What are the prospects for a diplomatic settlement to the simmering dispute with Iran over its nuclear program, now threatening to boil over?
On the positive side of the ledger, as Peter Crail spelled out in an Arms Control Association issue brief on Jan. 25, is that the P5 + 1 group (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) is not insisting the Iran permanently forgo uranium enrichment–only that it agree to tighter safeguards that would guarantee its nuclear activities are purely peaceful.That position represents a welcome improvement on the Bush Administration’s pre-2006 position, which was the Iran had to give up enrichment for good.
Crail does a nice job of laying out ideas about how Iran might be persuaded to limit dubious activities in the near term, including a Russian “step by step” proposal, the elements of the proposed 2009 fuel swap agreement, and the 2006 and 2008 P5 + 1 proposals. At the same time, he says with some emphasis that “it will also be necessary to have some idea of what the end-goal of such engagement [with Iran] might be.”
Another somewhat positive element is Iran’s declared willingness to enter into talks about stopping 20 percent enrichment, though it still declines to discuss an agreed-upon mechanism that would allow it to resume enrichment following a suspension. Serious concerns linger about whether it is still just trying to “run out the clock”–obtain relief from international pressure in the near term, leaving it free to build nuclear weapons when it is ready in the longer term.
Then too there is intelligence chief James Clapper’s recent congressional testimony, in which he declared that while Iran is continuing to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, there’s no evidence it has taken a final decision to actually build nuclear weapons as yet. That finding, as fellow blogger Jodi Lieberman pointed out this week, is sharply at variance with Israel’s assessment.
On the negative side of the ledge is Israel’s alleged readiness to take military action soon, having found that all conditions for such action are met, as reported in a lengthy New York Times magazine article by Ronen Bergman on Sunday. What is curious about the article, let it be said, is that though Ronen claims conditions for action exist, he ends his article with a rather impressive list–albeit by no means an exhaustive one– of very bad things that might result from a raid.
What seems singularly disturbing about the Ronen article is that it appears to have been planted, Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak having summoned Ronen for lengthy conversations that led to the article. Might the Israeli government be trying to push the U.S. government into taking action itself, or at least acquiescing in an Israeli strike, calculating that a pre-election Obama will be easier to influence than a re-elected Obama?
One can only hope that the Obama Administration is impressing on Israel just how badly a raid could go wrong. Many influential Israeli defense and intelligence officials concede that military action at best will slow Iran’s nuclear program, not end it for good. Retaliation by Hamas and Hezbollah is almost taken for granted. But what if Iran struck back at Iraq, which Israeli fighter-bombers would have to fly over to reach Iran and return? What if Saudi Arabia, more heavily armed with sophisticated weaponry than ever before, got involved? Or Egypt, where the military is vying with the Muslim Brotherhood for control of the country? Or the beleaguered Syrian government?
All such considerations argue for continuing diplomatic efforts at reaching both interim agreements and a final comprehensive settlement, in which many highly loaded issues will likely come into play: not just lifting of sanctions but diplomatic recognition of Iran; diplomatic recognition of Israel and acknowledgment of its right to exist; understandings about contending influences in Iraq and Lebanon; Israel’s nuclear status and prospects for a Middle East nuclear free zone.
Admittedly, it would take diplomacy of the very highest order to somehow bundle a settlement of Iran’s nuclear status with resolution of just some of those other major issues. But that kind of diplomacy is what the occasion calls for.
Iran has already incurred very high costs in its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and that capability has become a major point of national pride. No Iranian government will not give up that ambition without being able to boast of having obtained substantial tangible benefits in return.
