This seems really pathetic. there is no room for these type of actions neither in constitution nor in Islam. forceful conversion is not allowed and directly against Quran. I think human rights organizations especially some of rich or political class hindu community member can raise the issue in high court or supreme court or  even in Sharia Court as it is a direct violation of Islamic law as well. Only conversion allowed is voluntary conversion by heart. Also I believe Islamic organizations can help in this as it is a direct insult and misuse of Islam.

By Prof Farakh A Khan

(This is continuation of my last article.. It was felt that this subject requires greater depth since people in Pakistan have distorted view of our Fata issue. The origin and evolution of Jihadi Wahhabi movement has to be put in proper perspective)

Conflict in society is the oldest human response inherited from our evolutionary animal past. As human society graduated from sticks and stones as weapons of aggression to high explosives and air war the level of carnage increased dramatically. We are now entering phase of robotic war lased with nuclear technology where power of destruction has escalated to a new level. The level of misery caused by modern wars is not acceptable anymore. War in Afghanistan either by foreign forces intervention or internal conflict for the last 50 decades has left the nation in state of perpetual war. Since Russian intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 Pakistan still has 1.7 million Afghan refugees. The conflict in Afghanistan has spilled over into Pakistan where since 2004 estimated 35,000 people have been killed and many more disabled. The only winners of war are the manufactures of arms and ammunition. For Pakistan Federally Administrated Areas (Fata) formally called the Tribal Areas has been devastated and there is no end in sight. For Pakistan Balochistan is also an area in turmoil. The Americans are also pointing fingers at our Balochistan human rights record.

Pakistan’s religious and cultural hereditary ties with Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and Middle East have always been strong. Any development in one country has its impact on others including Pakistan. Today we are caught in conflict in Afghanistan tomorrow we may be in a bigger mess if Iran is attacked by Israel/American forces. Attack on Iran will be most unpopular with the people of Pakistan and destabilise its leadership especially the army.

Endgame in Afghanistan

The Nato/American occupation of Afghanistan since 2001 directly impacted on Pakistan especially in Fata. People Pakistan actively volunteered to resist the invading army but was initially overwhelmed by the firepower of the American guns. Historically people of Fata has seen whole host of aggressors from the West and East. Each time aggressors have called people of what are now Fata and of Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa different names at different times of history labelled as terrorists, militants, rebels, religious extremists/fanatics or freedom fighters. The ten-year war in Afghanistan has taken toll of the American purse and its fighters. The French want to pull out by next year. On the other hand the Afghan people are constantly suffering. Both sides are in fatigue mode. The Americans are openly talking to Afghan Taliban leadership since November 2010 to end American occupation of Afghanistan. The talks are at a crucial juncture where a Taliban office is to be opened in Qatar. The Americans are considering release of five Taliban leaders from infamous Guantanamo prison to be stationed in Qatar. Team led by Marc Grossman from the American side and Qari Yousaf Ahmedi from Afghan Taliban side are in discussions (DeYoung, Karen. US links Taliban talks to Karzai’s consent. Dawn/Washington Post/ Bloomberg News Service. January 13, 2012). In Qatar talks the sticking point is release of Guantanamo Taliban commanders and timing of ceasefire. The Americans want ceasefire first before prisoner release but the Taliban want start of American troop withdrawal first (US, Taliban historic talks begin in Qatar. AFP. The News. January 30, 2012). Taliban has denied any talks with the US (Taliban deny talks with ‘puppet’ govt. AFP. The News. February 17, 2012).

The Americans with their many think tanks and experience of Vietnam and Russians bitter Afghan disaster perhaps made no impact on the American leadership. The arrogance of power overrides the long-term reality of war in Afghanistan. The British with long direct experience of wars in Afghanistan were also drawn into the conflict in 2001. Their famous war hero Lord Roberts of Kandahar after the Second Afghan War (1878-80) strongly advised Britain to avoid meddling in Afghan affairs. The Treaty of Gandamak (May 26, 1879) took away foreign affairs from Afghan rulers with fatal results. The right to foreign affairs was given back after the Third Afghan War (1919) following a treaty on November 22, 1921 (Shah, 2000). This was part of the Great Game strategy. But this was long time ago.

Besides American brokered talks with Taliban Afghanistan and Pakistan wants separate talks to be held in Saudi Arabia (Afghanistan seeks Taliban talks in Saudi Arabia: officials. AFP. The News. January 30, 2012). The Americans feel greater threat from Iran and want to windup operations in Afghanistan as early as possible. For Pakistan Fata is the key problem area. If Iran is attacked then the problem shall spread to rest of Pakistan.

In a discussion on at the Karachi Literature festival on ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan: conflict, extremism and Taliban’ Dr Maleeha Lodhi claimed that Pakistan’s stand regarding Afghan solution to be achieved through dialogue was rejected by the US. Ten years later the US is trying to do the same (Ali, Imtiaz. US follows what Pakistan said 10 years ago: Lodhi. The News. February 13, 2012). In 1838 Maharaja Ranjit Singh faced a similar problem with the British intention of attacking Afghanistan. The British tried to persuade Ranjit Singh to join them in the attack. The clever illiterate Sikh ruler understood the people of Fata, then part of Afghanistan, better and politely refused but gave free passage to the British army to attack Afghanistan. The result in 1842 when the proud ‘Army of the Indus’ was annihilated as predicted by the Sikh chief.

In an address to US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence CIA Director David Petraeus claimed that Pakistan was supporting Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan, it was alleged, was supporting Haqqani Network, Commander Nazir Group and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan by providing sanctuaries and war materials. The allegation is not new but may be partly true although this was hotly denied by Pakistan (Iqbal, Anwar. Pakistan not putting sufficient pressure on Afghan Taliban: CIA chief. Dawn. February 2, 2012). On September 22, 2011 Admiral Mike Mullen claimed that ‘Haqqani Network is part of strategic arm of ISI’ (Krasmer, D Stephen, 2012). The report based on prisoner’s interrogation in Afghanistan called ‘State of Taliban’ was ‘leaked’ to the press. It implicated the ISI in helping the Taliban direct attacks against the Isaf forces in Afghanistan. The report admitted that once Nato forces leave Afghanistan the state will collapse and open it to return of Taliban (Secret Nato report accuses Pakistan of helping Taliban. The News. February 2, 2012). For Pakistan a stable Afghanistan is essential for solving Fata problem. Unfortunately its army determines Pakistan foreign policy.

There are reports that US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta is thinking of US forces combat mission to end by mid-2013, a year earlier than previous estimates (US plans to end combat mission by mid-2013. OC. Dawn. February 3, 2012). He has urged Pakistan to help stop IED attacks, which allegedly were manufactured in Pakistan and used in Afghanistan (Iqbal, Anwar. Pakistan urged to help contain IED attacks. Dawn. Dawn. February 16, 2012).

How will withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan impinge on Pakistan? Withdrawal of US forces and handing over security to the Afghans is not as simple as it was seen in Iraq. The cost of US withdrawal would be in billions of dollars every year for decades to come to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan economy (Sehgal, Ikram. Drawdown in Afghanistan. The News. February 9, 2012). It is interesting to note that think tanks all over the world blame America for leaving Afghanistan to its own devices after Russian army withdrawal in 1989. Now that the Americans are in full force in Afghanistan the same think tanks want them out.

Taliban who?

But let us first define what Taliban means? In our language it signifies a student. A movement was triggered by few madrassa students led by Mullah Omar and later joined by the majority of Afghan people against the corrupt warlords of Afghanistan all were later called Taliban including former warlords. In Pakistan Taliban is an ideological group supporting Afghan Taliban in supply of fighters and war material. It is debated whether Taliban are products of madrassas in Pakistan. Nevertheless jihadi literature is common in our madrassas. Poor socioeconomic conditions do promote recruitment to Taliban fold. In Fata the Taliban umbrella includes besides Pashtuns other nationalities as well. They have in their midst Pakistanis mainly from Southern Punjab, Arabs, Chinese Muslims, Uzbeks and Muslims from the West. These ethnic groups are bound by religious ideology of jihad against invading American and Nato forces (Gul, Imtiaz and Jaffar, Nabil, 2012). Punjab developed massive madrassas with government help during Gen Ziaul Haq’s time to produce mujahedeen to counter Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The fallout from jihadi madrassas spilled over into sectarian violence and attacks on soft civilian targets leaving 30,000 dead. Jihadi madrassas were in place in KP (Haqqania in Okara Khattak) as well as in Karachi (Madrassa Bonaria) (Hussain, 2012). Unfortunately most people in Pakistan are convinced that attacks on Pakistani people are the work of American, Israeli and Indian intelligence agencies.

Pakistani Jihadi Organisations

With retreat of the Russian troops the jihadi organisations turned their attention towards Kashmir and India for their terrorist activities. During Gen Musharraf’s Kargil disaster (May-July 1999) these mujahedeen were wrongly portrayed as leading the attack. When these Mujahids were prevented from meddling in Kashmir and India under international pressure they moved to Fata and carried out suicide attacks in Pakistani cities (Hussain, 2012). The monster created by our intelligence agencies started to attack our own civilian population and security forces. For a while these home grown Taliban conquered Swat and were poised to establish ‘Islamic’ system of government before army crackdown in 2009.

For the western media Taliban became associates of Al Qaeda in the leadership mode and after 9/11 were the target of the American might. Let us be clear that Taliban had no role in 9/11 beyond sheltering their leader Osama. Osama being an Arab had no leadership role in the tribal society of Afghanistan or Fata. For last six years of his life he was hiding in Abbottabad, Pakistan and had no role in Afghan resistance movement.

Taliban in western literature became synonymous with any religious organisation targeting the invading forces in Afghanistan and hence an enemy. The Western paranoia reached a stage where all Muslims and their religion Islam were designated as radical Islam, terrorists, militants, extremist or fundamentalists. Unfortunately other religions do not describe their ‘extremists’ in the same way as Islam. The Christian evangelists are just as radical as ‘ultra right’ Jews or ‘extremist’ Hindus. All religions have subset of people who claim to know the ‘true’ meaning of their religion but the issue is of imposing their views on others. The West should have recognised Taliban as freedom fighters against an occupying army. In fact Taliban designation covers a large number interest groups ranging from Jihadi ideologues to outright dacoits striving for loot through robbing banks or kidnapping for ransom. The Taliban do not have a standing army. The dress code has not changed over centuries, which include carrying arms, and we cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. We also have to recognise that Wahhabi interpretation of Islam did not emerge with funding from Saudi Arabia during Russian occupation of Afghanistan. In fact Wahhabi Islam reached Fata area in 1824 and soon spread to Afghanistan initially as anti Sikh and later anti British platform to oust the infidels from the Muslim society.

People admire the bravery and tenacity of Pashtuns of Fata and Afghanistan and their place in history. They have been devastated and made paupers in the name of ‘gairat’. The Afghan leadership has also been eulogised for their farsightedness and sagacity. Nothing can be far from the truth (Siddiqi, Muhammad Ali. No Sandhurst no West Point. Dawn. February 16, 2012).

Emergence of TTP

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is not a single homogeneous body. TTP was formed under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud in an agreement between 13 different armed groups in December 2007 against the Pakistani security forces, schools, mosques, markets and Nato forces in Afghanistan but it remains a loose federation of different interest groups. The Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar is striving to unite these groups to concentrate on on-going battle against the Nato forces in Afghanistan. A meeting organised by Afghan Taliban on December 11, 2011 in Datta Khel area, NWA the Afghan Taliban requested TTP to sink their differences and fight the Americans. Hakimullah Mehsud, Waliur Rehman, Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur attended the meeting. Sirajuddin Haqqani was representing the Afghan Taliban. Two representatives of Quetta Shura along with Al Qaeda commander Abu Yahya al-Libi attended the meeting. It was decided to establish a five-member Shura-e-Murakeba (Observation Council) which was launched on January 2, 2012 to sort out differences and concentrate on fighting the Americans in Afghanistan rather than take on the Pakistani security forces (Murshed, S Iftikhar. A dagger at the heart. The News. January 30, 2012).

The TTP is also involved in suicide bombing in major cities of Pakistan. The basic resentment emerged as the basis of revenge against killing of their kith and kin by the security forces and drone strikes. Revenge is basic cultural trait of the people of Fata. On the other hand killing of innocent people in Pakistan alienated any sympathy for them and went against the TTP public popularity. It is not surprising that bombing of cities in Pakistan has been put on hold. There is the issue of cross border attacks on Nato forces by some organisations in Fata. Since the Pakhtun relations lived across the porous ‘border’ (Durand Line) the TTP and other organisations were duty bound to help their brethren in Afghanistan. This has been strongly resented by the Americans and tried to put pressure on Pakistan to stop these attackers. The other aspect of Taliban ideology is found in rest of Pakistan especially in Punjab and hence called Punjabi Taliban. The Taliban belief of war against West, India and Israel and pro Taliban jihad is rampant in religious and main political parties in major urban areas of Pakistan. Majority of Taliban jihadi ideology mind set in Pakistan do not subscribe to violence as a means of change in the society. We do fear a military intervention (coup) since they are the ‘saviour of Pakistan’ and custodians of its ideology? Gen Zia’s indoctoration of the Pakistan military has played a significant role in the mind change of previous set of military commanders. Gen Hamid Gul is the prime example of jihadi generals of the past now part of ‘Defence of Pakistan Council’ organisation based on hate America, India and Israel.

Nato Invasion of Afghanistan and its Aftermath

Up to 2001 Afghanistan was an insignificant state ruled by Wahhabi leaning semi literate bunch of nobodies living in the Stone Age with scant understanding of developments in the world. They imposed their version of Wahhabi Islam. The world had forgotten Afghanistan with retreat of Russian army in 1989 till 2001. The most powerful army ever seen in the world seething with rage decided to ‘take out’ Osama after the 9/11 attack by a group of Arabs mainly from Egypt-none from Afghanistan. It seemed that the Taliban in Afghanistan would be pushover against the might of high-tech American army and their 500lb bombs dropped by air. It was predicted that Taliban would be totally eliminated by American hammering and what would be left of them shall beg for peace on American terms. Little did they realise that ten years later they would be still trying to find a way out of Afghanistan. Unfortunately the world and Pakistanis know very little about the conflict area in Afghanistan or Fata. For the world and Pakistani Fata and adjoining Afghanistan became the ‘bad lands’ and ‘most dangerous place in the world’ after 9/11. For the British in India these places were always the ‘bad lands’ only fit to train their army and seek medals for valour of their fighters against improvised lands. We need to explore the background of resistance of the people in the area before we make sweeping judgments.

The past of Afghanistan is haunting the Americans today and we need to divulge the past to understand what is happening today. We need to explore the historical role of foreign fighters and Punjabi Taliban in present context. These foreign fighters never assumed leadership role in the tribal system. The phenomenon of people crossing into Afghanistan from India to fight is not a new one.

Afghanistan Invasions in History

The Achaemenid Empire founded by Cyrus the Great (575 BC-530 BC) followed by Darius the Great (550-486 BC) included Afghanistan and part of Pakistan. Alexander’s objective was to conquer the Persian Empire and invaded Pakistan in 326 BC calling it India. He stopped at the banks of river Beas because beyond that was not India. This was a short Greek incursion of which the people of the area had no recollection. Bactrian Greeks ruled Afghanistan and northern Pakistan from 256 BC to 1^st century BC when Parthians finally defeated them. This was followed by invasion by Yuezhi (Kushan) and Scythians (Saka). The impact of invasion by different armies on local culture there is no documented evidence of change besides development of Indo-Greek sculpture used by Buddhists during Kushan period and adoption of Parthian dress of salwar kamiz by the people. In the middle of 4^th century AD Afghanistan was overrun by Epthalite branch of Huns. They finally managed to conquer most of northern India. Huns introduced title ‘khan’ into Afghanistan and Pakistan (Tanner, 2002). Besides invading armies over centuries different ethnic groups have silently moved across India from the west to permanently settle there. These migrating bands quietly integrated into the Indian society. Unfortunately these historical migrations have not been properly documented. In recent times war in Afghanistan has also displaced people. During the Russian invasion more than 3 million Afghans migrated to Pakistan. Today some 1.7 million Afghans refugees are still in Pakistan.

In more recent times the British invasion of Afghanistan by the ‘Army of the Indus’ to install a British puppet (modern American Karzai) as their ruler in 1839 led to annihilation of the army in its retreat in 1842. The Afghan invasion was pushed by the then Governor General Lord Auckland due to unfounded fear of Russian expansion into Afghanistan (this finally happened in 1979 when Russian army invaded Afghanistan). This was the time when Britain was the sole super power. British arrogance led them to disaster. To boost army’s morale Sindh was conquered in 1843. This was followed by annexation of Punjab in 1849. These British moves sent clear message about future British intentions to the hill tribes in the north west of the expanding British Empire. As early as 1847 Herbert Edwards as the British officer with the Sikh administration posted to Bannu as Assistant Resident, at that time border of ‘Eastern Afghanistan’, was able to subdue the valley and extract revenue for the Sikh Darbar (Obhrai, 1983). Starting in 1849 the British were regularly sending in punitive ‘expeditions’ into the Tribal belt. By 1857 British had launched 15 expeditions into the ‘Frontier’. By 1939 the ‘expeditions’ had increased to 58 (Barthorp, 2002). It is unfortunate to note that the British army in India used Fata as live training ground for its soldiers. But when the army faced well-equipped European armies during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and WW I it was found to be sadly lacking in battle skills. It was highly unethical to use the people of Fata as a military training ground for fame and glory. But if you are all powerful then ethics do not matter.

Before Sikh invasion of Peshawar (1818) the city was the summer capital of Kabul ruler. The city was finally annexed by the Sikhs in 1834 and was ruled by Gen Paolo Avitabile. His reign of terror was known as ‘gallows and gibbets’ (Wikipedia, 2012). The first British envoy Mountstuart Elphinstone visited the Afghan king in Peshawar in 1807 (Schofield, 2003). During the Sikh Darbar the Sikhs held the plains but the mountains in the west remained independent. By 1818 the Sikhs had taken Peshawar valley but part of the territory was given as Jagir to three brothers of Kabul ruler Amir Dost Mohammad. Till 1834 the Afghans were ruling Peshawar as Jagirdars of the Sikhs before it was annexed. Peshawar was the summer capital of ruler of Kabul. The Sikh army under the dreaded general Hari Singh Nalwa defeated the Afghan army in Nowshera and in 1838 Sikh Kardars replaced the Afghan administrators. Sikh garrisons were placed in Peshawar, DI Khan, Kohat and Teri. After the First Sikh War under a treaty signed on December 16, 1846 British formed Council of Regency and Hazara, Bannu, Kohat, DG Khan and DI Khan were placed under the British Assistant Residents. Chief Commissioner ruled Punjab in 1849 and in 1859 by Lt Governor. North-West Frontier got its Lt Governor in 1932. In the districts British Deputy Commissioners were appointed. During the Sikh wars Amir Dost Mohammad of Afghanistan moved into the Peshawar valley up to the Indus in December 1848. He made a grave miscalculation by sending a contingent of cavalry to aid the dying Sikh rule against the British.

During the Sikh rule Peshawar valley (Kabul River) up to Jamrud in the west was held with great atrocities. In 1849 the British took over the Sikh Darbar territories and established pickets (check posts) along the eastern banks of Indus and in Kabul River valley along the bases of mountains to restrain raids from tribes beyond in the mountains. The British were now in direct contact with Afghanistan and Persia. The first incursion of the British forces through what was Afghan tribal area took place when their army attacked Ghazni and Kabul in 1839 what became the disastrous 1^st Anglo-Afghan War (also called Auckland’s folly) (Barthorp, 2002). This was followed by revenge attack in August 1842 when the invading British forces (‘Avenging Army’) under Gen Pollock and Gen Nott brutally killed people of all ages and both sexes. This according to Duke of Wellington was ‘Restoration of Reputation in the East’. Kabul was sacked and bazaar burnt but this time the ‘Avenging Army’ retreated quickly.

Role of ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ in History

The origin of ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ needs to be explained. From times immemorial the Pakhtun belt now located between Afghanistan and Pakistan has not changed although they were Hindus at one time then converted to Buddhism and finally to Islam. Babar (early 16^th century) records his attack into Bonair to gather livestock and make a pyramid of heads of the local population (a Turkish tradition of Central Asia). At the time of Emperor Akbar, who held Kabul as a province of his empire, the Mughal policy was to pay some tribes for safe passage and to send expeditions to others. The unrest of Fata tribes instigated by Pir-e-Roshan (Sheikh Bazid Ansari) and his descendants, formally of South Waziristan Agency resident of Jalandhar (now in India) hence technically  ‘foreign fighters’, against religious doctrine of Deen-e-Elahi and occupation of Pakhtun homeland by Mughals was a severe test for Akbar’s armies. He sent in 15 expeditions to counter the jihadis in Tirah and Waziristan and after much bloodshed (including loss of his court jester Raja Birbal) he managed to make the area peaceful through diplomacy (Hosain, 1938; Shah, 2000). The tribes were in constant war with each other but united against any invader usually led by a religious figure. Nothing has changed since.

In more recent times Wahhabi cleric Syed Ahmed Shah moved from Bareilly, India, to what is now Fata to incite the tribes against Sikh rule in Punjab in 1824. In 1830 Syed Ahmed Shah, having not received any support from the tribes, was killed fighting the Sikh army in Balakot where he was buried.  His 300 surviving followers retreated to Sitana in Bonair and settled on the property of Syed Akbar Shah who became their Amir. The subsequent resistance movement was Wahhabi in nature. They were displaced from time to time but managed to establish ‘training’ centres in Tirah, Chamarkand and other places. Bonair became a serious problem for the British in 1852 when ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’, as labelled by the British, with the help of Hasanzai tribe took over the Kotla fort belonging to Nawab of Amb. An expedition was launched against them in 1853 and the fort was taken back.  At the time of Mutiny of 1857 the Hindustani fanatics led by Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan caused some problems. Their village called Narinji was attacked in July and later in August 1857 by a British force and set on fire. According to Major Vaughan “Not a house was spared; even the walls of many were destroyed by elephants…Three prisoners were taken—one was a Bareilly Maulvi, second a Chamla standard-bearer and the third a vagrant of Charonda; they were all subsequently executed.” Next was attack on the village of Sitana led by Sir Sydney Cotton. The Hindustanis came into attack dressed in white in silence and ‘every Hindustani in the position was either killed or taken prisoner (Nevill, 1910; Wylly, 1912).

Hindustani Wahhabi in Bonair 1860s

The scenes of massacres were still fresh in the memory of the tribes when the British forces launched Frontier War in 1863. The idea of this war was to teach a lesson to the tribes of Bonair to stop raids into the settled areas under British control and to ‘Hindustani fanatics’ of Wahhabi Islam who considered the British as occupier of their lands across India making jihad legitimate. The British felt that ‘Hindustanis’ were also spreading Wahhabi Islam in Fata and had to be stopped (Albinia, 2008).

To oppose British occupation the ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ were receiving funds from ‘Southern’ Bengal’ with its headquarter in Patna in Bihar. The arms and ammunition was coming from the Gulf and Afghanistan. Later armaments were supplied from ‘Mesopotamia’. The Mulka village in Mahabun Mountains of Syeds of Bunair housed left overs of Syed Ahmed Shaheed (d 1830) uprising against Sikh rule, was eventfully burnt by the locals under a British detachment in 1863. Between 1850 and 1863 the British launched 20 expeditions into the mountains beyond the plains occupied by the British forces. Each time the number of invading forces increased. In Sitana campaign (1863) more than 5,000 troops were used and later enforced. The initial force was trapped in Ambela Pass and Gen Sir Sydney Chamberlain was evacuated with severe wounds. The cost of the expedition was worrying for the British administration. The opposing tribesmen had few matchlock guns and mostly relied on swords and hurling stones. Swords were used in close quarter action (Adye, John. Sitana: a mountain campaign of the borders of Afghanistan in 1863. Published 1866). In 1860s the Afghan jezail with a range of 300 yards was better then the Brown Bess used by the British army. The introduction Snider and later Lee Metford and Martinis rifles (1897) with smokeless powder backed by artillery gave the British again the advantage. Finally the introduction of machinegun (Gatling and Maxim) made the British army a superior force. At the same time the tribes managed to acquire new weapons and balance was again maintained (Skeen, 1932). By 1906 Muscat imported 278,000 pounds worth of rifles from four European countries. The arms were transported to Mekran coast by boat and from their Afghan camel caravans took them to Southern Afghanistan and sold to the tribes. The British tried to block the movement by sea and land (Wylly, 1912).

The main issue of attacks by the British beyond its borders into Tribal Areas of Afghanistan (now Fata) was raids (cattle lifting) by tribes supported by ‘Hindustani Fanatics’ in the area. We must realise that the people living in inhospitable mountains had limited agricultural resource, living partly a nomadic life and raids in the more prosperous plains. In 1858 the British army raid destroyed Sitana, Bonair on the southern slopes of Mahabun Mountains. The British claimed that part of Amb State which was under British protection had been invaded by ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ and had to be evicted by the British Army. This was followed by destruction of ‘Hindustani settlement’ of Mulka located on the northern slopes of Mahabun Mountains in 1863. The British army in another raid destroyed ‘Hindustani village’ of Mundee in 1864. The other British approach was to block supplies, funds and fighters from British India. For the people of Fata fear of British occupation of Sindh and later Punjab was an indication of their advancement and occupation of their areas  (Punjab Administration Report, 1863-64 and 1867-68). The retaliatory raids into Tribal Territories by British forces became a nuisance for the poor. The tribes requested the Hindustani Jihadis to move their training camps into remote areas or leave the area. The Jihadis from outside Fata returned following Russian invasion in 1979.

20^th century Wahhabi Movement in India

There was resentment against British occupation of India among the educated youth in India. The Wahhabi doctrine of jihad carried intense appeal for these men. They decided to launch their jihad from Pakhtun tribes of British and Afghan frontier. They hoped that Afghanistan and Turkey would help them to conquer India. Large number of educated Muslims in India decided to move into the Tribal Area and some into Afghanistan in 1905. These British citizens called ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ were interned in Afghan territory at Jallalabad by the Afghan king Amir Habibullah Khan under pressure from the British. Influential Indians in Afghan court finally released them. Although highly educated young anti British volunteers were influenced by Deoband School led by Sheikhul Hind Maulana Mehmoodul Hassan they were looked upon with suspicion. The money was supplied from across India from Calcutta, Patna and Punjab. However they were sadly disillusioned with the state of affairs they found in Afghanistan. There was no rule of law and the justice system was a replica of ancient system where the only the king finally gave his verdict. There was no system of education and this is where the ‘Young Afghans’ with the help of young Indian students led by Dr Abdul Ghani from various parts of India proposed to bring change. A society with proposed constitution and educational awareness threatened Amir Habibullah’s rule. In 1909 Dr Abdul Ghani and 38 British subjects members of Mashroota movement were interned in the Ark Fort Kabul while seven Afghani citizens were blown from artillery pieces. The Islamic Wahhabi renaissance of Afghanistan with system of the West ended with complete disillusionment of educated Muslims of India. Amir Habibullah was assassinated in 1919 and the new Amir Amanullah released them.

The Muslims of India during the WW I felt betrayed by the British when it went to war against Turkey a Muslim country and the home of the Khalifa of the Muslim World. This was the Khalafat Movement joined by Hindus and Sikhs as a means to ouster of the British from India. The Muslim preachers across India were asking for jihad against the infidels in particular an end of Indian occupation by the British.

Another jihadi group of about 20,000 people entered Afghanistan from India during Khalafat Movement of 1920. A poor country like Afghanistan could not afford to house and feed these people who has burnt their boats in India and had nothing to live on. Most moved back to India but a small hard core remained but their cause was doomed. By this time the political scene had changed. Russia as a communist state was expanding into Central Asian states also became enemy of the religion and hence of Muslims. Some Mujahids became communists. Many of jihadis in Kabul were seeking communist help to push the British out of India. Other Indians wanted help from Turkey but the country was in dire strait and refused anything to do with these Indian ‘revolutionaries’. There were endless intrigues within the Indian ranks in Russia, which did not help their cause. Amir Amanullah was advanced financial support and fearful of Russian intention he aligned with the British and would not tolerate anti British moves in his kingdom. Many of new jihadi arrivals moved to Fata and settled in older Hindustani settlements. For the British transportation of explosives was worrying and made efforts to stop this. They used secret agencies to affectively stop funding of Hindustani settlements from their sympathisers in India. The jihadi movement by Hindustani Fanatics continued till the 1930s but were a spent force and did not pose any danger to the British authorities. Only two Hindustani settlements were remaining in Fata.

The movement for jihad by Hindustani Wahhabi volunteers had sever setbacks from changing world scene and from within their ranks. However one cannot but admire these people from relatively affluent background in India chose a life of immense struggle and hardships. With no military training they faced hostile tribes, corrupt police, suspicious rulers and dacoits these people were moving across Asia and Europe despite poor resources. Their travels in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Turkey could have given credit to any Western explorer of that time (Shah, 2000). With the Russian and later American invasion the old ‘Hindustani’ now Pakistani Mujahids started to stream into Afghanistan to fight the invaders. Nothing has changed.

Fata during the British Raj

The Agencies of Fata were created firstly of Khyber to keep a hold on the Pass in 1878. Following cession of Kurram by the Afghan government in 1879 it was made an agency in 1892. The Malakand, Tochi and Wana (later Waziristan) were developed between 1895 and 1896.  The people of Waziristan were up in arms against demarcation of western border based on strategic heights rather than tribal lines. To force the tribes in accepting Durand Line Waziristan Field Force was organised in 1894. In 1901 the settled districts were made into province of North West Frontier and the Agencies separated (Obhrai, 1983). Starting in 1920 railway line from Peshawar was extended to Landi Kotal (Bayley, 1926).

The British continued its policy in Fata of ‘Butcher and Bolt’ in retaliation of tribal raids. After subduing the lashkar the villages of ‘miscreants’ were torched or blown up, the crops burnt, waterways destroyed, livestock rounded up and economic blockade of the offending area put in place. Each time a new agreement was made with the tribal elders. Starting in 1917 the British troops used ‘Air Service’ to attack the Mehsud tribal lashkar. In response the old style of Lashkar attack was abandoned. In 1930s Chief of the Air Staff Sir Hugh Trenchard proposed use of fighter aircraft to keep the tribes in check rather than rely on slow cumbersome land expeditions. He was overruled due financial constraints (Barthorp, 2002). Now drone strikes by the Americans and bombing by Pakistani F16 are trying to do the same. With advancement of military technology armoured cars and later light tanks were used. In Tirah the tribes were asked to remove ‘Turk and Afghan’ settlers (now foreign fighters) which they did sending them back to Afghanistan (Obhrai, 1938). It seems that nothing has changed in the 21^st century. Unfortunately we have no written record of the suffering or body count of people during various invasions and devastations caused by armies entering the area.

The British policy regarding Fata had been shifting. John Lawrence was in favour of ‘backward school’ making the Indus as the final ‘natural’ border. Sir Mortimer Durand advocated a ‘scientific frontier’, which was a soft face of ‘forward policy’ (Diver, 1935). The Durand Line split the ancient tribal system to secure military vantage points for the British. Whatever the policy development work in the area was limited to making roads to facilitate movement of troops at short notice. When the British left in 1947 Pakistan reversed the Fata ‘forward policy’ and pulled out the regular troops from Fata. We had peace in Fata till 2004.

Recent Developments in Fata

Let us jump to recent events shaking Fata and Afghanistan. The bookshops today are full of bewildering array of old and new publications on Afghanistan, Taliban and Al Qaeda (see Bibliography). Most of the modern authors have little understanding of the area, people or its history under discussion. Even the Pakhtuns of KP have vague understanding of the people of Fata. Fata tribes are individually unique and do not fit into a single cultural pattern. Al Qaeda, initially an all-Arab group, as an entity appeared on our radar screen through American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Al Qaeda led by Arabs has a foreign agenda and is irrelevant for Pakistan’s Fata problem.

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 galvanised the tribes and people of the country and Fata against the occupiers. This time Russian had helicopters, APCs and tanks but in this asymmetrical war the Afghans had the terrain on their side and supplies of manpower and ammunition from America, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Al Qaeda, a small splinter group, was born out of this triple marriage. The supply of Stringer missiles by the Americans negated Russian air power. On our visit to Bokhara in 1995 it was sad to note a large soldiers graveyard in the local park killed in Afghanistan-a needless butchery of the youth of Bokhara.

The American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 united the Fata tribes once again into military opposition. People of Pakistan are also opposed to American intervention in Afghanistan and drone attacks in Fata. They are supplying manpower and funds to Taliban as seen in 1860s. The ‘Hindustani fanatics’ are now ‘foreign fighters’ or called ‘Punjabi Taliban, Arab fighters or Uzbeks’. The Fata Pakhtun ‘raiders’ of 1863 were transformed into Mujahedeen during Russian occupation and then into Taliban when the Americans came in. AK47, 50 calibre machinegun, sniper rifle, Improvised Explosive Device (IED), landmines, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and suicide bombers now affectively replace the Stringer missiles. The Pakhtuns are innovative. Pakistan became an enemy of the Taliban fighting the American and Nato armies because of Pakistan governments support to Americans in the form of supplies and drone attacks. We saw spate of suicide and IED blasts in major cities of Pakistan.

The incidence of Lal Masjid in Islamabad and then attack of the Pakistani army into South Waziristan in 2004 was the last straw for peace. Most of the students who died in Lal Masjid in the army assault were from Fata and KP. Then came the incidence of US troops killing 24 FC soldiers in cold blood in North Waziristan on November 26, 2011, which was followed by retaliatory freeze of Nato supplies through Pakistan and returning of Shamsi Air Base used for drone strikes in Fata. Earlier CIA agent Raymond Davis was held for shooting two motorcyclists in Lahore and then released after payment of blood money under Islamic law. He was never tried for murder of two young men in America. This was followed by the killing of Osama in an American raid in Abbottabad, which produced bad blood between the two countries. The people of Pakistan were told of thousands of visas issued by Pakistani embassy in US to dubious people considered as CIA agents.

Ten Years of American Occupation of Afghanistan

America is bleeding in Afghanistan like its predecessor the Russians. The 1^st World armies require expensive services and equipment, which are not appropriate for war in the 3^rd World. With killing of Osama the main reason for invasion of Afghanistan has been removed. The original motivational force for the American troops in the field was to make America ‘safe’ and revenge for 9/11 by removing Al Qaeda leadership has been achieved. The Americans have killed enough innocent Afghans to settle revenge for 9/11. The civilian deaths in Afghanistan in 2011 were estimated as 3,021, which was more than 8% in 2010. A total of 4,507 civilians were wounded. These deaths were attributed to militants (77%) and 14% due to Isaf and Afghan forces. The number of suicide bombings (450) increased by 8%. Homemade explosive landmines killed 967 people (Johson, Kay. Civilian deaths in Afghan war hit record high. Dawn. February 5, 2012). A report by Amnesty International claims that 500,000 Afghans are homeless due to on-going war. About 400 people are made homeless on daily basis (War, neglect leave 500,000 Afghans homeless, says AI. Agencies. The News. February 24, 2012). Today Americans are questioning the basic reason for US invasion of Afghanistan (Cloughley, Brian. Afghan war is based on lies and deception. Counterpunch/Daily Times. February 20, 2012).

The US soldiers in the field are now fighting a non-ideological war where it is now ‘them or us’. It is not surprising that American soldiers have been caught taking fingers as souvenirs and urinating on dead Afghans. It is time they got out without giving an impression that they have their tail between the legs. In any case Americans do not need troops on the ground in Afghanistan to ward off any untoward incidence. They have 50 bases in the Middle East and Qatar and Bahrain bases are not far from Afghanistan. For surveillance the Americans have ample supply of drones and settilites. Their troops can be moved into Afghanistan at short notice. I do not see how the Americans can maintain Karzai as the leader of Afghans once they leave.

Fata Solution-Options

The other player in Afghan scene is Pakistan. Afghan leadership never had soft corner for the Pakistan. The bone of contention between the two is the 2,640 km 1893 Durand Line Agreement inherited from the British for fixing ‘spheres of influence’ between the two countries. Thus the British claimed Fata and what is now most of KP as their ‘sphere of influence’. Today neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can dictate to the Fata tribes. Both keep Durand Line as a porous border and bone of contention. The attacks into Pakistan by Taliban or its splinter groups have been worrying. Like the British earlier the American and Pakistani leadership have made agreements with the various groups of Pakistani Taliban and tribes, which each side claim were broken by the other. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have to give a clear programme for the betterment of the people.

Legally the situation in Fata and Balochistan is quite similar. In Balochistan Area A, which is only 3% of the province is under direct provincial rule where the administration is functioning. In Area B (97%) the Sardars have been given the responsibility of governance and maintenance of private armies. In Fata, since there were no tribal chiefs, governance was given to the tribes with the right of the central government to intervene under Frontier Crime Regulation. The ancient tribal autonomy is the main issue for integration of Fata into mainstream of Pakistan. There have been many suggestions for bringing Fata into the mainstream of Pakistan. Since last year political parties have been allowed to function in Fata. Some claim that Fata should change its status from ‘sphere of influence’ into a province of Pakistan. Then there are others who want Fata to become part of corrupt Khyber Pakhtunkhawa province (Afridi, Ghulam S. Fata’s integration. Dawn. February 8, 2012). The political solution has to emerge from the people of Fata and cannot be dictated by the Pakistan government. The present military policy of creating displacement of the population (IDPs) followed by indiscriminate destruction of what little livelihood of the people of the area had has been a disastrous policy. The ‘hull’ (solution) for Fata is not war but economics and education. In any case Pakistan cannot financially afford even low-level military intervention in the area. Pakistan was spending (directly and indirectly) Rs259.10 billion on ‘war on terror’ in 2005 but by 2010 this was increased to Rs2,975.04 billion. Another estimate claims that Pakistan is loosing Rs3 billion daily and Rs93 billion every month on ‘war on terror’ (Abbasi, Ansar. Pakistan lost Rs7,020b, got only Rs990b. The News. February 8, 2012). The cost of human lives lost and those maimed is also significant (Shah, Akhtar Hussain in Stabilising Afghanistan, 2011).

Historically Afghanistan was on the trade route from Central Asia and Iran to India. Later the Russians joined in. With communist take over of Russia (1917) the borders were hermitically sealed and the ancient trade movement stopped. Afghanistan became dependent on India and later Pakistan for its basic needs.

From times immemorial Afghanistan and Fata was trading and providing heavy work to India till the Russia, British and later Pakistan came to define borders. Horses and cloth were brought in from Iran and Central Asia to be sold in India. Dry fruit sale was in their hands all over India. Heavy work such as building mud walls and providing wood to the rural areas in India was the work of these hardy men from the mountains. Today Fata has a million armed men but is heavily dependent on food, electricity, infrastructure, fuel and some places gas from Pakistan. Only 7% of land in the area is cultivable. Fata survives on smuggling, heroin export, and jobs in local militia and in rest of Pakistan. We are not sure of mineral wealth of Fata since no survey has been carried out. Thanks to the Americans we now know that neighbouring Afghanistan is full of mineral wealth including rare earth minerals (Simpson, 2011). Before the Russian invasion there was insignificant poppy growth in Afghanistan. Today they are producing 5,800 tons of opium a year and the American army has failed to make a dent on heroin production or its export (Cloughley, Brian. Doing Afghan drugs. Daily Times. January 29, 2012). Fata is one important outlet for heroin export and source of earning for the poor people.

We also need to evaluate the impact of developments in Afghanistan on Pakistan. First and foremost Talibanisation to a degree has taken place in Pakistan where most people are supportive of Islamisation, which cannot be equated with Talibanisation. The first step towards Islamisation of Pakistan took place with Objectives Resolution in 1949. Since then the rulers of Pakistan have used Islam to promote their rule over the country. Some of the so-called religious scholars have used Islam for financial gains or to grab power. Money has flowed from local and foreign sources in support of different factions. Religion has become the biggest industry in Pakistan. Religion has also been source of deadly conflict within Pakistan as different sects jockey for power.

The Arab Spring in Middle East and North Africa has drifted to Islam as a source of inspiration. Even Turkey with years of enforced secularism as visualised by its army is trying to find Islamic values. The lack of understanding by the West of the Muslim World is the basis of the problem of being threatened by Islam. There is also much confusion among the Muslim World as to what is Islamic and is coloured by cultural past of each society in the Muslim World. On the other hand Muslims should understand that ‘Islam is (not) in danger’ and they do not require armed conflict to achieve their goal. The Muslim World has to realise that we are now living in a global village and cannot survive in isolation as being tried by Iran. Most of all the West needs to understand the mind set of emerging Muslim World. A free stable Afghanistan needs to evolve from Stone Age and not forced at gunpoint to perceived Western values and governance. Afghan peace would bring peace in Fata. Rest assured the Afghans or people of Fata are not going to declare war on the West.

There is a strong parallel between Russian and later American invasions. The Russians came into Afghanistan to make them communists while the Americans after the period of rage want to build a capitalist system in their style of democracy. Neither of these super powers have made any dent on the Afghans. Change comes from the mind and not guns. This was the effort of Bacha Khan the Frontier Gandhi. He was essentially a social worker and not a politician dubbed as a traitor by the Pakistani leadership. We should use the carrot rather than the stick to solve Fata problem. There has been in place Fata Development Authority for many years it has dismal record of socio-economic development as compared to rest of Pakistan. Fata also has Fata Disaster Management Authority collaborating with UN Development Programme, which requires $200 million (Ali, Zulfiqar. Donors seek access to monitor Fata uplift. Dawn. February 15, 2012). Poor figures of health and education are alarming. We do not have correct information since the army feeds it and we have no independent observers in the area (Qureshi, Shafiullah. Fata failure. The News. January 29, 2012).

Guns shall make the Fata situation worse since there is no military solution. Above all we need professional research of the area and a ten years planned strategy with the consent of the Fata tribes. The old social structure has been altered with massive influx of arms and ammunition during Russian invasion. The old British administrative system is in tatters. The Political Agent and Malik equation and the jirga system have been dismantled. We are not dealing with old Fata anymore. Solution of Fata has to emerge from its people. Before we plan for a long-term policy for Fata it has to be taken off the hands of the Pakistan Army.

PS. Today Pakistan faces a more serious problem of separatist nationalist movement in Balochistan, which unlike Fata is not a religious issue. Unfortunately successive governments in Pakistan have been in a state of denial and used the gun to make Balochistan fall in line. This time it is not going to work.

Radicalisation of Pakistani society unleashed by Gen Zia fast gaining ground is also a major issue yet to be addressed (Hussain, 2012).

Selected Bibliography

1. Adye, John. Sitana: a mountain campaign of the borders of Afghanistan in 1863. ASIM: BOO6PE65CC. Published 1866.
2. Ahmed, Khalid. The mystery of what Pakistan wants. Friday Times. Jan 2/Feb 2, 2012.
3. Al Qaeda in its own words. Edited by Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2008.
4. Albinia, Alice. Empires of the Indus. John Murray, London. 2008.
5. Baha, Lal. NWFP: administration under British rule 1901-1919. National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad. 1978.
6. Barthorp, Michael. Afghan wars and the North-West Frontier 1839-1947. Cassell & Co, London. 2002.
7. Bayley, Victor. Permanent way through the Khyber. Jarrolds Publishers, London. MCMXXXIV (1924).
8. Bellew, HW. Afghanistan and the Afghans: brief review of the history of the country and account of its people. Samson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, London. 1879.
9. Bergen, Peter L. Holy war Inc: inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden. Phoenix, London. 2002.
10. Borovik, Artyom. The hidden war: a true story of war in Afghanistan. Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 1991.
11. Bruce, Richard Isaac. The forward policy and its results. 1898.
12. Burns, Alexander. Cabool: a personal narrative of a journey to, and residence in that city, in the years 1836, 7, and 8. Reprint Ferozesons Ltd., Lahore. 1961.
13. Caroe, Olaf. The Pathans. Reprint by Oxford University Press, Karachi. 1975.
14. Charny, IW. Fighting suicide bombing: a worldwide campaign for life. Praeger Security International, Westport. 2007.
15. Deshpande, Anirudh. British military policy in India, 1900-1945. Vanguard Books, Lahore. 2005.
16. Diver, Maud. Kabul to Kandahar. Peter Davis, London. 1935.
17. Docherty, Paddy. The Khyber Pass: a history of empire and invasion. Oxford University Press, Karachi. 2007.
18. Dupree, Louis. Afghanistan. Oxford Pakistan Paperback, Karachi. 1997.
19. Edwards, Herbert B. A year on the Punjab Frontier in 1848-49. Vol. I & II. Reprint Ferozesons Ltd., Lahore. 1963.
20. Elliott, JG. The Frontier 1839-1947: the story of the North-West Frontier of India. Cassell, London. 1968.
21. Fata- a most dangerous place. Principle Author Shuja Nawaz. Centre for Strategic & International Studies. 2009.
22. Griffiths, John C. Afghanistan. Pall Mall Press, London. 1967.
23. Gul, Imtiaz and Jaffar, Nabila. Taliban and the Pakistani politics. Friday Times. Jan 2/Feb 2, 2012.
24. Hamilton, Angus. Afghanistan. William Heinemann, London. 1906.
25. Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game: on secret service in High Asia. John Murray, London. 1990.
26. Hosain, Mohammad. A few phases of the Afghans in Jullundur Busties. 1938.
27. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjabi Taliban: driving extremism in Pakistan. Pentagon Press, New Delhi. 2012.
28. Hussain, Zahid. The scorpions tail. Free Press, New York. 2010.
29. Jalal, Ayesha. Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 2008.
30. Jan, Abid Ullah. Afghanistan: the genesis of the final crusade. Pragmatic Publication. Ottawa. 2006.
31. Journals and diaries of the Assistants to the Agent, Governor-General North West Frontier and Resident at Lahore 1846-1849. First edition 1911. Reprint Sang-e-Meel. 2006.
32. Khan, Mohammad Hosain. A few phases of the Afghans in Jullundur Basties. 1938.
33. Khan, Wajahat S. The other guy’s endgame—Part I. Friday Times. Jan27/Feb-2, 2012.
34. Khan, Wajahat S. The other guy’s endgame—Part II. Friday Times. February 3-9, 2012
35. Krasmer, D Stephen. Getting tough with Pakistan. Foreign Affairs. January/February. 2012.
36. Kroernig, Matthew. Foreign Affairs. January/February. 2012.
37. Lahood, Nelly. The jihadis’ path to self-destruction. Hurst & Co. London.2010.
38. Lieven, Anatal. Pakistan a hard country. Allen Lane, UK. 2011.
39. Matinuddin, Kamal. Power struggle in the Hindukush Afghanistan (1978-1991). Services Book Club, Lahore. 1991.
40. Mir, Amir. Talibanisation of Pakistan. Pentagon Security International, New Delhi. 2009.
41. Murray, Hallan AH. The high-road of Empire. John Murray, London. 1905.
42. Nevill, HL. Campaigns on the North-West Frontier. First published 1910. Reprint Sang-e-Meel Publications. 2003.
43. Nichols, Robert. Settling the Frontier: land, law and society in the Peshawar Valley, 1500-1900. Oxford University Press. 2001.
44. Obhrai, Divan Chand. The evolution of North-West Frontier Province. First published 1938. Reprint Saeed Book Bank, Peshawar, 1983.
45. Omissi, David. The Sepoy and the Raj: the Indian Army, 1860-1940. Macmillan Press Ltd, Houndmills. 1994.
46. Pakistan: the militant jihadi challenge. Asia Report No. 164. March 13, 2009. Pennell, TL. Among the wild tribes of the Afghan Frontier. Seeley &Co., London. 1909.
47. Post Taliban. Complied and edited by Ahmed Salim. Sang-e-Meel Publication, Lahore. 2003.
48. Rashid, Ahmed. Decent into chaos. Allen Lane, UK. 2008.
49. Razvi, Mujtaba. The frontiers of Pakistan: a study of Frontier problems in Pakistan’s foreign policy. National Publishing House Ltd., Karachi. 1971.
50. Ridedel, Milton A. In search for Al Qaeda: its leadership and future. Vanguard Books, Lahore. 2009.
51. Saleem, Shahzad. Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: beyond bin Laden and 9/11. Pluto Press, London. 2011.
52. Shah, Zahid. Muslim freedom fighters of India based in Central Asia. Area Study Centre (Russia & CA) Peshawar University and Hanns Seidel Foundation. 2000.
53. Schofield, Victoria. Afghan frontier: feuding and fighting in Central Asia. Tauris Parke Paperbacks, London. 2003.
54. Simpson, Sarah. Afghanistan’s buried riches. Scientific American. October 2011.
55. Skeen, Andrew. Tribal fighting in NWFP. First published 1932. Reprint Vanguard Books, Lahore. 2009.
56. Stabilising Afghanistan: regional perspective and prospects. Edited by Maqsudat, Hassan Nuri, Mohammad Munir and Aftab Hussain. Islamabad Policy Research Institute. Hanns Seidel Foundation. 2011
57. Steven, Coll. Ghost Wars. Penguin Books. 2004.
58. Stewart, Jules. The Khyber Rifles: from the British Raj to Al Qaeda. Sutton Publishing, Phoenix Mill. 2006.
59. Sykes, Percy. A history of Afghanistan. Vol. I & II. First published 1940. Reprint Al-Biruni, Lahore. 1979.
60. Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the Great to the fall of Taliban. Oxford University Press, London. 2002.
61. The Second Afghan War: 1878-80. Complied by Charles Metcalfe MacGregor and India Army Intelligence Branch. Army Education Press. 1975.
62. Thomas, Lowell. Beyond Khyber Pass. Hutchinson & Co., London. 1920s.
63. Warren, Alan. Waziristan, the Fiqir of Ipi, and Indian army- the North West Frontier Revolt of 1936-37. Oxford University Press, Karachi. 2000.
64. Wylly, HC. From the Black Mountain to Waziristan. Macmillan and Co., Ltd. London. 1912.
65. Yate, AC. Travels with the Afghan Boundary Commission. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh. 1886
66. Zaeef, Abdul Salam. My life with the Taliban. Hachette, India. 2010.

Appendix

Chronological Table of North West Frontier Campaigns (Barthorp, Michael, 2002).

A year ago I stumbled upon an interesting website. After relating a short story, it asked the reader to guess the religious context in which the tale was set. The questions varied from the way women dressed (burqa-esque, fully clad) to the practice of allowing men multiple wives. When I finished taking the quiz and looked up the answers, I realized how pre-programmed my perceptions were. As a Muslim, I was willing to accept that all listed societal vices were somehow traceable to acts of Muslims (albeit not in line with the true teachings of Islam); but what I was not expecting was for these to be stories from Christian and Jewish neighborhoods.

We are too quick to judge and hold other religious beliefs in contempt. Take for example a story of a group of men who have declared it against their religious sensitivities to allow girls to leave their homes wearing short sleeved shirts. Or segregated buses, banning women from appearing on billboards, and pepper-spraying girls who appear in public with boys.  These are all tales from Jewish communities in Israel, but could very well have been stories from my hometown of Lahore, Pakistan. If I have learned anything, it is that inane acts are done in the name of religion every day, and rarely do they correctly follow the tenants of that religion.

A popular belief is that religions have been interpreted or created to help men maintain power while denying the female population a voice. This is exactly what Dov Linzer, an Orthodox rabbi, said in an article in the New York Times: “It seems, then, that a religious tenet that begins with men’s sexual thoughts ends with men controlling women’s bodies.” During her tenure as Prime Minister of Israel, Golda Mier was asked to set a curfew for women to control the increasing cases of rape. She refused, saying: “It’s the men who are attacking the women. If there is to be a curfew, let the men stay home.”

In 2010, Nicholas Kristof  printed a “Religion and Sex Quiz” that taught me that abortion was in fact not mentioned in the Bible, regardless of what the Republicans say. My personal favorite asinine rules are created within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Some months ago clerics banned women from touching bananas and cucumbers to avoid “sexual thoughts”. Previously, Saudi cleric Sheik Abdel Mohsen Obeikan issued a fatwa, or Islamic ruling, calling on women to give breast milk to their male colleagues or men they come into regular contact with so as to avoid illicit mixing between the sexes (these men were now foster children, therefore social interaction would be deemed devoid of sexual context).

Disparity between what is pronounced as religion, and what it actually is, exist in all faiths mostly because we are all too willing to take someone else’s word for what is divinely ordained. As the Nigerian saying goes: “Not to know is a bad thing, to wish not to know is worse.”

My recent article for Viewpoint Online, published Jan 7, 2012:

Salmaan Taseer: The political context of a ‘religious’ assassination

Enforce rule of law, expose hypocrisy of the Taliban mentality

Just over a year ago, Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer was assassinated in the most cowardly manner by a government-assigned security guard. Mumtaz Qadri, a member of the Punjab Elite Force assigned to protect the Governor, pumped 27 bullets into his victim’s back as he headed to his car on the afternoon of January 4, 2011.

The sensational murder was no spontaneous act by an enraged fanatic. It was a well-thought out, cold-blooded plan. Was the executor acting alone, motivated only by ‘religious fervour’ as projected, or is there more to the issue than meets the eye? And even if his act was purely altruistic, should the law of the land not be applied to punish him?

The Governor was already a target of the ‘hate-filled organisations’ as he termed them, well before they saw an opportunity to (ab)use the ‘blasphemy law’ to unite their own until then divided ranks. For this, they needed a target. The opportunity arrived when a trial court sentenced a Christian woman, Aasia Bibi, to death on Nov 8, 2010, for ‘blasphemy’.

A few facts to put this situation in context:

• The ‘religious parties’, historically divided amongst themselves, have never made any significant headway in electoral politics in Pakistan. A democratic dispensation does not suit them.
• Although Pakistan under Gen. Musharraf officially cut ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after 9/11 (reluctantly, the last country to do), it continued to allow the ‘home grown jihadis’ to operate, seeing them as useful to keep the fire smouldering in Indian administered Kashmir.
• In Feb 2008, a democratically elected government replaced Gen. Musharraf’s military regime. The new government eschewed the earlier policy of using non-state actors to achieve its foreign policy objectives – but the security establishment remained wedded to the outdated paradigm of ‘strategic’ depth (i.e. Pakistan’s continued influence in Afghanistan because of a perceived threat from India).

What does all this have to do with Salmaan Taseer and the politics behind his assassination?

Everything. The mindset and political ideology disguised in the rhetoric of religion is furthered by a security establishment that sees its duty as being to protect not just Pakistan’s physical frontiers but also its ‘ideology’, developed along conservative religious lines since the 1965 war with India. This ideology was strengthened during the Afghan war of the 1980s, when a national war of liberation was converted into a ‘holy war’ (as Dr. Eqbal Ahmad pointed out in his talk on ‘Terrorism, theirs and ours’, 1998).

Pakistan’s ‘religious’ organisations flourished and gained strength with Saudi and American backing during the Zia years (1977-1988). They were allowed to function freely during the military-dominated ‘musical chairs’ years in which no government could complete its tenure (1988-1999). As mentioned above, they also had a free rein during the Musharraf years (1999-2008) even after 9/11.

Since the end of the first Afghan war, these organisations have been targeting and killing religious minorities and progressive minded people in Pakistan. The genie released during the Zia years and nurtured under Musharraf was not going to go tamely back into the bottle.

Governor Taseer was already in their sights for his outspoken and rational views on religion and human rights. He had no qualms naming the organisations he suspected to be behind the May 2010 massacre of worshippers in an Ahmedi mosque in Lahore, where over 80 people were killed and scores of others injured.

“These hate-filled organisations – Sipah-e-Sahaba, (Lashkar-e-) Jhangvi — they all have same ideology – Taliban, Al Qaeda…,” he said during his condolence visit.

“They should be prosecuted in the courts,” he said. “Don’t let them off. There should be zero tolerance towards them. No political alliance is possible with these organisations, you can’t go around having them at your political meetings, the Punjab government should prosecute them”.

Five months later the religious parties found a way to unite their ranks by conflating the ‘blasphemy’ issue with the issue of the ‘honour of the Prophet’ (peace be upon Him), when there were protests against the death sentence of Aasia Bibi. The ‘religious’ organisations came out in full force calling for her death because she had allegedly said something derogatory against the Prophet (peace be upon Him).

For some years the ‘blasphemy’ issue had lain somewhat dormant. Now, after many years, a court handed down a death sentence for such a case. Protests against the sentence by human rights and Christian organisations led to counter protests by ‘Islamic’ groups that used the issue to build up their political strength.

The situation was reminiscent of the early 1990s when there was a surge of ‘blasphemy’ cases, and the first ‘blasphemy murder’ was committed. Between 1986, when the law came into effect, and 2010, 1,081 people were charged under it, including 138 Christians, 468 Muslims and 454 Ahmadis, according to the National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP). In all cases investigated by human rights groups, motivations for these cases have been invariably rooted in rivalries or disputes related to money, property or other jealousies.

The High Courts and the Supreme Court have so far not upheld any death sentence passed by a lower court, although several defendants have been extra-judicially killed after being accused of ‘blasphemy’. In the early 1990s this was the scenario:

The frenzy had been building up. Masked gunmen had opened fire after a court hearing in April 1994, wounding Salamat and killing Manzoor Masih, one of the co-accused in the blasphemy case. Glossy, full-colour stickers and posters cropped up all over Lahore, calling for “believers” to find and kill (Asma) Jahangir. In July, a mob outside the Lahore High Court attacked her car. Luckily, she was not in the vehicle but her driver was assaulted and the car smashed. It was a few days later that the letter vowing to hunt down and kill Jahangir was delivered to her office. (Zarteef Khan Afridi: The tribesman who showed the way)

There was no case registered against Governor Salmaan Taseer but the propaganda against him was amplified by the proliferation of the 24/7 television channels and social media. Taseer was publicly projected as a blasphemer. The aggression of one particularly vitriolic television talk show host led the Governor to rebuke her: “You are acting as I am guilty of blasphemy” (watch the programme here and here).

Sunni Tehrik and other extremist organisations held rallies and demonstrations against clemency for Aasia Bibi and against proposed procedural amendments to the ‘blasphemy laws’ that PPP MNA Sherry Rehman sought to table. Put on the defensive, the government as well as opposition figures who had agreed to support the amendments, backtracked, leaving Rehman high and dry, her life under threat.

Zaid Hamid, Hanif Qureshi and others: preachers of hate misleading youth

Mumtaz Qadri was a known figure at such rallies where emotions were being whipped up. He even recited ‘naat’ at some of them – like at this one, just three days before he killed the man he was supposed to be protecting.

These questions arise:

• How was a man who attended such gatherings, who was already known for his extremist views (he had been earlier removed from the Special Branch because he was perceived as a security threat) inducted into the Elite Force in the first place?
• How was such a man assigned guard duty to a high profile target like the Governor Punjab?
• Why did the other guards not expose Qadri or get him arrested when he told them what he was going to do and asked them not to open fire, as he would surrender (as he said in his confession after his arrest)?
• Given that the other guards did not open fire, according to standard operating procedures in VIP guard duty, why were they not charged as accomplices to the murder, even though Qadri said he was acting alone?

Citizens for Democracy (CFD), an umbrella group of several professional and activist organisations formed on Dec 19, 2010 in Karachi, raised such questions in its statement of January 7, 2011. “We reiterate our stand that no one has the right to take the law into their own hands and kill anyone, regardless of whether they are accused of blasphemy or any other crime,” said the statement, endorsed by nearly 70 organisations.

But such voices were drowned in the din of ‘religious’ righteousness.

Qadri’s fellow guards who were detained after Governor Taseer’s assassination were released without being charged, as was the cleric whose inflammatory sermon convinced Qadri to pull the trigger.

Salmaan Taseer’s murder was followed just two months later by the murder of the Minister for Minority Affairs Shahbaz Bhatti, a Christian by faith, who had also been outspoken about the blasphemy issue. No one has been arrested for that murder. The trial court judge who sentenced Mumtaz Qadri to death has fled Pakistan for his own safety. Qadri’s supporters are calling for the death sentence to be commuted, which is somewhat puzzling given that Qadri has stated he is willing to die for his faith and he believes he has done right.

Pakistan has many pressing problems – including the perennial ones of clean drinking water, healthcare, education, shelter and so on that directly impact the people. But on a larger level, there is also clearly an urgent need to enforce the rule of law — charge, try and prosecute the guilty without fear or favour — and to expose the hypocrisy of the Taliban mentality that is tearing the country apart.

By Aisling Byrne
Asia Times Online

"War with Iran is already here," wrote a leading Israeli commentator recently, describing "the combination of covert warfare and international pressure" being applied to Iran.

Although not mentioned, the "strategic prize" of the first stage of this war on Iran is Syria; the first campaign in a much wider sectarian power-bid. "Other than the collapse of the Islamic Republic itself," Saudi King Abdullah was reported to have said last summer, "nothing would weaken Iran more than losing Syria." [1]

By December, senior United States officials were explicit about their regime change agenda for Syria: Tom Donilon, the US National Security Adviser, explained that the "end of the [President Bashar al-]Assad regime would constitute Iran’s greatest setback in the region yet – a strategic blow that will further shift the balance of power in the region against Iran."

Shortly before, a key official in terms of operationalizing this policy, Under Secretary of State for the Near East Jeffrey Feltman, had stated at a congressional hearing that the US would "relentlessly pursue our two-track strategy of supporting the opposition and diplomatically and financially strangling the [Syrian] regime until that outcome is achieved". [2]

What we are seeing in Syria is a deliberate and calculated campaign to bring down the Assad government so as to replace it with a regime "more compatible" with US interests in the region.

The blueprint for this project is essentially a report produced by the neo-conservative Brookings Institute for regime change in Iran in 2009. The report – "Which Path to Persia?" [3] – continues to be the generic strategic approach for US-led regime change in the region.

A rereading of it, together with the more recent "Towards a Post-Assad Syria" [4] (which adopts the same language and perspective, but focuses on Syria, and was recently produced by two US neo-conservative think-tanks) illustrates how developments in Syria have been shaped according to the step-by-step approach detailed in the "Paths to Persia" report with the same key objective: regime change.

The authors of these reports include, among others, John Hannah and Martin Indyk, both former senior neo-conservative officials from the George W Bush/Dick Cheney administration, and both advocates for regime change in Syria. [5] Not for the first time are we seeing a close alliance between US/British neo-cons with Islamists (including, reports show [6], some with links to al-Qaeda) working together to bring about regime change in an "enemy" state.

Arguably, the most important component in this struggle for the "strategic prize" has been the deliberate construction of a largely false narrative that pits unarmed democracy demonstrators being killed in their hundreds and thousands as they protest peacefully against an oppressive, violent regime, a "killing machine" [7] led by the "monster" [8] Assad.

Whereas in Libya, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) claimed it had "no confirmed reports of civilian casualties" because, as the New York Times wrote recently, "the alliance had created its own definition for ‘confirmed’: only a death that NATO itself investigated and corroborated could be called confirmed".

"But because the alliance declined to investigate allegations," the Times wrote, "its casualty tally by definition could not budge – from zero". [9]

In Syria, we see the exact opposite: the majority of Western mainstream media outlets, along with the media of the US’s allies in the region, particularly al-Jazeera and the Saudi-owned al-Arabiya TV channels, are effectively collaborating with the "regime change" narrative and agenda with a near-complete lack of questioning or investigation of statistics and information put out by organizations and media outlets that are either funded or owned by the US/European/Gulf alliance – the very same countries instigating the regime change project in the first place.

Claims of "massacres", "campaigns of rape targeting women and girls in predominantly Sunni towns" [10] "torture" and even "child-rape" [11] are reported by the international press based largely on two sources – the British-based Syrian Observatory of Human Rights and the Local Co-ordination Committees (LCCs) – with minimal additional checking or verification.

Hiding behind the rubric – "we are not able to verify these statistics" – the lack of integrity in reporting by the Western mainstream media has been starkly apparent since the onset of events in Syria. A decade after the Iraq war, it would seem that no lessons from 2003 – from the demonization of Saddam Hussein and his purported weapons of mass destruction – have been learnt.

Of the three main sources for all data on numbers of protesters killed and numbers of people attending demonstrations – the pillars of the narrative – all are part of the "regime change" alliance.

The Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, in particular, is reportedly funded through a Dubai-based fund with pooled (and therefore deniable) Western-Gulf money (Saudi Arabia alone has, according to Elliot Abrams [12] allocated US$130 billion to "palliate the masses" of the Arab Spring).

What appears to be a nondescript British-based organization, the Observatory has been pivotal in sustaining the narrative of the mass killing of thousands of peaceful protesters using inflated figures, "facts", and often exaggerated claims of "massacres" and even recently "genocide".

Although it claims to be based in its director’s house [13], the Observatory has been described as the "front office" of a large media propaganda set-up run by the Syrian opposition and its backers. The Russian Foreign Ministry [14] stated starkly:

The agenda of the [Syrian] transitional council [is] composed in London by the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights … It is also there where pictures of ‘horror’ in Syria are made to stir up hatred towards Assad’s regime.

The Observatory is not legally registered either as a company or charity in the United Kingdom, but operates informally; it has no office, no staff and its director is reportedly awash with funding.

It receives its information, it says, from a network of "activists" inside Syria; its English-language website is a single page with al-Jazeera instead hosting a minute-by-minute live blog page for it since the outset of protests. [15]

The second, the LCCs, are a more overt part of the opposition’s media infrastructure, and their figures and reporting is similarly encompassed only [16] within the context of this main narrative: in an analysis of their daily reports, I couldn’t find a single reference to any armed insurgents being killed: reported deaths are of "martyrs", "defector soldiers", people killed in "peaceful demonstrations" and similar descriptions.

The third is al-Jazeera, whose biased role in "reporting" the Awakenings has been well documented. Described by one seasoned media analyst [17] as the "sophisticated mouthpiece of the state of Qatar and its ambitious emir", al-Jazeera is integral to Qatar’s "foreign-policy aspirations".

Al-Jazeera has, and continues, [18] to provide technical support, equipment, hosting and "credibility" to Syrian opposition activists and organizations. Reports show that as early as March 2011, al-Jazeera was providing messaging and technical support to exiled Syrian opposition activists [19] , who even by January 2010 were co-ordinating their messaging activities from Doha.

Nearly 10 months on, however, and despite the daily international media onslaught, the project isn’t exactly going to plan: a YouGov poll commissioned by the Qatar Foundation [20] showed last week that 55% of Syrians do not want Assad to resign and 68% of Syrians disapprove of the Arab League sanctions imposed on their country.

According to the poll, Assad’s support has effectively increased since the onset of current events – 46% of Syrians felt Assad was a "good" president for Syria prior to current events in the country – something that certainly doesn’t fit with the false narrative being peddled.

As if trumpeting the success of their own propaganda campaign, the poll summary concludes:

The majority of Arabs believe Syria’s President Basher al-Assad should resign in the wake of the regime’s brutal treatment of protesters … 81% of Arabs [want] President Assad to step down. They believe Syria would be better off if free democratic elections were held under the supervision of a transitional government. [21]

One is left wondering who exactly is Assad accountable to – the Syrian people or the Arab public? A blurring of lines that might perhaps be useful as two main Syrian opposition groups have just announced [22] that while they are against foreign military intervention, they do not consider "Arab intervention" to be foreign.

Unsurprisingly, not a single mainstream major newspaper or news outlet reported the YouGov poll results – it doesn’t fit their narrative.

In the UK, the volunteer-run Muslim News [23] was the only newspaper to report the findings; yet only two weeks before in the immediate aftermath of the suicide explosions in Damascus, both the Guardian [24], like other outlets, within hours of the explosions were publishing sensational, unsubstantiated reports from bloggers, including one who was "sure that some of the bodies … were those of demonstrators".

"They have planted bodies before," he said; "they took dead people from Dera’a [in the south] and showed the media bodies in Jisr al-Shughour [near the Turkish border.]"

Recent reports have cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the false narrative peddled daily by the mainstream international press, in particular information put out by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and the LCCs.

In December, the mainstream US intelligence group Stratfor cautioned:

Most of the [Syrian] opposition’s more serious claims have turned out to be grossly exaggerated or simply untrue … revealing more about the opposition’s weaknesses than the level of instability inside the Syrian regime. [25]

Throughout the nine-month uprising, Stratfor has advised caution on accuracy of the mainstream narrative on Syria: in September it commented that "with two sides to every war … the war of perceptions in Syria is no exception". [26]

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and LCC reports, "like those from the regime, should be viewed with skepticism", argues Stratfor; "the opposition understands that it needs external support, specifically financial support, if it is to be a more robust movement than it is now. To that end, it has every reason to present the facts on the ground in a way that makes the case for foreign backing."

As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov observed: "It is clear that the purpose is to provoke a humanitarian catastrophe, to get a pretext to demand external interference into this conflict." [27] Similarly, in mid-December, American Conservative reported:

CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] analysts are skeptical regarding the march to war. The frequently cited United Nations report that more than 3,500 civilians have been killed by Assad’s soldiers is based largely on rebel sources and is uncorroborated. The Agency has refused to sign off on the claims.

Likewise, accounts of mass defections from the Syrian army and pitched battles between deserters and loyal soldiers appear to be a fabrication, with few defections being confirmed independently. Syrian government claims that it is being assaulted by rebels who are armed, trained and financed by foreign governments are more true than false. [28]

As recently as November, the Free Syria Army implied their numbers would be larger, but, as they explained to one analyst, they are "advising sympathizers to delay their defection" until regional conditions improve. [29]

A guide to regime change

In relation to Syria, section three of the "Paths to Persia" report is particularly relevant – it is essentially a step-by-step guide detailing options for instigating and supporting a popular uprising, inspiring an insurgency and/or instigating a coup. The report comes complete with a "Pros and Cons" section:

An insurgency is often easier to instigate and support from abroad … Insurgencies are famously cheap to support … covert support to an insurgency would provide the United States with "plausibility deniability" … [with less] diplomatic and political backlash … than if the United States were to mount a direct military action … Once the regime suffers some major setback [this] provides an opportunity to act.

Military action, the report argues, would only be taken once other options had been tried and shown to have failed as the "international community" would then conclude of any attack that the government "brought it on themselves" by refusing a very good deal.

Key aspects for instigating a popular uprising and building a "full-fledged insurgency" are evident in relation to developments in Syria.

These include:

>> "Funding and helping organize domestic rivals of the regime" including using "unhappy" ethnic groups;

>> "Building the capacity of ‘effective oppositions’ with whom to work" in order to "create an alternative leadership to seize power";

>> Provision of equipment and covert backing to groups, including arms – either directly or indirectly, as well as "fax machines … Internet access, funds" (on Iran the report noted that the "CIA could take care of most of the supplies and training for these groups, as it has for decades all over the world");

>> Training and facilitation of messaging by opposition activists;

>> Constructing a narrative "with the support of US-backed media outlets could highlight regime shortcomings and make otherwise obscure critics more prominent" – "having the regime discredited among key ‘opinion shapers’ is critical to its collapse";

>> The creation of a large funding budget to fund a wide array of civil-society-led initiatives (a so-called "$75 million fund" created under former US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice-funded civil society groups, including "a handful of Beltway-based think-tanks and institutions [which] announced new Iran desks)" [30];

>> The need for an adjacent land corridor in a neighboring country "to help develop an infrastructure to support operations".

"Beyond this," continues the report, "US economic pressure (and perhaps military pressure as well) can discredit the regime, making the population hungry for a rival leadership."

The US and its allies, particularly Britain [31] and France, have funded and helped "shape" the opposition from the outset – building both on attempts started by the US in 2006 to construct a unified front against the Assad government, and the perceived "success" of the Libyan Transitional National Council model. [32]

Despite months of attempts – predominately by the West – at cajoling the various groups into a unified, proficient opposition movement, they remain "a diverse group, representing the country’s ideological, sectarian and generational divides".

"There neither has been nor is [there] now any natural tendency towards unity between these groups, since they belong to totally different ideological backgrounds and have antagonistic political views," one analyst concluded. [33]

At a recent meeting with the British foreign secretary, the different groups would not even meet with William Hague together, instead meeting him separately. [34]

Nevertheless, despite a lack of cohesion, internal credibility and legitimacy, the opposition, predominately under the umbrella of the Syrian National Council (SNC), is being groomed for office. This includes capacity-building, as confirmed by the former Syrian ambassador to the US, Rafiq Juajati, now part of the opposition.

At a closed briefing in Washington DC in mid-December 2011, he confirmed that the US State Department and the SWP-German Institute for International and Security Affairs (a think-tank that provides foreign policy analysis to the German government) were funding a project that is managed by the US Institute for Peace and SWP, working in partnership with the SNC, to prepare the SNC for the takeover and running of Syria.

In a recent interview, SNC leader Burhan Ghaliyoun disclosed (so as to "speed up the process" of Assad’s fall) [35] the credentials expected of him: "There will be no special relationship with Iran," he said. "Breaking the exceptional relationship means breaking the strategic, military alliance," adding that "after the fall of the Syrian regime, [Hezbollah] won’t be the same." [36]

Described in Slate magazine [37] as the "most liberal and Western-friendly of the Arab Spring uprisings", Syrian opposition groups sound as compliant as their Libyan counterparts prior to the demise of Muammar Gaddafi, whom the New York Times described as "secular-minded professionals – lawyers, academics, businesspeople – who talk about democracy, transparency, human rights and the rule of law" [38]; that was, until reality transitioned to former leader of the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group Abdulhakim Belhaj and his jihadi colleagues.

The import of weapons, equipment, manpower (predominantly from Libya) [39] and training by governments and other groups linked to the US, NATO and their regional allies began in April-May 2011, [40] according to various reports [41], and is co-ordinated out of the US air force base at Incirlik in southern Turkey. From Incirlik, an information warfare division also directs communications to Syria via the Free Syria Army. This covert support continues, as American Conservative reported in mid-December:

Unmarked NATO warplanes are arriving at Turkish military bases close to Iskenderum on the Syrian border, delivering weapons … as well as volunteers from the Libyan Transitional National Council … Iskenderum is also the seat of the Free Syrian Army, the armed wing of the Syrian National Council. French and British special forces trainers are on the ground, assisting the Syrian rebels while the CIA and US Spec Ops are providing communications equipment and intelligence to assist the rebel cause, enabling the fighters to avoid concentrations of Syrian soldiers. [42]

The Washington Post exposed in April 2011 that recent WikiLeaks showed that the US State Department had been giving millions of dollars to various Syrian exile groups (including the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Movement for Justice and Development in London) and individuals since 2006 via its "Middle East Partnership Initiative" administered by a US foundation, the Democracy Council. [43]

Leaked WikiLeak cables confirmed that well into 2010, this funding was continuing, a trend that not only continues today but which has expanded in light of the shift to the "soft power" option aimed at regime change in Syria.

As this neo-con-led call for regime change in Syria gains strength within the US administration, [44] so too has this policy been institutionalized among leading US foreign policy think-tanks, many of whom have "Syria desks" or "Syria working groups" which collaborate closely with Syrian opposition groups and individuals (for example USIP [45] and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy) [46] and which have published a range of policy documents making the case for regime change.

In the UK, the similarly neo-con Henry Jackson Society (which "supports the maintenance of a strong military, by the United States, the countries of the European Union and other democratic powers, armed with expeditionary capabilities with a global reach" and which believes that "only modern liberal democratic states are truly legitimate") is similarly pushing the agenda for regime change in Syria [47].

This is in partnership with Syrian opposition figures including Ausama Monajed, [48] a former leader of the Syrian exile group, the Movement for Justice & Development, linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which was funded by the US State Department from 2006, as we know from WikiLeaks.

Monajed, a member of the SNC, currently directs a public relations firm [49] recently established in London and incidentally was the first to use the term "genocide" in relation to events in Syria in a recent SNC press release. [50]

Since the outset, significant pressure has been brought to bear on Turkey to establish a "humanitarian corridor" along its southern border with Syria. The main aim of this, as the "Paths to Persia" report outlines, is to provide a base from which the externally-backed insurgency can be launched and based.

The objective of this "humanitarian corridor" is about as humanitarian as the four-week NATO bombing of Sirte when NATO exercised its "responsibility to protect" mandate, as approved by the UN Security Council.

All this is not to say that there isn’t a genuine popular demand for change in Syria against the repressive security-dominated infrastructure that dominates every aspect of people’s lives, nor that gross human-rights violations have not been committed, both by the Syrian security forces, armed opposition insurgents, as well as mysterious third force characters operating since the onset of the crisis in Syria, including insurgents, [51] mostly jihadis from neighboring Iraq and Lebanon, as well as more recently Libya, among others.

Such abuses are inevitable in low-intensity conflict. Leading critics [52] of this US-France-UK-Gulf-led regime change project have, from the outset, called for full accountability and punishment for any security or other official "however senior", found to have committed any human-rights abuses.

Ibrahim al-Amine writes that some in the regime have conceded "that the security remedy was damaging in many cases and regions [and] that the response to the popular protests was mistaken … it would have been possible to contain the situation via clear and firm practical measures – such as arresting those responsible for torturing children in Deraa". And it argues that the demand for political pluralism and an end to the all-encompassing repression is both vital and urgent. [53]

But what may have began as popular protests, initially focused on local issues and incidents (including the case of the torture of young boys in Dera’a by security forces) were rapidly hijacked by this wider strategic project for regime change. Five years ago, I worked in northern Syria with the United Nations managing a large community development project.

After evening community meetings, it wasn’t uncommon to find the mukhabarat (military intelligence) waiting for us to vacate the room so they could scan flipcharts posted on the walls. That almost every aspect of people’s daily lives was regulated by a sclerotic dysfunctional Ba’ath party/security bureaucracy, devoid of any ideology apart from the inevitable corruption and nepotism that comes with authoritarian power, was apparent in every feature of people’s lives.

Tuesday, December 20 was reportedly the "deadliest day of the nine-month [Syrian] uprising "with the "organized massacre" of a "mass defection" of army deserters widely reported by the international press in Idlib, northern Syria. Claiming that areas of Syria were now "exposed to large-scale genocide", the SNC lamented the "250 fallen heroes during a 48-hour period", citing figures provided by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. [54] Quoting the same source, the Guardian reported that the Syrian army was:

… hunt[ing] down deserters after troops … killed close to 150 men who had fled their base". A picture has emerged … of a mass defection … that went badly wrong … with loyalist forces positioned to mow down large numbers of defectors as they fled a military base. Those who managed to escape were later hunted down in hideouts in nearby mountains, multiple sources have reported. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated that 100 deserters were besieged, then killed or wounded. Regular troops allegedly also hunted down residents who had given shelter to the deserters. [55]

The Guardian’s live blog-quoted AVAAZ, the citizen political advocacy/public relations group, which "claimed 269 people had been killed in the clashes", and cited AVAAZ’s precise breakdown of casualties: "163 armed revolutionaries, 97 government troops and 9 civilians". [56] They noted that AVAAZ "provided nothing to corroborate the claim".

The Washington Post reported only that they had spoken to "an activist with the rights group AVAAZ [who] said he had spoken to local activists and medical groups who put the death toll in that area Tuesday at 269". [57]

A day after initial reports of the massacre of fleeing deserters, however, the story had changed. On December 23, the Telegraph reported:

At first they were said to be army deserters attempting to break into Turkey to join the FSA [Free Syrian Army], but they are now said to be unarmed civilians and activists attempting to escape the army’s attempts to bring the province back under control. They were surrounded by troops and tanks and gunned down until there were no survivors, according to reports. [58]

The New York Times had, on December 21, reported that the "massacre", citing the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, was of "unarmed civilians and activists, with no armed military defectors among them, the rights groups said".

It quoted the head of the Observatory who described it as "an organized massacre" and said his account corroborated a Kfar Owaid witness’ account: "The security forces had lists of names of those who organized massive anti-regime protests … the troops then opened fire with tanks, rockets and heavy machine guns [and], bombs filled with nails to increase the number of casualties. [59]

The LA Times quoted an activist it had spoken to via satellite connection who, from his position "sheltering in the woods" commented: "The word ‘massacre’ seems like too small a word to describe what happened." Meanwhile, the Syrian government reported that on December 19 and 20, it had killed "tens" of members of "armed terrorist gangs" in both Homs and Idlib, and had arrested many wanted individuals. [60]

The truth of these two "deadly" days will probably never be known – the figures cited above (between 10-163 armed insurgents, 9-111 unarmed civilians and 0-97 government forces) differ so significantly in both numbers reported killed and who they were, that the "truth" is impossible to establish.

In relation to an earlier purported "massacre" in Homs, a Stratfor investigation found "no signs of a massacre", concluding that "opposition forces have an interest in portraying an impending massacre, hoping to mimic the conditions that propelled a foreign military intervention in Libya". [61]

Nevertheless, the "massacre" of December 19-20 in Idlib was reported as fact, and was etched into the narrative of Assad’s "killing machine".

Both the recent UN Human Rights Commissioner’s report and a recent data blog report [62] on reported deaths in "Syria’s bloody uprising" by the Guardian (published December 13) – two examples of attempts to establish the truth about numbers killed in the Syrian conflict – rely almost exclusively on opposition-provided data: interviews with 233 alleged "army defectors" in the case of the UN report, and on reports from the Syrian Human Rights Observatory, the LCCs and al-Jazeera in the case of the Guardian’s data blog.

The Guardian reports a total of 1,414.5 people (sic) killed – including 144 Syrian security personnel – between January and November 21, 2011. Based solely on press reports, the report contains a number of basic inaccuracies (eg sources not matching numbers killed with places cited in original sources): their total includes 23 Syrians killed by the Israeli army in June on the Golan Heights; 25 people reported "wounded" are included in total figures for those killed, as are many people reported shot.

The report makes no reference to any killings of armed insurgents during the entire 10-month period – all victims are "protesters", "civilians" or "people" – apart from the 144 security personnel.

Seventy percent of the report’s data sources are from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the LCCs and "activists"; 38% of press reports are from al-Jazeera, 3% from Amnesty International and 1.5% from official Syrian sources.

In response to the UN Commissioner’s report, Syria’s ambassador to the UN commented: "How could defectors give positive testimonies on the Syrian government? Of course they will give negative testimonies against the Syrian government. They are defectors."

In the effort to inflate figures of casualties, the public relations-activist group AVAAZ has consistently outstripped even the UN. AVAAZ has publicly stated it is involved in "smuggling activists … out of the country", running "secret safe houses to shelter … top activists from regime thugs" and that one "AVAAZ citizen journalist" "discover[ed] a mass grave". [63]

It states proudly that the BBC and CNN have said that AVAAZ data amounts to some 30% of their news coverage of Syria. The Guardian reported AVAAZ’s latest claim to have "evidence" of killings of some 6,200 people (including security forces and including 400 children), claiming 617 of whom died under torture [64] – their justification to have verified each single death with confirmation by three people, "including a relative and a cleric who handled the body" is improbable in the extreme.

The killing of one brigadier-general and his children in April last year in Homs illustrates how near impossible it is, particularly during sectarian conflict, to verify even one killing – in this case, a man and his children:

The general, believed to be Abdu Tallawi, was killed with his children and nephew while passing through an agitated neighborhood. There are two accounts of what happened to him and his family, and they differ about the victim’s sect.

Regime loyalists say that he was killed by takfiris – hardline Islamists who accuse other Muslims of apostasy – because he belonged to the Alawite sect. The protesters insist that he is a member of the Tallawi family from Homs and that he was killed by security forces to accuse the opposition and destroy their reputation. Some even claim that he was shot because he refused to fire at protesters.

The third account is ignored due to the extreme polarization of opinions in the city [Homs]. The brigadier-general was killed because he was in a military vehicle, even though he had his kids with him. Whoever killed him was not concerned with his sect but with directing a blow to the regime, thus provoking an even harsher crackdown, which, in turn, would drag the protest movement into a cycle of violence with the state. [65]

An image released by Pakistan's Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) on Nov. 30 shows smoke rising apparently after a cross-border NATO air strike on Pakistani border posts on a mountain in the Mohmand tribal district on Nov. 26, 2011.

Amid rising anger, Pakistan’s military has released a set of images which it says show the remote border posts attacked by NATO helicopters and fighter jets on Saturday in an incident that has soured relations between Pakistan and the United States.

Faisal Mahmood / Reuters

Young supporters of Jamaat-e-Islami, a religious and political party, yell anti-American slogans while protesting in Islamabad against a NATO cross-border attack along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Nov. 27. Pakistan buried 24 troops killed in a NATO cross-border air attack that has pushed a crisis in relations between the United States and an ally it needs to fight militancy towards rupture.

The word “shaheed,” or martyr is written on the caskets of soldiers killed in a cross-border attack along the Pakistan-Afghan border, as their bodies are being carried for funeral prayers in Peshawar, Nov. 27.

 

Khuram Parvez / Reuters

A roadsign shows the distance to cities in Afghanistan and trucks parked along the roadside after traffic was halted at the Pakistani border town Torkham, Nov. 27. Pakistan blocked vital supply routes for U.S.-led troops in Afghanistan and demanded Washington vacate a base used by American drones after coalition aircraft allegedly killed 24 Pakistani troops.

Athar Hussain / Reuters

A Shi’ite cleric speaks to protesters after clashes between two religious sects of Islam in Karachi Nov. 27. Two people were killed and two others wounded in an exchange of fire between militants from majority Sunni and minority Shi’ite communities in the southern city of Karachi. Angry mobs set fire to several cars and motorcycles.

Athar Hussain / Reuters

Drivers, some of whom were carrying fuel for NATO forces in Afghanistan, sleep on top of their trucks at a fuel terminal in Karachi Nov. 26.

Faisal Mahmood / Reuters

Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani, left, speaks beside Chinese General Hou Shusen, the deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), during a news conference after joint military exercises in Jhelum, in Pakistan’s Punjab province, Nov. 24.

B.k.bangash / AP

Pakistan’s former Information Minister Sherry Rehman talks to reporters in Islamabad, Nov. 23. Pakistan appointed democracy activist Sherry Rehman, who has faced militant death threats, as its new ambassador to the United States, moving quickly to replace the old envoy who resigned after upsetting the country’s powerful military in a scandal dubbed “memo-gate.”

Arshad Arbab / EPA

Local residents look at the debris of a girls school after it was bombed by alleged Taliban militants on the outskirts of Peshawar. Nov. 13. Hundreds of educational institutions including dozens of girls schools have been bombed by the Taliban militants in past months in country’s militancy-hit north-west region.

B.k.bangash / AP

Pakistani children takes ride during at a local park during the last day of the religious festival Eid-al- Adha in Islamabad, Nov. 9.

A nude shot of a sultry Pakistani starlet on the cover of an Indian lad mag has sparked an uproar between the two nuclear rivals.

Pakistani actress Veena Malik appears on the cover of FHM India’s December issue wearing nothing but a steamy gaze and the initials of Pakistan’s fearsome intelligence agency, ISI, tattooed across her arm.

Conservative Muslim clerics in her home country slammed the shot as an insult to Islam, while Pakistan’s government has promised to investigate whether the image was doctored, London’s The Telegraph reported.

Malik, meanwhile, has filed a lawsuit against the magazine, saying that she agreed to pose topless — along with a cheeky dig at her home country’s spy service — but the editors digitally altered the shot to make her appear totally nude.

“I agreed to a photo shoot and having an ISI tattoo in a humorous way but I did not have any nude photos. My pictures have been morphed,” she told a Pakistani television station.

The suit is seeking $2 million in damages. FHM India editor Kabeer Sharma insists the cover is legit.

“Maybe she is facing some kind of backlash, so maybe that’s why she is denying it,” Sharma told Agence France-Presse.

“We have not photoshopped or faked the cover. This is what she looks like, she has an amazing body.” Sharma says a video from the cover shoot would prove the photos are real.

An alternate cover that has surfaced online shows Malik clad in a dinky military cargo belt while nibbling on the pin of a grenade.

The 33-year-old Muslim actress and model was best known as a Pakistani TV star before hitting it big in India in 2010 as a contestant on the fourth season of the reality show “Bigg Boss,” a version of “Big Brother.”

In January, she got in a much-publicized verbal spat with a conservative Muslim cleric, who called her an insult to Pakistan and Islam for cozying up with a dashing Indian actor on the show.

Filed under: Desi, Freedoms, India, Pakistan, Veil Tagged: Big Boss, Big Brother, FHM India, India, ISI, Kabeer Sharma, Pakistan, Pakistani TV Star, Veena Malik