US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s assertion that Israel is preparing to attack Iran in either April, May, or June has added more speculation and fuel to the sensitive situation surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. David Ignatius’ article in The Washington Post provides us with a bit of evidence that Israel may be preparing for war, demonstrated by its cancelation of a military exercise with US forces that would conclude in May. News that the IAEA was not as pleased with its most recent trip to Iran may also further erode the chances for peace.

Returning to Ignatius’ article, one should pay special attention to Israeli’s thoughts on how Iran would likely respond to a strike on its nuclear facilities. Ignatius notes that some Israelis opine Israel’s attack on Syria’s suspected nuclear facility is an exemplar for how Iran will respond: mainly, do nothing. Moreover, some assert that the Iranian government would be ousted, similar to what occurred in 1976 following Israeli’s hostage rescue in Uganda. If these are honest opinions of important decision makers in Israel, we should be gravely concerned.

Iran would likely not sit back and allow Israel to escape unscathed, nor would the regime be toppled. Evidently it would leverage non-state assets, such as its relationships with Hezbollah, HAMAS, and other Palestinian actors, to pummel Israel, and its populace would unite behind it. It would also likely use IRGC-Quds Force hit squads to target Israeli interests abroad. The US would face a complex dilemma if Iran uses the Quds Force in such a manner, as well as if Iran counter-attacked by striking Israel overtly.

The state of diplomacy between Iran, Israel, and the US demonstrates how the West and Israel’s attempts to use the IAEA, UN, and sanctions against Iran have failed to encourage cooperation. Apparent diplomatic road rage has set in between at least Iran and Israel, which will likely prove deleterious for peace.

Thursday, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak again sought to frame the debate as one of preemptive action to safeguard Israel: ”Whoever says ‘later’, could find that it is too late”, Barak stated. Additionally, the head of the Shin Bet, while not admitting Israel’s culpability, said on Thursday that Iran will likely seek retaliation for recent assassinations of Iranian civilian and military personnel involved in its nuclear program so that it can deter future Israeli action.

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, countered in his televised Friday speech that Iran will respond in kind when appropriate, and that sanctions will not alter Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Khamenei furthered that sanctions, in fact, have encouraged Iran’s military to become more self-reliant. It does not appear that Iran will be backing into any corner, furthermore, in light of its intention to double defense spending and expand its diplomatic (and hence intelligence) presence in Africa, as well as its new Spanish speaking television channel, “Hispan TV”.

(Photo Credit: Behrouz Mehri from AFP/Getty Images, 3 June 2011).

 

What are the prospects for a diplomatic settlement to the simmering dispute with Iran over its nuclear program, now threatening to boil over?
On the positive side of the ledger, as Peter Crail spelled out in an Arms Control Association issue brief on Jan. 25, is that the P5 + 1 group (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) is not insisting the Iran permanently forgo uranium enrichment–only that it agree to tighter safeguards that would guarantee its nuclear activities are purely peaceful.That position represents a welcome improvement on the Bush Administration’s pre-2006 position, which was the Iran had to give up enrichment for good.

Crail does a nice job of laying out ideas about how Iran might be persuaded to limit dubious activities in the near term, including a Russian “step by step” proposal, the elements of the proposed 2009 fuel swap agreement, and the 2006 and 2008 P5 + 1 proposals. At the same time, he says with some emphasis that “it will also be necessary to have some idea of what the end-goal of such engagement [with Iran] might be.”

Another somewhat positive element is Iran’s declared willingness to enter into talks about stopping 20 percent enrichment, though it still declines to discuss an agreed-upon mechanism that would allow it to resume enrichment following a suspension. Serious concerns linger about whether it is still just trying to “run out  the clock”–obtain relief from international pressure in the near term, leaving it free to build nuclear weapons when it is ready in the longer term.

Then too there is intelligence chief James Clapper’s recent congressional testimony, in which he declared that while Iran is continuing to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, there’s no evidence it has taken a final decision to actually build nuclear weapons as yet. That finding, as fellow blogger Jodi Lieberman pointed out this week, is sharply at variance with Israel’s assessment.

On the negative side of the ledge is Israel’s alleged readiness to take military action soon, having found that all conditions for such action are met, as reported in a lengthy New York Times magazine article by  Ronen Bergman on Sunday. What is curious about the article, let it be said, is that though Ronen claims conditions for action exist, he ends his article with a rather impressive list–albeit by no means an exhaustive one– of very bad things that might result from a raid.

What seems singularly disturbing about the Ronen article is that it appears to have been planted, Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak having summoned Ronen for lengthy conversations that led to the article. Might the Israeli government be trying to push the U.S. government into taking action itself, or at least acquiescing in an Israeli strike, calculating that a pre-election Obama will be easier to influence than a re-elected Obama?

One can only hope that the Obama Administration is impressing on Israel just how badly a raid could go wrong. Many influential Israeli defense and intelligence officials concede that military action at best will slow Iran’s nuclear program, not end it for good. Retaliation by Hamas and Hezbollah is almost taken for granted. But what if Iran struck back at Iraq, which Israeli fighter-bombers would have to fly over to reach Iran and return? What if Saudi Arabia, more heavily armed with sophisticated weaponry than ever before, got involved? Or Egypt, where the military is vying with the Muslim Brotherhood for control of the country? Or the beleaguered Syrian government?

All such considerations argue for continuing diplomatic efforts at reaching both interim agreements and a final comprehensive settlement, in which many highly loaded issues will likely come into play: not just lifting of sanctions but diplomatic recognition of Iran; diplomatic recognition of Israel and acknowledgment of its right to exist; understandings about contending influences in Iraq and Lebanon; Israel’s nuclear status and prospects for a Middle East nuclear free zone.

Admittedly, it would take diplomacy of the very highest order to somehow bundle a settlement of Iran’s nuclear status with resolution of just some of those other major issues. But that kind of diplomacy is what the occasion calls for.

Iran has already incurred very high costs in its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and that capability has become a major point of national pride. No Iranian government will not give up that ambition without being able to boast of having obtained substantial tangible benefits in return.

 

This week I met with an Israeli military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, about Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu’s leadership.  While he lauded his economic acumen and abilities as a politician, the official continually said that Bibi is insincere about peace with the Palestinians and unable to make the tough and unpopular decisions. “He says he wants peace and is willing to do what is necessary, but he doesn’t follow up.  His father believed in greater Israel and so does he.  Regardless of whether they are ready for a state, the Palestinians can’t be occupied forever.  Look at the Arab Spring.”  The official also commented that Bibi deflects the issue by hiding behind rhetoric of Israel’s strength, security dilemma with Iran, and his ability to standup to the Obama administration.

By comparison, this sounds very similar to what was transpiring with Golda Meir and her policy towards the Arab states in the lead up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  Golda felt very empowered and believed that her Arab counterparts wouldn’t dare strike against Israel given the outcome of the 1967 War.  She made comments about wanting to make peace but found reasons to evade it.   Like Bibi, she used Israeli security and strength as an excuse to not engage her enemies.  Like Bibi, she downplayed American pressures to make peace.  So what happened in the end?  She ignored the signs of an impending war and over 2,000 Israeli’s lost their lives.

It is also worth noting that like Bibi, Meir continually turned a blind eye and found meandering excuses for settlement construction, legal and illegal.

To return to the topic at hand, some believe peace with Egypt would not have been possible without the Yom Kippur War.  However, that suggests that it took a war to get Israeli leadership out of the clouds.  Had Golda and her advisors been more balanced and flexible, they may have accomplished the peace accord without the bloodshed.

There is of course no one definitive answer on how to make peace with the Palestinians; and not everything is within Israel’s, or Bibi’s, control (Hamas).  That does not change the fact, though, that he has proven unwilling to make the tough decisions needed to make progress with the Palestinians.  Bibi, and Israeli society, should reflect on the 1973 Yom Kippur War and take heed in the words of Spanish born poet and philosopher George Santayana, “those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process (negotiations between Israel and Fatah) has reached a stalemate that could prove quite detrimental to the two-state solution.  It has allowed Hamas to make a resurgence in Palestinian public opinion.   Since the Gilad Schalit deal, which saw over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners released, Hamas has gained popularity in Gaza and the West Bank.  The Hamas political victory also discredited and undercut the influence and image of Fatah and its leaders.  In the eyes of the Palestinians, Hamas was able to make real gains through the use of threats of violence, while Fatah has nothing to show for their non-violent methods and stalled negotiation attempts with Israel.  In reality, this is of course not true.   The West Bank economy has more than flourished in comparison to that of the Gaza Strip, largely a result of Fatah’s negotiations with Israel.  But come election time, what will Palestinians weigh in on more?

While neither party may be part of the answer to the Israeli-Palestinian solution, a Hamas victory in the West Bank would put an end to the peace formula altogether.  Fatah is the only reasonable political party that Israel can negotiate a peace treaty with.  As a result, Israel must do all it can to restore the reputation of Fatah and help it win back the hearts and minds of its constituency.  Dennis Ross, a known supporter of Israel and the former special assistant to President Obama, provides some valuable and constructive insight on how Israel can do this in his most recent piece for the Washington Post:

The following was written on January 6, 2012 by Dennis Ross, the former special assistant to President Barak Obama, for the Washington Post:

Dan Meridor, one of Israel’s four deputy prime ministers, said to me years ago that “the peace process is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling, you fall off.” And currently, the Israelis and Palestinians have stopped pedaling.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is convinced that this Israeli government cannot make a peace deal — or at least one he can live with — so he imposes conditions on negotiations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sees these conditions as harsh and unprecedented, and doesn’t want to pay a steep political price just to enter talks.

The Obama administration and the other members of the Quartet — the Middle East mediating group that also includes envoys from the European Union, Russia and the United Nations — want to resume direct talks and this past week held a preparatory meeting with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in Amman, Jordan. There may be more such meetings, and that is good, because ultimately there will be no peace without negotiations.

But there should also be no illusions about the prospects of a breakthrough any time soon. The psychological gaps between the parties make it hard to resolve their differences and have bedeviled all the work for peace talks over the past few years.

I have been intimately involved in peacemaking efforts over the past 20 years under Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Obama, and I know that Abbas and Netanyahu carry the weight of their peoples’ history and mythology, and face enormous political constraints. But those difficulties cannot be a reason to despair and accept a stalemate, particularly when those who reject peace will exploit any impasse to challenge the very idea of a two-state outcome.

While there may be no early breakthrough on holding negotiations, it is possible to overcome the stalemate. One way to do so — and to validate those Palestinian leaders, such as Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who believe in nonviolence and coexistence — is for the Israelis to change the realities on the ground. After all, these Palestinian leaders need to be able to show that their approach is producing a process that will, in time, end the occupation.

What could demonstrate to the Palestinians that the occupation is receding? Examples are not hard to come by. Since the interim agreement of the Oslo process was finalized in 1995, the West Bank has been divided into non-contiguous areas known as A, B and C — with the Palestinians having putative control in Area A and Israel retaining overall responsibility in the two other areas. From the fall of 1995 to the spring of 2002, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) largely stayed out of Area A, which constitutes about 18 percent of the territory and includes all the major cities in the West Bank. According to the Oslo agreements, the Palestinians are to have civil and security responsibility in this area.

But in 2002, at the height of the second intifada and the horrendous suicide bombings that Palestinians were executing in Israel, the IDF began operating in Area A again to try to stop the attacks. Though the intifada ended in 2005 and Palestinian security forces have been generally effective in preventing terror attacks, the IDF still carries out periodic incursions into Palestinian cities to reinforce local security efforts. This grates on Palestinians, reminding them who remains in control.

So, one meaningful step would be either to stop all such incursions in Area A or, if there are continuing security concerns, to phase them out based on the security situation. Gabi Ashkenazi, former chief of staff of the IDF, has consistently said that “as the Palestinians do more on security, we will do less.” A gradual ending of incursions in Area A would certainly be consistent with that axiom.

In Area B, about 22 percent of the West Bank, Palestinian police maintain law and order but are not permitted to deal with terrorist threats. Israel could allow their presence to grow. From my discussions with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, I know that he is open to increasing the number of Palestinian police stations and broadening the areas where Palestinian security personnel operate. Now would be a good time to take these steps, as any such expansion would certainly be noticed, and welcomed, by the Palestinian public.

Finally, in Area C, which is about 60 percent of the West Bank, Palestinians’ security and police forces have no access, their economic activity is extremely limited, and Israel retains civil and security responsibilities. There is no practical reason that the Palestinians cannot be permitted dramatically more economic access and activity in this area.

To give one example, there are Palestinian stone masonry factories in Area A, but Palestinians have limited access to the rock quarries in the West Bank, which are in Area C. In a case brought against Israeli ownership of the rock quarries, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled late last month that no additional quarries should be Israeli-owned. That ruling creates an opening for private Palestinian ownership, should any new quarries be established — and there clearly is room for more.

Expanding the Palestinians’ economic opportunities in Area C would do wonders for job creation and the overall Palestinian economy. (In the West Bank, unemployment has come down in recent years but remains at about 16 percent.)

These steps should be feasible from an Israeli standpoint. First, these or similar changes could be implemented without altering the territory’ s political status and could be done in a way that would not put Israeli security at risk, particularly if coordinated closely with the IDF.

Second, Netanyahu has said repeatedly that he does not want to rule over Palestinians and that the stronger their economic base, the better the prospects for peace. These steps would certainly demonstrate that the prime minister means what he says. At the same time, they would signal to Palestinians that independence is possible and that the approach from Abbas and Fayyad — not Hamas resistance or violence — can produce it.

I’m not suggesting to forgo negotiations and their focus on a two-state solution. Talks need to be pursued, and the Obama administration is rightly doing so. The administration is also continuing to assist with institution-building by providing material support for the security, judicial and other sectors of Palestinian society — steps that fit neatly with the kind of actions I am proposing to validate leaders such as Fayyad. At this point, validation of nonviolence will come less from words and more from demonstrations that the occupation is shrinking and will, eventually, end.

The rest of the Middle East is churning, with dictators being toppled and protesters still in the streets a year into the Arab Awakening. Since the demand for free and fair elections has become a symbol of credibility in the uprisings, the pressure on both Fatah and Hamas to hold elections this year is likely to become irresistible. For the past few years, Abbas has said that he would not be a candidate in new elections, but now he is saying he would like those elections to take place in May and plans to depart the political scene afterward. Even if it will not be simple to reach an agreement with Hamas on the terms of elections, Abbas will feel the need to hold them sometime in 2012.

These elections are likely to shape the Palestinians’ identity and whether they continue to accept nonviolence, peaceful coexistence with Israelis and a two-state solution. If there are clear signs that the occupation is diminishing, the positions of Palestinians such as Abbas, Fayyad and their followers who believe in nonviolence will be validated before the elections. This is essential because the alternative is Hamas, which rejects nonviolence and peace with Israel.

In the recent deal with the Israeli government to free kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit, which gained the release of more than 1,000 prisoners, Hamas was seen as delivering political gain through an act of violence. By comparison, Abbas and Fayyad are not seen as delivering on the issues that matter to the Palestinian public, such as prisoner releases, Israeli withdrawal or a reduction of Israeli control.

For Palestinians, at least, this validation would also shrink the psychological gap between them and the Israelis, inspiring hope that negotiations could actually lead somewhere. It might, thus, also offer the best way to unstick the negotiating track. Even more important, with the changes sweeping the region and a political transition looming for the Palestinians, such a validation may be the only way to preserve support among the Palestinian and Arab publics for a two-state solution.

Dennis Ross, counselor at the Washington Institute, served as a special assistant to President Obama and a senior director on the National Security Council staff from July 2009 to December 2011.

In his NYT op-ed today entitled ‘Don’t Do It, Bibi,’ Roger Cohen issued another stern warning to his favorite target, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. In his piece, he warns about the grave repercussions if Israel were to attack Iran without political support from the United States.

This article is the latest installment in Cohen’s crusade against Netanyahu and the Likud-led governing coalition in Israel. Cohen solemnly recites all the ways in which Netanyahu has mistreated President Obama before he settles down and proceeds with his analysis of Iran’s nuclear threat.

Cohen argues that Netanyahu has stalled in his negotiations with the Palestinians because he foresees a rabidly pro-Israel Republican nominee beating Obama in the 2012 presidential elections. Yet in the next paragraph Cohen contends that Netanyahu is sorely tempted to bomb Iran before the elections because he and his advisors increasingly believe Obama can win in November.

Now, almost everybody following the Middle East understands that Netanyahu is a savvy politician who is not oblivious to American election cycles. Perhaps even more than most politicians, Netanyahu may be better characterized as “cynical” than “shrewd” in formulating his political agenda. And it may be true that Netanyahu indeed forecasts a Republican victory in 2012, but wants to hedge his bets by bombing Iran’s nuclear reactors while Obama courts the Jewish vote in the swing state of Florida.

However, Cohen makes the same mistakes in this article that he has consistently made throughout his analysis of the Iranian threat.

First, he implies that any attack by Israel would be a massive bombing campaign that would instantly and irreversibly unite all of Iran’s people under their oppressive regime and against the West. For starters, any aerial attack would be limited to the nuclear reactor sites and would probably result in few civilian casualties. With the possible tacit support of the US, in the last few years Israel has already attacked Iran’s nuclear program with a computer virus, assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, and sabotaged missile bases in Iran that resulted in dozens of Iranian deaths. Meanwhile, less than three years ago Iran’s regime was strongly challenged by its populace. While the theocratic government may have suppressed the mass protests in 2009, there is still a strong anti-regime sentiment among Iranians. Moreover, the “regime” itself is an uneasy coalition between Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that is showing highly visible signs of strain. I’m not sure how Cohen can absorb these facts and compute that an attack by Israel “locks in the Iranian Republic for a generation.”

Second (and he is not alone in this truly bizarre line of argumentation), he reckons that Israel’s security is threatened more by the status of the occupied territories than by Iran. I fully agree that Israel must keep striving to find a way to ensure that Palestinians have a fully functioning state. While the on and off again courtship between Hamas and Fatah certainly complicates matters, it is also reasonable to argue that the Netanyahu administration has shown a distinct lack of urgency in its approach toward negotiations with the Palestinians. I am also gravely aware of the risks that any aerial attack by Israel on Iranian reactor sites would entail (although per above I disagree with Cohen about their nature.) However, I struggle to comprehend how the Israeli-Palestinian quagmire, which is grinding toward its 45th year of existence, can be compared to the existential threat posed by the nuclear program of a country whose stated intention is to destroy Israel.

According to the latest news, Israel’s national airline EI AI and Tel Aviv stock exchange had been under the cyber attack, the latest in a series of cyber attacks on the Israeli businesses. A Saudi hacker, who calls himself as OxOmar, is considered to be behind this latest attack.

Israeli media considers such attacks as ‘politically motivated’ and they have expressed their motivation to retaliate. Hamas, the group which administers the Gaza Strip has hailed such attacks and encouraged the hackers to step up. Pro-Palestinian groups have said that they will continue such attacks in the future as well.

The computer experts in Israel has said that politically motivated attacks had happened in the past and they will continue to happen in future too. Thus, they urged private sector businesses to improve their cyber security to avoid such happenings in the future.

In nutshell, one can say that the Cyber-Security would be one of the most important challenges in the future, as there is a growing tendency to transfer business operations online. Disregarding the world in future is safer from the cyber-attacks or not, one things is for sure; thanks to cyber hackers, the demand for the computer specialists would continue to increase in future.

Guest Contribution by Jonathan D. Halevi

The following piece was originally published by Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. The author, Jonathan D. Halevi, is a senior researcher of the Middle East and Radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs headed by former Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Dr. Dore Gold. Mr. Halevi is also director of research for the Orient Research Group Ltd., a strategic and private information services company. 

The prevailing optimism in media reports concerning the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist party’s readiness to adhere to the peace treaty with Israel is based on general statements made by senior officials in both parties. These statements maintain that Egypt must honor the international treaties that it signed.

Yet a more rigorous examination of the two parties’ stances identifies a markedly different tendency. Both seek a way to cast off the Camp David agreement in a manner that will incur minimal diplomatic and economic damage to Egypt, and restore Egypt to its leading role in the circle of states confronting Israel.

The Muslim Brotherhood has set a number of criteria for examining international agreements, including the Camp David agreement: the considerations of Islamic canon law (Sharia), the position of the Egyptian people, and the degree of Israel’s compliance with the agreement from Egypt’s perspective.
The strategic objective of the Egyptian Islamic movements is to transform Egypt into a prime regional force that will lead the diplomatic and military battle against Israel. This means re-examining the Camp David agreement and submitting it to the decision of the new parliament that will be controlled by the Islamic parties or to a referendum – thereby alleviating the responsibility of any future Egyptian government for cancelling the peace treaty. These developments can be averted if the U.S. and its allies take a firm position against any initiative to undermine the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, and all echelons of the Egyptian establishment are made to understand the implications of any such action.

The revolution in Egypt, followed by elections to the parliament, has elevated the Islamic parties to a position of power as they enjoy an absolute parliamentary majority after the two initial stages of the parliamentary elections. The Muslim Brotherhood movement’s Freedom and Justice party won 49 percent of the total seats that it contested (73 out of 150) in the first stage of the elections and the Salafist al-Nur party won about 20 percent of the seats (30 seats). In the second stage of the elections the Muslim Brotherhood won about 40 percent of the votes and al-Nur about 35 percent. The final stage of the elections will take place in January 2012. However, we can already form the distinct impression that the Egyptian parliament will be controlled by the absolute majority retained by these two extreme Islamic parties.

In recent journalistic reports we repeatedly hear the claim that the Freedom and Justice party and the al-Nur party will continue to honor the Camp David peace agreement with Israel after the new regime has been consolidated under their leadership. These reports are essentially based on general statements made by senior officials in both parties to the effect that Egypt must honor the international agreements that it signed. However, a rigorous examination of the two parties’ stances indicates a totally different tendency: namely, the two parties seek to cast off the Camp David accords in a manner that will cause Egypt the minimal possible diplomatic and economic damage.

The issue of Egyptian adherence to the Camp David agreement was brought up during discussions that Senator John Kerry conducted together with the American Ambassador to Cairo, Anne Patterson, with leaders of the Freedom and Justice party on December 10, 2011. Dr. Mohammed Morsi, the party chairman, referred to the issue in general terms. A report on the meeting by the official website of the Muslim Brotherhood stated:

Morsi noted that Egypt is a large country with a deep-rooted history that fulfills an important role in the Arab, Islamic and international arenas and therefore it honors the agreements and contracts which it has signed. He demanded that the American administration listen directly to the people rather than listen to what is said about them, while emphasizing that the United States could play a role in facilitating economic stability and prosperity for all peoples should it choose to do so.1

New Egyptian Conditions

The Muslim Brotherhood set a number of criteria for examining international agreements, including the Camp David agreement. First, there is Islamic canon law (Sharia); second, one must take into account the Egyptian people’s position which Morsi mentioned in his talk with Senator Kerry; and third, one must weigh the degree of compliance by the other party to any agreement that was signed with Egypt.

The platform of the Freedom and Justice party determines that it will honor international human rights agreements, provided that they do not contradict the Islamic Sharia. Regarding the peace agreement with Israel, the platform states that agreements between countries must be acceptable to the people and conform to the principles of justice and the interests of the parties. Respect for these agreements is conditional upon an obligation by the parties to fulfill them in full, as is the norm in international relations. “Therefore, the party considers it obligatory to reappraise many of the agreements that were signed in various fields by the old regime.”2

Calls to Re-examine the Treaty with Israel

Senior leaders of the Freedom and Justice party have on numerous occasions in recent months favored amending or abrogating the Camp David accords and severing diplomatic and economic relations with Israel. On August 25, 2011, party chairman Dr. Mohammed Morsi demanded a re-examination of the Camp David agreement, and contended that Israel’s “attack” on an Egyptian army border position (that was in response to terrorist fire at the IDF from this position) exemplified Israel’s systematic violation of the agreement.3

Dr. Ahmed Abu Baraka, the Freedom and Justice party’s legal advisor and a senior leader of the party, said on August 28 that it was necessary to re-examine all the clauses of the Camp David agreement to see whether its abrogation was mandated. He emphasized the importance of deploying Egyptian army forces in the Sinai, equipped with heavy and advanced weaponry, in order to deter Israel.4

Dr. Mohammed Gamal Hismat, a senior leader of the Freedom and Justice party and a former parliament member, proposed on August 24 to establish a legal committee that would examine the Camp David agreement in light of Israel’s “continued violation” of the agreement.5

Dr. Essam El-Arian, the deputy leader of the Freedom and Justice party, on August 23 minimized the importance of American threats to terminate assistance to Egypt if it were to disown the Camp David agreement, and contended that Israel was violating the agreement “in a blatant fashion.”6

Dr. Hamdy Ismail, the party secretary in the Ismailiya district, explained on October 31 that the issue of the Camp David agreement directly affected the Egyptian citizenry, and therefore raised a proposal within the party to submit the decision on the issue to a referendum.7

Dr. Ahmed Rami, a senior Freedom and Justice party leader in the Qalyubiya district, called on August 27 for a re-examination of the Camp David agreement, noting that the revolution in Egypt marked the outset of a journey to liberate Jerusalem in view of the fact that the “Zionist entity is near collapse.”8

These positions received additional validation from the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Dr. Mohammed Badie, who in his weekly letters to movement activists elaborates his doctrine and positions with regard to the United States and Israel following the revolutions in Egypt and the Arab world. Badie terms the Camp David accord “a surrender” agreement and he presents a list of demands on this issue. In his letter of May 5, 2011, Badie wrote:

We vociferously call for the termination of normalization, that provided our enemy [Israel] with stability, putting an end to securing the Zionist borders and the killing of infiltrators into the enemy’s [territory], the abrogation of the issues of economic interests such as the QIZ,9 a [halt] to gas exports that wrought damage to our national security, urgent action to complete the opening of the Rafah crossing on a permanent basis and a re-examination of the Camp David agreement so it can be presented to the National Assembly elected in free elections, thus allowing it to have its say after it was denied this for years.10

Badie defines Israel and the United States as Egypt’s principal adversaries. In his weekly letter of October 6, 2011, he reaches the clear conclusion that “our main enemy is the Zionist-American plan, which aspires to take over the entire region in order to establish Greater Israel and the New Middle East.”11

Badie does not mention any option for cooperation with Israel or the United States, but, on the contrary, in his evaluation these two countries, that represent the most dangerous threat to Egypt, are currently in a state of historic decline:

The global forces, the Zionists and Americans, are absorbing a succession of debacles and defeats, commencing with Israel’s isolation and loss of its regional supporters, and the American failures in the military realm (in Iraq and Afghanistan), and in the economic arena that threaten the collapse of the capitalist regime as a result of failed policy and the huge expenses and wars prosecuted under the pretext of liquidating what they call terror. They’ve forfeited their credibility among peoples and now they’ve lost their financial sources, and we do not rule out the possibility that their fate will approximate the Soviet Union’s fate….At the same time the blessed revolutions of the Arab Spring presage a total change in the Arab national map.12

The irrelevance of the Camp David agreement finds expression in the Muslim Brotherhood movement’s overt aspiration to bring about the “liberation” of the entire territory of “Palestine,” a concept that dovetails with its Islamic ideological platform, and which finds expression in the current optimistic assessment by the Muslim Brotherhood leader on the prospects for realizing this vision in practice. In his weekly letter of June 9, 2011, Badie writes:

Victory is near with the help of Allah, it is definite and there can be no doubt about it. The restoration of Palestine, al Quds [Jerusalem], the Golan, and all the lands that Israel conquered is no longer feverish imagination, but a hope that will soon be realized after the [Arab] nations have revolted….The era of “Israeli” superiority has ended and “Israel” has begun to doubt its continuity and survival.13

The official position of the Salafist al-Nur party resembles that of the Muslim Brotherhood. Dr. Emad Abdel Ghafour, the party leader, says:

It is obligatory to honor the agreements to which Egypt is affiliated, and we demand that they be met. There are many passages in the peace agreement that were not implemented [by Israel], such as a solution to the Palestinian problem, the right of self-determination [for the Palestinian people], and the autonomy of a Palestinian state on Palestinian soil. There are many issues that must be implemented so that the Palestinian people will sense that it has benefited from the peace process….The peace agreement of Camp David requires a re-examination.14

Dr. Yousry Hamad, the spokesperson for the al-Nur party, explained that the party’s position on the Camp David agreement would be adopted on the basis of Sharia,15 and vigorously denied journalistic reports that the party was ostensibly prepared to maintain contacts with the Israeli ambassador in Cairo.16

Unfounded Optimism

The optimism regarding a radical change in the positions of these extreme Egyptian Islamic movements regarding Israel grasps at the straws of general statements that do not attest to an ideological reversal, but convey the tactics for obtaining the strategic objective: casting off the Camp David agreement and transforming Egypt into a prime regional force that will lead the diplomatic and military battle against Israel.

The Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the al-Nur party, is seeking a convenient exit point from the Camp David agreement, due to an awareness of the implications of violating a binding diplomatic treaty under international law and the immediate damage that the Egyptian economy is likely to absorb as a direct result of an initiated abrogation of the Camp David accords.

Egypt receives $1.3 billion annually in U.S. military assistance, while in 2010 American economic assistance totaled $250 million. The Egyptian army’s main strength is predicated on American weapons systems including F-16 and F 14 aircraft, Apache helicopters, M1A1 and M60A3 tanks, surface-to-air missiles, spy planes, and more. In the framework of bilateral military cooperation, the armies of the two countries customarily conduct joint training and maneuvers.

How to Nullify the Peace Treaty

Yet the die has been cast and the strategic choice has already been made. The only question on the agenda is how to implement this decision at a minimal diplomatic and economic cost. We can infer from comments by senior Muslim Brotherhood members that they are interested in playing the “democratic game” to the hilt on this issue as well. This means re-examining the Camp David agreement and submitting it to the decision of the new parliament that will be controlled by the Islamic parties or to a referendum – thereby alleviating the responsibility of any future Egyptian government for cancelling the peace treaty. The immediate pretext will be Israel’s noncompliance with clauses in the agreement, in order to attribute to Israel the blame for the treaty’s abrogation.

It would appear that the Muslim Brotherhood’s appraisal is that following their seizure of power and additional achievements of the Arab Spring, the U.S. will be compelled to accept the new reality, just as it has made peace with the situation up to now. American leaders have even reiterated their praise for the democratic process, although this process has elevated the radical Islamic forces to new positions of power. These forces aspire to drain democracy of content and gradually (the Muslim Brotherhood strategy) or immediately (the al-Nur party approach) implement Islamic religious law.

From Israel’s standpoint, the revolution in Egypt and its translation at the ballot box into the Islamic Revolution carries the serious potential for transforming Egypt in the foreseeable future into an enemy and restoring it to the circle of confrontation states. Israel is doing its utmost to preserve the Camp David agreement even for appearances sake. However, developments in Egypt will inevitably lead to the creation of a serious security challenge on Israel’s southern border. The new Egypt will try to exercise its full sovereignty in Sinai and deploy regular forces there, employing various pretexts, beginning with Israeli “violations” of the Camp David agreement, proceeding with the need to defend itself against an Israeli attack, and concluding with Egypt’s obligation to protect its Palestinian brothers in Gaza.

Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, the parent movement of Hamas, provides ongoing assistance to Hamas and furnishes it with strategic backing that is growing more potent due to the Brotherhood’s increased strength in the recent elections. A high proportion of Izzedine al Qassam Brigade activists who were killed in recent years in Gaza were simultaneously Muslim Brotherhood activists and Hamas members. The plausible assumption is that one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s first objectives after it assumes the reins of power will be to guarantee an open border crossing between Gaza and Egypt, and to provide comprehensive economic and military assistance to Hamas that will pose new security risks for Israel.

Furthermore, the strategic alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas may constrain Israel’s freedom of military action in Gaza (as well as in the West Bank) because this could provoke an Egyptian military response, including the transfer of aid, weapons, and intelligence to Hamas, the deployment of Egyptian forces in Sinai and/or in Gaza, stationing Egyptian antiaircraft systems on the border of Gaza, and threats of direct military action.

These developments can be averted if the U.S. and its allies take a firm position against any initiative to undermine the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, and all echelons of the Egyptian establishment are made to understand the implications of any such action.

* * *

Notes:

1. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?ArtID=96953&SecID=0

2. http://www.hurryh.com/Party_Program.aspx

3. http://www.hurryh.com/Provinces/Our_news_Details.aspx?News_ID=1933&ID=23

4. http://www.hurryh.com/Provinces/Our_news_Details.aspx?News_ID=2000

5. http://www.hurryh.com/Party_Article_Details.aspx?News_ID=1872

6. http://www.hurryh.com/Our_news_Details.aspx?News_ID=1850

7. http://www.hurryh.com/ar_print.aspx?print_ID=4579

8. http://www.hurryh.com/Our_news_Details.aspx?News_ID=1954

9. The QIZ Agreement (QIZ-Qualified Industrial Zones) was signed in 2005 between the governments of the United States, Israel and Egypt. The agreement defined industrial zones whose factories would receive a customs exemption on their exports to the United States if a certain percentage of the raw materials originated in Israel.

10. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?ArtID=83759&SecID=0

11. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?SecID=213&ArtID=92523

12. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?SecID=213&ArtID=92523

13. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?ArtID=85754&SecID=0

14. http://www.tayyar.org/Tayyar/News/PoliticalNews/ar-LB/salafi-egypte-pb-5363323219.htm

15. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8tCfUs6upxQ&feature=youtu.be

16. http://www.facebook.com/AlnourParty/posts/211082628974957

When I look back to the ended year, I think of so many unexpected turn of events, civilizations ruined, great people we lost as well as so many remarkable achievements in global peace, freedom, and justice movements. Some of these developments are easy to forget and some are cherished already. In North Africa protesters overthrew entrenched autocracies, the US caught it’s most wanted man, a tsunami devastated Japan, the European Union teetered on the verge of collapse, while famine ravaged the horn of Africa and demonstrators mobilized across the globe to slam excesses in the financial industry. In short, 2011 is unique on so many levels.

A society’s well being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream. In democratic societies all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well being. When governments fail or are unable to keep with the common good, it’s a matter of time until we will see them going down. This reminds me Martin Luther King Jr. “Freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed.”

Thanks to TIME Magazine, in its special edition, the liberal magazine honored the 2011 person of the year award to the protestors. There are indeed many to choose from. It’s a great recognition for the sacrifices paid by those who stand for freedom and justice. No one could have known that when a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself on fire in a public square in a town barely on a map, he would spark protests that would bring down dictators in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and rattle regimes in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Or that that spirit of dissent would spur Mexicans to rise up against the terror of drug cartels, Greeks to march against unaccountable leaders, Americans to occupy public spaces to protest income inequality, and Russians to marshal themselves against a corrupt autocracy.

TIME’s nomination was not free from questions. There are philosophical differences in mapping who is protesting for fairness, who is fighting for freedom and who is terrorizing humanity. As Larbi Sadiki noted in his view “Veiling luminance”, do the meanings of protest, dissidence, and objection apply to Osama bin Laden? Was he a protester? We all know he was a terrorist. Are terrorist’s protesters? Is it the medium of protest, its reach, geography or end that defines the properties or identity of a “protester”? Do Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Mandela epitomize “the protester”. Would Ché? Castro? ANC? Hamas? The Afghan Mujahedeen (once allies of Bin Laden)? The Tunisian Federation of Trade Unions? All had something to do with “redefining people power”!

Despite such critics, everywhere the protestors of 2011 were disproportionately young, middle class and educated. Almost all the protests last year began as independent affairs, without much encouragement from, or endorsement by, existing political parties or opposition bigwigs. All over the world, the protesters of 2011 share a belief that their countries’ political systems and economies have grown dysfunctional and corrupt — sham democracies rigged to favor the rich and powerful and prevent significant change. They are fervent small democrats.

While there are universal values which are the common denominators of all the 2011 protestors, there are no ready-made recipes for bringing an end to their plights. Their quest requires a broad and long-term perspective analysis on what caused the protests and how institutions respond to their plights. Time will tell the historical, cultural, and social factors in a given society or country that shape the protest. I hope 2012 will be time to act on our global peace and development challenges on the bases of respect, tolerance, and mending our long standing political deference.

The past year in Israel has been anything but boring.  The Palestinians were rejected for full-membership in the United Nations, Israeli Corporal Gilad Schalit was returned alive to Israel, Turkey downgraded its diplomatic relations with the Jewish state, the Israeli population took to the streets for social change, and Israel continued its covert operations against Iran’s nuclear program.  As is customary for bloggers covering specific regions for the Foreign Policy Association, I will address Israel’s “unexpected event of the year,” name a “man of the year,” and provide a “forecast for 2012.”

Most Unexpected Event: The Return of Gilad Schalit

There was no bigger surprise inIsrael this year than the return of five-year captive, Corporal Gilad Schalit.  On June 26, 2006, Corporal Schalit was captured on the Israeli-Gaza border by Hamas militants.  Several proofs of life were provided throughout the duration of his captivity, but in the back of most Israeli’s minds there was the likelihood that Schalit was dead.  The odds were against him, as most Israeli soldiers who have been captured by enemy states and non-state actors have either returned in coffins, or not at all.  Corporal Gilad Schalit defied the odds.  The Israeli population, who intensely lobbied the Israeli government and international community to secure his release, was overwhelmingly satisfied, proud, and inspired by his return.  They could be seen on television weeping and praying.

While a joyous occasion, Schalit’s release was surrounded by controversy.  There was significant debate about the price Israel had to pay for Schalit, more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners.  Several of the prisoners were directly responsible for the murder of Israelis. A handful of Knesset Ministers and community leaders felt that the prisoners being released would return to terrorism, and would lead future attacks on Israelis.  There was also the issue of how Egypt handled Schalit’s return to Israel.  Before being allowed to speak with or see his family, Egyptian authorities forced Schalit to do a shameful, and mistranslated, interview on Egyptian national television.

Regardless, the return of Gilad Schalit was a full display of Israel’s value on life, and was a welcomed jolt of optimism to a country that has been experiencing increased international isolation.

Person of the Year: Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas

Though he is not an Israeli, I could not pass up making Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas my 2011 “Person of the Year.”

2011 saw the most recent attempt by the Palestinian Authority to gain full-fledged membership in the United Nations.  Given its timing in relation to current peace-talks and failed Palestinian unity discussions, it is arguable whether this was in fact in the best interest of the Palestinians.  President Abbas did, however, do an admirable job of bringing it global attention.  What makes him man of the year is how little he did with that attention.

In the lead up to the UN General Assembly, there was much speculation about whether membership would actually be granted to the Palestinians.  Most understood that for political reasons it would not be. Nonetheless, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Barak Obama were noticeably nervous and dismayed.  They made significant attempts to change President Abbas’ mind and lure him back to the negotiating table for direct talks with Israel.  President Abbas found himself in a unique, and rare, position of power and control.  It would have been more than possible to make reasonable demands of Israel and the US in order to get peace talks back on track.  It could have been a turning point in discussions, bringing some long lost muscle and credibility back to Palestinian leadership.  Instead, President Abbas chose to pursue full-membership to the UN.  As expected, his application was rejected and his reputation spoiled.

Since his failure at the UN, President Abbas has been mostly stagnant and the Palestinian resolve has further eroded.  In the last two-weeks he has openly stated that he is considering Hamas membership in to the Palestinian Liberation Organization.  This would likely halt all discussions of peace and lead to a Hamasization of the West Bank.

Forecast for 2012

Given the events of 2011, the upcoming year will likely be a pivotal one for the Jewish state.  There are lots of unanswered questions: what is the future of Israeli-Turkish relations? Will the social protests actually lead to change? What is the future of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank?  What will the elections in Egypt mean for the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty? And of course, what is going to happen with Iran?

It would be nice if one could be optimistic about the answers to the above questions, but it is unfortunately difficult.  Israeli-Turkish relations are likely to break off completely barring a change of heart in Turkish regional ambition.  Given the gridlock system of the Israeli government it is unlikely any kind of social change will happen in the near future.  If Hamas is allowed in the Palestinian Liberation Organization the West Bank will likely turn in to Gaza 2, with peace-talks hitting an all-time low.  The Muslim Brotherhood, the likely future ruling party of Egypt, is preaching moderation and peace with Israel, but political pundits believe otherwise.  It will not be the first time politicians have lied about alliances in order to gain international support.  The only place one can find any remote sense of optimism/neutrality in predicting Israel’s 2012 is that it will certainly keep up its covert operations against Iran’s nuclear program.

The truth is that Israel is one of the most dynamic and unpredictable countries in the world.  On any given day, anything can happen.  The only thing that is certain is that Israel will continue its economic development and that its people will do their best to live happy and normal lives.

This year in Cuban history will be viewed as a significant one, having seen more economic change and reform on the island than some entire decades. But Washington’s response over the course of a year has proven insignificant.

Let’s start with a brief summary of the past year. In January, the executive branch of the U.S. government announced and published new travel and remittance rules with respect to Cuba, which increased possibilities for people-to-people travel. The effect has been gradual (OFAC in the Treasury is under-staffed and really quite slow), but greater numbers of cultural travel groups have received their necessary licenses and are leading trips to the island because of the new rules. February and March saw the trial of the infamous violent Cuban exile Luis Posada Carriles, and a historic step in the United States to prosecute him for terrorist acts in Cuba (he was later acquitted, to the chagrin of many). Alan Gross, the USAID contractor who remains in jail in Cuba, was sentenced in March to 15 years in prison — a relationship-damaging development that has continued to be a point of great contention between Washington and Havana. In April, the Cuban Communist Party held their Sixth Party Congress and reviewed the terms of a great number of economic reforms, which have proceeded in implementation during the rest of the year. Yet in October we stood nearly solo at the United Nations as the world voted against the U.S. embargo on Cuba. We put Cuba again on our list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” though the evidence to support the designation has withered. And here we are in December with President Obama still apparently convinced that the release of political prisoners in Cuba and the drastic economic changes underway are not enough to qualify as the “change” that would merit a significant bilateral discussion.

Asi es la vida for Cuba-watchers. The most unexpected event of this year was not a “happening” at all: it is the lack of movement forward in Washington on Cuba issues, and the continuing age-old tendency to cater to the conservative Miami Cuban-American base — a demographic that is changing and adapting its views to new developments in Cuba more so than Congress and the current administration, it seems. We expected more this year, despite the myriad of other global challenges faced by the United States. Washington has found time recently to take a fresh look at Myanmar, but still not at our close neighbor Cuba.

With all of the events of the last year, here in the United States the individual whose name has received the most airtime — and who therefore receives our designation of person of the year – is Alan Gross. Mr. Gross has been held in Cuba since December 2009 for distributing communications equipment illegally on the island; his sentence of 15 years in prison for crimes against the Cuban state was upheld by the Cuban Supreme Court in August. U.S. officials have tried unsuccessfully to argue for his unilateral release: many experts have suggested a prisoner swap (modeled off of the Israel-Hamas prisoner exchange of Gilad Shalit for hundreds of Palestinians — but in this case just one for five), but this has not gained traction in Washington. Mr. Gross remains imprisoned.

The forecast for 2012 is unfortunately only a tick higher than bleak in terms of the U.S.-Cuba relationship. This is unlike me; I know. But 2012 is an election year, and Cuba policy remains contentious politically. There is frankly very little reason for an administration seeking re-election to take the kind of political risk that drastic (necessary) Cuba policy changes entail. But the island’s future looks positive, at least for the moment. The population is testing out new economic reforms, the reforms are pressing ahead to the long-run benefit of a troubled economy, and foreign businesses and investors remain interested in Cuba despite recent crackdowns on corruption that have affected foreigners as well as Cubans.

We’ll be here as this all develops.