Testimony of Mansoor Ijaz in London

NADEEM MALIK

OPENING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

I, Musawer Mansoor Ijaz (Ijaz), a citizen of the United States of America, do hereby solemnly swear that the testimony I present in this Witness Statement on oath to the Honourable Commission (the Commission)is the truth as I know it to have occurred based on the evidence in my possession and to the best of my recollection where physical or documentary evidence is not available in reference to the subject matter of this inquiry (the Inquiry).

I submit my testimony as a first person witness to the events herein. I appear in front of this Commission to present the physical evidence in my possession and to allow such evidence as I have to be forensically tested in any manner chosen by competent, independent and unbiased experts retained by the Commission so that the authenticity of these data can be ascertained with certainty. I duly submit this Witness Statement to the Commission as a private citizen of the United States, born in the State of Florida in the year 1961, and bound only by the laws of the United States of America. I state for the record that my loyalties are first and foremost to the national interests of my country of birth. I do not now nor have I ever served in any official position in the US government. I act at the behest of no person in government, outside of government, in any foreign country or in the United States of America.

CONTACT WITH PAKISTAN OFFICIALS

While I maintain high-level political and military/intelligence contacts in nearly two dozen countries around the world, during the past decade, I have had no contact with any Pakistani government official, civilian, judicial, military or intelligence with the following four exceptions (Amb. Haqqani excluded):

(a)2003 when I last interacted with the former director general of Inter-Services Intelligence, Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, shortly before he left the DG-ISI position in 2004; and,

(b)Nov. 2005 when my wife and I visited the prime minister of Pakistan and some military officers during and after our trip to Kashmir as the earthquake reconstruction period began; and,

(c)May 5, 2009 when I met with President Asif Ali Zardari for 45-50 minutes at the Willard Intercontinental Hotel in Washington DC at the invitation of Amb. Haqqani(Haqqani)to brief the president shortly before he met with US officials at the White House; and,

(d)Oct. 22, 2011 when I met alone with Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the current DG-ISI, a this request for approximately four hours in London to provide him with the same accounting of facts I provide to the Commission herein.

CONTACT WITH HAQQANI

Over the past decade, I have maintained regular contact with Haqqani through e-mail, BlackBerry chat exchanges, SMS, in-person meetings and telephonic discussions. Often, after the 9-11 attacks, when I was not available for media appearances due to calendar conflicts, I would refer producers to Haqqani as a qualified expert on Pakistan affairs. Haqqani was helpful

and supportive in other important matters, including speaking at one of my charity’s annual

fundraising dinners in June 2009 (please see Exhibit-A for examples of our communications).From the day Haqqani assumed his ambassadorship role, I had no involvement in his Congressional or White House lobbying efforts, no role in his development of the Pakistani-American community or any other aspect of his role as ambassador other than assisting in the ways we were able to after the 2005 Kashmir earthquake.

At no time during Haqqani’s ambassadorial tenure have I lobbied anyone for Pakistan, acted as an agent of the Pakistani government or represented any foreign interest lobbying for a particular outcome. I acted in this matter purely as a friend in my private capacity trying to assist Haqqani in communicating his message in ways that only he dictated, characterized and gave authority for, not in any way to be construed as diplomatic or official activity. Other than as disclosed above, I maintain no active relationships of any type electronic, e-mail contact, telephonic contact, BlackBerry messenger contact or SMS contact with anyone living in Pakistan. I have no close relatives living or alive in Pakistan. I have no business interests in Pakistan. I have no political interests in Pakistan. I have never been involved in any political party, political organization or given a single political contribution in Pakistan to any candidate for high office, or sitting elected official. In short, I have no material ties to Pakistan other than my birth parents.

EVENTS OF MAY 9, 2011 UNTIL MAY 12, 2011

The events I describe herein are a factual recantation of my interactions with Haqqani on the dates of May 9th, May 10th, May 11th and May 12th of 2011, and then again starting on October10, 2011, the date on which an opinion piece I authored was published in the Financial Times entitled “Time to take on Pakistan’s jihadist spies.”

The text of this opinion article has already been entered into the record on the date of the Court’s Order.

I had further material interactions with Haqqani on October 28, 2011 and November 1, 2011. At no time did I meet Haqqani in person. All communications were electronic / telephonic.

The events of the three and a half days in May will be summarized in Tabular form in order to show the type of communication (telephone, e-mail, BlackBerry chat, PIN message and handwritten notes), a brief description of each type of communication, and where a communication was evidenced by physical documentation or electronic messages those are attached hereto as labeled exhibits. My recollections of the discussions in telephone calls a replaced in quotations where attributed to Haqqani. Where the dialogue uses coded words or phraseology that may not be apparently clear to the Court, I have put annotations to explain what was intended by the language used.

RESERVATION NOTICE

I reserve the right to amend this Witness Statement at a future date once forensic examination of my electronic BlackBerry device is complete. There are certain messages (PIN, SMS, etc) that may be archived in backup volumes that I am presently unaware of, having not seen any of those messages since June 2011 when the last monthly backup was made. I have chosen not to retrieve these messages from my computer hard drives which normally roll off after a thirty (30) day period in the device until a certificate that my BlackBerry device has not been tampered with and contains original data in it can be provided. The backup data will only be reviewed once the forensic examination is complete. I would also ask the Commission’s permission to spend about20-30 minutes in explaining how BlackBerry handsets work and why the knowledge of BB operations are so critical to the analysis of data in this matter. Finally, certain Explanation comments that I have noted are for “In Camera” hear in gs only because the disclosures are not appropriate for this statement that can be viewed by others. Please note in the tabular formats set forth below, line numbered for convenience, the following legend: BBM = BlackBerry Messenger chat exchange SMS = Short Message exchangeE-M = E-MAIL sent or received CALL = Telephone OUT to recipient or received IN (numbers withheld for “In Camera” briefing)

TBA = To Be Announced (for those messages referenced but held on backup hard drives)All dates are shown in MONTH/DAY/YEAR format. All times given are Central European Time (CET) in military time format.

HAQQANI BLACKBERRY PIN NUMBERS

I submit for the Commission’s records the two PIN numbers that are unique in the BlackBerry system of communications that were used by Haqqani during our communications by BBM Messenger. The first one, 2326A31D, was used in May. The second, 287EF1E9, was used in the October and November exchanges up until at least November 5th or 6th when I noticed he had disabled me as a BBM contact. I wish to additionally inform the Commission that in the intervening weeks since Haqqani once again changed his BlackBerry PIN, I have been informed

by two important official sources (whom I shall identify “In Camera”) that attempts may have

been or are being made to manipulate, erase, delete or otherwise distort data in the electronic devices of Haqqani that could confirm the data I have provided herein as fact. Additionally, it may be noted by the Commission that both the Interior Minister of Pakistan as well as Haqqani have confirmed that some form of electronic messaging and commstook place with me. Yet Haqqani continues to deny the entirety of any exchanges, for example, as those set forth in this Statement. So which is it? Did he communicate with me or not? If so, where is that data and who has access to it today?

TELEPHONE CALL SUMMARIES

CALL #1

–

05/09/2011 IJAZ TO HAQQANI

–

12:35:49

–

DURATION 16:03

I called Haqqani at the London Intercontinental Hotel, Room 430 as he had requested a few minutes earlier by BlackBerry messenger. We had not spoken by telephone for some time, so we briefly exchanged pleasantries. I asked him what he was doing in London he simply said it was a private visit and moved on to the subject matter at hand. There was an elevated stress in his voice. He spoke rapidly, almost randomly at times. Several times I had to ask him during the call to slow down so I could get the notes down from what he was trying to tell me. He explained that the bin Laden raid had created severe stresses between the army/intelligence organs of Pakistan and the civilian branch of government. Referencing some meeting that had

taken place “72 hours ago” between the army chief, the prime minister and the president, he said there was a “collective jute chalak y” [my spelling phonetically because I do not know what these words mean as my
Urdu is quite rudimentary] between the army and ISI to pin the blame of the bin Laden failure on President Zardari’s administration.

He said the US and British were “beating the shit out of us” to get information in the raid’s aftermath about how bin Laden had been on Pakistani soil for so long. He said in clear words that I wrote on my notepad as he said them, “the Army wants to bring the government down”. He then said he needed my help.

I asked in which sense and he informed me that it was urgent to get a message verbally to “the Americans” that the Obama administration needed to back the army down. He said this was a “1971 moment” a reference I did not understand at all at the time he first made it and had to ask him at the end of the call to clarify for me because he repeatedly referred to this phrase during the call. He then immediately stated his preference for the right person to give this as yet undefined verbal message to was Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the US joints chiefs of staff because (a) he was one of the few people who Gen. Kayani would listen to and (b) he was about to chair a meeting with a Pakistani delegation a two days later in Washington (Wednesday, May 11, 2011).I informed him that I did not know Adm. Mullen. I asked him why he needed me to do this for him when he had so many other ways to do it and he said in his official position, it was impossible to get such a message to the Americans without risking the possibility of detection by

ISI or the military officers he had around him at the embassy in DC. He said I was “plausibly deniable” as a conduit and that no one would ever believe if this got public in those days he had come to me for such kind of help. I made it clear that I had long ago given up the role of a back-channel communicator and that I would do it for him as a friend only if I could get someone on the US side to agree to deliver a message to Adm Mullen in the timeframe Haqqani had requested.

I then asked him whose authority he was acting on behalf of. He was vague. Not evasive, just vague. He said there was a like-minded group of people in Islamabad that would be brought on board by “the boss” a reference I understood to mean President Asif Ali Zardari as the new national security team once tensions had dissipated. He mentioned two names I recognized (Jehangir Karamat and Mahmud Durrani) but added that they would be approached once this was all over a point I took to mean they were unaware of this operation in advance. I then asked him what the message was that he wanted delivered and by when exactly it had to be in Mullen’s hands. He dictated a series of points to me, many of which are contained on the two pages of handwritten notes, and the rest were typed into a blank e-mail template at the point I asked him to pause because I couldn’t keep handwritten pace with his verbal speed while holding the phone to my ear at the same time. The balance of notes, typewritten into the blank e-mail template, ultimately became the basis of the first draft of the written memorandum that I sent him at 18:32 on May 9, 2011. The handwritten notes are explained further under EXHIBIT B explanations. We concluded the 16-minute phone call by agreeing to use certain coded words in our BBM chat exchanges during the following two days until the effort was concluded. These are enumerated as each chat took place in the “Explanation” column of Table 1

CALL #2

05/09/2011 IJAZ TO GEN. JONES

12:58:06

DURATION 02:25

I called Gen. Jones at home. His wife picked up and said he was jogging. I explained the importance. As I rarely called at home that early in the morning, she understood it was important and said she would get in touch with him while he was running and get him to call me back in about an hour when he was in. I gave her a brief overview that the matter had to do with a rapidly devolving situation on the ground in Pakistan and that I had been asked to get an urgent message into a senior administration official. I did not go into details. I did not give names.

CALL #3

05/09/2011 IJAZ TO LAWYER #1

13:01:27

DURATION 04:47

As a parallel track, I immediately called my outside counsel, whose name I am withholding pending an “In Camera” hearing on this matter, in Washington DC he is a former senior government official from the administration of Pres. George H W Bush working at one of Washington’s most prominent and largest law firms. I called him because I knew he had a wide array of contacts available for us to explore how else we might approach Adm. Mullen if I was unable to persuade Gen. Jones to pass the message on. I explained the situation at hand inoutline form only. I explained under attorney-client privilege that Haqqani had asked me to assist him, that the tone of my earlier discussion with Haqqani indicated to me that something serious was amiss in Islamabad and that if we could help we should. His principal concern was under whose authority such a sensitive message was being delivered. I explained that Haqqani generally enjoyed the complete confidence of the president in Pakistan, and that I understood the impetus for this operation was coming from Pres. Zardari in the broader sense, if not operationally. He told me there were two options available to us through the law firm, one a senior US political figure now in private life and the other an acting officer of the US government who knew Adm. Mullen well. He told me he would get in touch with both andreport back to me later in the day (it was 7am in Washington at the time I reached him)

CALL #4

05/09/2011 GEN. JONES TO IJAZ

13:54:31

DURATION 19:26

Gen. Jones called me back from his private cell number around 8am his time in Virginia. I recapped the entire Haqqani call (please see summary of Call #1 for details). His first reaction was to say he didn’t particularly trust Pakistani officials (generally, not specifically), and that in his experience through government work with them, they often made verbal promises that they didn’t keep. He said he would not consider taking any message to Adm. Mullen if it wasn’t in writing. Gen. Jones also insisted on having higher political authority than Haqqani, whom he had grown to be somewhat skeptical of over time, if and when he decided to go ahead. We went through the points Haqqani wanted relayed, which took the bulk of the time on the call. He commented that while compelling, it sounded like an opposition group’s agenda. I made clear that it was morelike a change of players under a sitting head of state whose new ground rules and agenda were so diametrically different than the old that it (Haqqani’s desired message) could give off that impression. I gave Jones some background on my relationship with Haqqani and told him that Haqqani would never have come to me if it wasn’t serious because of my past tensions with the senior leaders of Pakistan, no matter whether military, intelligence, political of any party persuasion.

Jones’s skepticism remained throughout the call, but in the final analysis he said he would do it as a favor for me if I could get the message to him in writing with the appropriate political authority. We agreed to be in touch later in the day once I had gotten Haqqani on board with the NO VERBAL, ONLY WRITTEN demand and I had further explained to Haqqani that Jones wanted certain knowledge of the appropriate political authority and consent for this operation before delivering the message to Adm. Mullen.

CALL #5

05/09/2011 HAQQANI TO IJAZ

18:28:45

DURATION 02:34

During this call, I informed Haqqani that one of the three choices on the US side was insisting onhaving the message in writing, with higher political authority than Haqqani alone, to go forward. I informed him that I had taken the precautionary step, given the tight time constraints, to prepare a written draft based on the notes I took in the first call and that I had tried to reach him earlier in the day to let him know about the in-writing constraint. He agreed and told me to send him the draft in writing for his review. I then asked him to clarify what he meant by “discipline” in the nuclear program a point he had made in the written notes earlier and whether the point he made about US Vice President Biden on the “blank sheet” agreement on nukes and Kashmir should be included in the preamble paragraphs. He said no. I also asked him whether he wanted names included in the paragraph mentioning the new national security team he said no. Finally, I asked him whether he wanted any characterization of the army chief, prime minister, president’s meeting included this is when he gave me the information about the CIA station chief’s name being outed and the phraseology about “no central control being in place” as a result of the stresses in Islamabad during the previous days.After inserting a few of the necessary comments into the e-mail draft, I sent the draft to Haqqaniat 18:32. We closed the call by noting my mail to him would come in a few minutes as well as the message’s delivery timing and logistics.

CALL #6

05/09/2011 LAWYER #1 TO IJAZ

23:49:10 & 23:55:21

DURATION 05:28 & 09:58

During these two calls

the first with my outside general counsel, the second a conf call with a third party, we explored the requirements posed by two other possible candidates to deliver the message to Adm. Mullen. My counsel informed me that he had reached a close aide of the active US government officer who knew Adm. Mullen well, and that he wanted to have a conference call with me to listen to how we wanted to do this and what the US official wanted from us as performance parameters before agreeing to our request. We then agreed that the US political personality was out due to slow response. We followed up this call with a 10-minute conference call with the US official’s trusted friend.

We discussed two possibilities the first was to have the US official arrange a private meeting between myself and Adm. Mullen so I could deliver a verbal message as Haqqani had initially preferred. This approach had two problems

I was a nine hour airplane ride away from Washington and there simply wasn’t enough time to match Adm. Mullen’s busy schedule with my getting in the air before the Wed. meeting was to have taken place. The second problem was my personal hesitation to carry a verbal message given what Gen. Jones had told me in his first call about the unreliability of Pakistani officials saying one thing and doing another. The second possibility discussed was for us to have the US official deliver the message, in writing, to Adm. Mullen. This posed two different challenges the US official was unwilling to do it as a “non paper” (a message delivered in writing on paper without signature or letterhead between governments). He insisted on the message being on letterhead with appropriate signature. This conference call made it clear that the 2nd potential US interlocutor was simply not the right solution.

CALL #7

05/10/2011 HAQQANI TO IJAZ

00:30:55

DURATION 01:17

I informed Haqqani that two of the three options for transmission were out, why they were out

and that in order to proceed with the third option I needed him to confirm the memo’s draft form

or send me his changes, and I needed his confirmation that he had the Pakistani government’s highest political authority to proceed. He said he would review the memo during the night. On authority, he said something like “don’t worry about that, I’ve got it sorted out with the boss.”

Haqqani also quickly informed me at the end of the conversation that I needed to remove Point 6on the list because it was already agreed by the Pakistani authorities in the intervening hours since we had last spoken.

CALL #8

05/10/2011 IJAZ TO GEN. JONES

00:33:05

DURATION 01:39

I called Gen. Jones immediately to say that he would transmit the message, that I had confirmation from Haqqani of his authority to proceed from the highest political level and that I would be sending the memorandum over shortly with a request that he hold on to it until I had Haqqani’s final word in the morning (Tue, 10 May). I told Gen. Jones that given the fluidity of events on the ground, it was best that he waited until at least midday on Tuesday before puttingthe Memo in Adm. Mullen’s hands. I recall asking him whether he preferred WORD.DOC files or .PDF files for printing purposes and I sent him both types of files later in the night so that if there were last minute changes and I was not in front of a computer, he could make the necessary changes himself with me giving him Haqqani’s changes by telephone.

CALL #9

05/10/2011 IJAZ TO HAQQANI

09:06:16

DURATION 11:16

During this call on the morning of May 10th, I asked Haqqani if he had any last minute changes to the Memorandum, and then informed him that I had sent it to the US interlocutor earlier in the night so that if there were no changes, we were ready to deliver to Mullen later that day, before Haqqani had planned to leave London .We went through the architecture of the Memo, focusing this time on the opening paragraph and confirming the new signature paragraph (from whom did this document come) that had been added in. We reviewed briefly the six agenda points.I then asked him one last time to confirm he had the authority from the highest political level to proceed with the operation because Gen. Jones (who remained anonymous to Haqqani) would not proceed without that understanding from me and he said, “I’ve got the boss’s approval; go ahead”. I told him we would n

eed to wait until just after lunchtime for me to reach the US interlocutor and give the final delivery instruction.We discussed briefly his schedule for return to the US and next contact time, and when I wouldbe given the time of the Wednesday meeting with Mullen.

CALL #10

05/12/2011 IJAZ TO HAQQANI

01:09 ON MMI US CELL

DURATION 04:00

Haqqani informed me about the results of the meeting with Mullen. He said a “call will go outfrom Washington to Pindi [Rawalpindi?] tonight.” and that he was sa

tisfied the intervention hadworked. We clarified the M remark in my BBMs, he thanked me and the call ended.

RATIONALE FOR WRITING THE Financial Times ARTICLE

Much confusion has been introduced by media analysts, critics and supporters alike about the motivations and agendas that may have led me to publish the initial FT article on October 10,2011. I state for the record that there was no external impetus given to me to write the initial article, neither from any individual, nor from any governmental body US or foreign nor anyother source in any manner whatsoever. Since 1996, when I published my first article in The Wall Street Journal, I have published over 125 opinion pieces in only the most reputable journals and newspapers around the world, and have appeared extensively on television and radio as ananalyst regarding political, security and business issues. I have also had numerous articles written about my citizen diplomacy initiatives in Sudan, Kashmir, Pakistan and elsewhere.In recent years, I have reduced my writings dramatically, writing only a few times a year when a major political or geopolitical event takes place that bears consequence on subject matters thatinterest me. Pakistan generally, and more specifically the struggle to bring a secure and stable democracy to the fore without hidden agendas, corrupt practices and the venality that is so often present in modern day Pakistani rulers military and civilian alike is a major topic on which I have written often in the past. If the Commission so wishes, I am happy to provide a full reference list for my past writings on Pakistan.

I further state for the record that my sole motivation in writing the Oct. 10th FT article was to enunciate a policy prescription I believed was in the best national security interests of the United States about how best to deal with Directorate S of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. The impetus for the article, which I drafted the first thoughts for on 24 September 2011, arose from testimony offered by Adm. Mullen in his final appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee in which he called the Haqqani network of terrorists a “veritable arm” of the ISI, among other very strong comments.

The reaction in Pakistan’s media to Adm. Mullen’s statement was immediate, and as it has been in my case under the glare of the Mullen Memorandum controversy, was shrill and unabashed in lambasting a high-ranking military officer of the United States who served our country honorably for 43 years. While Adm. Mullen needed no defense from my writings, I felt it was important for US policymakers to know that an effort which involved Adm. Mullen himself back in May had been made to reign in Directorate S of ISI, and it so happened that to source this material for my

opinion piece, I referenced the memorandum as the “peg”

as it is called in journalism to base my opinions on. There was no malicious intent involved in bringing the memorandum into the opening paragraph. The description I gave was the bare minimum of facts that were needed in order to give my opinion piece the authenticity it required for the policy prescription to be given any weight. I had written more or less exactly the same opinion article on June 2, 2011 for Newsweek / Daily Beast Company

http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2011-06-02/pakistans-isi-spy-agency-s-wing-and-terrorism/

after learning of the death of Saleem Shahzad, without material effect in the inquiry of my arguments. Clearly, introducing the memorandum into the FT opinion article strengthened the argument because it gave it the needed authenticity. Editors at the FT who normally evaluate my opinion columns for publication have tended in the past to choose those articles of mine that begin with some historical anecdote to anchor the article’s policy prescriptions and opinions. This article was no different, other than the anecdote was in the form of a “first person” analysis.

If the Commission so requests, I will make available my internal correspondence with the FT editors to provide evidence of this fact. I would like to note, for the Commission’s interest, that Haqqani sent me the following BBMchat on June 4, 2011 to which I responded and he then wrote a reply please see the following screen shots:

I apologize to the Commission for the frank exchange of language between Haqqani and myself, but this is evidence of the type of relationship we shared together. Message time-stamped 02:18was first message from Haqqani. I replied the next day. Message in second screen time-stamped18:05 was his reply. One final point of note on this subject matter: some sections of the media have questioned why it took so long for the opinion piece to be published in the FT from the date of Adm. Mullen’s

statement. As you are most certainly aware, FT is a financial newspaper whose editorial pages are reserved primarily for finance discussions, not matters of security and foreign policy. As Europe has been engulfed in perhaps the most important financial crisis it has suffered since the introduction of the Euro, the Eurozone crisis dominated the editorial pages of the FT for those weeks, and my opinion article which dealt with matters much further away and unrelated to the major editorial thrust, simply was placed on a date that was convenient to the FT’s editorial calendar. I had no control over that decision and again, at the Commission’s request, I amprepared to make my internal communications with the editors available in this specific regard.

EVENTS OF NOTE AFTER THE Financial Times

ARTICLE APPEARS

Haqqani sent me a BlackBerry message around 21:50 GMT on the evening of October 10, 2011, shortly after my opinion article had been published on the FT’s website. It read: “This FT op-ed of yours is a disaster”. Before I had a chance to see it and respond, he telephoned me at 21:57GMT in a somewhat panicked voice, reiterating what he had just said by BBM message and then asking me whether there were any other “senior Pakistani diplomats” I knew in Islamabad that he could name to throw the “press hounds of my scent”. I responded by querying why the op-ed was such an issue for him and what he was so upset about. He replied simply by saying everyone would now assume it was he who was the brainchild of the Memorandum and that I understood nothing about Pakistan’s domestic situation. It was a short call lasting only 00:45.

At the time of this writing, I do not yet have the hard copy details of my October telephone bills to give the exact time and date of the second call I received from Haqqani

it was about 5 or 6days before I met with Gen. Shuja Pasha in London. My recollection of that call is as follows: Haqqani called to inform me he had just learned that Gen. Pasha was coming to London. I expressed disinterest and lack of knowledge. He expressed some anxiety over my disinterest and said something to the effect of “what’s going on here” a clear reference to his skepticism of my disinterest. He did not ask once during that call whether I had been approached to see Gen. Pasha. His only concern was whether Gen. Pasha would be meeting with the FT editors in London, whether I knew anything about it and whether I would do him the favor of intervening with the FT editors to insure they did not provide Gen. Pasha with a copy of the Memorandum or any other evidence that I had provided the editors when I wrote the opinion piece. I responded by again asking him, as I had on the night of May 10, 2011, why he was so paranoid about the Memorandum and whether we had done something wrong in delivering it to Adm. Mullen. His response was to simply reiterate that I understood nothing about Pakistan’s domestic political situation and that there were some who would say Haqqani “was playing for your [U.S.A.] side” if the content of the Memorandum was revealed in public. I told him that I did not believe the FT editors would take a meeting with Gen. Pasha without a lot of advance work being done about purpose, etc and the call ended.

SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF MEETING WITH DG-ISI LT. GEN. SHUJA PASHA

I was contacted by a person, whose real name I do not know to this day, on or about the 16th of October to see whether I would be willing to meet with Gen. Pasha. I inquired purpose and proposed location. Purpose: to determine the truthful facts surrounding the content of the Memorandum and its genesis (authorship, operational details of the effort to get it delivered to Adm. Mullen, etc). Location: London was the most convenient location for both of us to meet. After discussing the implications of such a meeting going ahead with my in-house legal counsel and my family, I agreed to take the meeting. We met on the evening of 22nd October in London at the Park Lane Intercontinental Hotel, Room210, from approximately 1830hrs until 2230hrs, according to my records. There was one person

I believe the logistics manager of the meeting with Gen. Pasha when I was shown into the room by a member of his security detail and that person shook hands with me and left the room promptly.

I brought my electronic devices and a notepad to the meeting. We both agreed to take batteries out of our telephones while we spoke. The telephones were stored in a drawer near the table we sat at. Gen. Pasha brought a notepad as well. After being seated face to face at a small dining table, Gen. Pasha opened the meeting by stating his purpose in asking to meet me. He made clear he was not there to interrogate but rather to understand with evidence supporting my statements what exactly had happened in the days in question. He made clear he was in London with the consent of the army chief, Gen. Kayani. He made clear he did not know who I was prior to the meeting, and had asked one of his researchers to prepare a dossier for his review. He asked me to give him my own summary of my background, partly to allow me to introduce myself, but also to separate fact from fiction in the dossier he held. Each comment I made was later backed up during the meeting by evidence I showed him on my computer about my background, life, family and businesses. I made clear to him at the outset of the meeting that I had agreed to the meeting on the basis that it was entirely possible in my mind given the adverse reactions Haqqani had shown me on the two telephone calls I had with him prior to this meeting that Haqqani did not properly inform the government of Pakistan of his activities, and that if anything he had done was against the laws of Pakistan, in violation of the Constitution of Pakistan or the rules of international diplomacy as agreed between the US and Pakistan, it was possible that myself, Gen. Jones and Adm. Mullen had become unwitting accessories to these possible wrongdoings. For that reason alone, whether I liked or disliked the ISI, whether I had written against it or the military or any other organ of the Pakistani state, I felt the responsibility to share the facts with him and to understand whether there was any possible wrongdoing on our part collectively as US citizens that had assisted Haqqani in transmitting the message to Adm. Mullen. I also made clear to Gen. Pasha that I did not want to personally be involved in any debriefing of

him that would lead to a disruption of the civilian government’s normal business he responded by making clear that it was his and Gen. Kayani’s deep desire to see a government complete its term, but that the rumors of what was contained in the Memorandum from a content perspective could simply not be ignored. On this basis, we agreed to start the meeting in good faith with him questioning openly without constraints and me answering in the most truthful and complete manner possible. He asked me about my relationship with Haqqani (length, frequency of contact, type of contact, etc). He queried me about my interactions with prior Pakistani ambassadors in the United States, as well as past political leaders (Bhutto, Sharif, Musharraf, etc). After my initial set of answers about 30 minutes into the meeting he went to the door of the room and informed the security person that “this is going to take a while”.

We then began the data debriefing. We went through the information that has been provided in this Witness Statement line by line so that I could explain what had happened in those three and a half days. He asked questions, at times looked a bit astonished at what he was seeing but at no time did he offer any assessment of the data other than to indicate that the records were “clear and convincing” evidence. We took the bulk of the four hour meeting to do the data debrief. In my recollection, Gen. Pasha read the Memorandum itself in about three or four minutes, demonstrated surprise and dismay at times disgust and disappointment over the content of the document. He did not ask a single question about the content of the document other than if I was willing to divulge the names of the others besides Haqqani that he had told me were to be part of the new national security team. I did so with the caveat that I did not believe either Karamat or Durrani knew anything about the plan to deliver the Memorandum, the contents of the Memorandum or the mindset of Haqqani and those behind him in dreaming up the scheme. At the point during the meeting where he learned of the three US people I had approached to deliver the Memorandum to Adm. Mullen, he asked me how I knew each of them, how well and to briefly summarize my requests of them in terms of why, who was involved, under what authority and in which modality such delivery might take place with each person. Intermittently during the data debrief, I would open my computer or my BlackBerry device and point out how the data was stored, transmitted, displayed, etc. He then carefully analyzed dates, times, “properties” of my Microsoft documents to see when the documents were created and how

they fit into the timeline I was stating, looked at the original telephone bill logs, checked the time at which each BBM message was sent or received and reviewed my handwritten notes. Contrary to media reports, at no time did Gen. Pasha try to send a BBM message to Haqqani from my handset. He recorded the PIN numbers that I had for Haqqani, both the old one and the new one Haqqani did not yet have the third PIN at that time that he would ultimately obtain. Gen. Pasha did ask to see how I stored e-mail addresses and to see the ones I had for Haqqani one from his private university mailbox (Boston Univ.) and one for official use at the embassy in Washington. There were no other issues relevant to this subject matter discussed during the meeting. It ended on a cordial note with Gen. Pasha thanking me for providing a clear record of events and asking if it was okay to follow up if other questions arose in the aftermath of his further investigation into the matter.

BBM CHAT EXCHANGES WITH HAQQANI ON 28 OCT 2011

approx 21:55 until 22:33 CET

Participants:Mansoor IJAZ, Husain HaqqaniMessages:

Husain Haqqani: you can keep saying you delivered a message and show bbm convos to prove it Husain Haqqani: Basically you don’t get itHusain Haqqani: You have given hardliners in Pak Mil reason to argue there

was an effort to get US to conspireagainst Pak MilHusain Haqqani: You are a US citizenHusain Haqqani: You are supposed to look after US interestsMansoor IJAZ: I wrote one article. Have not said one word on the record since then to anyone. I think your press isworking both sides against the middle, trying to force something out of anyone they can. Period. I don’t play in thatgameHusain Haqqani: In Pak political situation, getting burned as a US stooge undermines one’s effectivenessHusain Haqqani: I will make sure FO shuts upHusain Haqqani: Let this die downHusain Haqqani: We are in the rightHusain Haqqani: We will still make things happenMansoor IJAZ: Okay, well I know my IQ is pretty low so you are probably correct in saying I just don’t get it.Husain Haqqani: The Pak press be damnedHusain Haqqani: I stand by you as a man of integrity werving his countryHusain Haqqani: You don’t let ppl back home argue I play for your team, not oursMansoor IJAZ: But from my point of view, if there was a real threat, as you stated at the time, it is clear you weretrying to save a democratic structure from those hawksHusain Haqqani: You get to write the book on how you changed US-Pak dynamic and won the war in A’tan (w/ somehelp from a Paki nerd) Mansoor IJAZ: I was happy to get the message in the back door because it served American interests to preserve thedemocratic civilian setup and the offers made, if achieved, were very much congruent with American objectives inthe regionHusain Haqqani: True that, friend. But you know premature revelation ain’t goodMansoor IJAZ: As far as I can see, we did right. Unless there is something I don’t see here. But then I’m sorta dumbfrom down on the farm where them hillbillies liveHusain Haqqani: Hey! Don’t run down hillbilliesHusain Haqqani: Even the smartest can miss a piece of the puzzleHusain Haqqani: You are assuming there are no powerful men in Pak willing to break w/ US. Premature revelationgives those ppl reason to claim ‘conspiracy’, ‘treason’Husain Haqqani: That is all you missed. Period.Husain Haqqani: And no one else might tell you this, you’re becoming irritable and losing your sense of humor asyou grow oldHusain Haqqani: Let this one go. There is much to do. MUCH. And then, there’s the beach where I’ve been waitingto be invited, the slum boy visiting the millionaireMansoor IJAZ: I’m not a millionaire. But I do know a nice piece of beach!Husain Haqqani: I’m not a slum boy either but I know how to make friends with smart people with a sense of history:PMansoor IJAZ: Jesus, then what the fuck are you doing hanging around with me? =DHusain Haqqani: We’ll make things happen and if we can’t, we’ll write a book about itHusain Haqqani: Who said I was hanging around witjh you. A minute ago I thought you were about to hang me Mansoor IJAZ: :OMansoor IJAZ: Really?Husain Haqqani: Look, Isloo is a mess. Journos gone wild. Politicos scared of mil. Mil scared of Yanks.Mansoor IJAZ: Tell me one important thing. Who likes you and who hates you in the US establishment? Who wantsyou to stay and who wants to fuck you up?

Husain Haqqani: The debate abt your oped has caused my detractors to put pressure on my bossHusain Haqqani: In US estab, I can count on Leon and PetraeusMansoor IJAZ: I thought YOU were the boss!Mansoor IJAZ: Who is against you?Husain Haqqani: Folks at State don’t like meMansoor IJAZ: Why?Mansoor IJAZ: Too close to AZ?Husain Haqqani: They think I am too mixed up w/ DoD and others and do not help them cut deals w/ Pak milHusain Haqqani: Close to AZ bit tooHusain Haqqani: They are wrong re DoD and others.Husain Haqqani: It is just that becoz of A’tan, they are more imp than StateMansoor IJAZ: I always thought HRC was one of your fans. She even has a lady from our parts working with herHusain Haqqani: It is folks at State who got pissed off by your missionHusain Haqqani: She may be but I was Holbrooke’s buddy so everyone who hates him hates meHusain Haqqani: I have no time for just pushing paper aroundHusain Haqqani: State likes processMansoor IJAZ: Which mission? Sudan, Kashmir, there were so many they got pissed off about. I showed them howto do real American diplomacy and that was like a big pile of shit on their desk they couldn’t swallowHusain Haqqani: Conferences, statements–with nothing changingHusain Haqqani: The latest oneMansoor IJAZ: Yeah, I got it. You’re right!Mansoor IJAZ: Anyway, State will always hate me because I don’t accept their muddling way of doing thingsHusain Haqqani: I don’t know for a fact but I won’t be surprised if the FO statement was prompted by someone hereHusain Haqqani: Robin Raphel is back as Grossman’s deputyHusain Haqqani: You stepped on her toes w/ Kashmir missionMansoor IJAZ: That would be typical. But Grossman knows me and he knows how serious I am. Raphael still hatesme for the Kashmir intervention where she did everything she could to fuck me upHusain Haqqani: And now they hate me more when folks back home who hate me tell them you and I might havebeen together on s’thing (whether we were or not is irrelevant to them)Husain Haqqani: Grossman is good but he doesn’t like anyone playing a larger than life role. Old schoolHusain Haqqani: That’s why I have been requesting you to let this one goMansoor IJAZ: Yeah I know. Found that out when he was our lobbyist. But he’s a good guyHusain Haqqani: That takes attention off meMansoor IJAZ: Hmmmmmmmmm……. Not sure anything could take attention off youHusain Haqqani: I try and make peace with State and focus on battles at homeHusain Haqqani: HaHa Mansoor IJAZ: Diplomacy at its finest!!!Husain Haqqani: Yeah, right! But at least I shd not be painted as playing for your teamMansoor IJAZ: Why not? You were a good quarterback for those three days!!Husain Haqqani: I want to solve f***ing problems not fight a rearguard action all the timeHusain Haqqani: Husain Haqqani: Let us wait and see if Hillary’s latest foray changes things in any directionMansoor IJAZ: Did we really solve a true problem or was this all smoke and mirrors?Mansoor IJAZ: I mean on those days of stress…Husain Haqqani: View here is that everyone in Isloo sucks!Mansoor IJAZ: That’s pretty much true!!!!Husain Haqqani: Too early to say re solutionMansoor IJAZ: But if they all suck, then what did we save — a sinking ship that was going to sink anyway???Husain Haqqani: And there is a genetic problem at that end, predisposed to going round and round in circlesMansoor IJAZ: Yup!! That’s for damn sureHusain Haqqani: I think we save the situation from an extremely violent outcomeMansoor IJAZ: How can you solve the problems you understand so well from here if all the people in charge overthere are wrong? It’s only one year til we have a change in the US. Then you really won’t like who we have here!Husain Haqqani: I mean, Iran might have done better if the Shah had been saved AND some true reform introducedHusain Haqqani: Actually, I think the new ppl here might be better to deal with

Husain Haqqani: They won’t take lies easilyMansoor IJAZ: Don’t bet on it. We have a lot of extremists cropping up and seeping into the systemMansoor IJAZ: They don’t trust anything PakistaniMansoor IJAZ: Don’t matter what it isHusain Haqqani: Well, in that case find me a cheap piece of beachMansoor IJAZ: Cain, Romney (who hates Muslims), Perry — its all the same crapMansoor IJAZ: Hmmmmm, yes, I can arrange thatMansoor IJAZ: Why is Z such an idiot?Husain Haqqani: But don’t go off writing opeds abt arranging piece of beach w’out consulting first Husain Haqqani: HaHa! Tough questionHusain Haqqani: I have a speech in 20 mins so let’s keep that for laterHusain Haqqani: Bye for nowMansoor IJAZ: Okay. Good luck.Husain Haqqani: Thank you!

BBM CHAT EXCHANGES WITH HAQQANI ON 01 NOV 2011

–

22:06, then 22:31 until 23:03

Participants:Mansoor IJAZ, Husain Haqqani Messages:

Mansoor IJAZ: Hi buddy, I understand you/ your foreign office hacks are commissioning hatchet pieces against me.Unfortunate…. very unfortunate Husain Haqqani: I will enquire and stop them. There’s no need for any of this.Husain Haqqani: You haven’t helped by engaging so much w/ Pak media.Husain Haqqani: What happened to the ‘silent soldier’?Mansoor IJAZ: I issued a statement that was designed to put an end to all of this after Imran Khan’s rally nonsense.But be that as it may,I’m not going to tolerate character assassination in any of thisHusain Haqqani: I agreeHusain Haqqani: Will do my best to prevent itMansoor IJAZ: Roger thatHusain Haqqani: Focus on your policy message instead of who did what and we can turn this aroundMansoor IJAZ: Please remind your boss that his beloved wife, who later became a good friend of mine, tried thesame bullshit tactics in 1996 when Maleeha was envoy — result: her government was dismissed in Nov 1996.Mansoor IJAZ: I’m not someone he can mess around with. He better get that message from me and really understanditHusain Haqqani: My response to Imran was very simple and true: I did not write a treasonous letter and if Imran hasa copy, he should present itHusain Haqqani: I don’t think your threatening helpsMansoor IJAZ: That’s true from my point of view as well. But politicians are politiciansMansoor IJAZ: I don’t make threats. I state facts. Your boss needs reminding of the factsHusain Haqqani: Are you sure your side won’t deny?Mansoor IJAZ: No, maybe they will. But that would also be a mistake. Too much proof on that side as well.Husain Haqqani: But does “proving” help anything?Husain Haqqani: Is it not the nature of a private mission that officials deny it?Mansoor IJAZ: Don’t know. Don’t care. My point is simple — I’ve said what I was going to. Attacks on my personwill not be tolerated. And my statement stands. Stop telling lies about me and I might just stip telling the truth aboutyouHusain Haqqani: If you were to listen to my advice, you would let this blow over and prove yourself afterwards. Youare the one who will outlast the flying shit Husain Haqqani: That is usually my strategy: be there when the others have self-destructed or blown over

Mansoor IJAZ: I’ve kept to my word — if everyone wants to call it a fabrication and make me the fall guy, thengloves come off and it’s not going to be fun or pretty for anyoneMansoor IJAZ: You did something you thought was right outside channels because you felt it would be the mosteffective way to get the job done.I helped you execute. I haven’t thrown you under the bus. But be damn sure I won’t let anyone do that to meHusain Haqqani: I’ll do what I can to keep it prettyHusain Haqqani: I haven’t. I won’t.Mansoor IJAZ: By the way, I know a lot more than you give me credit for about the circumstances that led to May 1and your role in all that. Just FYIHusain Haqqani: Honorable ppl stick with one another. Take care.Mansoor IJAZ:

BBM CHAT FROM HAQQANI ON 02 NOV 2011 at 03:42

Husain Haqqani: I am maintaining silence so pls check with me before reacting if some Pak journo attributes anything to me

This completes my Witness Statement to the Commission. I wish to thank this august body forpermitting me to be heard in completeness. I remain ready to answer any of your questions. Iwish the Commission

God’s speed in addressing the important issues raised by this matter.

Thank you, Chairman and the members of this Honourable Commission, for your time and yourattention in this matter of great national importance.

Submitted for the record this 16th day of February, 2012

Deponent Musawer Mansoor IJAZ

VERIFICATION:

Verifying on solemn affirmation on this 16th day of February, 2012 at London that all content of this affidavit, oral as well as printed in script from blackberry, email and other devices are absolutely true, honest and sincere to the best of my knowledge and nothing has been deposed falsely, ambiguously and wrongly. Deponent Musawer Mansoor IJAZ

NADEEM MALIK

Filed under: CURRENT AFFAIRS

ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court on Friday threw out an appeal from embattled Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani against contempt charges, paving the way for him to be indicted next week. Speaking to reporters outside the court, Barrister Atizaz Ahsan, the PM’s counsel, confirmed that the prime minister would now appear in court on Monday. The [...]

Somewhere in the long list of things we lost in blood and fire is the joy of poetry.

It is a loss I cannot reconcile with. My memories get in the way. It was through poetry, that I learnt to think, feel, mean and be. Words existed in our household with an identity of their own, like people with names, personalities and pasts. There would be good words and bad, happy and melancholy, wise and wanton. When strung together in perfect meter and imperfect reason, they would offer doggerel explanations of the abstract in a way no other genre could. Poetry would respect life for its expanse and vagueness, not subject it to confined dialectics.

I have always felt that a poem, whether conceived in joy or pain, captures forever the place in life that elicited it; like a white Christmas trapped in a snow globe. There is a strange comfort in hearing from another, what one is feeling within. And so, having navigated life by finding solace, company and sometimes humour in these footprints from the past, I cannot imagine a world without the abstract. To lose the joy of poetry is to lose the counsel of wonder. It is not a loss to be reconciled with.

My grandfather used to quote that a poem is never finished, only abandoned. He was, among many things, a writer and a critic. His book, ‘Urdu shaairi ka tanqeedi ja’eza’ (a critical overview of Urdu poetry), is more of poetry in the horizontal than prose. However, you may not be able to find the book in print anymore. I have an old copy which I hold very dear. I fear that if I don’t, it will be lost forever as the irrelevancy that poetry has become today…

We may be sympathetic to the passion of Faiz and the romance of Faraz, but truth is that most other poets, some very good ones, hardly make it to their second editions. Book stores like Ferozesons, Maavra etc which used to have complete collections of all poets, black, white and brown, have degenerated to the level of deli’s selling what sells. Ironically, you would more easily find classical poets’ complete works in India, than in Pakistan. But is it the problem, or merely a symptom?

Perhaps it is both. Literature, in particular poetry, cannot be treated like Wall Street Journal, good only as long as it sells. But publishers are in the business of selling. I believe the onus therefore lies on the universities, Urdu boards and academies of the country to promote poetry, not as a mercantile pursuit, but as a way of looking at life.

It has to be the easiest thing to do! One would only need to create the platforms. The rest will just happen. Who can deny the fiery provocation of Faiz’s ushhaq, the transcendent drift of Ghalib’s sense of self and the lofty persuasions of Iqbal’s shaheen? What heart wouldn’t relate to the pained pride that was felt and expressed in every possible form by Faraz. Who wouldn’t identify with Jon’s temper, Nasir’s agony or Perveen’s insecurities? Whose thoughts would atleast once not have wandered as freely as Zaidi’s?

These are life-long relationships waiting to happen. Failure to recognize the joy and perspective these bring to life would be like sentencing oneself to a tunneled life clogged with reality and deprived of oxygen. We have too many people worrying ‘what colour is their parachute’, and not enough wondering ‘what colour is the wind’. It is a whole different ball game of self-actualization that is as, if not more, important as the more tangible pursuits in life.

An immediate priority should be an all-hands-on-the-deck effort to digitize Urdu poetry. We should do it before it disappears. If the Urdu Academy doesn’t do it, perhaps we should look at a more private venture to make it happen. Universities, colleges, and poetry lovers all over would need to plough in. A first step in this direction may be developing a reliable OCR for Urdu. With the talent we have in the country in the field of IT, and given the fact that Urdu has no home but ours, it is the least we should do. With the OCR in place, digitization can be led by the universities, proof-read by poetry lovers and institutions, and preserved forever in the cyber-world.

The second step, hopefully an outcome of the first, would be integrating poetry with life. More Mushaairas, more ghazal singers, more celebration of the new and appreciation of the old in the field. What better way to drain the paranoia from reality-clogged minds, too afraid to dream and too clumsy to dance?

It will take time, perhaps five to ten years, but it will be forever. I sincerely hope that we act before it is too late.

For as long as I lived in Lahore, my idea of a perfect evening was an old bench in Lawrence Gardens, a book of poetry and a steaming cup of doodh patti. I feel we have an obligation to add this joy to the packsack of keepsakes we leave behind for the next generation. They can add coffee and kindle a’ la mode, but atleast they will have their counsel of wonder …

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS
Commission internationale de juristes – Comisión Internacional de Juristas

” Protecting and promoting human rights through the Rule of Law”

PRESS RELEASE For immediate release – 25 January 2012
Former Pakistan Ambassador to the US faces threats to his life – ICJ

Geneva, Switzerland – The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) today expressed its
grave concern for the infringement of rights of Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistan
Ambassador to the United States of America.

Hussain Haqqani has been embroiled in a political and judicial conflict stemming from a
leaked political memorandum that he was alleged to have authored, only a few days after
al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed by US military forces.

“Hussain Haqqani faced a vicious media trial following which the Supreme Court of Pakistan on a petition filed debarred him from travelling abroad, despite the fact that he has not been charged with any crime,” said Sheila Varadan, International Legal Advisor at the ICJ Asia-Pacific Regional Office. “Hussain Haqqani continues to receive threats and has been painted as disloyal to the country. There is, though, no proof of any betrayal of his
duties as an Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States.”

His counsel, Asma Jahangir, confirmed that Hussain Haqqani is under threat and has taken refuge in the compound of the Prime Minister’s residence.

The leaked memo, which on 10 May 2011 was delivered to the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, was said to contain promises of greater cooperation with the Americans in counter-terrorism operations from President Zardari’s People’s Party of Pakistan (PPP) Government in exchange for support from the United States to subvert a potential military coup d’état.

News of the memo was leaked to the media by an American-Pakistani businessman, Ijaz Mansoor, in early October 2011.

Hussain Haqqani was recalled to Islamabad and resigned his post as Pakistan Ambassador to the United States in November 2011. The PPP Government denied allegations of involvement in the memo scandal and a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry was set up on 21 December 2011 to investigate the matter. A few days later, the Supreme Court of Pakistan established its own Commission of Inquiry.

There are legitimate concerns that in convening this Commission, the Supreme Court may have overstepped its constitutional authority and that this action could undermine the ongoing Parliamentary inquiry.

“We are calling on the Pakistani Authorities to respect Hussain Haqqani’s right to be presumed innocent and to remove the restriction on his right to leave the country and any other restrictions on his right to freedom of movement,” added Sheila Varadan. “They
must also ensure his personal safety at all times and respect his right to a fair and impartial hearing throughout the Inquiry process.”

For further information, please contact:
Sheila Varadan, International Legal Advisor, ICJ (Bangkok), tel + 66 2 619 83 04

Former Ambassador to US Husain Haqqani has expressed fear for his life in an exclusive interview to The Daily Telegraph on Tuesday.

Haqqani, allegedly involved in the Memogate scandal, said he fears that he will be killed if he steps out of his residence as he has been branded a “traitor” by “powerful quarters” – a reference towards the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He has been residing at the prime minister’s house in Islamabad since his return to Pakistan on his resignation as the ambassador.

He told The Daily Telegraph that he left the prime minister’s house only on three occasions under heavy security escort.

Denying all allegations against him in the Memogate scandal, Haqqani termed the issue as a “psychological warfare” against the government of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani.

I’m a guest of the prime minister with whom I have had a long-standing political association. There are clear security concerns given the hysteria generated against me. Staying at the prime minister’s house is the safest option.

My good friend Salman Taseer was killed by a security guard because he heard in the media that the governor had blasphemed. I’m being called a traitor and an American lackey in the media with the clear encouragement of certain powerful quarters even though I’ve not been charged legally with anything.

Haqqani’s counsel Asma Jehangir recently refused to appear before the judicial commission probing the case saying that the ISI might influence it to get its desired results. Jehangir asked the court to question the ISI and the army, and not just civilians in the case.

There are numerous issues besides ‘Memogate’ that directly affect the people, like the shortage of gas, electricity, clean drinking water, housing, healthcare, employment and so on. But the issue gains significance because so far, no democratically elected civilian government in Pakistan has ever been allowed to complete its tenure and hand over power to the next one through democratic elections (as I outlined in this paper). There were hopes that this government would be the first to do so – a critical step towards the continuation of a democratic political that is necessary to move the country away from the military-dominated politics of the past – something, as it is now all too apparent, is not a thing of the past after all. In this context, it’s important to understand the current situation and its dangers. Myra MacDonald sums it up in an analysis for Reuters. Some insights were posted to this blog earlier (here and here). Additional facts are laid out in a document received today (reproduced below) that outlines some facts about Husain Haqqani and ‘memogate’. Also read this important article, ‘Treason? Under what Constitution? in the New Pakistan blog, which dissects the ‘memo’ contents and notes that each item in the document falls under the constitutional purview of the federal government…

Issue at hand: Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the US, Husain Haqqani, is currently a virtual prisoner as his life is under danger both from the extremists and from the security agencies. He is residing for his own safety at the Prime Minister’s residence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan imposed a travel ban on him on December 1, 2011 restricting him from leave the country. His wife, Member of Pakistan’s Parliament, Farahnaz Ispahani’s life is also in danger, which is why she is currently in the US where she had come for medical checkups.

This situation arose after the false allegations by an American businessman of Pakistani origin, Mansur Ijaz, who claimed that the Ambassador and President Zardari had sought American help to prevent a military coup in Pakistan. Ambassador Haqqani has flatly denied these allegations. Further, Ambassador Haqqani knew Admiral Mullen very well and could have contacted him directly anytime; it defies understanding why he would need Ijaz to convey a message to Admiral Mullen.

A history of false claims: Mansur Ijaz is well-known over the years for self-promotion and false claims. During the mid-1990s he claimed that he had close ties to the Sudanese government and would be able to help the Clinton administration get Osama Bin Laden. However, both Clinton NSA Sandy Berger and the 9/11 Commission that interviewed Ijaz found no credible evidence in what he said. In 1999 Ijaz claimed to be the American envoy to India and Pakistan to help resolve the Kashmir dispute but in the end neither side found him credible or someone who could deliver. In 2004 Ijaz claimed that chemical warheads were being smuggled into Iraq for an attack on American troops which he later denied.

The ‘memo’: Former US national security advisor General Jim Jones conveyed Ijaz’s memo to then Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen. Gen Jones in an affidavit has sworn that he believes Ambassador Haqqani had nothing to do with the memo. According to General Jones the language of the memo was akin to what Ijaz wrote.

Ijaz claims that soon after he wrote an OpEd about the ‘memo issue’ on October 10, 2011, Pakistan’s ISI chief, Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha flew to London, met him and examined the evidence and found it credible. However, Admiral Mullen has stated that when he received the memo from Gen Jones, he did not find it credible and took no action on it.

Threats: Asma Jahangir, leading human rights advocate and counsel to Ambassador Haqqani, has stated that Ambassador Haqqani is under threat from his own intelligence-security agencies. In this context Admiral Mullen in one of his final testimonies stated that Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI, and the Pakistani military have often lied to the Americans, and provide support to the extremist groups, including those who kill Americans.

Action required: Ambassador Haqqani needs to have his passport returned to him and have his name taken off the Exit Control List (ECL) so he can travel. The due process of law must be applied.

Background: The government’s opponents – in the media, political parties, military-intelligence establishment – have used this opportunity to attack the government and try to make Ambassador Haqqani a scapegoat. Some worrying facts:

• Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif (who in 1999 had Ambassador Haqqani imprisoned and tortured for writing OpEds against his regime)  is the leading petitioner before the Supreme Court.
• • The Supreme Court took up Mr Sharif’s petition instead of sending it to a trial court first.
• The Supreme Court ignored due process of law and immediately placed a travel ban on Ambassador Haqqani without letting him or his counsel appear before court.
• The head of the ISI himself conducted a forensic investigation and the army chief and head of ISI have stated in their affidavits that they believe the ‘memo’ was genuine – which points to an attempt to frame the Ambassador by institutions that have never agreed with his views.
• A political-media trial and witch-hunt has been ongoing since Ijaz’s OpEd first appeared in the Financial Times.

Detailed Background and Information

Background of Memo: The origins of the memo are in dispute. On October 10, 2011 an American businessman of Pakistani descent, Mansur Ijaz, wrote an OpEd in Financial Times alleging that in the aftermath of the Osama Bin Laden raid of May 2, 2011, he was approached by a senior Pakistani diplomat to pass on a memo to enlist the US military’s help to head off a feared military coup, in exchange for overhauling the country’s powerful top security leadership. He said he gave the memo to former NSA Gen (retd) Jim Jones who passed it on to then Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen.

In the ensuing weeks Ijaz claimed that Amb Husain Haqqani was that senior diplomat and that he and Amb Haqqani corresponded by Blackberry messenger messages, phone conversations and emails.

Amb Haqqani flatly denied these allegations. Admiral Mullen stated that he had received a memo but he did not find it ‘credible.’ According to Mullen’s spokesman “I have said this before and am saying again today. Nothing about that letter had the imprimatur on the Pakistani Government. It was not signed. And the contents of it Admiral Mullen did not find credible. So he took no action on it.” (November 22, 2011)

Amb Haqqani returned to Pakistan on November 19 and tendered his resignation in order to ensure a free and fair inquiry into the issue. The civilian government, while supporting Amb Haqqani’s account accepted his resignation. His passport was confiscated upon his return to Pakistan.

Supreme Court action: December 23, former Prime Minister and leader of the main opposition party, PML-N, Nawaz Sharif filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) claiming that under article 184(3) of the Constitution, the SCP could take up any issue of public importance which relates to fundamental rights. SCP accepted the petition along with other petitions.

On December 1, 2011 the Pakistan Supreme Court placed former ambassador Husain Haqqani on the Exit Control List (ECL) barring him from being able to leave the country, without giving the former ambassador or his lawyer to appear before the court. So due process of law was not followed and Mr Haqqani’s fundamental rights were violated.

Gen Jones in his affidavit to the Pakistan Supreme Court stated that while he did pass on the memo he does not believe Amb Haqqani had anything to do with the memo.

On December 30, Pakistan’s Supreme Court set up a 3-member judicial commission to investigate the issue. According to the SCP judgment a petition seeking an investigation into the affair had “succeeded in establishing that the issues involved are justiciable.” The court also upheld the travel ban on Amb Haqqani. Further, the court has ordered the attorney general of Pakistan, Foreign Ministry and the Pakistani High Commissioner in Canada to approach the parent company of Blackberry, Research In Motion (RIM).

The government maintains that since Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy the correct forum for any such inquiry should be the parliament. The Parliamentary Committee on National Security was already looking into the case and that should be the proper venue not the Supreme Court.

Counter arguments by Amb Haqqani’s lawyer, Asma Jahangir: According to Ambassador Haqqani’s lawyer, leading human rights advocate, Asma Jahangir, the verdict was the “darkest day for the judiciary because the apex court has subjected fundamental rights to national security.”

Terming the court’s judgment ‘disappointing’, she said, “today we feel that the military authority is superior to the civilian authority. Today, the struggle for the transition to democracy has been blocked.” And, “I am forced to think if it is the judiciary of the people or the judiciary of the establishment.” Ms Jahangir also expressed her deep regrets and said she was totally unprepared for this reward of sacrifices rendered by lawyers’ fraternity, as the Court ‘dimmed even a fraction of ray of hope’, while providing the petitioner with relief beyond what they had sought.

Ms Jahangir said the decision was against the rule of law and had compromised a citizen’s right to justice. The verdict reflected undue supremacy of national security and integrity over human rights. “When order came on 1st December, Husain Haqqani was not heard. He did not even have a lawyer,” she said. “Saying that there is a memo and linking it with Husain Haqqani are two different things, it’s more of a media trial that got hyped after Supreme Court’s order”.

Amb Haqqani’s lawyer and others have pointed to the role of Pakistan’s security services, especially its intelligence agency. Both the head of Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha and Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, submitted petitions before the Supreme Court insisting they believed the memo was genuine and needs to be investigated. Significantly, according to Mansur Ijaz, Lt Gen Pasha travelled to London in October and ascertained that the memo was genuine. Why was Lt Gen Pasha so eager to travel to London and agree with what Ijaz said? Whose permission did he obtain before doing so? Is he the person who should perform a forensic investigation? Mr Ijaz also alleged in an interview in December that soon after the Bin Laden raid Lt Gen Pasha travelled to the Gulf to muster support for a military coup.

Imminent danger to Mr Husain Haqqani: A media trial has been ongoing since Mansoor Ijaz’s OpEd published in FT in October. The involvement of opposition parties and their leaders in this political-media witchhunt.

The judiciary seems to be ruling on the basis of national security ideology instead of constitution and law.

All those individuals who are speaking out in Pakistan for democracy and human rights are being silenced one by one. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, former Governor Salman Taseer, former Minister Shahbaz Bhatti were assassinated. Former Amb Haqqani and his lawyer have received serious death threats.

On January 1, 2012, Ms Jahangir announced that she was quitting the case as she did not have faith in the commission been set up by the Supreme Court. According to Ms Jahangir, the Supreme Court’s decision on the petition was a victory for the country’s establishment, and it was being used to transform the country into a ‘security state.’

Ms Jahangir further stated that her client, Mr Haqqani, was under threat from the security agencies. She feared that the security forces-intelligence agencies would try to coerce a statement out of Mr Haqqani. That is why he first stayed at the President’s House and is currently residing at the Prime Minister’s residence.

(ends)

What is ‘Memogate’? The ‘memo’ in question is a letter allegedly written at the behest of Pakistan’s President by the Ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani, asking USA to prevent a possible military coup in Pakistan after US Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan on May 2, 2011. Haqqani denied the allegations, sent in a letter offering to resign in order to facilitate an impartial inquiry, and returned to Pakistan to clear his name. Instead, he found his resignation letter accepted. The Supreme Court barred his exit from Pakistan. He has been forced for his own safety to confine himself first to the Presidency and then to the Prime Minister House. On Dec 30, 2011, The Supreme Court in response to a petition against the ‘memo’ formed a three-member judicial commission to look into the matter that the media has dubbed as ‘memogate’.

Asma Jahangir, counsel for Husain Haqqani and former Supreme Court Bar Association President, has refused to appear before the commission saying that she does not trust the judiciary. She has said that instead of forming a commission to create or produce new evidence the Supreme Court should have looked into the evidence placed before it to decide whether there was a prima facie case and whether the court could proceed to enforce any fundamental rights by making a binding order.

The entire affair appears to be geared towards undermining the democratic political process in Pakistan – specifically at targeting President Asif Ali Zardari, using Husain Haqqani as a vehicle. Asma Jahangir has unequivocally termed the Supreme Court’s judgment as a victory for the military that has run affairs in Pakistan for decades and is obviously still all-powerful behind the scenes.

Asma Jahangir has argued that the Supreme Court had no right to bar Haqqani’s travel abroad. Nor does Supreme Court or the judicial commission set up, have the right to demand Blackberry (RIM) data without due process of law. No server (BU or RIM) should share data with Commission, which is essentially pursuing a political dispute, not criminal charges. The judiciary seems to be ruling on the basis of national security ideology instead of constitution and law.

In the first place, the Supreme Court was not competent in the first place to uphold the petition as maintainable, given that no fundamental right had been violated as a result of the memo and its alleged conspiracy. Secondly, the memo had in any case failed to achieve its alleged aim – according to its recipient (then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen) as well as the Pakistan Army Chief.

“Article 184(3) empowers the Supreme Court to make an order in matters of public importance guaranteed in Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution in which violation of any fundamental rights has taken place. In this case, no violation of fundamental rights has taken place, a most essential question, without an answer to which the court should not have proceeded to make an order of this nature,” comments advocate Asad Jamal in his informative article of Dec 4, 2011 (Deconstructing the SC order on the memo).

The existing evidence is not sufficient to determine whether there was some conspiracy or threat to the security or sovereignty of Pakistan. The evidence placed before the court by the DG ISI and Mansoor Ijaz shows that there was no conspiracy or threat to the security or sovereignty of Pakistan.

In fact there are several contradictions in Mansoor Ijaz’s claim. For one thing, his email dated 10 May, 2011 (annexed with Mansoor Ijaz’s affidavit before the SC) addressed to Gen (Retd.) James Jones, former US national security adviser who handed the ‘memo’ to Admiral Mullen, states that the so-called memorandum had been prepared by three persons. Moreover, Gen. Jones in his affidavit has said that Mansoor Ijaz never mentioned Husain Haqqani’s name in his communication with him, implying that Husain Haqqani was never involved in drafting it or in asking for its delivery to Mike Mullen.

The court says it will not go into the facts of the case, but is clearly influenced by the DG ISI’s statement that he went and met Mansoor Ijaz on October 22, 2011, examined his evidence and believed that what he was told was correct. If the DG ISI has evidence about the case, given that he went all the way to London to meet Pakistan origin US citizen Mansoor Ijaz, why has he not presented it in the court to facilitate the evidence collection?

Mansoor Ijaz’s Blackberry messages (BBMs) contain nothing from Husain Haqqani about the supposed memo.  Going by the transcript, assuming it is genuine, it was Mansoor Ijaz who offered to fly down to meet Husain Haqqani in 90 minutes – it was not Haqqani who invited him. There are other obvious problems with the existing evidence, including discrepancies in the BBM transcript attached with Mansoor Ijaz’s reply and that published in The News. Then, Mansoor Ijaz in his covering email to Gen (Retd.) James Jones, former US national security adviser who handed the ‘memo’ to Admiral Mullen, writes that the attached ‘memo’ was drafted by three ex-officers related to national security. Gen. Jones in his affidavit testified that Mansoor Ijaz never mentioned Husain Haqqani.

“Article 184 (3) is not an automatic trigger that gets pulled with the filing of a petition; a petitioner has to make out a proper case,” notes advocate Jamal. “When there is no violation, what fundamental right will the SC maintain? The commission appointed by the SC is to conduct an inquiry but its findings will not be binding on any court of law, the government or the Parliament. So what fundamental rights will be enforced?”

The argument so far was restricted to the maintainability of petitions but by appointing a commission, the court went a step further, granting the entire relief (and more) in one go without hearing the arguments, or discussing the commission’s terms of reference. Then, after assuming that the memorandum’s “issuance, prima facie, seems to be established”, the court suggested that the offence (the nature of which is yet to be determined) may invoke Article 6 of the Constitution, i.e. the offence of treason, notes Jamal.

He points out that: “The petitioners have, intriguingly, arrayed the President of Pakistan as a respondent, to which no objection was raised by the Court.” This lends credence to the widespread perception that the real target in this case is the President – an allegation that Asma Jahangir also levelled in her interview with Matiullah Jan of DawnNews TV, Dec .31, 2011.

Many lawyers privately agree with this view but balk at expressing their opinions publicly, afraid of antagonising the courts on which they depend for their living. “They have to plead before these same courts for relief for their clients,” says Asad Jamal. “No one wants to risk getting their backs up.”

The court’s attitude to Asma Jahangir was downright hostile, he observes. “She stood for three hours before they let her speak, and she barely said a few words when they cut in, they basically didn’t let her speak”.

Regarding Asma Jahangir’s refusal to appear before the Commission, Asad Jamal notes that for one thing, she had expressed her distrust of the Commission, and secondly, its proceedings are expected along the lines of a criminal case, which is not her area of expertise.

Last but not least, it is a matter of grave concern that Husain Haqqani, his lawyer Asma Jahangir, the columnist Marvi Sirmed and others who have taken a stand in this issue that counters the view propagated by the security establishment, find themselves at serious risk in Pakistan.They regularly receive threats to their lives. A highly dangerous situation in the current climate in Pakistan, where rule of law leaves much to be desired.

(ends)

Former Pakistan ambassador Husain Haqqani’s counsel Asma Jahangir sounds a sombre warning about the danger Haqqani is in from the military and intelligence agencies that are capable of picking him up and ‘twisting his limbs’ to make him say what they want to hear. Talking to Dawn TV’s Matiullah Jan in a detailed interview of Jan 1, 2012 she says that she took up the case because she found it a travesty that an individual was being condemned on the basis of a media trial without due process or representation. However, she will not represent him before the Judicial Commission that has been formed as she does not trust the process. The interview, posted in six parts (about 5-6 min each), is worth listening to in full as she makes some crucial points about the significance of this judgement to Pakistan’s politics. She sums some of these points up in this earlier brief interview with Al Jazeera English:

“It’s is a very disappointing judgement, because the Supreme Court has actually said it is people’s fundamental right to come set up a commission against anyone that they accuse. So once a commission is set up and if Mr Haqqani is aggrieved by that something the Commission has done, there’s nowhere he can go; his due process has been taken away. But more than that it has restricted fundamental rights to national security. It’s a big blow to those who believe in the democratic process and in the protection of fundamental rights”.

The issue as she said, was not about one individual, Husain Haqqani. “The point of the case is to go right up to the government. So this is basically (about the) civil military relationship in which sadly the courts have more or less shifted their weight with the establishment.”

In Pakistan, the military is still in power, there has been no transfer of power, she said. “They have been able to use one of the opponents of the government to go to court and take this petition under the guise of fundamental rights.” So our fundamental rights “are now subservient to national security. When there’s a tussle between what the civilian government says and what the military says, which are two different things, there has to be a showdown and where will that take us?”

Asked what the course of action should have been, she pointed out that there was already a parliamentary commission looking into ‘Memogate’. And secondly “there are laws in this country under which they could have got an investigation”. Instead, they moved to the highest court as the first instance, taking Mr Haqqani “out of the queue and denying due process”.

In her Dawn News interview later, elaborating, she says she expected the judges to uphold the Constitution and fundamental rights, rather than undermining them in the guise of ‘national security’.

“I don’t have great expectations from the judges, they seem to have expectations of themselves,” she said. “I’ve argued in court, because this is such a politicised matter, let the politicians settle it. Secondly, if we want to further democratic norms and traditions, we need to support the power of the people” rather than the power of the establishment. It is this that will provide the state its true security.

“That’s not the job of the SC. Their job is to support us, the citizens. Judges are subservient to the Constitution. This is a crucial and critical point. They should not make an issue out of national security. There can be many interpretations of national security.”

To Matiullah Jan’s question about the issue of national security, given Pakistan’s status as a “Muslim nation with nuclear weapons”, she replied: “You can’t compromise on fundamental rights, you can’t compromise on people’s rights. Secondly, there was no danger to national security.”

About Mansoor Ijaz, she said, that the DG ISI went to him and said that prima facie this is a case. Someone who has been writing articles against Pakistan for some years, DG ISI never went to him before. He is “a man who is a US citizen, who says his loyalty is to United States, someone who has written many articles against Pakistan, including one that I didn’t read out in court out of respect, in which he’d written that the Chief Justice is indebted to Nawaz Sharif. You’re accepting his credibility, not giving credibility to your ambassador to US. You’re informing the civilian government after you’ve already conspired against them. There are so many holes in the BBM memos that we’ve pointed out, but the CJ can’t see those holes?”

In essence, the army leadership has prevailed over society and institutions. This is a victory for them. There have been many petitions before SC earlier but “this is the first time that that notice was sent to them and they went running.”

Asked what proof there was that the petition was sponsored by the military, she said for one thing, they are never in such a hurry to reply, secondly, they didn’t go through Attorney General, and thirdly, it’s “clear that the federation is giving one answer, they’re giving another”.
Could this have happened if the government wasn’t weak, asks Jan.

“Yes, the government is weak. We wouldn’t have seen this day if it wasn’t. It doesn’t matter which government it is, what matters is whether the army is going to retain its influence on politics in Pakistan. They’ve exposed themselves. They’ve exposed the fact that the DG ISI was carrying out an investigation against the Prime Minister.”

She said she had asked Husain Haqqani to get another lawyer for the Commission, as it was too much for her blood pressure.
“As a professional lawyer, shouldn’t you be able to fight this case also?” asks Jan.

“It’s not about losing a case. We lose 3-4 cases every month,” she replied. “This has been a struggle I’ve been involved in (restoration of judiciary and democracy). There was a hope, but I don’t see that being fulfilled. It’s not personal, it’s not about this government or another. There are much bigger issues at stake.”

The basic issue, she stressed, is the civil-military relationship. The judgement has been a setback to the struggle for democracy and due process. The struggle, as Asma Jahangir said, will continue.

ISLAMABAD: Renowned lawyer Asma Jahangir on Sunday refused to continue as former Ambassador to the US Hussain Haqqani’s counsel in the memogate case, DawnNews reported. Asma Jahangir said that she did not trust the commission formed by the Supreme Court to investigate the memo-scandal, alleging that the Supreme Court judges were under the establishment’s influence. [...]

It’s not easy taking your problems one at a time when they refuse to get in line.

Something mysterious ails the country’s president. The opposition, inside and outside parliament, is calling for early elections, ostensibly to pre-empt an army takeover. The robes seem ready to bring their gavels crashing down on the government. The rightwing is standing with guns drawn, ready and aimed. Pakistan is fast losing friends in Washington. The outside world at large is tired of what it sees as Pakistan’s double game. And most worryingly, the boys in uniform are up to their tricks again.

Have things ever looked this bad for the Pakistan Peoples Party? Not in a long time. The most telling part of it all is that no two people, either in the party or among the talking heads watching from the sidelines, will give you the same answer to any question, whether it’s about what exactly is wrong with Zardari’s health, if the president with nine lives still has some cards left to play, and whether there is something significant about the timing of a confrontation that no side can foreseeably win.

Late Thursday morning, even as a Supreme Court judge tried to convince Husain Haqqani’s counsel that the institution she had apprehensions about – the army – was also seeking ‘due process of law’ by coming to the court, everyone was wondering: how long to the point of no return? And then the prime minister, the gift that just keeps on giving, broke the kettle and sank the boats. A fatal collision between the government and the army was in the offing, if it hadn’t already occurred.

Thundering away before a gathering at the Pakistan National Council of Arts, the prime minister warned that a conspiracy was being hatched to send an elected government packing but promised that it would live to fight another day.

And he didn’t stop there: he reminded the khakis, even if indirectly, that as the chief executive, all institutions of the state worked under the prime minister and all state officials got their salaries from the state exchequer. Sure, the army has sacrificed much in the war on terror but it was the elected government that had given it the mandate to fight that war in the first place and secured ownership of it from the people. No army can fight alone. The message was clear. And ominous.

And finally, the real insult: the Inquiry Commission on the Abbottabad Operation was formed to answer the basic question of what Osama had been doing in Pakistan all this time, the prime minister demanded. Why then was it now being used to ask the government how many visas it had issued and to whom?

When your beard is on fire, it’s a folly to ask for a match to light your smoke. And yet, that’s exactly what the prime minister has done. For all practical purposes, he’s told the khakis if they cross a limit, the government will ask all the questions it hasn’t so far touched.

If there was ever a point of no return, this looked like it. But the question no one has an answer to yet is: why?

What has brought both the government and the army to this terminus? What does one want that the other is unwilling to, or cannot, concede? Why can the two sides no longer agree to a compensation value? Why doesn’t either side see any point in negotiating any more? What has the army asked of the civilians that has made it prohibitively expensive, even impossible, for them to turn back?

After the boys got Haqqani’s scalp, most people expected things to settle down. But it is increasingly obvious now that the memo was just an excuse: that silly yet fatal mistake the army was waiting for the government to make so that it could go for the kill. So, what more does it want now?

Another extension for Shuja Pasha, some are asking? Maybe, but that doesn’t seem like a concession the government would sacrifice its term over. Zardari’s head? An interim set-up minus the president? Or does this have to do with the economy? That the government warned the army of economic ruin unless the Nato supply lines were reopened and the boys wouldn’t budge – not even if the civilians offered to work with them on national security issues in order to give political legitimacy to their agenda?

They say there is nothing in the world more stubborn than a corpse: you can hit it, you can knock it to pieces, but you cannot convince it. Does that explain the prime minister’s tone? What would he have to lose if he were convinced the game was already up? Was he just the silly cock crowing on his own dunghill? Or was it that between strengthening its armour and sacrificing itself or just limping forward on one leg and remaining alive, the PPP has finally made its choice? Remember how after the May 2 raid everyone criticised the government for missing the chance to show the public that the greatest threats to national security were in fact created and compounded by the army itself? Is the PPP seizing the moment now?

Perhaps, the turn of events is just the final culmination of the PPP’s larger political strategy that many warned was bound to reach its limit sooner rather than later. Zardari’s games worked with those who saw politics as a dhanda: the politicians who were amenable to, and could be incentivised with, inducements. But the strategy of sharing the spoils was ultimately going to prove inadequate with an army that considers itself above this game of give and take. That thinks it owns the game. Surrendering to it the national security and foreign policy domains would never have been enough. Ultimately, it would have wanted more. And perhaps now it does.

Those who argued that the army had its hands full and wasn’t interested in politics – especially not if the civilians got their act together – neither had their eyes on history nor their ears to the ground.

Will better sense prevail? Some would argue that for the PPP, it’s not the crisis it has to conquer now, but itself. Sometimes, if big enough, a crisis becomes your biggest asset. Rock bottom is good solid ground; a dead-end street just a place to turn around.

And then, say the optimists, Nawaz Sharif and PM Gilani are finally in touch again now, the army chief has gone off to the battle areas to show he’s not playing politics and the government is safer today than yesterday. Why be so glum?

But even if it may not be time for despair just yet, the army has to remember this: a real patriot is the fellow who gets a parking ticket and rejoices that the system works. Back off boys!

(From The News, Pakistan)

© 2011, Mehreen Zahra-Malik. This article may not be reproduced in any form without providing an active attribution link/ reference to The Pakistan Forum. All attribution links within the article must also be retained.