Tag Archive | "Gilani"

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The Obsolete Prime Minister

Posted on 30 December 2011 by Tea Server

Why has Prime Minister Gilani suddenly found himself on the precipice of utility? 

Once upon a time, in the eighties, Gilani was a young minister in Prime Minister Junejo’s cabinet. At that point, Junejo wasn’t quite getting along with his Punjab chief minister, Nawaz Sharif. Most worryingly, even Ziaul Haq was convinced Nawaz was getting too big for his britches and had forgotten that the position he occupied was a generous gift from the General.

Zia expressed his reservations before kingmaker Pir Pagaro who promised to “fix” Nawaz. The next day, Pir Sahib called Gilani and instructed him to leave for Punjab and start laying the planks of his campaign as future chief minister. Gilani immediately went off and set up shop in Lahore.

As he mixed with dozens of political heavyweights, news spread that change was a-comin’. Big names like Nasrullah Dareshak, Aashiq Gopang, Malik Allahyar Khunda, Makhdoom Altaf, Rafiq Laghari and others flocked to see Gilani for secret meetings. There were reports that Manzoor Wattoo was becoming restless. When Chaudhry Parwaiz Elahi contacted Gilani and hinted at wanting to leave Nawaz, it seemed like a job well done.

The chief-minister-in-waiting couldn’t wait any longer and sent a message to the Pir saying the seeds of mutiny had been sown. Pagaro told him to wait.

So while Gilani waited in Lahore, rubbing his hands in silent expectation of torpedoing Nawaz’s career, the by now shaken chief minister arrived to meet his master in Islamabad. No one really knows what transpired during the meeting between Nawaz and Zia – expect that, after it was over the General announced before the media that the chief minister’s fort was secure. Junejo followed up with a similar statement that there would be no change in Punjab. And the final clincher came from Pir Sahib himself: there was a rip in Nawaz’s sack that had been patched up. It was indeed a job well done.

This turn of events created panic in Lahore, of course. The MPAs who had so readily lined up behind Gilani scurried away like roaches in the light. They all realised that they had been used. Gilani understood too.

A hangdog Gilani arrived to meet the Pir and asked him why he had done what he had done. Pir Sahib smiled. “Bacha, this is politics,” he said. “Nawaz was showing the eye to the General so I told him I’d teach him a lesson. I selected you because you are young. You don’t have absolute credibility in politics yet, but you come from a powerful political family in Multan; plus, you’re my relative and it would have been easy for you to convince MPAs to leave Nawaz. Thank God my hunch was not wrong. You have not disappointed me.”

“But this means you have used me,” a heartsore Gilani replied.

Pir Sahib smiled again. A defeated Gilani left, having learnt an invaluable lesson: that there are two kinds of politicians – the first, who masters the art of using others for his political gains, and the second who is always used by others for their political gains.

But over two decades after this incident – which reporter Rauf Klasra narrates in his book, Aik Siyasat Kaee Kahaniyan (One Politics, Many Stories) – any guesses what kind of politician Gilani has turned out to be?

After the 2008 general election, many wondered why exactly Gilani was selected by Zardari: because he would be a strong prime minister or because he would be a pushover prime minister? At the time some had, perhaps naively, suggested Gilani had the capability of being either. After all, he had resisted Benazir’s demands to use strong-arm tactics against the opposition when he was the National Assembly speaker in the mid-1990s. And he had suffered years as a political prisoner under Gen Musharraf rather than splitting from the PPP. Which is perhaps why the day after Gilani’s election as prime minister, one commentator wrote: “Gilani himself sets the limits of what he will and will not do.”

Nearly four years later, has he? If anything, the problem with this prime minister is that he’s good for absolutely nothing but being used by others. Charlatanism of some degree is indispensable to effective leadership. But Gilani has been religiously consistent in who he is: a pushover. Yes, President Zardari has used him again and again to get through political crises of all sorts. But what use is he outside the universe of political wheeling and dealing – where the economy is a gigantic mess, the security situation fragile, at best, and governance absolutely beside the point for the government?

Yes, Gilani has a special knack for starting near where he thinks the opponent is – at the fifty-yard line – and then moving closer to his position, and that has helped pull the government out of many a political crisis. But what does that mean for the poor, hungry, unemployed voter who doesn’t have electricity or gas, health or education, protection or justice?

Maybe, Zardari gets this now, and hence all the mutterings about a change of guard? Especially with Javed Hashmi and Shah Mehmood Qureshi both joining Team Imran, Gilani isn’t much use in Multan either. And he seems to have burnt all his bridges with the army also. Sp, why keep him at all, especially when his greatest quality – an instinctive subservience to the ends of others – has become redundant?

(From News International)

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© 2011, Mehreen Zahra-Malik. This article may not be reproduced in any form without providing an active attribution link/ reference to The Pakistan Forum. All attribution links within the article must also be retained.

Syndicated from: The Pakistan Forum

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A Janus Faced Alliance

Posted on 24 December 2011 by Tea Server

The heightened rhetoric between Pakistan and the United States has reached a fever pitch after the recent incident which killed twenty-four Pakistani soldiers on the Pak-Afghan border. The relationship already beset by accusations, recriminations and threats since the bin Laden killing seems to have gone into a tailspin in the last few weeks.

An uneasy alliance as always

Pakistan considers the unfortunate border incident as a deliberate act, a part of a ‘plot,’ and very nearly as an act of war. Echoing strong public feeling, the Pakistani civilian leadership probably egged on by the all-powerful military is increasingly combative in its public pronouncements and actions vis-à-vis the United States. Prime Minister Gilani warned the US and its NATO allies that any future cross-border attack would meet with a “detrimental response”, whatever that means.

Pakistanis generally tend to view the US as an untrustworthy superpower up to its neck in the Afghanistan quagmire and on the verge of defeat at the hands of a ragtag band of holy warriors. Pakistanis are convinced that despite having to rely on on their country to pull its chestnuts out of the Afghan fire, the US blinded by imperial arrogance continues to dump on Pakistan.

On the other hand, many US policy makers consider Pakistan a failing nuclear armed state with dubious democratic credentials which is infested with extremists and terrorists. Pakistan’s anti-terrorism policies are characterized as ‘Janus-faced’, delivering on some goals in fits and starts as local security forces choose the terrorists they fight and those they coddle. The Washington based Council on Foreign Relations, an influential think-tank, has ranked a conflict with Pakistan among the top potential threats facing the United States in 2012.

The Pak-US alliance is akin to a shotgun marriage brought about by the “war on terror”, otherwise the two countries do not always share the same worldview or the same opinions or the same national interest. The inherent contradictions in the relationship make a “hearts and minds” winning strategy a non-starter at this juncture.

Pakistanis will continue to view the US as a two-faced ally using and discarding Pakistan as a tactical military tool while strengthening a long term strategic economic, defence and nuclear partnership with India. The US burdened by the cost of fighting two wars in a deep recession would be hard pressed to open another front unless a serious terrorist attack can be traced back to sponsors in Pakistan.

What is drowned out in the negative media sound bites is that neither side can afford an acrimonious divorce while there is an absolute need to cooperate on issues like terrorism, Afghanistan and nuclear proliferation. The complex Pak-US relationship must endure in the dangerous environment existing in the region and beyond despite its intrinsic conflict and in the present deep schism. Hopefully, Pakistan and the US will see the sense in looking beyond a purely short-term military alliance towards developing and sustaining a long-term democratic partnership.

A sobering reality for Pakistan is that replacing its long serving “paymaster” the US with “all weather friend” China will not happen overnight. The enraptured Pakistani media describes China as a relentless economic juggernaut while the US is derided as an almost bankrupt economic basket case. From what we know of the great Chinese success story built on no-nonsense hard work and sacrifice, Pakistanis should not be under any illusion that China will be an over indulgent “sugar daddy” easily taken for a ride like the often naïve Americans.

Equally, American policy makers could tone down their public criticism of Pakistan and leave the delivery of “tough love” messages to State Department professionals in their private meetings with their Pakistani counterparts. The US must understand that Pakistanis are very sensitive to criticism having suffered hundreds of deadly attacks and thousands of civilian and military casualties in the fight against terrorism in the last decade. The criticism of Pakistan is especially harmful to the bilateral relationship as many Pakistanis believe that their weak and ineffectual leadership is slavishly fighting the “war on terror” on the US’s behalf.

As a start, instead of public criticism and bluster, General Kayani and the new US chief military officer General Dempsey who were apparently batch mates at Fort Leavenworth, could organize a golf game and rediscover their affection over a cold one. The two omniscient khakis may convey to their civilian “masters” that Pakistan and the US have more in common than just the unclad Veena Malik and Lindsay Lohan!

Syndicated from: Pak Tea House

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[Editorial] Democracy is the guarantee for future stability of Pakistan

Posted on 23 December 2011 by Tea Server

The political environment of Pakistan is changing fast. The rhetoric, manoeuvres, ‘meetings’, and the upbeat judicial activism, aided by a fiery and sensationalist mainstream media, have for the past several weeks successfully shaped an environment where people have almost prepared themselves for a military coup, yet again. This feeling, of fear,  got a voice when PM Gilani spoke [...]

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Affidavets of COAS & ISI Chief to SCP

Posted on 16 December 2011 by Tea Server

Following are the text of affidavits exclusively for my readers:  

Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in his reply to the Supreme Court stated that the memo was a reality and a conspiracy was being hatched against the army and national security.
In the reply General Kayani writes that the Financial Times published Mansoor Ijaz’s story about the memo on October 10. COAS Kayani was informed about DG ISI General Pasha’s meeting with Mansoor Ijaz on October 24 and Pasha was of the opinion that there was enough evidence to validate the authenticity of the memo.The DG ISI said there was evidence which illustrated that Ijaz was in touch with Hussain Haqqani between May 9-11 and that they exchanged text messages and phone calls. Kayani says on October 28 the spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry and Presidency denied the memo in separate statements. Admiral Mike Mullen through his spokesperson first denied receiving the memo on November 8 but a few days later confirmed its receipt.
The reply goes on to state that on November 13, during a meeting with Prime Minister Gilani, I (Kayani) advised that those points of the memo which were leaked were very sensitive and that a decision had to be made on its being real or not. According to the reply Kayani strongly insisted that the Prime Minister summon Haqqani so he can brief the country’s leadership about this matter.
Kayani told the prime minister that time was limited and the sooner we found out the facts the better it would be.
On November 15, Kayani said he was called by the President for a meeting and met him at two in the afternoon.
According to Kayani the prime minister had already informed the president about his recommendations. President Zardari informed Kayani that the decision to summon Haqqani had already been made.
On November 21, US General James Jones confirmed that he had taken the memo to Mullen.
Kayani said that he was part of a meeting which also included the prime minister, president and DG ISI on November 22.
It was during this meeting that Haqqani briefed all of them and Prime Minister Gilani asked for Haqqani’s resignation and ordered an investigation.
Towards the end Kayani writes that there was enough evidence validating the memo and there should be full review to evaluate the circumstance and facts behind it.
General Kayani said that the memo tried to decrease the morale of the Pakistan Army but was unsuccessful in doing so.
DG ISI Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha submitted to the Supreme Court:
Respectfully submitted;
1. Respondent No 7 has not received any petition till now. However, in compliance with the orders of the Honourable Court dated 1.12.2011 reply is submitted herein:
2. Media Wing of ISI brought to my notice the piece published in the Financial Times on the 10th of October. It was written by one Mr Mansoor Ejaz. The writer had, in this article, criticised the ISI’s role and suggested some actions against the Organization. This was usual anti ISI rhetoric.
3. But I did find the opening paragraph of this piece quite unusual and damaging. It mentioned that a senior Pakistani official had been attempting to pass on a message to senior US leaders indicating imminence of a military takeover in Pakistan. The whole thing looked intriguing. I concluded that one could write such a piece so blatantly unless he had some evidence to support his assertions. I, therefore, tasked my sources to know about Mr Mansoor Ijaz and find out if he would agree to share the information about the purported Memorandum.
4. It was confirmed to me by my sources that Mr Mansoor ijaz was ready to share the information but only with the Director General and also not in Pakistan. He insisted that the meeting shall be without any aides on both sides. Accordingly, a meeting was thus planned and took place in London on 22nd of October 2011.
5. Mr Mansoor Ijaz briefed me that our Ambassador in Washington had gotten in touch with him and remained in communication about the contents and delivery of the Memo to the relevant US authorities. He also showed me the proof of a large number of messages sent through BlackBerry which had been exchanged between our Ambassador in Washington and him regarding the document, which later came to be known as the Memorandum. He explained to me in fair amount of details about the circumstances leading to the drafting of Memo and why it was delivered through him. I told him, that I could not believe him unless I saw his BlackBerry and Computer myself to form an opinion that the messages were really exchanged between the two individuals. Having seen these means of communication used, I was satisfied that he had enough corroborative material to prove his version of the incident. He insisted that he will present the details of the evidence himself before a commission or court of law, if asked to do so.
6. I left London the next evening and reported my findings verbally to the Chief of Army Staff on 24th October 2011.
7. I met the Honourable President of Pakistan on 18th of November 2011 when this matter also came under discussion and I briefed him on what, according to my assessment, the facts were. I also suggested to him the issue pertained to National Security and should not be taken lightly. I suggested to the President that it will be in the fitness of things to ask our Ambassador in Washington to verify or contradict the matter.
8. The Respondent has the honour to lead ISI, an organization that stands in forefront, particularly during the peace time, to safeguard the security of the Country as well as the honour and respect of its people. Men and women under command of the Respondent continue to risk their lives and those of their children to positively contribute to the overall security calculus of the Country. All our efforts are geared towards that end.
9. The Respondent, in his humble personal capacity, maintains that access to unadulterated truth and justice is a right of the people of Pakistan, the real sovereign masters of this Country. To this end, Honourable Court may, if deemed appropriate, graciously consider the following:-
a. May kindly summon Mr Mansoor Ijaz to appear before the Honourable Court as he alone holds the real evidence, as claimed by him. He has already, at a number of occasions, indicated his willingness to do so, through the print and electronic media.
b. May kindly demand forensic examination of the computers and all the cell phones and Black Berry Telephones used since May 2011 till date by the both, Mr Mansoor Ijaz and our Ex Ambassador to the US.
c. May kindly consider retrieval of the Call Record Data related to this incident from the Black Berry as well as other service providers, if any.
10. Under the circumstances, the answering Respondent shall comply with all the directions given by this Honourable Court in the matter and render necessary assistance to its appointed commission whenever so required.
Syndicated from: AKC

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