intelligence sources. Lastly, while Iran arguably perceives that it benefits greater than it suffers in light of this behavior, how has Iranian foreign policy and intelligence become isolated because of the disdain and mistrust the regime has fostered?
In some sense, one could say Evin Prison has served as Iran’s proving-ground for failed policies.