Below is an article by a Syrian journalist who has put light on the lives people of Syria are living in fear. Bashar al Asad like his father is a tyrant and he seems to be the modern version of Nazi leadership. People should raise their voices all over the world and support the freedom and justice loving people in any manner they can.

Confessions of an ‘agent’ in Syria–>DAWN News Article

by Maryam Hasan (Pen name)

Source : http://www.dawn.com/2012/02/28/confessions-of-an-agent-in-syria.html

 

 

Whether it’s a call on my phone or at the door, I feel scared to death. I mentally prepare myself for the worst, assuming that “they” are here to take me.

But then, when I find a friend at the door or a homeless compatriot asking for food, I realise that it is not my day yet, it is someone else’s.

Despite being unusually lucky, my nightmares don’t end. I rather prepare myself to deal with a situation when Bashar’s sleuths would come to pick me up for writing about the misery of Syrian taxpayers and democracy-lovers.

Regardless of our terrible conditions, we do greet each other daily with ‘sabah al-khair’ or good morning but with little hope for the same.

When I hear stories of torture and disfigured bodies of the missing Syrians and journalists alike, my only prayer to Allah remains, “I am ready for it but ease it on me and my people please.”

We write with pen names and log on the Internet using proxies, thinking we are safe. The reality is otherwise. My missing journalist friends and bloggers had no time to say bye to their loved ones inside the very home they were abducted from. Al-mokhabarat or intelligence agents, just plucked them away, mostly in the dark of the night.

They may discover me sooner or later but I make it a point to erase all my cell phone logs of call and text messages, clear my browser history and empty my laptop’s trash bin. Thinking that I might have forgotten something, sometimes I repeat the act many times a night.

Of late, my personal fear of being kidnapped by government sleuths has been overshadowed by a big, bloodier development. Every day, I see uploaded YouTube videos of the best of Soviet and Russian arsenal knocking down bustling neighborhoods first in Dara’a, then Hama and now Homs.

While I still fear the footsteps of sleuths on my door, I am not being searched as minutely as before.

Instead of looking out for activists and undercover journalists, Bashar’s military is wiping out entire cities from world maps, over suspicions of treason against the Alawite regime.

What started as massacre has duly transformed into genocide. My editors abroad insist on sending my stories with real names, concrete evidence and versions from both sides. I have been in double jeopardy since the first eight months of the uprising when the world only knew about Tahrir square kind of protests.

I, sometimes, wonder if the top-notch media watchdog bodies really know what a faceless and nameless journalist in Syria goes through, at the hands of sleuths as well as the very editors known as gatekeepers.

When making a phone call can risk not only yours and your families’ lives but also the person answering the phone, calling a government source is simply suicidal. Even the most naïve journalist here knows that cellular and landline phone companies are not only owned by the regime’s front-men but also bugged and monitored.

Simultaneously, Syria is a busy place for journalists where one cannot choose which story angle to focus on any given day i.e. massacres in Homs, protests in Damascus and Idlib,  Russian FM’s visit to Bashar, or statements from Washington echoing only fake promises.

But in the end the choice won’t be mine! The media company decides which one suits its agenda and its geopolitical context. Mostly, the easy bet is to bank on the wire service, ignoring the at-risk on-ground journalist who for them is a mere ‘stringer’!

I felt proud of my profession when I first saw stories by foreign journalists covering Syria from their high risk abodes and makeshift media centers. Though the world would not have believed a Syrian journalist like me for the Bab Amar massacre or siege of Homs but I hope they won’t ignore the outsiders’ testimony.

The natural but tragic death of Anthony Shadid, a Lebanon-born journalist for The New York Times, weighed very heavy on Syrian people’s hearts and the battered country’s image. Syria was referred to as home of death.

Besides dozens if not hundreds of slain Syrian journalists, the uprising has claimed two French media-men, and the one and only Marie Colvin died in more familiar way. Their heartrending deaths came in solidarity with local fellow professionals whose names and faces may be known when the tyrant falls and conscience rules in Syria.

Unluckily, I have many pen names for it is hard to write with a real one.  Death of Marie Colvin was personally embarrassing to me. Should I still use pen names when my star colleagues are writing with their warm blood?

I am a single woman with no liabilities except a widowed mother and siblings. One simple story with my real name appearing on an Arabic language blog or English-language website has greater probability of leading sleuths to my home.

Now even my family rarely knows which pen name I use and where in the world, my work publishes. Not that I don’t trust my family but the regime’s four decades of fear can easily cause a Freudian slip.

A year ago, I proudly showed off my byline in international dailies but now we are writing for our lives and not for pride.

I rarely get internet access good enough to open my emails and send my stories in time. I must admit that overall depressing conditions too result in my missing deadlines. Ironically, stories featuring Syrians’ bloodbath are never stale and the desk accepts them more often.

When I work on my laptop, my siblings and mother spy on me to see what I am doing or writing. My eldest sister advised me last September, “I can’t stop a journalist from writing but she should not forget the fate her younger brothers may face if they (mokhabarat) find out.”

One of my university fellows was picked up for writing a blog about a missing seven-year-old in Dara’a. Her brother went to a police station to lodge a report but never returned home. Three weeks later, their mother was asked to receive her son’s body from the same police office. She not only got the body of her 20-year-old son but also discovered the disfigured corpse of her blogger daughter.

Earlier, I hoped to change the world’s opinion with my writings but now, I am only recording testimonies of massacres and detailing current history.

Long after they have taken me to die in their dark cells, my stories will serve as credible evidence to try Bashar and his advisors for crimes against humanity.

Like journalism, we are learning survival techniques on our own, the hard way. Whenever a couple of us sit together away from our parents and the listening walls, we talk about the best ways in dealing with the worst.

I usually tell my colleagues, “Why do you think they would wait for us to admit or defend ourselves. Our charge-sheets are already there with no room for defense or discussion . . . Agents we are! . . . Agents of change!”

Maryam Hasan is a young journalist, whose family struggled against Hafiz Al-Assad’s tyrannical rule and policies. She is using a pen-name due to security reasons.

 

As I write these words, demonstrations are unfolding in the public squares of Syrian cities and towns, as they have done every Friday for the last eleven months, since the people of Dir’a first took to the streets to manifest their discontent at the indignities imposed upon them by the Asad regime.

Grainy scenes of crowds heaving, swaying, chanting slogans, singing revolutionary songs flash across the screens of Arab satellite channels, scenes of jubilant defiance and anger.

And, as I write, the violent repression of these protests continues. The London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and al-Jazeera (in Arabic) report that 25 individuals have been killed already in the besieged city of Homs and the countryside of Damascus. Another 83 died yesterday across Syria, according to the Observatory, while the Local Coordination Councils put the figure higher still, at 126 – 107 of them in Homs alone.

Overnight, army tanks entered the Insha’at neighbourhood of Homs, prompting fears of a broader ground assault, to follow the week-long artillery campaign on the city, which activists estimate has led to the loss of more than 400 lives.

Reports emerging from the city testify to the use of long-range shells and mortar to pound the residential neighbourhoods of Bab ‘Amru, al-Khalidiyya, al-Insha’at, and Bayyada, and to a worsening humanitarian situation. Human Rights Watch reports that hospitals are unable to cope with the number of casualties, while Al-Jazeera’s Beirut correspondent Rula al-Amin reports that medical supplies and food are running dangerously low (see links above).

There is no doubt that armed contingents of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are present in several neighbourhoods of Homs. However, these deserters number no more than a few hundred or thousand men – a stark reminder of the deep asymmetries of power between these dissident forces and the Syrian regime, which has insistently claimed that it is faced an uprising by ‘armed bands’ (‘isabat), while using to the fullest its military superiority.

In other places, including the coastal cities of Banias and Latakia, in the ‘Alawi heartlands, and the Damascus suburbs of Duma and Daraya, troops have deployed to prevent demonstrators from congregating after Friday prayers.

Meanwhile, several car explosions went off in the northern city of Aleppo, killing 25 and injuring more than 175 according to Syrian state television, which has blamed the attacks on “armed terrorist gangs”.

The General Council for the Syrian Revolution, for its part, has accused the regime of plotting the attacks to foment unrest. This claim was echoed by an activist in the city itself who, citing ‘suspicious activity by security personnel’ in the moments before the explosion, told the BBC that “we hold the Syrian regime entirely responsible for this action”.

Further confusion has arisen from the conflicting claims of different contingents within the FSA. While one officer reportedly told Al-Jazeera’s Beirut correspondent Rula al-Amin that the FSA was responsible for the attacks, the Syrian National Council has issued a statement from the FSA in which it categorically denies any role in the attacks.

This latest blast will only increase the virulent controversy in the blogosphere between supporters of the regime, who see in them confirmation of government claims that the protests of the past year are born of a ‘terrorist’ ‘conspiracy’, and its opponents, who believe that they are one more cynical act of official violence, designed to keep the populations of first Damascus, and now Aleppo, quiescent.

Syria, it is clear, has entered a vicious spiral of violence. The spectre of instability, which the Baathist regimes of Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad have long boasted of holding at bay while neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq were consumed by internecine strife, is now at the door.

Many within the country, of course, had already resigned themselves to protracted unrest before the failure of the UN Security Council to reach agreement on a Draft Resolution supporting the Arab League’s efforts to secure a negotiated transition of power in Syria on the Yemeni model.

However, it does seem that the decision of Russia and China to veto this Draft Resolution has galvanized both the regime and the opposition to ramp up their activities.

While the regime has seen this veto as a license to continue in its repression, the continuing division of the international community on the vexed question of Syria has only added to the intransigence of many activists; despairing at their enforced isolation, they have become more obdurate still in their desire not to give in.

Thus, in a video message circulated on social networks on 6 February, the Humsi activist Khalid Abu Salah allied a call for assistance with a message of resilience. After appealing to ‘every noble human being to save us here in Baba ‘Amr, to save the children and the women in Baba ‘Amr’, he turns away from the camera for a brief moment, as gunfire resounds outside, and the clip seems to draw to an end.

Then, turning back, he addresses words of defiance to the Syrian president: ‘Ya Bashar, don’t think we’re going to surrender, if you killed all of us we wouldn’t surrender … if you killed all of us we wouldn’t surrender’.

Khalid Abu Salah’s “Appeal to the Free World”

There is no doubt whom Syrian opposition activists blame for the lack of support they receive. While the Local Coordination Committees have in the past berated the general inaction of the international community, naming one of their Friday demonstrations, in a sharp rejoinder to the international community, ‘Your silence is killing us’, they have chosen to call this Friday ‘Russia is killing our children’.

Russia has responded in kind to this deliberately emotive message. In a statement issued earlier today, its Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, accused the West of being “accomplices in the process of inflaming the crisis”, and insisted that the opposition’s refusal to enter into talks with the regime of Bashar al-Asad meant that it “bears full responsibility for improving the situation”.

It is clear that Russia feels stung by what it regards as a deliberate manipulation of the Security Council to prosecute regime change in Libya, and many critics of intervention have echoed its claims that any international action in Syria would be ruinous.

In a particularly caustic piece, the Columbia professor Joseph Massad has claimed that intervention of one kind or another would only serve what he calls ‘American imperialism in the Middle East’, berating the ‘exile opposition’ for having ‘hijacked the popular uprising against the Asad dynasty’.

But such claims overlook two crucial factors.

The first is that there exists no stark divide between opponents of the regime within the country and those in the Syrian mahjar, or diaspora. Opposition activists certainly disagree on key issues – not least that of international intervention – but the schism does not run along geographical lines.

The Syrian National Council itself, despite repeated assertions to the contrary, is not simply an exilic organization with few ties to those within Syria. While its figurehead, Barhun Ghaliun, has long been settled in France, other members of its executive committee, like Samir Nachar, have only very recently left Syria.

In a note posted on its Facebook page a few weeks before the official announcement of its formation on 1 October 2011, the SNC itself claimed that while 60% of its members were abroad, another 40% remained within Syria itself.

Moreover, it is clear that the SNC, far from the pipe-dream of ambitious émigré schemers, developed from reformist trends within Syria in the early to mid-2000s, such as the Damascus Declaration of 2005.

The second is that Russia and China, by blocking the proposed resolution, have themselves intervened in this internal conflict. Though some have justified their claims by pointing to the need to respect the sovereignty of the Syrian state, the notion that the West is, alone, contemplating intervention is harder to countenance.

To intervene, one need not put troops on the ground, send fighter planes or frigates – though, of course, Russia has already done so, having despatched a naval flotilla led by the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov to its own naval base in Tartus in November 2011, in a show of support for the regime of Bashar al-Asad…

With sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran gaining greater momentum and the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran looming large in the global economy, a key question remains whether or not the Islamic Republic will ink a deal to extricate itself from increasingly biting sanctions and ensure its survival, or will it inch toward an inevitable military confrontation with the West? 

Houshang Hassan-Yari sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, senior writer at Foreign Policy Association, to answer the above questions and discuss what’s in store for the greater Middle East.
Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari is Professor of international relations and strategic military studies at Royal Military College of Canada.

 

In the current geopolitical climate involving Iran and the West marked by loud and reciprocal threats, intensifying sanctions, non-dollar trade paradigms, and an apparent shadow war, what do you think is in store for the region as it pertains to Iranian-Western rivalries?

Hassan-Yari: I think the current situation cannot continue for too long. If there is no peaceful solution in the nuclear issue of Iran, the cul-de-sac will be opened in another way. The war will be the most plausible. Iran is very much isolated in the region.
The United States and Israel have been successful in creating an association between the Iranian nuclear program and nuclear weapons. They were also able to join the vast majority of Arab countries to their perception of the danger that Iran poses to stability in these countries. The sum of U.S. efforts and concerns of the militarily weak Arab regimes have resulted in the necessity to contain a dangerous Iran. If there is a rivalry between Iran and West in the Middle East, it is clearly favourable to the West.

Iran has recently conducted a number of naval and air drills in the Persian Gulf in the course of which it has put on display new surface-to-sea and surface-to-surface missile capabilities. It has also threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. How do you assess Iran’s military capabilities in countering U.S. Navy presence in the Persian Gulf and in closing the Strait of Hormuz? What do you think would galvanize the U.S. and its allies into concrete military action against Iran?

Hassan-Yari: In this climate of distrust and suspicion which prevails in the Persian Gulf, a miscalculation by the parties involved could lead to a war that nobody wants. The threat of Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, a threat that is taken lightly by the Iranian authorities, will lead to war.
Any aggression aiming international navigation in the Strait may trigger hostilities. It seems to me that the majority of the Persian Gulf Arab countries want to settle once and for all the “Iranian issue”. The problem is that they are unable to do so themselves. This is where the utility of American military power comes in. In other words, Arabs are pushing Americans to a war they want but cannot perform. Israelis also are in a similar situation.

Since taking office, and in particular during his second term, the policies of President Ahmadinejad and his administration have been synonymous with the rise of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iranian politics and economy. Given the prominence of the IRGC in the socio-political and economic management of the country, has it been an effective and capable force in formulating various policies and in executing those policies?

Hassan-Yari: President Ahmadinejad is only one factor that facilitated the rise in the status of the IRGC. The indispensable actor that greatly opened the door to the predominance of the IRGC in all aspects of Iranian life is the leader himself. The latter could not do so under Mohammad Khatami because of the popularity and the resistance of the reformist president. We should not forget that Ahmadinejad is one of them and owes his presidency largely to the intervention of the IRGC in the electoral process of 2005.
The multifaceted IRGC is not a homogenous force. Nor is it a force formed to formulate and implement policies for the common good. The main concern of the Force is to protect the leader and the revolution as it intends to do. Everything it does in the field of security, political, economic and social serves this purpose. In other words, its allegiance is first and foremost the Leader.
Dependency of political power to the military force of the IRGC has forced the former to give exclusive mega contracts to latter in all economic sectors. But as the Guardians do not have expertise in all these areas, they often fail to deliver a good quality product. However, the poor quality of their work was never an obstacle to prevent the IRGC to receive new contracts worth billions of dollars.
Their imprint is deeply engraved in all aspects of life from sport to aviation to missile technology to nuclear programme of Iran.

Recent statements made by former high-ranking officials and parliamentarians (Hossein Alaei of IRGC and Emad Afrough of Majles) appear to be part of a new paradigm in directly challenging the clerical establishment. Do you think these statements signify a new rupture in Iran’s power structure? If that is the case, how could this new rupture play itself out in the upcoming Majlis elections?

Hassan-Yari: What Alaei, Afrough and other rightwing moderates (Principalists /Ossoulgarayaan) pose as a question today are after-shocks of the popular protests of 2009 and the tremors of the recent Arab awakening. These individuals are also very sensitive to preserve intact the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini which is fast eroding since the coming to power of Ahmadinejad and the unconditional support he received from the Leader. They attempt to salvage the Islamic Republic by returning to the values of the 1979 Revolution. They directly challenge the entourage of the Leader and indirectly the Leader himself who has created a propitious environment for the growth of political immorality and toadyism.
This new phenomena is certainly a break with the established order since coming to power of Ayatollah Khamenei in 1989. It is expected to expand gradually as the gap in the conservative camp is widening, a situation that Khamenei is incapable of controling effectively.
A number of scenarios for the outcome of Majles election could be envisaged. If the elections are carried by the camp of Ahmadinejad, the status of the leader will be further weakened and the consequences could be fatal to the Republic as we know it today. A possible victory by the leader’s entourage should not be interpreted as the return to normality.
I think that a return to the former situation when the leader was not objectionable is impossible without resorting to brutal force. Even then, the lull is only temporary. The sanctity of the Leader is broken and with it the unchallenged position of the clergy close to the government. It is quite possible that we witness a return of the clergy in its religious schools leaving power to the ‘civilian’. In Iran, people break the personality before breaking the person.

Iran and Israel seem locked in a strategic rivalry that has gone through different stages, each stage with its own narrative. What are the key aspects of this strategic rivalry that have made the U.S. an indispensable player in it? Do you envision a point at which security establishments from the U.S., Iran, and Israel would decide to negotiate (most likely secret negotiations) as a way out of the current atmosphere of brinkmanship to avert a potentially large-scale regional conflict and save the global economy from spiralling down a path of sever instability?

Hassan-Yari: First, on Iran-Israel rivalry. From the perspective of the Iranian political elite in power, this rivalry has a clear ideological pronouncement. It goes back to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s epoch and the pre-1979 revolutionary romanticism when Iranian islamists received their military training in Lebanon and sympathized with the Palestinian cause. For them, Israel is a colonial creation, artificial and usurper. It is an illegitimate entity, so to disappear. For Israel, Iran was an opportunity to lessen the Arab pressure.
Since the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran, this rivalry has taken on new dimensions. Israel remains not only as an ideological enemy, but also a military obstacle that challenges Tehran’s supremacist claim on the regional leadership. In addition, since the Israeli danger to Iran’s nuclear program has become more pressing, Tehran uses its Lebanese and Palestinian allies to keep Israel concerned about its own safety and away from the Iranian border.
On the other hand, Iran is the only country in the Middle East that poses a challenge to the qualitative predominance of Israel’s powerful military machine in the region. In the final analysis, if Israel can live with a non-militant Iran, Tehran cannot co-exist with a ubiquitous ‘Zionist danger’ in the region. This is where the United States enters into the equation as a moderating force. While Washington would prefer a more cooperative Iran, it seeks to remain the final arbiter of the regional game. It seems that neither Iran nor Israel want their regional importance overshadowed by the American omnipotence.
In regard to a possible “ménage à trios”, Iran-Israel-U.S., in the field of regional security, this hypothesis seems very unrealistic under current conditions. If the United States and Israel can provide manageable compromise to Iran over its security considerations without losing face, the latter, on the contrary, has everything to lose by entering into this game that goes against its identity as “defender” of the dispossessed. The only situation, in which the Islamic Republic will make painful compromise, is if it concludes that its own survival is at risk by persisting in its belligerent posture in regional and international security issues.

Russian officials have repeatedly made it clear that they are fiercely opposed to any military confrontation between the West and Iran. From geo-political and geo-energy perspectives, what are at stake for Russia? Do you think a political tilt by Iran toward the West would change the geo-political equation in Eurasia/Middle East?

Hassan-Yari: Russian resistance to any military intervention in Iran is not a matter of principle, nor is it aimed at preventing another catastrophic war in the region. The Russian calculation is based on geopolitical considerations. Russia is still looking for the lost place of the Soviet Union on the world stage. Any U.S. military intervention in the region further isolates Russia. It is also in this context that we must understand the resistance from Moscow to any foreign military intervention in Syria. For Russia, this is a zero sum game. In addition, an isolated Iran strengthens the position of Russia as an intermediary between this country and the West. Iran’s isolation and demonization has helped Russia develop advanced military and commercial relations with Iran. The same is true for China, with more emphasis on the economic relations with Iran.
A dominant U.S. presence in Iran could compromise Russian’s not too comfortable authority in the Caspian Sea basin. One of the reasons for creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was to counterbalance the U. S. presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The fall of the Islamic Republic could revive the spectrum of Soviet containment through a new security belt connecting Europe to Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

This year Russia and Iran started doing trade in their respective national currencies, replacing the U.S. dollar and Euro. Similarly, trade has been taking place between Iran and China in Chinese Renminbi and between Iran and Japan in Japanese Yen including for the sale of Iranian oil. Do you think the exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by these trade partners could hold geopolitical implications? If so, in what ways?

Hassan-Yari: Since the day after the revolution Iran has tried to to break free from the yoke of the dollar, without much success. The currencies of Russia and China are not convertible, which reinforces the dependency of Iran on Russians and Chinese. It’s an ironic situation because Iran claims to want to break from the grip of the U. S. dollar and to free itself of turbulence of American imperialism by creating more dependency on secondary powers like Russia and China. In its business dealings with Moscow and Beijing, Iran is forced to buy Sino-Russian merchandise. However, the quality of those goods does not meet consumer expectations in Iran. The continuation of this trade policy increasingly limits Iran to two or three unreliable suppliers who put their own national interests ahead of Iranian welfare in any dispute with Americans. Russia in particular has demonstrated that it is not a feasible partner. There is no other country in the world that has hurt Iranian interests as much as Russia since the 19th century.
The recent currency crisis that deeply hit the value of Iran’s Rial showcased the significance of dollar as a safe currency for ordinary Iranians. During the crisis, no one was looking for Russian or Chinese currency. It is also ironic that some ministers in Iran use the dollar as reference when they talk about their non-petroleum exports, the value of the national economy or foreign investment. The language that the average Iranian better understands is that of Dollar, not the Rouble, or the Yuan. In addition, the Central Bank of Iran often manipulates the value of dollar to regulate the amount of liquidity in circulation.
The exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by Iran and its trade partners could hold geopolitical implications if Euro Zone dismantles itself and if China decided to dispose its massive dollar reserve. Among some other possibilities one can invoke the unlikely scenario of the Arab oil producers to join the Russia-China-Iran trio in replacing dollar by other currencies. Iran’s economy is too small to have a geopolitical impact on the dollar.

How stable is the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria? How Iran could be impacted by Assad’s fall?

Hassan-Yari: Assad’s regime is extremely weak. It has reached a point of no return and condemned to disappear. Its fall will have major implications for the safety and security of the Islamic Republic as well as the rest of the Middle East. The survival of the Syrian regime is so crucial to the Iranian theocratic system that it forced Tehran to denounce the Syrians protesting against Damascus as agents of Zionism and imperialism while praising Arabs in other countries as Islamist followers of Iran’s Islamic revolution. This position has highlighted the contradiction in the official discourse of the Iranian leadership by substantially weakening its claim to the universality of the Islamic revolution.
Syria is the only strategic ally of Iran in the Arab world. It also acts as a bridge between Iran and Lebanon. It gives Iran direct access to Israeli territory through the Hazbollah and some Palestinian groups. The fall of the Assad regime will also weaken the position of Shiite militants in the region. A regime change in Damascus further limits Iran’s ability to intervene on the regional scene. It will deprive Islamic Iran of a vital window to breathe. Finally, it will make Iran even more vulnerable in facing a possible foreign military attack. Within Iran itself, it will strengthen the resolve of opponents of the Islamic regime.

The Saudi government has made significant military hardware purchases from the United States. The Saudi diplomacy has been also active in countries impacted by the Arab Spring. How do you assess the future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and in light of Arab Spring, what are the chances of having a more representative leadership in Saudi Arabia?

Hassan-Yari: The Islamic Republic is not the only country embarrassed by the Arab awakening. The United States and Saudi Arabia have also taken contradictory positions to events in Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere.
The future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia depends largely on the Kingdom’s internal dynamics. A democratic Saudi Arabia will be more independent in its foreign policy. It will also have much less appetite for accommodating dictatorships in surrounding countries.
But since we are not there yet, I cannot envisage any strategic change in the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, even if there is a few sporadic surmountable bumps.
As for democratic changes in Saudi Arabia, they will be introduced very gradually in the absence of a popular revolution. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can not remain immune to the political and military changes that inflame its neighbourhood. The question is the degree and level of change that the descendants of Al-Saud are forced to introduce.

By Aisling Byrne
Asia Times Online

"War with Iran is already here," wrote a leading Israeli commentator recently, describing "the combination of covert warfare and international pressure" being applied to Iran.

Although not mentioned, the "strategic prize" of the first stage of this war on Iran is Syria; the first campaign in a much wider sectarian power-bid. "Other than the collapse of the Islamic Republic itself," Saudi King Abdullah was reported to have said last summer, "nothing would weaken Iran more than losing Syria." [1]

By December, senior United States officials were explicit about their regime change agenda for Syria: Tom Donilon, the US National Security Adviser, explained that the "end of the [President Bashar al-]Assad regime would constitute Iran’s greatest setback in the region yet – a strategic blow that will further shift the balance of power in the region against Iran."

Shortly before, a key official in terms of operationalizing this policy, Under Secretary of State for the Near East Jeffrey Feltman, had stated at a congressional hearing that the US would "relentlessly pursue our two-track strategy of supporting the opposition and diplomatically and financially strangling the [Syrian] regime until that outcome is achieved". [2]

What we are seeing in Syria is a deliberate and calculated campaign to bring down the Assad government so as to replace it with a regime "more compatible" with US interests in the region.

The blueprint for this project is essentially a report produced by the neo-conservative Brookings Institute for regime change in Iran in 2009. The report – "Which Path to Persia?" [3] – continues to be the generic strategic approach for US-led regime change in the region.

A rereading of it, together with the more recent "Towards a Post-Assad Syria" [4] (which adopts the same language and perspective, but focuses on Syria, and was recently produced by two US neo-conservative think-tanks) illustrates how developments in Syria have been shaped according to the step-by-step approach detailed in the "Paths to Persia" report with the same key objective: regime change.

The authors of these reports include, among others, John Hannah and Martin Indyk, both former senior neo-conservative officials from the George W Bush/Dick Cheney administration, and both advocates for regime change in Syria. [5] Not for the first time are we seeing a close alliance between US/British neo-cons with Islamists (including, reports show [6], some with links to al-Qaeda) working together to bring about regime change in an "enemy" state.

Arguably, the most important component in this struggle for the "strategic prize" has been the deliberate construction of a largely false narrative that pits unarmed democracy demonstrators being killed in their hundreds and thousands as they protest peacefully against an oppressive, violent regime, a "killing machine" [7] led by the "monster" [8] Assad.

Whereas in Libya, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) claimed it had "no confirmed reports of civilian casualties" because, as the New York Times wrote recently, "the alliance had created its own definition for ‘confirmed’: only a death that NATO itself investigated and corroborated could be called confirmed".

"But because the alliance declined to investigate allegations," the Times wrote, "its casualty tally by definition could not budge – from zero". [9]

In Syria, we see the exact opposite: the majority of Western mainstream media outlets, along with the media of the US’s allies in the region, particularly al-Jazeera and the Saudi-owned al-Arabiya TV channels, are effectively collaborating with the "regime change" narrative and agenda with a near-complete lack of questioning or investigation of statistics and information put out by organizations and media outlets that are either funded or owned by the US/European/Gulf alliance – the very same countries instigating the regime change project in the first place.

Claims of "massacres", "campaigns of rape targeting women and girls in predominantly Sunni towns" [10] "torture" and even "child-rape" [11] are reported by the international press based largely on two sources – the British-based Syrian Observatory of Human Rights and the Local Co-ordination Committees (LCCs) – with minimal additional checking or verification.

Hiding behind the rubric – "we are not able to verify these statistics" – the lack of integrity in reporting by the Western mainstream media has been starkly apparent since the onset of events in Syria. A decade after the Iraq war, it would seem that no lessons from 2003 – from the demonization of Saddam Hussein and his purported weapons of mass destruction – have been learnt.

Of the three main sources for all data on numbers of protesters killed and numbers of people attending demonstrations – the pillars of the narrative – all are part of the "regime change" alliance.

The Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, in particular, is reportedly funded through a Dubai-based fund with pooled (and therefore deniable) Western-Gulf money (Saudi Arabia alone has, according to Elliot Abrams [12] allocated US$130 billion to "palliate the masses" of the Arab Spring).

What appears to be a nondescript British-based organization, the Observatory has been pivotal in sustaining the narrative of the mass killing of thousands of peaceful protesters using inflated figures, "facts", and often exaggerated claims of "massacres" and even recently "genocide".

Although it claims to be based in its director’s house [13], the Observatory has been described as the "front office" of a large media propaganda set-up run by the Syrian opposition and its backers. The Russian Foreign Ministry [14] stated starkly:

The agenda of the [Syrian] transitional council [is] composed in London by the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights … It is also there where pictures of ‘horror’ in Syria are made to stir up hatred towards Assad’s regime.

The Observatory is not legally registered either as a company or charity in the United Kingdom, but operates informally; it has no office, no staff and its director is reportedly awash with funding.

It receives its information, it says, from a network of "activists" inside Syria; its English-language website is a single page with al-Jazeera instead hosting a minute-by-minute live blog page for it since the outset of protests. [15]

The second, the LCCs, are a more overt part of the opposition’s media infrastructure, and their figures and reporting is similarly encompassed only [16] within the context of this main narrative: in an analysis of their daily reports, I couldn’t find a single reference to any armed insurgents being killed: reported deaths are of "martyrs", "defector soldiers", people killed in "peaceful demonstrations" and similar descriptions.

The third is al-Jazeera, whose biased role in "reporting" the Awakenings has been well documented. Described by one seasoned media analyst [17] as the "sophisticated mouthpiece of the state of Qatar and its ambitious emir", al-Jazeera is integral to Qatar’s "foreign-policy aspirations".

Al-Jazeera has, and continues, [18] to provide technical support, equipment, hosting and "credibility" to Syrian opposition activists and organizations. Reports show that as early as March 2011, al-Jazeera was providing messaging and technical support to exiled Syrian opposition activists [19] , who even by January 2010 were co-ordinating their messaging activities from Doha.

Nearly 10 months on, however, and despite the daily international media onslaught, the project isn’t exactly going to plan: a YouGov poll commissioned by the Qatar Foundation [20] showed last week that 55% of Syrians do not want Assad to resign and 68% of Syrians disapprove of the Arab League sanctions imposed on their country.

According to the poll, Assad’s support has effectively increased since the onset of current events – 46% of Syrians felt Assad was a "good" president for Syria prior to current events in the country – something that certainly doesn’t fit with the false narrative being peddled.

As if trumpeting the success of their own propaganda campaign, the poll summary concludes:

The majority of Arabs believe Syria’s President Basher al-Assad should resign in the wake of the regime’s brutal treatment of protesters … 81% of Arabs [want] President Assad to step down. They believe Syria would be better off if free democratic elections were held under the supervision of a transitional government. [21]

One is left wondering who exactly is Assad accountable to – the Syrian people or the Arab public? A blurring of lines that might perhaps be useful as two main Syrian opposition groups have just announced [22] that while they are against foreign military intervention, they do not consider "Arab intervention" to be foreign.

Unsurprisingly, not a single mainstream major newspaper or news outlet reported the YouGov poll results – it doesn’t fit their narrative.

In the UK, the volunteer-run Muslim News [23] was the only newspaper to report the findings; yet only two weeks before in the immediate aftermath of the suicide explosions in Damascus, both the Guardian [24], like other outlets, within hours of the explosions were publishing sensational, unsubstantiated reports from bloggers, including one who was "sure that some of the bodies … were those of demonstrators".

"They have planted bodies before," he said; "they took dead people from Dera’a [in the south] and showed the media bodies in Jisr al-Shughour [near the Turkish border.]"

Recent reports have cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the false narrative peddled daily by the mainstream international press, in particular information put out by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and the LCCs.

In December, the mainstream US intelligence group Stratfor cautioned:

Most of the [Syrian] opposition’s more serious claims have turned out to be grossly exaggerated or simply untrue … revealing more about the opposition’s weaknesses than the level of instability inside the Syrian regime. [25]

Throughout the nine-month uprising, Stratfor has advised caution on accuracy of the mainstream narrative on Syria: in September it commented that "with two sides to every war … the war of perceptions in Syria is no exception". [26]

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and LCC reports, "like those from the regime, should be viewed with skepticism", argues Stratfor; "the opposition understands that it needs external support, specifically financial support, if it is to be a more robust movement than it is now. To that end, it has every reason to present the facts on the ground in a way that makes the case for foreign backing."

As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov observed: "It is clear that the purpose is to provoke a humanitarian catastrophe, to get a pretext to demand external interference into this conflict." [27] Similarly, in mid-December, American Conservative reported:

CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] analysts are skeptical regarding the march to war. The frequently cited United Nations report that more than 3,500 civilians have been killed by Assad’s soldiers is based largely on rebel sources and is uncorroborated. The Agency has refused to sign off on the claims.

Likewise, accounts of mass defections from the Syrian army and pitched battles between deserters and loyal soldiers appear to be a fabrication, with few defections being confirmed independently. Syrian government claims that it is being assaulted by rebels who are armed, trained and financed by foreign governments are more true than false. [28]

As recently as November, the Free Syria Army implied their numbers would be larger, but, as they explained to one analyst, they are "advising sympathizers to delay their defection" until regional conditions improve. [29]

A guide to regime change

In relation to Syria, section three of the "Paths to Persia" report is particularly relevant – it is essentially a step-by-step guide detailing options for instigating and supporting a popular uprising, inspiring an insurgency and/or instigating a coup. The report comes complete with a "Pros and Cons" section:

An insurgency is often easier to instigate and support from abroad … Insurgencies are famously cheap to support … covert support to an insurgency would provide the United States with "plausibility deniability" … [with less] diplomatic and political backlash … than if the United States were to mount a direct military action … Once the regime suffers some major setback [this] provides an opportunity to act.

Military action, the report argues, would only be taken once other options had been tried and shown to have failed as the "international community" would then conclude of any attack that the government "brought it on themselves" by refusing a very good deal.

Key aspects for instigating a popular uprising and building a "full-fledged insurgency" are evident in relation to developments in Syria.

These include:

>> "Funding and helping organize domestic rivals of the regime" including using "unhappy" ethnic groups;

>> "Building the capacity of ‘effective oppositions’ with whom to work" in order to "create an alternative leadership to seize power";

>> Provision of equipment and covert backing to groups, including arms – either directly or indirectly, as well as "fax machines … Internet access, funds" (on Iran the report noted that the "CIA could take care of most of the supplies and training for these groups, as it has for decades all over the world");

>> Training and facilitation of messaging by opposition activists;

>> Constructing a narrative "with the support of US-backed media outlets could highlight regime shortcomings and make otherwise obscure critics more prominent" – "having the regime discredited among key ‘opinion shapers’ is critical to its collapse";

>> The creation of a large funding budget to fund a wide array of civil-society-led initiatives (a so-called "$75 million fund" created under former US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice-funded civil society groups, including "a handful of Beltway-based think-tanks and institutions [which] announced new Iran desks)" [30];

>> The need for an adjacent land corridor in a neighboring country "to help develop an infrastructure to support operations".

"Beyond this," continues the report, "US economic pressure (and perhaps military pressure as well) can discredit the regime, making the population hungry for a rival leadership."

The US and its allies, particularly Britain [31] and France, have funded and helped "shape" the opposition from the outset – building both on attempts started by the US in 2006 to construct a unified front against the Assad government, and the perceived "success" of the Libyan Transitional National Council model. [32]

Despite months of attempts – predominately by the West – at cajoling the various groups into a unified, proficient opposition movement, they remain "a diverse group, representing the country’s ideological, sectarian and generational divides".

"There neither has been nor is [there] now any natural tendency towards unity between these groups, since they belong to totally different ideological backgrounds and have antagonistic political views," one analyst concluded. [33]

At a recent meeting with the British foreign secretary, the different groups would not even meet with William Hague together, instead meeting him separately. [34]

Nevertheless, despite a lack of cohesion, internal credibility and legitimacy, the opposition, predominately under the umbrella of the Syrian National Council (SNC), is being groomed for office. This includes capacity-building, as confirmed by the former Syrian ambassador to the US, Rafiq Juajati, now part of the opposition.

At a closed briefing in Washington DC in mid-December 2011, he confirmed that the US State Department and the SWP-German Institute for International and Security Affairs (a think-tank that provides foreign policy analysis to the German government) were funding a project that is managed by the US Institute for Peace and SWP, working in partnership with the SNC, to prepare the SNC for the takeover and running of Syria.

In a recent interview, SNC leader Burhan Ghaliyoun disclosed (so as to "speed up the process" of Assad’s fall) [35] the credentials expected of him: "There will be no special relationship with Iran," he said. "Breaking the exceptional relationship means breaking the strategic, military alliance," adding that "after the fall of the Syrian regime, [Hezbollah] won’t be the same." [36]

Described in Slate magazine [37] as the "most liberal and Western-friendly of the Arab Spring uprisings", Syrian opposition groups sound as compliant as their Libyan counterparts prior to the demise of Muammar Gaddafi, whom the New York Times described as "secular-minded professionals – lawyers, academics, businesspeople – who talk about democracy, transparency, human rights and the rule of law" [38]; that was, until reality transitioned to former leader of the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group Abdulhakim Belhaj and his jihadi colleagues.

The import of weapons, equipment, manpower (predominantly from Libya) [39] and training by governments and other groups linked to the US, NATO and their regional allies began in April-May 2011, [40] according to various reports [41], and is co-ordinated out of the US air force base at Incirlik in southern Turkey. From Incirlik, an information warfare division also directs communications to Syria via the Free Syria Army. This covert support continues, as American Conservative reported in mid-December:

Unmarked NATO warplanes are arriving at Turkish military bases close to Iskenderum on the Syrian border, delivering weapons … as well as volunteers from the Libyan Transitional National Council … Iskenderum is also the seat of the Free Syrian Army, the armed wing of the Syrian National Council. French and British special forces trainers are on the ground, assisting the Syrian rebels while the CIA and US Spec Ops are providing communications equipment and intelligence to assist the rebel cause, enabling the fighters to avoid concentrations of Syrian soldiers. [42]

The Washington Post exposed in April 2011 that recent WikiLeaks showed that the US State Department had been giving millions of dollars to various Syrian exile groups (including the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Movement for Justice and Development in London) and individuals since 2006 via its "Middle East Partnership Initiative" administered by a US foundation, the Democracy Council. [43]

Leaked WikiLeak cables confirmed that well into 2010, this funding was continuing, a trend that not only continues today but which has expanded in light of the shift to the "soft power" option aimed at regime change in Syria.

As this neo-con-led call for regime change in Syria gains strength within the US administration, [44] so too has this policy been institutionalized among leading US foreign policy think-tanks, many of whom have "Syria desks" or "Syria working groups" which collaborate closely with Syrian opposition groups and individuals (for example USIP [45] and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy) [46] and which have published a range of policy documents making the case for regime change.

In the UK, the similarly neo-con Henry Jackson Society (which "supports the maintenance of a strong military, by the United States, the countries of the European Union and other democratic powers, armed with expeditionary capabilities with a global reach" and which believes that "only modern liberal democratic states are truly legitimate") is similarly pushing the agenda for regime change in Syria [47].

This is in partnership with Syrian opposition figures including Ausama Monajed, [48] a former leader of the Syrian exile group, the Movement for Justice & Development, linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which was funded by the US State Department from 2006, as we know from WikiLeaks.

Monajed, a member of the SNC, currently directs a public relations firm [49] recently established in London and incidentally was the first to use the term "genocide" in relation to events in Syria in a recent SNC press release. [50]

Since the outset, significant pressure has been brought to bear on Turkey to establish a "humanitarian corridor" along its southern border with Syria. The main aim of this, as the "Paths to Persia" report outlines, is to provide a base from which the externally-backed insurgency can be launched and based.

The objective of this "humanitarian corridor" is about as humanitarian as the four-week NATO bombing of Sirte when NATO exercised its "responsibility to protect" mandate, as approved by the UN Security Council.

All this is not to say that there isn’t a genuine popular demand for change in Syria against the repressive security-dominated infrastructure that dominates every aspect of people’s lives, nor that gross human-rights violations have not been committed, both by the Syrian security forces, armed opposition insurgents, as well as mysterious third force characters operating since the onset of the crisis in Syria, including insurgents, [51] mostly jihadis from neighboring Iraq and Lebanon, as well as more recently Libya, among others.

Such abuses are inevitable in low-intensity conflict. Leading critics [52] of this US-France-UK-Gulf-led regime change project have, from the outset, called for full accountability and punishment for any security or other official "however senior", found to have committed any human-rights abuses.

Ibrahim al-Amine writes that some in the regime have conceded "that the security remedy was damaging in many cases and regions [and] that the response to the popular protests was mistaken … it would have been possible to contain the situation via clear and firm practical measures – such as arresting those responsible for torturing children in Deraa". And it argues that the demand for political pluralism and an end to the all-encompassing repression is both vital and urgent. [53]

But what may have began as popular protests, initially focused on local issues and incidents (including the case of the torture of young boys in Dera’a by security forces) were rapidly hijacked by this wider strategic project for regime change. Five years ago, I worked in northern Syria with the United Nations managing a large community development project.

After evening community meetings, it wasn’t uncommon to find the mukhabarat (military intelligence) waiting for us to vacate the room so they could scan flipcharts posted on the walls. That almost every aspect of people’s daily lives was regulated by a sclerotic dysfunctional Ba’ath party/security bureaucracy, devoid of any ideology apart from the inevitable corruption and nepotism that comes with authoritarian power, was apparent in every feature of people’s lives.

Tuesday, December 20 was reportedly the "deadliest day of the nine-month [Syrian] uprising "with the "organized massacre" of a "mass defection" of army deserters widely reported by the international press in Idlib, northern Syria. Claiming that areas of Syria were now "exposed to large-scale genocide", the SNC lamented the "250 fallen heroes during a 48-hour period", citing figures provided by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. [54] Quoting the same source, the Guardian reported that the Syrian army was:

… hunt[ing] down deserters after troops … killed close to 150 men who had fled their base". A picture has emerged … of a mass defection … that went badly wrong … with loyalist forces positioned to mow down large numbers of defectors as they fled a military base. Those who managed to escape were later hunted down in hideouts in nearby mountains, multiple sources have reported. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated that 100 deserters were besieged, then killed or wounded. Regular troops allegedly also hunted down residents who had given shelter to the deserters. [55]

The Guardian’s live blog-quoted AVAAZ, the citizen political advocacy/public relations group, which "claimed 269 people had been killed in the clashes", and cited AVAAZ’s precise breakdown of casualties: "163 armed revolutionaries, 97 government troops and 9 civilians". [56] They noted that AVAAZ "provided nothing to corroborate the claim".

The Washington Post reported only that they had spoken to "an activist with the rights group AVAAZ [who] said he had spoken to local activists and medical groups who put the death toll in that area Tuesday at 269". [57]

A day after initial reports of the massacre of fleeing deserters, however, the story had changed. On December 23, the Telegraph reported:

At first they were said to be army deserters attempting to break into Turkey to join the FSA [Free Syrian Army], but they are now said to be unarmed civilians and activists attempting to escape the army’s attempts to bring the province back under control. They were surrounded by troops and tanks and gunned down until there were no survivors, according to reports. [58]

The New York Times had, on December 21, reported that the "massacre", citing the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, was of "unarmed civilians and activists, with no armed military defectors among them, the rights groups said".

It quoted the head of the Observatory who described it as "an organized massacre" and said his account corroborated a Kfar Owaid witness’ account: "The security forces had lists of names of those who organized massive anti-regime protests … the troops then opened fire with tanks, rockets and heavy machine guns [and], bombs filled with nails to increase the number of casualties. [59]

The LA Times quoted an activist it had spoken to via satellite connection who, from his position "sheltering in the woods" commented: "The word ‘massacre’ seems like too small a word to describe what happened." Meanwhile, the Syrian government reported that on December 19 and 20, it had killed "tens" of members of "armed terrorist gangs" in both Homs and Idlib, and had arrested many wanted individuals. [60]

The truth of these two "deadly" days will probably never be known – the figures cited above (between 10-163 armed insurgents, 9-111 unarmed civilians and 0-97 government forces) differ so significantly in both numbers reported killed and who they were, that the "truth" is impossible to establish.

In relation to an earlier purported "massacre" in Homs, a Stratfor investigation found "no signs of a massacre", concluding that "opposition forces have an interest in portraying an impending massacre, hoping to mimic the conditions that propelled a foreign military intervention in Libya". [61]

Nevertheless, the "massacre" of December 19-20 in Idlib was reported as fact, and was etched into the narrative of Assad’s "killing machine".

Both the recent UN Human Rights Commissioner’s report and a recent data blog report [62] on reported deaths in "Syria’s bloody uprising" by the Guardian (published December 13) – two examples of attempts to establish the truth about numbers killed in the Syrian conflict – rely almost exclusively on opposition-provided data: interviews with 233 alleged "army defectors" in the case of the UN report, and on reports from the Syrian Human Rights Observatory, the LCCs and al-Jazeera in the case of the Guardian’s data blog.

The Guardian reports a total of 1,414.5 people (sic) killed – including 144 Syrian security personnel – between January and November 21, 2011. Based solely on press reports, the report contains a number of basic inaccuracies (eg sources not matching numbers killed with places cited in original sources): their total includes 23 Syrians killed by the Israeli army in June on the Golan Heights; 25 people reported "wounded" are included in total figures for those killed, as are many people reported shot.

The report makes no reference to any killings of armed insurgents during the entire 10-month period – all victims are "protesters", "civilians" or "people" – apart from the 144 security personnel.

Seventy percent of the report’s data sources are from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the LCCs and "activists"; 38% of press reports are from al-Jazeera, 3% from Amnesty International and 1.5% from official Syrian sources.

In response to the UN Commissioner’s report, Syria’s ambassador to the UN commented: "How could defectors give positive testimonies on the Syrian government? Of course they will give negative testimonies against the Syrian government. They are defectors."

In the effort to inflate figures of casualties, the public relations-activist group AVAAZ has consistently outstripped even the UN. AVAAZ has publicly stated it is involved in "smuggling activists … out of the country", running "secret safe houses to shelter … top activists from regime thugs" and that one "AVAAZ citizen journalist" "discover[ed] a mass grave". [63]

It states proudly that the BBC and CNN have said that AVAAZ data amounts to some 30% of their news coverage of Syria. The Guardian reported AVAAZ’s latest claim to have "evidence" of killings of some 6,200 people (including security forces and including 400 children), claiming 617 of whom died under torture [64] – their justification to have verified each single death with confirmation by three people, "including a relative and a cleric who handled the body" is improbable in the extreme.

The killing of one brigadier-general and his children in April last year in Homs illustrates how near impossible it is, particularly during sectarian conflict, to verify even one killing – in this case, a man and his children:

The general, believed to be Abdu Tallawi, was killed with his children and nephew while passing through an agitated neighborhood. There are two accounts of what happened to him and his family, and they differ about the victim’s sect.

Regime loyalists say that he was killed by takfiris – hardline Islamists who accuse other Muslims of apostasy – because he belonged to the Alawite sect. The protesters insist that he is a member of the Tallawi family from Homs and that he was killed by security forces to accuse the opposition and destroy their reputation. Some even claim that he was shot because he refused to fire at protesters.

The third account is ignored due to the extreme polarization of opinions in the city [Homs]. The brigadier-general was killed because he was in a military vehicle, even though he had his kids with him. Whoever killed him was not concerned with his sect but with directing a blow to the regime, thus provoking an even harsher crackdown, which, in turn, would drag the protest movement into a cycle of violence with the state. [65]