The United States (US) Committee on Foreign Affairs is set to convene a congressional hearing on Wednesday (February 8), for an exclusive discussion on Balochistan.

The extraordinary event has generated great interest among followers of Pakistan-US relations, as the allies’ mutual relationship seems to be deteriorating. The powerful House of Representatives committee oversees America’s foreign assistance programs and experts believe it can recommend halting US assistance to Pakistan over human rights violation in Balochistan.

Calls for ‘independence’
While Islamabad has strictly treated Balochistan as an internal matter, the debate on such a divisive topic by the powerful committee has highlighted the level of American interest in Balochistan and its support, if any, for the nationalist movement. On its part, Pakistan has kept Washington at arm’s length on the Balochistan issue, by refusing to grant it permission to open a consulate in Quetta.

A Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, who recently co-authored an article with Congressman Louie Gohmert expressing support for an independent Balochistan, will chair the hearing.

“Perhaps we should even consider support for a Balochistan carved out of Pakistan to diminish radical power there (in Pakistan),” Rohrabacher wrote in his piece.

According to Asia-Pacific Reporting Blog, “it is expected that the hearing will tackle issues related to whether or not the US Congress should tie human rights issues in Balochistan to Pakistani aid.”

Witness box
Another area of interest is of the controversial witnesses who will testify before the committee. The three-member panel comprises of defence analyst Ralph Peters, Georgetown assistant professor, C. Christine Fair and Ali Dayan Hasan, Pakistan Director of the Human Rights Watch.

Ironically, the panel on Balochistan does not include a Baloch representative, an issue which has disappointed the Baloch diaspora in the United States, who fear the misinterpretation of their stance by people they view as unfamiliar with the Baloch conflict.

One of the witnesses, Ralph Peters, attracted scathing criticism by right-wing Pakistani strategists in June 2006, when his article Blood Borders was published in the Armed Forces Journal with a map of Free Balochistan. Peters, 59, a former US army officer, is expected to support in his testimony the idea of an independent Balochistan comprising of the Balochistan provinces in Pakistan and Iran and parts of Afghanistan.

On the other hand, Dr Christine Fair is known as a passionate supporter of Pakistan with an anti-India stance. The Pakistani media quoted Dr Fair in March 2009, for allegedly linking India with the Baloch insurgency. She was reportedly questioned the role of the Indian consulates in Afghanistan and Iran.

“Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan,” she told a roundtable organized by the Foreign Affairs magazine, “I can assure you they (Indians) are not issuing visas as their main activity.” Later on, however, she told Outlook, an Indian news magazine, in an interview that the Pakistanis had blown her comments out of proportion.

On Twitter, a week ahead of the hearing, Dr Fair called Ralph Peters, the fellow witness, a “nut” and asked “WHAT does he know?” On Saturday, she also irked the Balochs by questioning their majority status in Balochistan while in another Tweet she warned the separatists not to “expect me to support an independent Balochistan”.

Public debate
Dr. Akbar S. Ahmed, Pakistan’s former high commissioner to the United Kingdom, told Dawn.com that the congressional hearing was a “significant step” in highlighting Balochistan’s problems. “The information provided in the event,” he said, “will not only be used by members of the US Congress but will also be picked up by the world media.”

“The shocking stories of torture and murder in Balochistan will become part of the public debate. It is in the interest of Pakistan to quickly and effectively resolve the situation in Balochistan bringing back the Baluch with honor, respect and dignity,” said Dr Ahmed, who is currently the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at the American University in Washington DC.

Dr Ahmed, who served in 1980s as the Commissioner of three districts in Balochistan, says the hearing can potentially create a great deal of negative publicity for Pakistan.

Close watchers
In the United States, the conflict in Balochistan has been gaining remarkable attention of late. While some officials from the government and non-governmental organizations have only expressed concern over the situation, other individuals, including former army soldiers, State department officials and members of the US Congress, have now begun to publicly assert support for an independent Balochistan.

For instance, on January 15, Victoria Nuland, the State Department spokeswoman, expressed America’s “deep concern” over the ongoing violence in Balochistan, especially targeted killings, disappearances and human rights violations.

“This (Balochistan) is a complex issue. We strongly believe that the best way forward is for all the parties to resolve their differences through peaceful dialogue,” she said.

Last year on November 16, the State Department deputy spokesman, Mark Toner, had also observed during a press briefing, “You know, more broadly, we do have concerns about the situation in Balochistan. We’ve addressed those concerns with the government of Pakistan.”

Nationalist view
Baloch nationalists are cautiously monitoring Wednesday’s hearing.

“To be honest, we are not very optimistic about this meeting,” Sardar Akhtar Mengal, a former chief minister of Balochistan, told Dawn.com, “but both support and attention from the US are significant because the presence of the US cannot be overlooked in South East Asia. It is essential that the US gives attention to Balochistan, as the aid that is given to Pakistan in the name of war against terror is being spent to commit atrocities in Balochistan.”

A political expert in Washington DC, who requested anonymity, said during the election year, the Republicans are likely to bring up the Balochistan issue to castigate Democratic President Barrack Obama for deliberately keeping quiet against Pakistan, an ally in the war on terror, for allegedly misusing American assistance to fight the secular Balochs instead of quashing the Taliban.

After the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, many American policymakers have become disillusioned with Pakistan and now some of them propose an independent Balochistan to fight religious extremism. Last month, Louie Gohmert, another Republican Congressman from Texas, suggested that the US should, “talk about creating a Balochistan in the southern part of Pakistan…they love us. They’ll stop the IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and all the weaponry coming into Afghanistan, and we got a shot to win over there.”

Sardar Mengal, who leads the largest Balochistan National Party (BNP), says the hearing does not mean that the Washington is going to support the Baloch cause in the future.

“What the US can do for us is to care for the Baloch as human beings. Since Washington is apparently a committed supporter of human rights, it is obligatory that the US should stop the genocide of the Baloch nation by the authorities as it has done in other parts of the world, supporting their right of self-determination.”

M. Chris Mason, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, who recently retired from the US Foreign Service, has emerged as another ardent proponent of free Balochistan in the United States.

In an article, Mason, who lecturers at the prestigious National Defense University, argued an independent Balochistan would solve many of the [Af-Pak] region’s most intractable problems overnight and would create “a territorial buffer between rogue states Iran and Pakistan.”

“The answer to the current Pakistani train-wreck is… recognizing Balochistan’s legitimate claim to independence… to help the Baluchis go the way of the Bangladeshis in achieving their dream of freedom from tyranny, corruption and murder at the hands of the diseased state,” he wrote.

Routine matter
Hassan Abbas, a scholar based in Washington DC who until recently was Quaid-i-Azam Chair Professor at Columbia University in New York, seriously doubts if the US will officially support Baloch nationalists at this time as this will complicate US-Pakistan relations.

“I think the hearing is a routine matter as all security related issues in Pakistan are being analyzed in the policy world with keen interest as well as concern. The hearing will discuss human rights issue as well as politics,” says Abbas, who is also a Senior Advisor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, “but the hearing itself will not create any serious diplomatic row. The US Congress must listen and understand that there is a variety of perspectives on the subject.”

Dr Ahmed, meanwhile, attributes the deepening crisis in Balochistan to Islamabad’s failure to understand that time is running out for it.

“The leaders of Pakistan are so focused on the power struggles in Islamabad that they seem to have little will or imagination to deal with the urgent issues that concern the country’s largest province of Balochistan.”

How will Islamabad respond to the hearing?

“Pakistan’s establishment is quite sensitive about the Balochistan crisis and they will follow the hearings closely and sceptically,” says Hassan Abbas, whose book, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, was published in 2005.

According to Abbas, hawkish elements in Pakistani media are likely to create a lot of hue and cry over the hearing. Yet he cautions, “They will serve Pakistan better by focusing on projecting the concerns of the ordinary Baloch people, who are disenfranchised, distressed and increasingly getting disenchanted.”

Sardar Mengal of BNP, who was detained in Karachi for several months during the Pervez Musharraf regime, predicts there would be a definite reaction from the government.

“They can only display their superiority to the ones who are weaker, and in this case, the Baloch are the weaker ones,” he says and warns, “But if there is a reaction from Pakistan toward us, this time it will be once and for all. Either the Baloch will swim across or sink as a nation.” (Courtesy: Dawn, Pakistan)

Raza Habib Raja
Professor Philip Oldenburg is a professor of political science in Columbia University and author of the book titled India, Pakistan, and democracy: solving the puzzle of divergent paths. As an academic, Subcontinent has been his prime area of political research. A few months ago, he was invited to Cornell University where I was privileged to hear his views on a very interesting topic which was why India and Pakistan despite being apparently similar in history and culture have taken divergent paths as far as democracy and role of military are concerned.

First of all Professor Philip made an interesting statement that India’s successful evolution as a democracy is not a “normal” phenomenon but rather an exception whereas Pakistan has evolved the way most of the third world countries with similar characteristics are likely to evolve. Now this contradicts with most of the stuff I hear about the reasons as to why India and Pakistan have taken different trajectories. I have mostly heard that democracy has not evolved simply for the sole reason because military has not allowed it to evolve. Explanation for the difference in India and Pakistan has always been pinned down to only deep conspiracies of the “deep state” against political class.
Now this analysis at least partially disagrees with the overwhelmingly prevalent and rather simplistic explanation according to which democracy does not function solely because Pakistan’s army has always been conspiring against it whereas in India the armed forces have decided to respect the political template of the government.

According to Professor Philip, a country with low literacy rate, weak industrial base and with a colonial legacy is often expected to take the similar trajectory as of Pakistan. He then cited many examples of the countries where military coups have taken place and the institution enjoys great power and privileges.
However, he made an interesting remark that Pakistan in many ways had performed worse and while many other countries (like Bangladesh and Turkey) are gradually shaping towards the ascendency of political class and strengthening of democracy, in Pakistan the political developments are pointing towards the other direction.

So what makes Pakistan a similar and yet in the longer run a “different” case as far as the role of military is concerned? Why the neighbouring India is an exception and why could not Pakistan follow the same trajectory despite the fact that it was carved out of the same British Empire?
Well the reasons are complicated and cannot be solely just attributed to the conspiracies of the military. Besides trying to understand as to why military intervenes, it should be worthwhile to also dwell as to how it is actually able to intervene. In Pakistan’s case the reasons are rooted in:
1) its general cultural and political traits such as low literacy, rural dominance and lack of developed stabilizing as well as independent institutions like Judiciary,
2) the history of Pakistan movement and its early years after coming into being
3) chaos when civilians are in power and their inability to take a decisive action when opportunity presented
4) Urban middleclass impatience and excessive emphasis on “order” which has provided armed interventions a semblance of support
5) Manipulations by the army and the intelligence apparatus

Firstly, one has to understand that military in weak third world country is often the only well-disciplined, centralized and sophisticated institution. It has sophisticated instruments of violence and has a top down chain of command which is seldom if ever broken. Particularly in countries where democratic institution are either nascent or democracy after its introduction leads to chaos, military due to its ability to bring “stability” and restore order often intervenes. Third world has thus witnessed a number of coups and Pakistan by no stretch of imagination is an exception. However, military interventions by no stretch of imagination are good developments, though in the context of tremulous political cultures, understandable .

Military once it intervenes to overthrow the political government becomes a political stakeholder and from that point onwards, takes steps particularly in the constitutional and legal realm, which solidify its acquired political status, powers and privileges. Of course the military is not accountable to the electorate and therefore in the longer run is quite insulated from the normal pressures which a political government has to go through. Military rule seriously undermines the democratic evolution and does not allow the political culture to deepen. It depoliticizes the populace and also creates a state which is not responsive to its people.

In Pakistan unfortunately the genesis of the military rule is actually in the way the Pakistan movement shaped up and the complex interplay of the dynamics of the movement with cultural and political characteristics of the region which eventually became Pakistan.

Compared to Indian freedom movement, Pakistan’s independence movement became a mass movement at a very late stage. Whereas Congress’s birth was in 1885 and it became a mass movement particularly due Gandhi’s efforts by 1920s, Muslim League even in early 1940s had not been successful to garner the same kind of mass support. Ironically the areas where it was actually popular were areas which subsequently became part of India.

It was only in the second half of the decade of 1940s that the Muslim League started to make real appeal to the people of the areas which subsequently became Pakistan.

Muslim League did not attain the political maturity the way Congress did which had gone through several generations of leaders and the political culture was institutionalized in the party as well as the movement headed by it.

This is an important distinction which shaped the respective roles of the military in both the countries. In India the political class was dominant from the beginning and moreover the public perception of the army was not of a saviour as the Indian army had served loyally under the British empire . The entrenched political culture ensured that Indian political landscape made a smooth transition from a movement into a functioning democracy from the word go. Moreover, Nehru remained at the political helm in the initial years providing the much needed political stability under democratic umbrella. Military was never in a position to stage a coup both because the chaos-which often precedes the military coup and at least is the justification the first time- was never there and secondly the army did have an “image” issue due to its close association with the colonial rule. Nehru’s revered and towering status also prevented the development of any militaristic bonapartism.

Pakistan on the other hand was founded in an area where had already been militarized as most of the recruitment was taking place from so called “Martial Races” of Punjab and what is now Khyber Pukhtunkhawa. Moreover the state apparatus was stronger in Punjab and local politicians had to rely a lot on the civil bureaucracy in order to get things “done”. The reliance of political class on the state apparatus in areas falling under West Pakistan was much greater than in areas which later became India.

So when Pakistan came into being, the local politicians, particularly in the rural areas, had already become too entrenched in the practice of looking towards state apparatus to gain privileges and powers rather than rather than through political mechanism consisting of parties, manifestoes and ideology. In rural Punjab, this practice with varying degrees continues to this date.

When Pakistan came into being the Muslim League despite having gained support in the last two years was still not a deeply rooted political party in the area which was West Pakistan. The main leaders of the League actually belonged to the areas which were in India and when they came to Pakistan, they were without the same kind of support. The nationalist movement actually brought leaders in West Pakistan whose roots had been left behind. In addition, Jinnah through charismatic did not live long and during his one year at the helm also did not do much in line with democratic norms. His one year rule was as a Governor General and was highly personalized.

In the initials years army was needed again and again both at the external front (Kashmir front) as well as the internal front (riots of 1953) to restore order. During these times while army’s role strengthened, the political landscape was fraught with chaos and repeated change of governments. The political class in the absence of a stabilizing political leader (Liaquat Ali Khan was shot dead in1951) and a political infrastructure underpinned by proper political culture, could not gain strength.

While government heads kept on changing, the Chief of Army Staff continued to gain power and moreover whereas in India the Chief of Army staff position witnessed at least five different individuals, Pakistan persisted with Ayub Khan. Repeated changes of governments and chaotic situation provided the impetus for the military intervention and when finally military intervened; there was actually a sigh of relief.

The military intervention of 1958 is extremely important as it initiated several things. First, military’s image among the urban middle class (at that time small in number but powerful due to its monopoly over education, and white collared job market) as a saviour was created. From that point onwards, the middleclass, particularly the urban middleclass has seen army in that light particularly when during short stings of democracy the situation gets chaotic. It actually expects army to intervene. Secondly, army’s self-image also enhanced to include itself as the ultimate custodian of the political stability as well. Third, it gave the loudest signal that army was a definite stakeholder and in fact more powerful than all others. So from that point onwards, political class had to factor in army more than any other stakeholder for its own survival.

Although Ayub was personally perhaps a secular but increasingly the army was tutored in Islam in order to provide it with an ideological fabric to bolster its combative zeal. Increasingly the army also started to see itself as the ultimate custodian of the ideological frontier also. It was in fact during the Ayub tenure that army also started to make overtures to the religious outfits for both external and a domestic objectives, a trend which over time has only increased .

The ascendency of army given the unique circumstances of Independence, earlier turmoil, the “expectations” of the urban middleclass, and the work done during Ayub era to solidify its status as political power, was difficult to check but nevertheless there were several opportunities which could have been availed.

Given army’s “respect” as a saviour, the best time to curtail army’s role as a political force is at the time when it has been dishonoured or humiliated. However, for that the political class besides removing the head of the armed forces also needs to exercise maturity in its own conduct. This is essential in order to dispel army’s potential role as the “saviour” of the last resort, a role which is largely perceived by the urban middleclass.

Unfortunately Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto due to his personal conduct and “I am above the law “ attitude squandered the chance. Bhutto ruled in a capricious manner, and used security forces to terrorize his rivals. Moreover, he alienated the urban middleclass too much due to his personal conduct and dictatorial traits. He rigged the elections and once again it was urban middleclass which was in complete resentment as ZAB had taken several steps to displease them and supplanted those with his style of rule. The “movement” against the election rigging was primarily an urban bourgeoisie movement and during those times there was a resurgence of army’s image also. The leaders of the movement were in fact giving overtures to the armed forces to intervene and “rescue” Pakistan. Army, at that time while apparently supporting Bhutto, was at the same time also in contact with the opposition and was cleverly plotting a coup. When army finally intervened on that fateful night, it was not only in accordance with its own institutional interests but also the interests of the urban middleclass.

This point is essential here because the urban middleclass actually has historically provided the armed interventions a semblance of popular support. Although urban middleclass is not monolithic and it would incorrect to assume that it can actually think like a unified orgasm but by and large this class is anti-democratic and apolitical in its orientation. This class is upwardly mobile, prefers stability over chaos and has been successfully tutored in a nationalist brand of civic nationalism. In Pakistan’s case the brand of civic nationalism has Islam as an important ingredient coupled with inherent negation towards plurality. Civic nationalism here tries to promote a strong centre and homogeneity or oneness. This brand of civic nationalism is strongest in the urban middle class as it is cultivated chiefly through education and then further reinforced by mass media. Further on this brand of nationalism also places strong emphasis on Pakistan’s place in the Islamic world and also in the global context.

Army, particularly the officer cadre is chiefly drawn from the middleclass and its ideological thrust is quite identical to that of the urban middleclass. So besides the deep suspicion about “corrupt” politicians and “chaotic” democracy, another major reason that urban middleclass likes army is its own ideological thrust resonates closely with that of army. Consequently despite major blunders army’s respect remains high. Even when it has suffered a blow it has buoyed again.

In some ways, it is the expectations of the urban middleclass and the pedestal on which it by and large holds the army that the latter finds additional incentives to keep a “check” on politicians.

And then there is the case of almost complete ownership of foreign policy by the army which was taken over during Zia’s time. Of course Zia was the head of the government also but the espionage activities of the army and ISI during the Afghan war made it the most important stakeholder. Once Benazir came into power she quickly had to resign to the fact that foreign policy was not an area where a civilian government could have much leeway.

Over the years, even under the façade of civilian governments, army has been running the show. Foreign policy particularly its terms of engagement with “foes” like India and “friends” like USA has become the sole domain of the army. It is from here that army draws its most strength and even its reason for existence and it won’t allow any sort of “interference” from the civilian government.

Over the years, army has ensured that Pakistan double deals with the United States, constantly adopts a hostile posture towards India and pursues the policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan. For these objectives, military and its intelligence apparatus has constantly courted militant organizations which at times have gone out of control like a Frankenstein monster only to at times turn against itself.

It is here that military simply does not listen to the concerns of the civilian governments and in fact won’t hesitate to pressurize it through back door means and even mount a coup. In 1999, it deeply embarrassed Nawaz Sharif government by initiating Kargil war while he was trying to make peace initiatives towards India. And it is agitated against Zardari led government for being too cosy with Washington (though these charges are hardly credible).

Unfortunately USA has also more or less accepted the dominance of military and has adopted the tactic of directly dealing with the military at times bypassing the civilian governments. And of course all the military dictatorships have been supported by the US which found it easier and convenient to deal with them and were ready to ignore “trivialities” like democracy.
In fact Hussain Haqqani’s masterpiece ( one of the most extraordinary books I have ever read) also makes the same point that USA in its desire of convenience found it easier to deal with military.

Turning a blind eye policy adopted by the USA has eventually resulted in military being the party they have to negotiate with even when it is not cooperating and indulging in double games. Civilian governments virtually are irrelevant.

It is hold over foreign policy and terms of engagement with critical countries like India, United States and Afghanistan which military guards even more than its finances. The entire intelligence apparatus is dedicated towards this end and if a civilian government tries to assert its authority in this domain, it pays the price.

Can we break this hold? Yes, it can be broken but for that politicians too have to show maturity and respect rule of law. They also need to show unity instead of cheap opportunism when the opportunity to weaken military presents itself. My mind immediately goes back to what happened when Osama Bin Laden was killed. Instead of having a united front, Mr. Zardari was keen on creating a rift between army and Nawaz Sharif for short sighted political gains. That opportunity was lost. And subsequently Mr. Sharif actually went to Supreme Court in Memo scandal despite the fact that the military establishment was targeting him also and if democracy were to be derailed, he too will be a loser. However, in Mr. Nawaz sharif’s head nothing mattered more than Zardari’s scalp.

We cannot wrestle away the power unless we show unity and an unshakable belief in democracy. However that belief in democracy is also underpinned by the way major political actors govern when in power and also engage with each other. Urban middleclass does not love army just for the sake of loving it. It likes army (rightly or wrongly is a separate issue) because it restores order and since it is politically insulated therefore gives an impression of merit. Army needs chaos as a reason to intervene. It needs political governments to fail to ensure its hegemony. It wants political class to be riddled with internal rifts.

What the political parties (the two main parties) can do is to at least ensure that they govern properly and ensure rule of law. They need to be united on the fact that they would not conspire against each other and will not try to seek army’s help for derailing the other.

Remember that it is no longer feasible for the army to directly rule the country and therefore the chances of an old fashioned coup are very rare. The chances of a complete roll back of the system are slim and therefore the political parties can take decisive steps provided they are united and get their act together.

Is it just me, or are seemingly incessant GOP debates the past few months allowing President Obama’s lack of public exposure to seem more and more like solid leadership? The Republican lineups simplistic, square and reactionary focus on “Anti-Obama” rhetoric especially on foreign policy has highlighted a resoundingly hawkish stance on Iran with little attention to our current engagements in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And while it may be expedient amongst a certain political base to try and one-up each other in aggressive foreign policy talk, only Ron Paul challenges the party line on Americas role in the world.

When it comes to Pakistan, compared to Democrats Republicans have a consistent history of preferring to work closely with the military establishment in Islamabad. While there is a level of bipartisanship post 9/11, (case in point is Obama’s continuation of Bush era drone use with little debate), Republicans have through the Cold War and beyond preferred dealing with the military establishment rather than focusing on democratic, or liberal institution building. Which is not necessarily an entirely erroneous policy; part of the rationale is that state building is expensive in blood, toil, time and treasure and rarely feasible. Further, there are an endless number of constraints and uncertainties that profoundly hinder institution, or democratic state building in a place like Pakistan, rendering Republican policies simply pragmatic.

Which brings us to current policy: the bipartisan endorsed “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act” (S. 1707) enacted in 2009 has yet to bear tangible fruit. Granted the aforementioned that institution building is time exhaustive, the fact remains that Pakistan has deteriorated politically, in the realm of security and economically. And having watched everyone from Gov. Romney, Sen. Santorun, Gov. Perry, Rep. Bachmann and yes even the soft spoken Gov. Huntsman, reiterates hawkish foreign policy while refusing to acknowledge a need for meaningful improvement. In the Republican camp only Rep. Ron Paul’s extreme calls for an isolationist posture offer some semblance of change. And because his prescriptions have yet to be tried, the utility of his ideas have yet to be tested. And now may be a time to consider his stance since they call for exactly what the Pakistani public wants right now.

Referring to our policies to Pakistan as nothing short of “Bombs for Bribes” Ron Paul acknowledges the nobility, yet inherent futility in calling for democratic institutions in places of strategic engagement. He understands that we are already engaged in “130 countries” with “700 bases around the world” and in this speech against the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, he bluntly explains:

“the way we treat our fellow countries around the world is we tell them what to do and if they do it, we give them money. If they don’t we bomb them. Under this condition we are doing both. We are currently dropping bombs in Pakistan and innocent people get killed. If you want to promote our good values and democratic processes, you can’t antagonize the people”

Ron Paul Opposes “Bombs and Bribes” for Pakistan – 9/30/2009 - VIDEO

He goes on to suggest dialogue and trade as alternatives to current policy. And although his statement is simplistic and was made in 2009, it highlights Ron Paul’s isolationist, more economically focused prescriptions on foreign policy that seek to reduce our military footprint abroad based on pragmatic constraints, like military and fiscal overstretch. And these calls seem more reasonable than before, especially when it comes to Pakistan and the fact that our aid has yet to yield satisfactory results. So while the Obama administration continues engagement and GOP candidates refuse to acknowledge much concern over current policy to Pakistan, can Ron Paul really be the only alternative available?

Someone once considered completely out of left, excuse me, right field, could be the reminder we need to moderate our engagement with countries of interest. Because what is interesting is that current rhetoric in Pakistan is very much in line with Ron Paul’s ideas. Ron Paul isn’t touting conspiracy theories, nor does he echo far left foreign policy thinkers like Noam Chomsky. Rather, his past statements on our engagement in Pakistan as “inadvertently causing chaos” and “violating security and sovereignty“ are exactly what the average Pakistani seems to feel and hears about in their mainstream TV, and print media. Takeaway for us means, it’s a perception that is realistic; perhaps more so than current policy reflects.

In fact, legendary cricket star turned politician Imran Khan’s recent surge in popularity is in large part due to his highly critical foreign policy rhetoric that vociferously calls for D.C. to adopt a more isolationist stance so Pakistan might reclaim lost autonomy. Imran Khan steadily built support for his party on the continued observation that America’s “War on Terror” has intensified insecurity and his subsequent promises to curtail American involvement is a first step in alleviating Pakistan’s problems.

Imran Khan at Davos – Talks about Winning Hearts & Minds; the War on Terror – VIDEO

He underscores Ron Paul’s sentiment that perceptions urgently matter in a climate where American intervention is increasingly received hostilely. While there may be issues of concern with Ron Paul’s overall foreign policy prescriptions, both politicians insistence on winnings hearts and minds does render the congressman’s ideas in relation to Pakistan worthy of consideration. Imran Khan’s recent ascendency and Governor Paul’s gradually increasing support marks a convergence in shifting to a direction of a less militarized approach to engaging Islamabad. Two men once considered out of the realm of politician viability now increasingly resonate in their respective publics; policymakers ought to take note.