As Reported by The Economic Times

The reported move by the Pakistan government to phase out major restrictions on trade with India by switching to the negative list, and doing away with that too by the end of the year, is wholly welcome. Normalising trade relations with India will help establish a template of wider normalization of mutual ties.

An indication of deep-rooted animosities and suspicions which have stymied that goal can be seen in the opposition from quarters within Pakistan to Islamabad’s declared – and logical – aim of granting India the World Trade Organization-compliant Most Favoured Nation status next year.

But the arrangement to separate commerce from thornier issues like Kashmir and Pakistan’s actions against those accused of terror attacks against India can lay a foundation for minimising mutual distrust. For New Delhi, this would be in keeping with the idea of engaging various power centres in Pakistan, given the fractured power structure in that country.

While being perfectly aware that policy on India, like in other areas deemed to be ‘strategic’ by the military, is mostly determined by the latter, the aim should be to defang and isolate hardline elements by positing the real and tangible benefits enhanced mutual trade can offer Pakistan.

And there certainly is ample scope to do that: direct Indo-Pak trade is less than 1% of their global trade; annual mutual trade was around $2.7 billion through March 2011, which, despite being up 50% from the previous year is still measly compared to, say, India’s $60 billion annual trade with China or the potential.

But a beginning has been made with Pakistani industry backing the new move, which, in turn, can help allay fears that Indian goods will swamp Pakistani markets. What will happen is the ending of trade routed through third countries (mostly Dubai).

Legitimate mutual trade can lead to both countries envisaging cooperation in a wider trading entity comprising Afghanistan and Central Asia, with obvious benefits for regional stability. This might sound utopian for now, but mutually-beneficial commerce does have a way of tempering hostilities.

Filed under: Afghanistan, China, Desi, India, Pakistan, Peace Tagged: Afghanistan, China, Dubai, India, India Pakistan Trade, MFN, Most Favored Nation, Pakistan, World Trade Organization

By Prof Farakh A Khan

(This is continuation of my last article.. It was felt that this subject requires greater depth since people in Pakistan have distorted view of our Fata issue. The origin and evolution of Jihadi Wahhabi movement has to be put in proper perspective)

Conflict in society is the oldest human response inherited from our evolutionary animal past. As human society graduated from sticks and stones as weapons of aggression to high explosives and air war the level of carnage increased dramatically. We are now entering phase of robotic war lased with nuclear technology where power of destruction has escalated to a new level. The level of misery caused by modern wars is not acceptable anymore. War in Afghanistan either by foreign forces intervention or internal conflict for the last 50 decades has left the nation in state of perpetual war. Since Russian intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 Pakistan still has 1.7 million Afghan refugees. The conflict in Afghanistan has spilled over into Pakistan where since 2004 estimated 35,000 people have been killed and many more disabled. The only winners of war are the manufactures of arms and ammunition. For Pakistan Federally Administrated Areas (Fata) formally called the Tribal Areas has been devastated and there is no end in sight. For Pakistan Balochistan is also an area in turmoil. The Americans are also pointing fingers at our Balochistan human rights record.

Pakistan’s religious and cultural hereditary ties with Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and Middle East have always been strong. Any development in one country has its impact on others including Pakistan. Today we are caught in conflict in Afghanistan tomorrow we may be in a bigger mess if Iran is attacked by Israel/American forces. Attack on Iran will be most unpopular with the people of Pakistan and destabilise its leadership especially the army.

Endgame in Afghanistan

The Nato/American occupation of Afghanistan since 2001 directly impacted on Pakistan especially in Fata. People Pakistan actively volunteered to resist the invading army but was initially overwhelmed by the firepower of the American guns. Historically people of Fata has seen whole host of aggressors from the West and East. Each time aggressors have called people of what are now Fata and of Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa different names at different times of history labelled as terrorists, militants, rebels, religious extremists/fanatics or freedom fighters. The ten-year war in Afghanistan has taken toll of the American purse and its fighters. The French want to pull out by next year. On the other hand the Afghan people are constantly suffering. Both sides are in fatigue mode. The Americans are openly talking to Afghan Taliban leadership since November 2010 to end American occupation of Afghanistan. The talks are at a crucial juncture where a Taliban office is to be opened in Qatar. The Americans are considering release of five Taliban leaders from infamous Guantanamo prison to be stationed in Qatar. Team led by Marc Grossman from the American side and Qari Yousaf Ahmedi from Afghan Taliban side are in discussions (DeYoung, Karen. US links Taliban talks to Karzai’s consent. Dawn/Washington Post/ Bloomberg News Service. January 13, 2012). In Qatar talks the sticking point is release of Guantanamo Taliban commanders and timing of ceasefire. The Americans want ceasefire first before prisoner release but the Taliban want start of American troop withdrawal first (US, Taliban historic talks begin in Qatar. AFP. The News. January 30, 2012). Taliban has denied any talks with the US (Taliban deny talks with ‘puppet’ govt. AFP. The News. February 17, 2012).

The Americans with their many think tanks and experience of Vietnam and Russians bitter Afghan disaster perhaps made no impact on the American leadership. The arrogance of power overrides the long-term reality of war in Afghanistan. The British with long direct experience of wars in Afghanistan were also drawn into the conflict in 2001. Their famous war hero Lord Roberts of Kandahar after the Second Afghan War (1878-80) strongly advised Britain to avoid meddling in Afghan affairs. The Treaty of Gandamak (May 26, 1879) took away foreign affairs from Afghan rulers with fatal results. The right to foreign affairs was given back after the Third Afghan War (1919) following a treaty on November 22, 1921 (Shah, 2000). This was part of the Great Game strategy. But this was long time ago.

Besides American brokered talks with Taliban Afghanistan and Pakistan wants separate talks to be held in Saudi Arabia (Afghanistan seeks Taliban talks in Saudi Arabia: officials. AFP. The News. January 30, 2012). The Americans feel greater threat from Iran and want to windup operations in Afghanistan as early as possible. For Pakistan Fata is the key problem area. If Iran is attacked then the problem shall spread to rest of Pakistan.

In a discussion on at the Karachi Literature festival on ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan: conflict, extremism and Taliban’ Dr Maleeha Lodhi claimed that Pakistan’s stand regarding Afghan solution to be achieved through dialogue was rejected by the US. Ten years later the US is trying to do the same (Ali, Imtiaz. US follows what Pakistan said 10 years ago: Lodhi. The News. February 13, 2012). In 1838 Maharaja Ranjit Singh faced a similar problem with the British intention of attacking Afghanistan. The British tried to persuade Ranjit Singh to join them in the attack. The clever illiterate Sikh ruler understood the people of Fata, then part of Afghanistan, better and politely refused but gave free passage to the British army to attack Afghanistan. The result in 1842 when the proud ‘Army of the Indus’ was annihilated as predicted by the Sikh chief.

In an address to US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence CIA Director David Petraeus claimed that Pakistan was supporting Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan, it was alleged, was supporting Haqqani Network, Commander Nazir Group and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan by providing sanctuaries and war materials. The allegation is not new but may be partly true although this was hotly denied by Pakistan (Iqbal, Anwar. Pakistan not putting sufficient pressure on Afghan Taliban: CIA chief. Dawn. February 2, 2012). On September 22, 2011 Admiral Mike Mullen claimed that ‘Haqqani Network is part of strategic arm of ISI’ (Krasmer, D Stephen, 2012). The report based on prisoner’s interrogation in Afghanistan called ‘State of Taliban’ was ‘leaked’ to the press. It implicated the ISI in helping the Taliban direct attacks against the Isaf forces in Afghanistan. The report admitted that once Nato forces leave Afghanistan the state will collapse and open it to return of Taliban (Secret Nato report accuses Pakistan of helping Taliban. The News. February 2, 2012). For Pakistan a stable Afghanistan is essential for solving Fata problem. Unfortunately its army determines Pakistan foreign policy.

There are reports that US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta is thinking of US forces combat mission to end by mid-2013, a year earlier than previous estimates (US plans to end combat mission by mid-2013. OC. Dawn. February 3, 2012). He has urged Pakistan to help stop IED attacks, which allegedly were manufactured in Pakistan and used in Afghanistan (Iqbal, Anwar. Pakistan urged to help contain IED attacks. Dawn. Dawn. February 16, 2012).

How will withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan impinge on Pakistan? Withdrawal of US forces and handing over security to the Afghans is not as simple as it was seen in Iraq. The cost of US withdrawal would be in billions of dollars every year for decades to come to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan economy (Sehgal, Ikram. Drawdown in Afghanistan. The News. February 9, 2012). It is interesting to note that think tanks all over the world blame America for leaving Afghanistan to its own devices after Russian army withdrawal in 1989. Now that the Americans are in full force in Afghanistan the same think tanks want them out.

Taliban who?

But let us first define what Taliban means? In our language it signifies a student. A movement was triggered by few madrassa students led by Mullah Omar and later joined by the majority of Afghan people against the corrupt warlords of Afghanistan all were later called Taliban including former warlords. In Pakistan Taliban is an ideological group supporting Afghan Taliban in supply of fighters and war material. It is debated whether Taliban are products of madrassas in Pakistan. Nevertheless jihadi literature is common in our madrassas. Poor socioeconomic conditions do promote recruitment to Taliban fold. In Fata the Taliban umbrella includes besides Pashtuns other nationalities as well. They have in their midst Pakistanis mainly from Southern Punjab, Arabs, Chinese Muslims, Uzbeks and Muslims from the West. These ethnic groups are bound by religious ideology of jihad against invading American and Nato forces (Gul, Imtiaz and Jaffar, Nabil, 2012). Punjab developed massive madrassas with government help during Gen Ziaul Haq’s time to produce mujahedeen to counter Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The fallout from jihadi madrassas spilled over into sectarian violence and attacks on soft civilian targets leaving 30,000 dead. Jihadi madrassas were in place in KP (Haqqania in Okara Khattak) as well as in Karachi (Madrassa Bonaria) (Hussain, 2012). Unfortunately most people in Pakistan are convinced that attacks on Pakistani people are the work of American, Israeli and Indian intelligence agencies.

Pakistani Jihadi Organisations

With retreat of the Russian troops the jihadi organisations turned their attention towards Kashmir and India for their terrorist activities. During Gen Musharraf’s Kargil disaster (May-July 1999) these mujahedeen were wrongly portrayed as leading the attack. When these Mujahids were prevented from meddling in Kashmir and India under international pressure they moved to Fata and carried out suicide attacks in Pakistani cities (Hussain, 2012). The monster created by our intelligence agencies started to attack our own civilian population and security forces. For a while these home grown Taliban conquered Swat and were poised to establish ‘Islamic’ system of government before army crackdown in 2009.

For the western media Taliban became associates of Al Qaeda in the leadership mode and after 9/11 were the target of the American might. Let us be clear that Taliban had no role in 9/11 beyond sheltering their leader Osama. Osama being an Arab had no leadership role in the tribal society of Afghanistan or Fata. For last six years of his life he was hiding in Abbottabad, Pakistan and had no role in Afghan resistance movement.

Taliban in western literature became synonymous with any religious organisation targeting the invading forces in Afghanistan and hence an enemy. The Western paranoia reached a stage where all Muslims and their religion Islam were designated as radical Islam, terrorists, militants, extremist or fundamentalists. Unfortunately other religions do not describe their ‘extremists’ in the same way as Islam. The Christian evangelists are just as radical as ‘ultra right’ Jews or ‘extremist’ Hindus. All religions have subset of people who claim to know the ‘true’ meaning of their religion but the issue is of imposing their views on others. The West should have recognised Taliban as freedom fighters against an occupying army. In fact Taliban designation covers a large number interest groups ranging from Jihadi ideologues to outright dacoits striving for loot through robbing banks or kidnapping for ransom. The Taliban do not have a standing army. The dress code has not changed over centuries, which include carrying arms, and we cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. We also have to recognise that Wahhabi interpretation of Islam did not emerge with funding from Saudi Arabia during Russian occupation of Afghanistan. In fact Wahhabi Islam reached Fata area in 1824 and soon spread to Afghanistan initially as anti Sikh and later anti British platform to oust the infidels from the Muslim society.

People admire the bravery and tenacity of Pashtuns of Fata and Afghanistan and their place in history. They have been devastated and made paupers in the name of ‘gairat’. The Afghan leadership has also been eulogised for their farsightedness and sagacity. Nothing can be far from the truth (Siddiqi, Muhammad Ali. No Sandhurst no West Point. Dawn. February 16, 2012).

Emergence of TTP

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is not a single homogeneous body. TTP was formed under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud in an agreement between 13 different armed groups in December 2007 against the Pakistani security forces, schools, mosques, markets and Nato forces in Afghanistan but it remains a loose federation of different interest groups. The Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar is striving to unite these groups to concentrate on on-going battle against the Nato forces in Afghanistan. A meeting organised by Afghan Taliban on December 11, 2011 in Datta Khel area, NWA the Afghan Taliban requested TTP to sink their differences and fight the Americans. Hakimullah Mehsud, Waliur Rehman, Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur attended the meeting. Sirajuddin Haqqani was representing the Afghan Taliban. Two representatives of Quetta Shura along with Al Qaeda commander Abu Yahya al-Libi attended the meeting. It was decided to establish a five-member Shura-e-Murakeba (Observation Council) which was launched on January 2, 2012 to sort out differences and concentrate on fighting the Americans in Afghanistan rather than take on the Pakistani security forces (Murshed, S Iftikhar. A dagger at the heart. The News. January 30, 2012).

The TTP is also involved in suicide bombing in major cities of Pakistan. The basic resentment emerged as the basis of revenge against killing of their kith and kin by the security forces and drone strikes. Revenge is basic cultural trait of the people of Fata. On the other hand killing of innocent people in Pakistan alienated any sympathy for them and went against the TTP public popularity. It is not surprising that bombing of cities in Pakistan has been put on hold. There is the issue of cross border attacks on Nato forces by some organisations in Fata. Since the Pakhtun relations lived across the porous ‘border’ (Durand Line) the TTP and other organisations were duty bound to help their brethren in Afghanistan. This has been strongly resented by the Americans and tried to put pressure on Pakistan to stop these attackers. The other aspect of Taliban ideology is found in rest of Pakistan especially in Punjab and hence called Punjabi Taliban. The Taliban belief of war against West, India and Israel and pro Taliban jihad is rampant in religious and main political parties in major urban areas of Pakistan. Majority of Taliban jihadi ideology mind set in Pakistan do not subscribe to violence as a means of change in the society. We do fear a military intervention (coup) since they are the ‘saviour of Pakistan’ and custodians of its ideology? Gen Zia’s indoctoration of the Pakistan military has played a significant role in the mind change of previous set of military commanders. Gen Hamid Gul is the prime example of jihadi generals of the past now part of ‘Defence of Pakistan Council’ organisation based on hate America, India and Israel.

Nato Invasion of Afghanistan and its Aftermath

Up to 2001 Afghanistan was an insignificant state ruled by Wahhabi leaning semi literate bunch of nobodies living in the Stone Age with scant understanding of developments in the world. They imposed their version of Wahhabi Islam. The world had forgotten Afghanistan with retreat of Russian army in 1989 till 2001. The most powerful army ever seen in the world seething with rage decided to ‘take out’ Osama after the 9/11 attack by a group of Arabs mainly from Egypt-none from Afghanistan. It seemed that the Taliban in Afghanistan would be pushover against the might of high-tech American army and their 500lb bombs dropped by air. It was predicted that Taliban would be totally eliminated by American hammering and what would be left of them shall beg for peace on American terms. Little did they realise that ten years later they would be still trying to find a way out of Afghanistan. Unfortunately the world and Pakistanis know very little about the conflict area in Afghanistan or Fata. For the world and Pakistani Fata and adjoining Afghanistan became the ‘bad lands’ and ‘most dangerous place in the world’ after 9/11. For the British in India these places were always the ‘bad lands’ only fit to train their army and seek medals for valour of their fighters against improvised lands. We need to explore the background of resistance of the people in the area before we make sweeping judgments.

The past of Afghanistan is haunting the Americans today and we need to divulge the past to understand what is happening today. We need to explore the historical role of foreign fighters and Punjabi Taliban in present context. These foreign fighters never assumed leadership role in the tribal system. The phenomenon of people crossing into Afghanistan from India to fight is not a new one.

Afghanistan Invasions in History

The Achaemenid Empire founded by Cyrus the Great (575 BC-530 BC) followed by Darius the Great (550-486 BC) included Afghanistan and part of Pakistan. Alexander’s objective was to conquer the Persian Empire and invaded Pakistan in 326 BC calling it India. He stopped at the banks of river Beas because beyond that was not India. This was a short Greek incursion of which the people of the area had no recollection. Bactrian Greeks ruled Afghanistan and northern Pakistan from 256 BC to 1^st century BC when Parthians finally defeated them. This was followed by invasion by Yuezhi (Kushan) and Scythians (Saka). The impact of invasion by different armies on local culture there is no documented evidence of change besides development of Indo-Greek sculpture used by Buddhists during Kushan period and adoption of Parthian dress of salwar kamiz by the people. In the middle of 4^th century AD Afghanistan was overrun by Epthalite branch of Huns. They finally managed to conquer most of northern India. Huns introduced title ‘khan’ into Afghanistan and Pakistan (Tanner, 2002). Besides invading armies over centuries different ethnic groups have silently moved across India from the west to permanently settle there. These migrating bands quietly integrated into the Indian society. Unfortunately these historical migrations have not been properly documented. In recent times war in Afghanistan has also displaced people. During the Russian invasion more than 3 million Afghans migrated to Pakistan. Today some 1.7 million Afghans refugees are still in Pakistan.

In more recent times the British invasion of Afghanistan by the ‘Army of the Indus’ to install a British puppet (modern American Karzai) as their ruler in 1839 led to annihilation of the army in its retreat in 1842. The Afghan invasion was pushed by the then Governor General Lord Auckland due to unfounded fear of Russian expansion into Afghanistan (this finally happened in 1979 when Russian army invaded Afghanistan). This was the time when Britain was the sole super power. British arrogance led them to disaster. To boost army’s morale Sindh was conquered in 1843. This was followed by annexation of Punjab in 1849. These British moves sent clear message about future British intentions to the hill tribes in the north west of the expanding British Empire. As early as 1847 Herbert Edwards as the British officer with the Sikh administration posted to Bannu as Assistant Resident, at that time border of ‘Eastern Afghanistan’, was able to subdue the valley and extract revenue for the Sikh Darbar (Obhrai, 1983). Starting in 1849 the British were regularly sending in punitive ‘expeditions’ into the Tribal belt. By 1857 British had launched 15 expeditions into the ‘Frontier’. By 1939 the ‘expeditions’ had increased to 58 (Barthorp, 2002). It is unfortunate to note that the British army in India used Fata as live training ground for its soldiers. But when the army faced well-equipped European armies during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and WW I it was found to be sadly lacking in battle skills. It was highly unethical to use the people of Fata as a military training ground for fame and glory. But if you are all powerful then ethics do not matter.

Before Sikh invasion of Peshawar (1818) the city was the summer capital of Kabul ruler. The city was finally annexed by the Sikhs in 1834 and was ruled by Gen Paolo Avitabile. His reign of terror was known as ‘gallows and gibbets’ (Wikipedia, 2012). The first British envoy Mountstuart Elphinstone visited the Afghan king in Peshawar in 1807 (Schofield, 2003). During the Sikh Darbar the Sikhs held the plains but the mountains in the west remained independent. By 1818 the Sikhs had taken Peshawar valley but part of the territory was given as Jagir to three brothers of Kabul ruler Amir Dost Mohammad. Till 1834 the Afghans were ruling Peshawar as Jagirdars of the Sikhs before it was annexed. Peshawar was the summer capital of ruler of Kabul. The Sikh army under the dreaded general Hari Singh Nalwa defeated the Afghan army in Nowshera and in 1838 Sikh Kardars replaced the Afghan administrators. Sikh garrisons were placed in Peshawar, DI Khan, Kohat and Teri. After the First Sikh War under a treaty signed on December 16, 1846 British formed Council of Regency and Hazara, Bannu, Kohat, DG Khan and DI Khan were placed under the British Assistant Residents. Chief Commissioner ruled Punjab in 1849 and in 1859 by Lt Governor. North-West Frontier got its Lt Governor in 1932. In the districts British Deputy Commissioners were appointed. During the Sikh wars Amir Dost Mohammad of Afghanistan moved into the Peshawar valley up to the Indus in December 1848. He made a grave miscalculation by sending a contingent of cavalry to aid the dying Sikh rule against the British.

During the Sikh rule Peshawar valley (Kabul River) up to Jamrud in the west was held with great atrocities. In 1849 the British took over the Sikh Darbar territories and established pickets (check posts) along the eastern banks of Indus and in Kabul River valley along the bases of mountains to restrain raids from tribes beyond in the mountains. The British were now in direct contact with Afghanistan and Persia. The first incursion of the British forces through what was Afghan tribal area took place when their army attacked Ghazni and Kabul in 1839 what became the disastrous 1^st Anglo-Afghan War (also called Auckland’s folly) (Barthorp, 2002). This was followed by revenge attack in August 1842 when the invading British forces (‘Avenging Army’) under Gen Pollock and Gen Nott brutally killed people of all ages and both sexes. This according to Duke of Wellington was ‘Restoration of Reputation in the East’. Kabul was sacked and bazaar burnt but this time the ‘Avenging Army’ retreated quickly.

Role of ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ in History

The origin of ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ needs to be explained. From times immemorial the Pakhtun belt now located between Afghanistan and Pakistan has not changed although they were Hindus at one time then converted to Buddhism and finally to Islam. Babar (early 16^th century) records his attack into Bonair to gather livestock and make a pyramid of heads of the local population (a Turkish tradition of Central Asia). At the time of Emperor Akbar, who held Kabul as a province of his empire, the Mughal policy was to pay some tribes for safe passage and to send expeditions to others. The unrest of Fata tribes instigated by Pir-e-Roshan (Sheikh Bazid Ansari) and his descendants, formally of South Waziristan Agency resident of Jalandhar (now in India) hence technically  ‘foreign fighters’, against religious doctrine of Deen-e-Elahi and occupation of Pakhtun homeland by Mughals was a severe test for Akbar’s armies. He sent in 15 expeditions to counter the jihadis in Tirah and Waziristan and after much bloodshed (including loss of his court jester Raja Birbal) he managed to make the area peaceful through diplomacy (Hosain, 1938; Shah, 2000). The tribes were in constant war with each other but united against any invader usually led by a religious figure. Nothing has changed since.

In more recent times Wahhabi cleric Syed Ahmed Shah moved from Bareilly, India, to what is now Fata to incite the tribes against Sikh rule in Punjab in 1824. In 1830 Syed Ahmed Shah, having not received any support from the tribes, was killed fighting the Sikh army in Balakot where he was buried.  His 300 surviving followers retreated to Sitana in Bonair and settled on the property of Syed Akbar Shah who became their Amir. The subsequent resistance movement was Wahhabi in nature. They were displaced from time to time but managed to establish ‘training’ centres in Tirah, Chamarkand and other places. Bonair became a serious problem for the British in 1852 when ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’, as labelled by the British, with the help of Hasanzai tribe took over the Kotla fort belonging to Nawab of Amb. An expedition was launched against them in 1853 and the fort was taken back.  At the time of Mutiny of 1857 the Hindustani fanatics led by Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan caused some problems. Their village called Narinji was attacked in July and later in August 1857 by a British force and set on fire. According to Major Vaughan “Not a house was spared; even the walls of many were destroyed by elephants…Three prisoners were taken—one was a Bareilly Maulvi, second a Chamla standard-bearer and the third a vagrant of Charonda; they were all subsequently executed.” Next was attack on the village of Sitana led by Sir Sydney Cotton. The Hindustanis came into attack dressed in white in silence and ‘every Hindustani in the position was either killed or taken prisoner (Nevill, 1910; Wylly, 1912).

Hindustani Wahhabi in Bonair 1860s

The scenes of massacres were still fresh in the memory of the tribes when the British forces launched Frontier War in 1863. The idea of this war was to teach a lesson to the tribes of Bonair to stop raids into the settled areas under British control and to ‘Hindustani fanatics’ of Wahhabi Islam who considered the British as occupier of their lands across India making jihad legitimate. The British felt that ‘Hindustanis’ were also spreading Wahhabi Islam in Fata and had to be stopped (Albinia, 2008).

To oppose British occupation the ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ were receiving funds from ‘Southern’ Bengal’ with its headquarter in Patna in Bihar. The arms and ammunition was coming from the Gulf and Afghanistan. Later armaments were supplied from ‘Mesopotamia’. The Mulka village in Mahabun Mountains of Syeds of Bunair housed left overs of Syed Ahmed Shaheed (d 1830) uprising against Sikh rule, was eventfully burnt by the locals under a British detachment in 1863. Between 1850 and 1863 the British launched 20 expeditions into the mountains beyond the plains occupied by the British forces. Each time the number of invading forces increased. In Sitana campaign (1863) more than 5,000 troops were used and later enforced. The initial force was trapped in Ambela Pass and Gen Sir Sydney Chamberlain was evacuated with severe wounds. The cost of the expedition was worrying for the British administration. The opposing tribesmen had few matchlock guns and mostly relied on swords and hurling stones. Swords were used in close quarter action (Adye, John. Sitana: a mountain campaign of the borders of Afghanistan in 1863. Published 1866). In 1860s the Afghan jezail with a range of 300 yards was better then the Brown Bess used by the British army. The introduction Snider and later Lee Metford and Martinis rifles (1897) with smokeless powder backed by artillery gave the British again the advantage. Finally the introduction of machinegun (Gatling and Maxim) made the British army a superior force. At the same time the tribes managed to acquire new weapons and balance was again maintained (Skeen, 1932). By 1906 Muscat imported 278,000 pounds worth of rifles from four European countries. The arms were transported to Mekran coast by boat and from their Afghan camel caravans took them to Southern Afghanistan and sold to the tribes. The British tried to block the movement by sea and land (Wylly, 1912).

The main issue of attacks by the British beyond its borders into Tribal Areas of Afghanistan (now Fata) was raids (cattle lifting) by tribes supported by ‘Hindustani Fanatics’ in the area. We must realise that the people living in inhospitable mountains had limited agricultural resource, living partly a nomadic life and raids in the more prosperous plains. In 1858 the British army raid destroyed Sitana, Bonair on the southern slopes of Mahabun Mountains. The British claimed that part of Amb State which was under British protection had been invaded by ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ and had to be evicted by the British Army. This was followed by destruction of ‘Hindustani settlement’ of Mulka located on the northern slopes of Mahabun Mountains in 1863. The British army in another raid destroyed ‘Hindustani village’ of Mundee in 1864. The other British approach was to block supplies, funds and fighters from British India. For the people of Fata fear of British occupation of Sindh and later Punjab was an indication of their advancement and occupation of their areas  (Punjab Administration Report, 1863-64 and 1867-68). The retaliatory raids into Tribal Territories by British forces became a nuisance for the poor. The tribes requested the Hindustani Jihadis to move their training camps into remote areas or leave the area. The Jihadis from outside Fata returned following Russian invasion in 1979.

20^th century Wahhabi Movement in India

There was resentment against British occupation of India among the educated youth in India. The Wahhabi doctrine of jihad carried intense appeal for these men. They decided to launch their jihad from Pakhtun tribes of British and Afghan frontier. They hoped that Afghanistan and Turkey would help them to conquer India. Large number of educated Muslims in India decided to move into the Tribal Area and some into Afghanistan in 1905. These British citizens called ‘Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics’ were interned in Afghan territory at Jallalabad by the Afghan king Amir Habibullah Khan under pressure from the British. Influential Indians in Afghan court finally released them. Although highly educated young anti British volunteers were influenced by Deoband School led by Sheikhul Hind Maulana Mehmoodul Hassan they were looked upon with suspicion. The money was supplied from across India from Calcutta, Patna and Punjab. However they were sadly disillusioned with the state of affairs they found in Afghanistan. There was no rule of law and the justice system was a replica of ancient system where the only the king finally gave his verdict. There was no system of education and this is where the ‘Young Afghans’ with the help of young Indian students led by Dr Abdul Ghani from various parts of India proposed to bring change. A society with proposed constitution and educational awareness threatened Amir Habibullah’s rule. In 1909 Dr Abdul Ghani and 38 British subjects members of Mashroota movement were interned in the Ark Fort Kabul while seven Afghani citizens were blown from artillery pieces. The Islamic Wahhabi renaissance of Afghanistan with system of the West ended with complete disillusionment of educated Muslims of India. Amir Habibullah was assassinated in 1919 and the new Amir Amanullah released them.

The Muslims of India during the WW I felt betrayed by the British when it went to war against Turkey a Muslim country and the home of the Khalifa of the Muslim World. This was the Khalafat Movement joined by Hindus and Sikhs as a means to ouster of the British from India. The Muslim preachers across India were asking for jihad against the infidels in particular an end of Indian occupation by the British.

Another jihadi group of about 20,000 people entered Afghanistan from India during Khalafat Movement of 1920. A poor country like Afghanistan could not afford to house and feed these people who has burnt their boats in India and had nothing to live on. Most moved back to India but a small hard core remained but their cause was doomed. By this time the political scene had changed. Russia as a communist state was expanding into Central Asian states also became enemy of the religion and hence of Muslims. Some Mujahids became communists. Many of jihadis in Kabul were seeking communist help to push the British out of India. Other Indians wanted help from Turkey but the country was in dire strait and refused anything to do with these Indian ‘revolutionaries’. There were endless intrigues within the Indian ranks in Russia, which did not help their cause. Amir Amanullah was advanced financial support and fearful of Russian intention he aligned with the British and would not tolerate anti British moves in his kingdom. Many of new jihadi arrivals moved to Fata and settled in older Hindustani settlements. For the British transportation of explosives was worrying and made efforts to stop this. They used secret agencies to affectively stop funding of Hindustani settlements from their sympathisers in India. The jihadi movement by Hindustani Fanatics continued till the 1930s but were a spent force and did not pose any danger to the British authorities. Only two Hindustani settlements were remaining in Fata.

The movement for jihad by Hindustani Wahhabi volunteers had sever setbacks from changing world scene and from within their ranks. However one cannot but admire these people from relatively affluent background in India chose a life of immense struggle and hardships. With no military training they faced hostile tribes, corrupt police, suspicious rulers and dacoits these people were moving across Asia and Europe despite poor resources. Their travels in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Turkey could have given credit to any Western explorer of that time (Shah, 2000). With the Russian and later American invasion the old ‘Hindustani’ now Pakistani Mujahids started to stream into Afghanistan to fight the invaders. Nothing has changed.

Fata during the British Raj

The Agencies of Fata were created firstly of Khyber to keep a hold on the Pass in 1878. Following cession of Kurram by the Afghan government in 1879 it was made an agency in 1892. The Malakand, Tochi and Wana (later Waziristan) were developed between 1895 and 1896.  The people of Waziristan were up in arms against demarcation of western border based on strategic heights rather than tribal lines. To force the tribes in accepting Durand Line Waziristan Field Force was organised in 1894. In 1901 the settled districts were made into province of North West Frontier and the Agencies separated (Obhrai, 1983). Starting in 1920 railway line from Peshawar was extended to Landi Kotal (Bayley, 1926).

 

The British continued its policy in Fata of ‘Butcher and Bolt’ in retaliation of tribal raids. After subduing the lashkar the villages of ‘miscreants’ were torched or blown up, the crops burnt, waterways destroyed, livestock rounded up and economic blockade of the offending area put in place. Each time a new agreement was made with the tribal elders. Starting in 1917 the British troops used ‘Air Service’ to attack the Mehsud tribal lashkar. In response the old style of Lashkar attack was abandoned. In 1930s Chief of the Air Staff Sir Hugh Trenchard proposed use of fighter aircraft to keep the tribes in check rather than rely on slow cumbersome land expeditions. He was overruled due financial constraints (Barthorp, 2002). Now drone strikes by the Americans and bombing by Pakistani F16 are trying to do the same. With advancement of military technology armoured cars and later light tanks were used. In Tirah the tribes were asked to remove ‘Turk and Afghan’ settlers (now foreign fighters) which they did sending them back to Afghanistan (Obhrai, 1938). It seems that nothing has changed in the 21^st century. Unfortunately we have no written record of the suffering or body count of people during various invasions and devastations caused by armies entering the area.

 

The British policy regarding Fata had been shifting. John Lawrence was in favour of ‘backward school’ making the Indus as the final ‘natural’ border. Sir Mortimer Durand advocated a ‘scientific frontier’, which was a soft face of ‘forward policy’ (Diver, 1935). The Durand Line split the ancient tribal system to secure military vantage points for the British. Whatever the policy development work in the area was limited to making roads to facilitate movement of troops at short notice. When the British left in 1947 Pakistan reversed the Fata ‘forward policy’ and pulled out the regular troops from Fata. We had peace in Fata till 2004.

 

Recent Developments in Fata

Let us jump to recent events shaking Fata and Afghanistan. The bookshops today are full of bewildering array of old and new publications on Afghanistan, Taliban and Al Qaeda (see Bibliography). Most of the modern authors have little understanding of the area, people or its history under discussion. Even the Pakhtuns of KP have vague understanding of the people of Fata. Fata tribes are individually unique and do not fit into a single cultural pattern. Al Qaeda, initially an all-Arab group, as an entity appeared on our radar screen through American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Al Qaeda led by Arabs has a foreign agenda and is irrelevant for Pakistan’s Fata problem.

 

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 galvanised the tribes and people of the country and Fata against the occupiers. This time Russian had helicopters, APCs and tanks but in this asymmetrical war the Afghans had the terrain on their side and supplies of manpower and ammunition from America, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Al Qaeda, a small splinter group, was born out of this triple marriage. The supply of Stringer missiles by the Americans negated Russian air power. On our visit to Bokhara in 1995 it was sad to note a large soldiers graveyard in the local park killed in Afghanistan-a needless butchery of the youth of Bokhara.

 

The American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 united the Fata tribes once again into military opposition. People of Pakistan are also opposed to American intervention in Afghanistan and drone attacks in Fata. They are supplying manpower and funds to Taliban as seen in 1860s. The ‘Hindustani fanatics’ are now ‘foreign fighters’ or called ‘Punjabi Taliban, Arab fighters or Uzbeks’. The Fata Pakhtun ‘raiders’ of 1863 were transformed into Mujahedeen during Russian occupation and then into Taliban when the Americans came in. AK47, 50 calibre machinegun, sniper rifle, Improvised Explosive Device (IED), landmines, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and suicide bombers now affectively replace the Stringer missiles. The Pakhtuns are innovative. Pakistan became an enemy of the Taliban fighting the American and Nato armies because of Pakistan governments support to Americans in the form of supplies and drone attacks. We saw spate of suicide and IED blasts in major cities of Pakistan.

 

The incidence of Lal Masjid in Islamabad and then attack of the Pakistani army into South Waziristan in 2004 was the last straw for peace. Most of the students who died in Lal Masjid in the army assault were from Fata and KP. Then came the incidence of US troops killing 24 FC soldiers in cold blood in North Waziristan on November 26, 2011, which was followed by retaliatory freeze of Nato supplies through Pakistan and returning of Shamsi Air Base used for drone strikes in Fata. Earlier CIA agent Raymond Davis was held for shooting two motorcyclists in Lahore and then released after payment of blood money under Islamic law. He was never tried for murder of two young men in America. This was followed by the killing of Osama in an American raid in Abbottabad, which produced bad blood between the two countries. The people of Pakistan were told of thousands of visas issued by Pakistani embassy in US to dubious people considered as CIA agents.

 

Ten Years of American Occupation of Afghanistan

America is bleeding in Afghanistan like its predecessor the Russians. The 1^st World armies require expensive services and equipment, which are not appropriate for war in the 3^rd World. With killing of Osama the main reason for invasion of Afghanistan has been removed. The original motivational force for the American troops in the field was to make America ‘safe’ and revenge for 9/11 by removing Al Qaeda leadership has been achieved. The Americans have killed enough innocent Afghans to settle revenge for 9/11. The civilian deaths in Afghanistan in 2011 were estimated as 3,021, which was more than 8% in 2010. A total of 4,507 civilians were wounded. These deaths were attributed to militants (77%) and 14% due to Isaf and Afghan forces. The number of suicide bombings (450) increased by 8%. Homemade explosive landmines killed 967 people (Johson, Kay. Civilian deaths in Afghan war hit record high. Dawn. February 5, 2012). A report by Amnesty International claims that 500,000 Afghans are homeless due to on-going war. About 400 people are made homeless on daily basis (War, neglect leave 500,000 Afghans homeless, says AI. Agencies. The News. February 24, 2012). Today Americans are questioning the basic reason for US invasion of Afghanistan (Cloughley, Brian. Afghan war is based on lies and deception. Counterpunch/Daily Times. February 20, 2012).

 

The US soldiers in the field are now fighting a non-ideological war where it is now ‘them or us’. It is not surprising that American soldiers have been caught taking fingers as souvenirs and urinating on dead Afghans. It is time they got out without giving an impression that they have their tail between the legs. In any case Americans do not need troops on the ground in Afghanistan to ward off any untoward incidence. They have 50 bases in the Middle East and Qatar and Bahrain bases are not far from Afghanistan. For surveillance the Americans have ample supply of drones and settilites. Their troops can be moved into Afghanistan at short notice. I do not see how the Americans can maintain Karzai as the leader of Afghans once they leave.

 

Fata Solution-Options

The other player in Afghan scene is Pakistan. Afghan leadership never had soft corner for the Pakistan. The bone of contention between the two is the 2,640 km 1893 Durand Line Agreement inherited from the British for fixing ‘spheres of influence’ between the two countries. Thus the British claimed Fata and what is now most of KP as their ‘sphere of influence’. Today neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can dictate to the Fata tribes. Both keep Durand Line as a porous border and bone of contention. The attacks into Pakistan by Taliban or its splinter groups have been worrying. Like the British earlier the American and Pakistani leadership have made agreements with the various groups of Pakistani Taliban and tribes, which each side claim were broken by the other. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have to give a clear programme for the betterment of the people.

 

Legally the situation in Fata and Balochistan is quite similar. In Balochistan Area A, which is only 3% of the province is under direct provincial rule where the administration is functioning. In Area B (97%) the Sardars have been given the responsibility of governance and maintenance of private armies. In Fata, since there were no tribal chiefs, governance was given to the tribes with the right of the central government to intervene under Frontier Crime Regulation. The ancient tribal autonomy is the main issue for integration of Fata into mainstream of Pakistan. There have been many suggestions for bringing Fata into the mainstream of Pakistan. Since last year political parties have been allowed to function in Fata. Some claim that Fata should change its status from ‘sphere of influence’ into a province of Pakistan. Then there are others who want Fata to become part of corrupt Khyber Pakhtunkhawa province (Afridi, Ghulam S. Fata’s integration. Dawn. February 8, 2012). The political solution has to emerge from the people of Fata and cannot be dictated by the Pakistan government. The present military policy of creating displacement of the population (IDPs) followed by indiscriminate destruction of what little livelihood of the people of the area had has been a disastrous policy. The ‘hull’ (solution) for Fata is not war but economics and education. In any case Pakistan cannot financially afford even low-level military intervention in the area. Pakistan was spending (directly and indirectly) Rs259.10 billion on ‘war on terror’ in 2005 but by 2010 this was increased to Rs2,975.04 billion. Another estimate claims that Pakistan is loosing Rs3 billion daily and Rs93 billion every month on ‘war on terror’ (Abbasi, Ansar. Pakistan lost Rs7,020b, got only Rs990b. The News. February 8, 2012). The cost of human lives lost and those maimed is also significant (Shah, Akhtar Hussain in Stabilising Afghanistan, 2011).

 

Historically Afghanistan was on the trade route from Central Asia and Iran to India. Later the Russians joined in. With communist take over of Russia (1917) the borders were hermitically sealed and the ancient trade movement stopped. Afghanistan became dependent on India and later Pakistan for its basic needs.

 

From times immemorial Afghanistan and Fata was trading and providing heavy work to India till the Russia, British and later Pakistan came to define borders. Horses and cloth were brought in from Iran and Central Asia to be sold in India. Dry fruit sale was in their hands all over India. Heavy work such as building mud walls and providing wood to the rural areas in India was the work of these hardy men from the mountains. Today Fata has a million armed men but is heavily dependent on food, electricity, infrastructure, fuel and some places gas from Pakistan. Only 7% of land in the area is cultivable. Fata survives on smuggling, heroin export, and jobs in local militia and in rest of Pakistan. We are not sure of mineral wealth of Fata since no survey has been carried out. Thanks to the Americans we now know that neighbouring Afghanistan is full of mineral wealth including rare earth minerals (Simpson, 2011). Before the Russian invasion there was insignificant poppy growth in Afghanistan. Today they are producing 5,800 tons of opium a year and the American army has failed to make a dent on heroin production or its export (Cloughley, Brian. Doing Afghan drugs. Daily Times. January 29, 2012). Fata is one important outlet for heroin export and source of earning for the poor people.

 

We also need to evaluate the impact of developments in Afghanistan on Pakistan. First and foremost Talibanisation to a degree has taken place in Pakistan where most people are supportive of Islamisation, which cannot be equated with Talibanisation. The first step towards Islamisation of Pakistan took place with Objectives Resolution in 1949. Since then the rulers of Pakistan have used Islam to promote their rule over the country. Some of the so-called religious scholars have used Islam for financial gains or to grab power. Money has flowed from local and foreign sources in support of different factions. Religion has become the biggest industry in Pakistan. Religion has also been source of deadly conflict within Pakistan as different sects jockey for power.

 

The Arab Spring in Middle East and North Africa has drifted to Islam as a source of inspiration. Even Turkey with years of enforced secularism as visualised by its army is trying to find Islamic values. The lack of understanding by the West of the Muslim World is the basis of the problem of being threatened by Islam. There is also much confusion among the Muslim World as to what is Islamic and is coloured by cultural past of each society in the Muslim World. On the other hand Muslims should understand that ‘Islam is (not) in danger’ and they do not require armed conflict to achieve their goal. The Muslim World has to realise that we are now living in a global village and cannot survive in isolation as being tried by Iran. Most of all the West needs to understand the mind set of emerging Muslim World. A free stable Afghanistan needs to evolve from Stone Age and not forced at gunpoint to perceived Western values and governance. Afghan peace would bring peace in Fata. Rest assured the Afghans or people of Fata are not going to declare war on the West.

 

There is a strong parallel between Russian and later American invasions. The Russians came into Afghanistan to make them communists while the Americans after the period of rage want to build a capitalist system in their style of democracy. Neither of these super powers have made any dent on the Afghans. Change comes from the mind and not guns. This was the effort of Bacha Khan the Frontier Gandhi. He was essentially a social worker and not a politician dubbed as a traitor by the Pakistani leadership. We should use the carrot rather than the stick to solve Fata problem. There has been in place Fata Development Authority for many years it has dismal record of socio-economic development as compared to rest of Pakistan. Fata also has Fata Disaster Management Authority collaborating with UN Development Programme, which requires $200 million (Ali, Zulfiqar. Donors seek access to monitor Fata uplift. Dawn. February 15, 2012). Poor figures of health and education are alarming. We do not have correct information since the army feeds it and we have no independent observers in the area (Qureshi, Shafiullah. Fata failure. The News. January 29, 2012).

 

Guns shall make the Fata situation worse since there is no military solution. Above all we need professional research of the area and a ten years planned strategy with the consent of the Fata tribes. The old social structure has been altered with massive influx of arms and ammunition during Russian invasion. The old British administrative system is in tatters. The Political Agent and Malik equation and the jirga system have been dismantled. We are not dealing with old Fata anymore. Solution of Fata has to emerge from its people. Before we plan for a long-term policy for Fata it has to be taken off the hands of the Pakistan Army.

 

PS. Today Pakistan faces a more serious problem of separatist nationalist movement in Balochistan, which unlike Fata is not a religious issue. Unfortunately successive governments in Pakistan have been in a state of denial and used the gun to make Balochistan fall in line. This time it is not going to work.

 

Radicalisation of Pakistani society unleashed by Gen Zia fast gaining ground is also a major issue yet to be addressed (Hussain, 2012).

 

Selected Bibliography

 

1. Adye, John. Sitana: a mountain campaign of the borders of Afghanistan in 1863. ASIM: BOO6PE65CC. Published 1866.
2. Ahmed, Khalid. The mystery of what Pakistan wants. Friday Times. Jan 2/Feb 2, 2012.
3. Al Qaeda in its own words. Edited by Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2008.
4. Albinia, Alice. Empires of the Indus. John Murray, London. 2008.
5. Baha, Lal. NWFP: administration under British rule 1901-1919. National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad. 1978.
6. Barthorp, Michael. Afghan wars and the North-West Frontier 1839-1947. Cassell & Co, London. 2002.
7. Bayley, Victor. Permanent way through the Khyber. Jarrolds Publishers, London. MCMXXXIV (1924).
8. Bellew, HW. Afghanistan and the Afghans: brief review of the history of the country and account of its people. Samson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, London. 1879.
9. Bergen, Peter L. Holy war Inc: inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden. Phoenix, London. 2002.
10. Borovik, Artyom. The hidden war: a true story of war in Afghanistan. Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 1991.
11. Bruce, Richard Isaac. The forward policy and its results. 1898.
12. Burns, Alexander. Cabool: a personal narrative of a journey to, and residence in that city, in the years 1836, 7, and 8. Reprint Ferozesons Ltd., Lahore. 1961.
13. Caroe, Olaf. The Pathans. Reprint by Oxford University Press, Karachi. 1975.
14. Charny, IW. Fighting suicide bombing: a worldwide campaign for life. Praeger Security International, Westport. 2007.
15. Deshpande, Anirudh. British military policy in India, 1900-1945. Vanguard Books, Lahore. 2005.
16. Diver, Maud. Kabul to Kandahar. Peter Davis, London. 1935.
17. Docherty, Paddy. The Khyber Pass: a history of empire and invasion. Oxford University Press, Karachi. 2007.
18. Dupree, Louis. Afghanistan. Oxford Pakistan Paperback, Karachi. 1997.
19. Edwards, Herbert B. A year on the Punjab Frontier in 1848-49. Vol. I & II. Reprint Ferozesons Ltd., Lahore. 1963.
20. Elliott, JG. The Frontier 1839-1947: the story of the North-West Frontier of India. Cassell, London. 1968.
21. Fata- a most dangerous place. Principle Author Shuja Nawaz. Centre for Strategic & International Studies. 2009.
22. Griffiths, John C. Afghanistan. Pall Mall Press, London. 1967.
23. Gul, Imtiaz and Jaffar, Nabila. Taliban and the Pakistani politics. Friday Times. Jan 2/Feb 2, 2012.
24. Hamilton, Angus. Afghanistan. William Heinemann, London. 1906.
25. Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game: on secret service in High Asia. John Murray, London. 1990.
26. Hosain, Mohammad. A few phases of the Afghans in Jullundur Busties. 1938.
27. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjabi Taliban: driving extremism in Pakistan. Pentagon Press, New Delhi. 2012.
28. Hussain, Zahid. The scorpions tail. Free Press, New York. 2010.
29. Jalal, Ayesha. Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 2008.
30. Jan, Abid Ullah. Afghanistan: the genesis of the final crusade. Pragmatic Publication. Ottawa. 2006.
31. Journals and diaries of the Assistants to the Agent, Governor-General North West Frontier and Resident at Lahore 1846-1849. First edition 1911. Reprint Sang-e-Meel. 2006.
32. Khan, Mohammad Hosain. A few phases of the Afghans in Jullundur Basties. 1938.
33. Khan, Wajahat S. The other guy’s endgame—Part I. Friday Times. Jan27/Feb-2, 2012.
34. Khan, Wajahat S. The other guy’s endgame—Part II. Friday Times. February 3-9, 2012
35. Krasmer, D Stephen. Getting tough with Pakistan. Foreign Affairs. January/February. 2012.
36. Kroernig, Matthew. Foreign Affairs. January/February. 2012.
37. Lahood, Nelly. The jihadis’ path to self-destruction. Hurst & Co. London.2010.
38. Lieven, Anatal. Pakistan a hard country. Allen Lane, UK. 2011.
39. Matinuddin, Kamal. Power struggle in the Hindukush Afghanistan (1978-1991). Services Book Club, Lahore. 1991.
40. Mir, Amir. Talibanisation of Pakistan. Pentagon Security International, New Delhi. 2009.
41. Murray, Hallan AH. The high-road of Empire. John Murray, London. 1905.
42. Nevill, HL. Campaigns on the North-West Frontier. First published 1910. Reprint Sang-e-Meel Publications. 2003.
43. Nichols, Robert. Settling the Frontier: land, law and society in the Peshawar Valley, 1500-1900. Oxford University Press. 2001.
44. Obhrai, Divan Chand. The evolution of North-West Frontier Province. First published 1938. Reprint Saeed Book Bank, Peshawar, 1983.
45. Omissi, David. The Sepoy and the Raj: the Indian Army, 1860-1940. Macmillan Press Ltd, Houndmills. 1994.
46. Pakistan: the militant jihadi challenge. Asia Report No. 164. March 13, 2009. Pennell, TL. Among the wild tribes of the Afghan Frontier. Seeley &Co., London. 1909.
47. Post Taliban. Complied and edited by Ahmed Salim. Sang-e-Meel Publication, Lahore. 2003.
48. Rashid, Ahmed. Decent into chaos. Allen Lane, UK. 2008.
49. Razvi, Mujtaba. The frontiers of Pakistan: a study of Frontier problems in Pakistan’s foreign policy. National Publishing House Ltd., Karachi. 1971.
50. Ridedel, Milton A. In search for Al Qaeda: its leadership and future. Vanguard Books, Lahore. 2009.
51. Saleem, Shahzad. Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: beyond bin Laden and 9/11. Pluto Press, London. 2011.
52. Shah, Zahid. Muslim freedom fighters of India based in Central Asia. Area Study Centre (Russia & CA) Peshawar University and Hanns Seidel Foundation. 2000.
53. Schofield, Victoria. Afghan frontier: feuding and fighting in Central Asia. Tauris Parke Paperbacks, London. 2003.
54. Simpson, Sarah. Afghanistan’s buried riches. Scientific American. October 2011.
55. Skeen, Andrew. Tribal fighting in NWFP. First published 1932. Reprint Vanguard Books, Lahore. 2009.
56. Stabilising Afghanistan: regional perspective and prospects. Edited by Maqsudat, Hassan Nuri, Mohammad Munir and Aftab Hussain. Islamabad Policy Research Institute. Hanns Seidel Foundation. 2011
57. Steven, Coll. Ghost Wars. Penguin Books. 2004.
58. Stewart, Jules. The Khyber Rifles: from the British Raj to Al Qaeda. Sutton Publishing, Phoenix Mill. 2006.
59. Sykes, Percy. A history of Afghanistan. Vol. I & II. First published 1940. Reprint Al-Biruni, Lahore. 1979.
60. Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the Great to the fall of Taliban. Oxford University Press, London. 2002.
61. The Second Afghan War: 1878-80. Complied by Charles Metcalfe MacGregor and India Army Intelligence Branch. Army Education Press. 1975.
62. Thomas, Lowell. Beyond Khyber Pass. Hutchinson & Co., London. 1920s.
63. Warren, Alan. Waziristan, the Fiqir of Ipi, and Indian army- the North West Frontier Revolt of 1936-37. Oxford University Press, Karachi. 2000.
64. Wylly, HC. From the Black Mountain to Waziristan. Macmillan and Co., Ltd. London. 1912.
65. Yate, AC. Travels with the Afghan Boundary Commission. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh. 1886
66. Zaeef, Abdul Salam. My life with the Taliban. Hachette, India. 2010.

 

 

Appendix

 

Chronological Table of North West Frontier Campaigns (Barthorp, Michael, 2002).

 

 

1849               Baizais                                                1879               Zakha Khel

1850               Kohat Afridis                                     1880               Marris

1851               Mohmands                                         1881               Mahsuds

1852               Ranizais                                              1883               Shiranis

1852               Utman Khel                                        1888               Black Mountain Tribes

1852               Waziris                                               1890               Zhob Valley

1852               Black Mountain Tribes                     1891               Black Mountain Tribes

1853               Hindustani Fanatics                          1891               Miranzai

1853               Shiranis                                              1891               Hunza and Nagir

1853               Kohat Afridis                                     1894               Mahsuds

1854               Mohmands                                         1895               Chitral

1854               Afridis                                                 1897               Tochi Wazirs

1855               Orakzais                                             1897               Malakand

1855               Miranzai                                             1897               Mohmands

1856               Kurram                                               1897               Orakzais

1857               Bozdars                                              1897               Afridis

1857               Hindustani Fanatics                          1900               Mahsuds

1859               Waziris                                               1908               Zakha Khel

1860               Mahsuds                                             1908               Mohmands

1863               Ambela                                               1915               Mohmands

1863               Mohmands                                         1917               Mahsuds

1868               Black Mountain Tribes                     1919-20         Waziristan

1868               Bizotis                                                 1923               Mahsuds

1872               Tochi                                                  1927               Mohmands

1877               Jowakis                                               1930-31         Afridis

1878               Utman Khel                                        1933               Mohmands

1878               Zakha Khel                                         1935               Mohmands

1878               Mohmands                                         1936-37         Waziristan

1878               Zaimukhts                                          1937-39         Waziristan

 

 

 

Asif Hussain The Gilgit-Baltistan region is situated in the extreme north of Pakistan between longitude 72-75 in the North and 35-37, latitude in the East. It joins Xingjiang province of China in the north, Afghanistan and the Chitral District in the northwest with Tajikistan (Central Asia close behind). In the southeast side there is a [...]

With sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran gaining greater momentum and the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran looming large in the global economy, a key question remains whether or not the Islamic Republic will ink a deal to extricate itself from increasingly biting sanctions and ensure its survival, or will it inch toward an inevitable military confrontation with the West? 

Houshang Hassan-Yari sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, senior writer at Foreign Policy Association, to answer the above questions and discuss what’s in store for the greater Middle East.
Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari is Professor of international relations and strategic military studies at Royal Military College of Canada.

 

In the current geopolitical climate involving Iran and the West marked by loud and reciprocal threats, intensifying sanctions, non-dollar trade paradigms, and an apparent shadow war, what do you think is in store for the region as it pertains to Iranian-Western rivalries?

Hassan-Yari: I think the current situation cannot continue for too long. If there is no peaceful solution in the nuclear issue of Iran, the cul-de-sac will be opened in another way. The war will be the most plausible. Iran is very much isolated in the region.
The United States and Israel have been successful in creating an association between the Iranian nuclear program and nuclear weapons. They were also able to join the vast majority of Arab countries to their perception of the danger that Iran poses to stability in these countries. The sum of U.S. efforts and concerns of the militarily weak Arab regimes have resulted in the necessity to contain a dangerous Iran. If there is a rivalry between Iran and West in the Middle East, it is clearly favourable to the West.

Iran has recently conducted a number of naval and air drills in the Persian Gulf in the course of which it has put on display new surface-to-sea and surface-to-surface missile capabilities. It has also threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. How do you assess Iran’s military capabilities in countering U.S. Navy presence in the Persian Gulf and in closing the Strait of Hormuz? What do you think would galvanize the U.S. and its allies into concrete military action against Iran?

Hassan-Yari: In this climate of distrust and suspicion which prevails in the Persian Gulf, a miscalculation by the parties involved could lead to a war that nobody wants. The threat of Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, a threat that is taken lightly by the Iranian authorities, will lead to war.
Any aggression aiming international navigation in the Strait may trigger hostilities. It seems to me that the majority of the Persian Gulf Arab countries want to settle once and for all the “Iranian issue”. The problem is that they are unable to do so themselves. This is where the utility of American military power comes in. In other words, Arabs are pushing Americans to a war they want but cannot perform. Israelis also are in a similar situation.

Since taking office, and in particular during his second term, the policies of President Ahmadinejad and his administration have been synonymous with the rise of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iranian politics and economy. Given the prominence of the IRGC in the socio-political and economic management of the country, has it been an effective and capable force in formulating various policies and in executing those policies?

Hassan-Yari: President Ahmadinejad is only one factor that facilitated the rise in the status of the IRGC. The indispensable actor that greatly opened the door to the predominance of the IRGC in all aspects of Iranian life is the leader himself. The latter could not do so under Mohammad Khatami because of the popularity and the resistance of the reformist president. We should not forget that Ahmadinejad is one of them and owes his presidency largely to the intervention of the IRGC in the electoral process of 2005.
The multifaceted IRGC is not a homogenous force. Nor is it a force formed to formulate and implement policies for the common good. The main concern of the Force is to protect the leader and the revolution as it intends to do. Everything it does in the field of security, political, economic and social serves this purpose. In other words, its allegiance is first and foremost the Leader.
Dependency of political power to the military force of the IRGC has forced the former to give exclusive mega contracts to latter in all economic sectors. But as the Guardians do not have expertise in all these areas, they often fail to deliver a good quality product. However, the poor quality of their work was never an obstacle to prevent the IRGC to receive new contracts worth billions of dollars.
Their imprint is deeply engraved in all aspects of life from sport to aviation to missile technology to nuclear programme of Iran.

Recent statements made by former high-ranking officials and parliamentarians (Hossein Alaei of IRGC and Emad Afrough of Majles) appear to be part of a new paradigm in directly challenging the clerical establishment. Do you think these statements signify a new rupture in Iran’s power structure? If that is the case, how could this new rupture play itself out in the upcoming Majlis elections?

Hassan-Yari: What Alaei, Afrough and other rightwing moderates (Principalists /Ossoulgarayaan) pose as a question today are after-shocks of the popular protests of 2009 and the tremors of the recent Arab awakening. These individuals are also very sensitive to preserve intact the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini which is fast eroding since the coming to power of Ahmadinejad and the unconditional support he received from the Leader. They attempt to salvage the Islamic Republic by returning to the values of the 1979 Revolution. They directly challenge the entourage of the Leader and indirectly the Leader himself who has created a propitious environment for the growth of political immorality and toadyism.
This new phenomena is certainly a break with the established order since coming to power of Ayatollah Khamenei in 1989. It is expected to expand gradually as the gap in the conservative camp is widening, a situation that Khamenei is incapable of controling effectively.
A number of scenarios for the outcome of Majles election could be envisaged. If the elections are carried by the camp of Ahmadinejad, the status of the leader will be further weakened and the consequences could be fatal to the Republic as we know it today. A possible victory by the leader’s entourage should not be interpreted as the return to normality.
I think that a return to the former situation when the leader was not objectionable is impossible without resorting to brutal force. Even then, the lull is only temporary. The sanctity of the Leader is broken and with it the unchallenged position of the clergy close to the government. It is quite possible that we witness a return of the clergy in its religious schools leaving power to the ‘civilian’. In Iran, people break the personality before breaking the person.

Iran and Israel seem locked in a strategic rivalry that has gone through different stages, each stage with its own narrative. What are the key aspects of this strategic rivalry that have made the U.S. an indispensable player in it? Do you envision a point at which security establishments from the U.S., Iran, and Israel would decide to negotiate (most likely secret negotiations) as a way out of the current atmosphere of brinkmanship to avert a potentially large-scale regional conflict and save the global economy from spiralling down a path of sever instability?

Hassan-Yari: First, on Iran-Israel rivalry. From the perspective of the Iranian political elite in power, this rivalry has a clear ideological pronouncement. It goes back to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s epoch and the pre-1979 revolutionary romanticism when Iranian islamists received their military training in Lebanon and sympathized with the Palestinian cause. For them, Israel is a colonial creation, artificial and usurper. It is an illegitimate entity, so to disappear. For Israel, Iran was an opportunity to lessen the Arab pressure.
Since the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran, this rivalry has taken on new dimensions. Israel remains not only as an ideological enemy, but also a military obstacle that challenges Tehran’s supremacist claim on the regional leadership. In addition, since the Israeli danger to Iran’s nuclear program has become more pressing, Tehran uses its Lebanese and Palestinian allies to keep Israel concerned about its own safety and away from the Iranian border.
On the other hand, Iran is the only country in the Middle East that poses a challenge to the qualitative predominance of Israel’s powerful military machine in the region. In the final analysis, if Israel can live with a non-militant Iran, Tehran cannot co-exist with a ubiquitous ‘Zionist danger’ in the region. This is where the United States enters into the equation as a moderating force. While Washington would prefer a more cooperative Iran, it seeks to remain the final arbiter of the regional game. It seems that neither Iran nor Israel want their regional importance overshadowed by the American omnipotence.
In regard to a possible “ménage à trios”, Iran-Israel-U.S., in the field of regional security, this hypothesis seems very unrealistic under current conditions. If the United States and Israel can provide manageable compromise to Iran over its security considerations without losing face, the latter, on the contrary, has everything to lose by entering into this game that goes against its identity as “defender” of the dispossessed. The only situation, in which the Islamic Republic will make painful compromise, is if it concludes that its own survival is at risk by persisting in its belligerent posture in regional and international security issues.

Russian officials have repeatedly made it clear that they are fiercely opposed to any military confrontation between the West and Iran. From geo-political and geo-energy perspectives, what are at stake for Russia? Do you think a political tilt by Iran toward the West would change the geo-political equation in Eurasia/Middle East?

Hassan-Yari: Russian resistance to any military intervention in Iran is not a matter of principle, nor is it aimed at preventing another catastrophic war in the region. The Russian calculation is based on geopolitical considerations. Russia is still looking for the lost place of the Soviet Union on the world stage. Any U.S. military intervention in the region further isolates Russia. It is also in this context that we must understand the resistance from Moscow to any foreign military intervention in Syria. For Russia, this is a zero sum game. In addition, an isolated Iran strengthens the position of Russia as an intermediary between this country and the West. Iran’s isolation and demonization has helped Russia develop advanced military and commercial relations with Iran. The same is true for China, with more emphasis on the economic relations with Iran.
A dominant U.S. presence in Iran could compromise Russian’s not too comfortable authority in the Caspian Sea basin. One of the reasons for creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was to counterbalance the U. S. presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The fall of the Islamic Republic could revive the spectrum of Soviet containment through a new security belt connecting Europe to Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

This year Russia and Iran started doing trade in their respective national currencies, replacing the U.S. dollar and Euro. Similarly, trade has been taking place between Iran and China in Chinese Renminbi and between Iran and Japan in Japanese Yen including for the sale of Iranian oil. Do you think the exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by these trade partners could hold geopolitical implications? If so, in what ways?

Hassan-Yari: Since the day after the revolution Iran has tried to to break free from the yoke of the dollar, without much success. The currencies of Russia and China are not convertible, which reinforces the dependency of Iran on Russians and Chinese. It’s an ironic situation because Iran claims to want to break from the grip of the U. S. dollar and to free itself of turbulence of American imperialism by creating more dependency on secondary powers like Russia and China. In its business dealings with Moscow and Beijing, Iran is forced to buy Sino-Russian merchandise. However, the quality of those goods does not meet consumer expectations in Iran. The continuation of this trade policy increasingly limits Iran to two or three unreliable suppliers who put their own national interests ahead of Iranian welfare in any dispute with Americans. Russia in particular has demonstrated that it is not a feasible partner. There is no other country in the world that has hurt Iranian interests as much as Russia since the 19th century.
The recent currency crisis that deeply hit the value of Iran’s Rial showcased the significance of dollar as a safe currency for ordinary Iranians. During the crisis, no one was looking for Russian or Chinese currency. It is also ironic that some ministers in Iran use the dollar as reference when they talk about their non-petroleum exports, the value of the national economy or foreign investment. The language that the average Iranian better understands is that of Dollar, not the Rouble, or the Yuan. In addition, the Central Bank of Iran often manipulates the value of dollar to regulate the amount of liquidity in circulation.
The exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by Iran and its trade partners could hold geopolitical implications if Euro Zone dismantles itself and if China decided to dispose its massive dollar reserve. Among some other possibilities one can invoke the unlikely scenario of the Arab oil producers to join the Russia-China-Iran trio in replacing dollar by other currencies. Iran’s economy is too small to have a geopolitical impact on the dollar.

How stable is the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria? How Iran could be impacted by Assad’s fall?

Hassan-Yari: Assad’s regime is extremely weak. It has reached a point of no return and condemned to disappear. Its fall will have major implications for the safety and security of the Islamic Republic as well as the rest of the Middle East. The survival of the Syrian regime is so crucial to the Iranian theocratic system that it forced Tehran to denounce the Syrians protesting against Damascus as agents of Zionism and imperialism while praising Arabs in other countries as Islamist followers of Iran’s Islamic revolution. This position has highlighted the contradiction in the official discourse of the Iranian leadership by substantially weakening its claim to the universality of the Islamic revolution.
Syria is the only strategic ally of Iran in the Arab world. It also acts as a bridge between Iran and Lebanon. It gives Iran direct access to Israeli territory through the Hazbollah and some Palestinian groups. The fall of the Assad regime will also weaken the position of Shiite militants in the region. A regime change in Damascus further limits Iran’s ability to intervene on the regional scene. It will deprive Islamic Iran of a vital window to breathe. Finally, it will make Iran even more vulnerable in facing a possible foreign military attack. Within Iran itself, it will strengthen the resolve of opponents of the Islamic regime.

The Saudi government has made significant military hardware purchases from the United States. The Saudi diplomacy has been also active in countries impacted by the Arab Spring. How do you assess the future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and in light of Arab Spring, what are the chances of having a more representative leadership in Saudi Arabia?

Hassan-Yari: The Islamic Republic is not the only country embarrassed by the Arab awakening. The United States and Saudi Arabia have also taken contradictory positions to events in Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere.
The future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia depends largely on the Kingdom’s internal dynamics. A democratic Saudi Arabia will be more independent in its foreign policy. It will also have much less appetite for accommodating dictatorships in surrounding countries.
But since we are not there yet, I cannot envisage any strategic change in the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, even if there is a few sporadic surmountable bumps.
As for democratic changes in Saudi Arabia, they will be introduced very gradually in the absence of a popular revolution. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can not remain immune to the political and military changes that inflame its neighbourhood. The question is the degree and level of change that the descendants of Al-Saud are forced to introduce.

This is first part of a series of posts on Iran based on travel experiences in the country in 2011.

“Sir, can I ask why Iran?” asked the travel agent whom I called to book the flight for Tehran.

 “I have an interest in the culture, people and language”, I respond.

“Hmmm but people would normally go to Dubai for that… anyway”, he conveys his lack of cultural knowledge.

Just like a lot of people confuse us Pakistanis as Arabs, the Iranians have to face the same misery.

The country is so diverse in terms of culture, lifestyle and landscape that planning the trip to Iran was itself an exciting experience – from LonelyPlanet to Iranian travel agents, books and travel documentaries; I explored everything to ensure my time in Iran is well spent and I return with a better understanding of the country and its people.  With the variety it has got, its unfortunate Iran isn’t a hot tourist destination.

Getting a Visa

Despite the bad press, the travel agency business seems booming in Iran. There are hundreds of them in the capital and tens in other bigger cities. They can help planning the trip, arranging accommodation, travel, guides and more. Most importantly, you may need them to get a visa. Although nationals of some countries can get a visa-on-arrival but the recommended option is to get in touch with a travel agency, email relevant documents (passport copy, itinerary etc), make the visa handling payment (30-50 Euro) and wait for them to get you a Visa Ref Number which you take to your local Iranian Embassy and get a visa stamped on the passport on-spot. I received my Visa Ref number in a week and didn’t even had to go to the Iranian Embassy. You can post your Passport, Visa Ref Number and payment details to the Embassy and they return passport with the visa fairly quick. The visa fee depends on your nationality.

I would highly recommend Shiraz based Pars Tourist Agency and specifically Marjan Owji in their Visa Department. She can help you in literally everything on your trip to Iran and she does that not from a customer-friendly-business perspective, its Persian hospitality at its best. She took only three working days to get back to me and the Embassy took another three days. The visa process was fairly straightforward. Everyone, except citizens of Israel can get an Iranian visa. The citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia and Turkey can stay for up to 3 months without a visa.  The maximum duration of tourist visa is 30 days while for the visa-on-arrival its 15 days. Once in Iran, extension is possible fairly easy.

Visa fee for every country is available here and here. We had to pay something around £20 on a Pakistani passport and £120 on a British passport. More information can be obtained by calling the local Iranian Embassy or browsing the MFA Iran website.

As a notable exception, the 90sq-km beach resort of Kish Island, south of Iran, easily accessible from Dubai, does not require advance visas for visits of up to 14 days, including Americans. This is Iran’s response to the Emirates and the state is promoting trade (by making it free-trade-zone) and tourism on the island. The island has facilities for scuba diving, jet-skiing, sailing, fishing, parasailing, reef walking, coral viewing, boating and water-skiing and offers gorgeous white sandy beaches for relaxing walks and plenty of huge malls if you fancy a retail therapy.

Air-lines

Most of the major carriers have flights to Iran but the favourite for travelling to Iran are Iran’s national carrier Iran Air, Azerbaijan airlines with stopover in Baku, Aeroflot (Russian airlines) with stopover in Moscow, Air France and other Middle East based carriers.  Other low-cost international carriers include Pegasus airlines (Istanbul-Tehran), Air Asia (Far East-Tehran), Air Arabia and Jazeera Airways both connecting through the middle East.

Launched in the mid of 20^th century, Iran Air started with domestic flights between Tehran and Mashhad. By 1970s, Iran Air was ranked amongst the safest airlines in the world (second only to Qantas; being accident free for decades). However, things changed suddenly after the revolution. Because of the US imposed sanctions, the airline could not buy new planes and even had to cancel deals setup earlier. The sanctions meant the airline had to rely on older planes, risking the security of the passengers and the staff onboard. At present, majority of the fleet is decades old with average age nearing 25 years. The Fajr Aviation and Composites Industry in Tehran is responsible for overhauling existing fleet and designing new airplanes. Recently, there have been conflicts over refuelling Iran Air planes as well when UK CAA and the Abu Dhabi Airports Company refused to refuel Iran Air planes. The EU has also recently banned Iran Air’s fleet of Boeing and Airbus because of safety concerns.

I choose to fly with Aeroflot – cheaper, good connections and short stopovers. The flight originated from London Heathrow, serving nicely done Salmon and landing three hours later in Tehran’s primary IKA airport (30KM from city). The two-hour stopover at Moscow Sheremetyevo International Airport was an interesting experience – this was by far the best airport I have seen so far. It’s so huge it could take hours walking from one terminal to the other with duty free shops spread everywhere and the airport giving a fine, shiny, glossy clean look and feel. Plenty of Iranians on the airport – some praying, some gossiping or buying stuff; looks like this the favorite route from EU to get back home for them. It took another three hours for the flight from Moscow to Tehran with an amazing Omelet served for breakfast as we approached Iran.

Note that if not staying in Tehran and planning to get to any city other than Tehran upon your arrival, you would have to change airports, from Imam Khomeini to Mehrabad, 40 km away, to get to your domestic flight.

Accommodation in Iran

You do not necessarily need travel agents to book accommodation for you, although that’s the easiest way. Popular travel/hotel-booking websites like booking.com, venere.com, laterooms.com do not support Iranian hotels; again because of the economic sanctions. However, there are lots of websites voluntarily setup by Iranians who like to see more people visiting their country and these provide lots of information on hotels, pictures, locations, costs etc. You can use these websites, in addition to travel agent websites to choose hotels and then book by directly calling/emailing the hotel, many of which have their own websites as well.

There is no presence of international-chain-hotels like Marriot or Holiday Inn in Iran – if you have read this far, you should know why. The hotels in Iran come in three varieties:

(i)                  Cheap bed-n-breakfasts with private or shared accommodation – These can be found in pretty much every city and are  generally located in city centre with good transport links. Tehran is scattered with hundreds of them.

(ii)                Traditional hotels – These are Iranian version of premium-posh hotels. They are generally converted Inns, older mansions/houses, travellers and traders resting spots – called Sofrekhane Sonati in Farsi. Ponds, trees and fountains in the central lawn, tinted glass windows and beautifully lit at night, these are your best bet to experience Iranian culture.

(iii)               Mid-range to top-notch modern hotels – Larger urban capitals and tourist destinations like Kish Islands have a few modern hotels to compete with multi-star international hotels. Generally, they are not located in city centre and price range vary on a large scale, so one needs to be cautious to check prices from several sources.

Travelling between cities

Transportation between cities in Iran is comfortable, safe, timely, reliable, well managed and cheap as chips. Cities and towns are connected through buses, rail network and domestic flights while port-cities and towns both in North and South also enjoy ferry connections. Depending on the distance, time available to travel and cost considerations, one can make use of flights, trains, buses or even hire comparatively cheaper private taxis.

Buses: Iran enjoys a pretty extensive and competitive bus network from most of its major cities. Major cities have bus terminals a few miles outside the city, planned on the model of airports with separate terminals and connected to city through local transport links. Buses can take you from anywhere to anywhere in Iran – pretty much anytime of the day (or night), normally without long stop-overs and running on time. Police checkpoints on the highways ensure safety. Tickets can be booked either in advance by calling the bus station or on-spot if you reach sometime before expected time of bus departure.

The buses generally come in two classes: lux/Mercedes/2nd class and super/Volvo/1st class. First class buses are air-conditioned and you will be provided with a small snack during your trip, while second class services are more frequent. There is little financial incentive to opt for the second class tickets.  Among the many bus operators, Royal Safar Iranian is the best, in terms of comfort and reliability, with a fleet of modern comfortable buses. They also run sleeper buses between major cities with reclining chairs, serving Iranian meals and sweets and movies on play – e.g. Shiraz to Isfahan all for $11; while regular buses cost $6. Apparently, you can book tickets online at http://www.royall.ir/ , if you can read their Farsi website or by calling the available phone numbers. Other bus operators are named Seir-o-Safar and Taavoni. Saipa Diesel, Iran’s leading manufacturer of trucks, trailer and mini-buses provides many of the buses you see on roads in Iran. The company also imported several hundred larger buses from China to serve on longer routes.

Trains: The train network is limited but comfortable, speedy and affordable. It has been expanding at 500KM every year for few years and major cities have been connected through contracts with Chinese companies. The under construction Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad railway line extending from northeast to southeast will enable Pakistan pilgrims to travel by train to Mashhad instead of the long bus journey from the border. Other international links include trains to Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Afghanistan and Central Asia. It is possible to travel from London to Tehran, by train!

The passenger rail system is called Raja Passenger Trains. The Sleeper berths in trains allow good night’s sleep specially on longer journeys like Tehran-Mashhad; will cost almost double the bus ticket but are worth it on longer journeys. The best of the trains are called 4 pax Ghazal or Plur train. The added benefit of travelling by train in Iran, like anywhere else, is that you get to see a lot of places on the way, sample food, see tourists and unlike many places, get a chance to meet, talk with and befriend locals. This is your best option to make a few good friends in Iran.

For Train timings, ticket prices and booking information, Google is your friend. If nothing helps, travel agencies can do it for you.

Domestic Flights: A leading oil producer can of course afford to have cheap domestic flights, sometimes dramatically cheap in comparison to international market. Planes are aging, and maintenance and safety procedures are sometimes well below western standards, but it still remains the safest way to get around Iran, given the huge death toll on the roads and longer distances between cities. The average price is in the range of $50 – $80.

Iran’s major domestic carriers Mahan Air, Iran Air, Kish Air and Aseman Air, all have websites and online booking system but you cannot make use of online ticket booking unless you have an Iranian bank account or a debit/credit card. The reason obviously is economic sanctions imposed on Iran means no international banking relationship with Iranian companies. The best way to book domestic flight tickets in Iran before landing in Iran is (i) find local office of above stated Iranian airlines in your city/country and they can do it for you or (ii) use an Iranian travel agent to book tickets for you, they will give you eticket and you pay them into their bank account normally setup somewhere in the EU.

Off Days in Iran

Thursday is generally half-day and Friday is the weekend break. Saturday and Sunday are normal working days. The biggest and most celebrated of all events in Iran is Nowrooz – the start of new year on Persian calendar which is marked with a week off. Other holidays are linked to the revolution and religious days (Muharram/Ramzan) as well as Eid festival.

Comparison Charts

Based on all the information I gathered from websites, Lonely Planet and talking to travel agents, I composed a comparative chart with compares price offers by four different travel agencies for hotel accomodation and travelling between cities (cab/train/flight). This helped me figure out which agency works best for me. The chart can be downloaded in image format here and more detailed Excel format here.

In the next posts, we’ll explore Iran from inside…. with pictures, videos and lots of interesting stories and interpersonal observations.

Some of the travel Agencies I spoke to….

• Setareh, Lotus Travel Agency
• Iran Paradise
• Tehran based Dornagasht
• Marjan Owji, Shiraz based Pars Tourist Agency
• Sara, Iran Tour Package/Lovely Iran
•  Zohreh Souki, Tehran based Sarvineh Tours, Welcome2Iran

Some of the websites I used for hotel search…

• http://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Hotels-g293998-Iran-Hotels.html#T_CAT_HOTEL_MOTEL
• http://www.audleytravel.com/Destinations/North-Africa-and-The-Middle-East/Iran/Accommodation.aspx
• http://www.persiatravelmart.com/
• http://www.asemangasht.com/?blog=22
• http://www.iranbudgettour.com/iran-hotels
• http://www.irantour.org/hotel.html
• http://www.southtravels.com/middleeast/iran/index.html
• http://www.hoteltravel.com/iran
• http://www.bestirantravel.com/hotel/hotels.html
• http://www.irpedia.com/iran-hotels/

 

I wish I had uploaded this back in mid-November, but here it is. S. Frederick Starr, Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University, presented his advice for American leadership in Central Asia.His presentation is a overview of US strategy and possibilities in a time of constrained resources and authoritarianism. Yet the US still needs to be active in the region. Rather than money or democracy building, Starr focused on the software of long-distance trade across so many borders. The US should assist governments in making sure that the transit routes that do exist have well-functioning border posts with good software that prevents back-ups and creates consistency. This is the sort of practical thinking I like. He comes in at the 4:30 mark.

Prof Farakh A Khan’s exclusive contribution for PTH

The aggressors have called people of what are now Fata and of Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa different names at different times of history labelled as terrorists or freedom fighters. The ten-year war has taken toll of the American purse and its fighters. On the other hand the Afghan people are constantly suffering. The Americans are openly talking to Afghan Taliban leadership since November 2010 to end American occupation of Afghanistan. The talks are at a crucial juncture where a Taliban office is to be opened in Qatar. The Americans have released five Taliban leaders from infamous Guantanamo prison to be stationed in Qatar. Team led by Marc Grossman from the American side and Qari Yousaf Ahmedi from Afghan Taliban side are in discussions (DeYoung, Karen. US links Taliban talks to Karzai’s consent. Dawn/Washington Post/ Bloomberg News Service. January 13, 2012). The Americans feel greater threat from Iran and want to windup operations in Afghanistan as early as possible.

We need to explore the background of resistance of the people in the area before we make sweeping judgments.

The invasion of Afghanistan by the British ‘Army of the Indus’ in 1839 led to annihilation of the army in its retreat in 1842. The Afghan invasion was pushed by the then Governor General Lord Auckland. This was the time when Britain was the sole super power. British arrogance led them to disaster. To boost army’s moral Sindh was conquered in 1843. This was followed by annexation of Punjab in 1849. These British moves sent clear message about future British intentions to the hill tribes in the north west of the expanding British Empire. Starting in 1850 the British were regularly sending in punitive expeditions into the Tribal belt.

During the Sikh Darbar the Sikhs held the plains but the mountains in the west were independent. Places like Hazara, Bannu, Kohat, DG Khan and DI Khan in the later Sikh period were under the British Deputy Commissioners. During the Sikh wars Amir Dost Mohammad of Afghanistan moved into the Peshawar valley up to the Indus. He made a grave miscalculation by sending a contingent of cavalry to aid the dying Sikh rule.

During the Sikh rule Peshawar valley (Kabul River) up to Jamrud in the west was held with great atrocities. In 1849 the British took over the Sikh Darbar territories and established pickets (check posts) along the eastern banks of Indus and in Kabul River valley along the bases of mountains to restrain raids from tribes beyond in the mountains. The first incursion of the British forces through what was Afghan tribal area took place when their army attacked Ghazni and Kabul in 1839 what became the disastrous 1st Afghan War. This was followed by revenge attack in 1879-80 (2nd Afghan War) when the invading British forces brutally killed people of all ages and both sexes. The scenes of massacres were still fresh in the memory of the tribes when the British forces launched Frontier War in 1863. The idea of this war was to teach a lesson to the tribes of Bonair to stop raids into the settled areas under British control and to ‘Hindustani fanatics’ of Wahhabi Islam who considered the British as occupier of their lands across India making jihad legitimate. The British felt that Hindustanis were also spreading Wahhabi Islam in Fata and had to be stopped (Albinia, Alice. Empires of the Indus. John Murray, London. 2008).

The Hindustani Wahhabi Fanatics were receiving funds from ‘Southern’ Bengal. The Mulka village of Syeds of Bunair housed left overs of Syed Ahmed Shaheed (d 1830) in Mahabun Mountains was eventfully burnt by the locals under a British detachment. Between 1850 and 1863 the British launched 20 expeditions into the mountains beyond the plains occupied by the British forces. Each time the number of invading forces increased. In Sitana campaign (1863) more than 5,000 troops were used and later enforced. The initial force was trapped in Ambela Pass and Gen Sir Sydney Chamberlain was evacuated with severe wounds. The cost of the expedition was worrying for the British administration. The tribesmen had few matchlock guns and mostly relied on swords and stones. Swords were used when they came close to the enemy (Adye, John. Sitana: a mountain campaign of the borders of Afghanistan in 1863. Published 1867).

The main issue of attacks by the British beyond its borders into Tribal Areas of Afghanistan was raids (cattle lifting) by tribes supported by ‘Hindustani Fanatics’ in the area. In 1858 the British army raid destroyed Sitana on the southern slopes of Mahabun Mountains. This was followed by destruction of ‘Hindustani settlement’ of Mulka located on the northern slopes of Mahabun Mountains in 1863. The British army in another raid destroyed ‘Hindustani village’ of Mundee in 1864. The other British approach was to stop supplies of funds and fighters from British India. For the people of Fata fear of British occupation of Punjab was an indication of their advancement and occupation of their areas (Punjab Administration Report, 1863-64 and 1867-68).

The British continued its policy of ‘Butcher and Bolt’ in retaliation of tribal raids. After subduing the lashkar the villages of ‘miscreants’ were torched or blown up, the crops burnt, waterways destroyed and cattle rounded up. Each time a new agreement was made with the tribal elders. Starting in 1917 the British troops used ‘Air Service’ to attack the tribal lashkar (now drone strikes by the Americans and bombing by Pakistani F16). In Tirah the tribes were asked to remove ‘Turk and Afghan’ settlers (foreign fighters) which they did sending them back to Afghanistan (Obhrai, 1938). It seems that nothing has changed in the 21st century.

From times immemorial the Pakhtun belt now located between Afghanistan and Pakistan has not changed although they were Hindus at one time then converted to Buddhism and finally to Islam. Babar (early 16th century) records his attack into Bonair to gather cattle and make a pyramid of heads of the local population (a Turkish tradition of Central Asia). The tribes were in constant war with each other but united against any invader. Nothing has changed.

When the British left in 1947 Pakistan reversed the ‘forward policy’ and pulled out the troops from Fata. We had peace in Fata till 2004.

Let us jump to recent events shaking Fata and Afghanistan. The bookshops today are full of bewildering array of publications on Afghanistan, Taliban and Al Qaeda. Most of the modern authors have little understanding of the area, people or its history under discussion. Al Qaeda as an entity appeared on our radar screen through American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Al Qaeda has a foreign agenda and is irrelevant for Pakistan’s Fata problem.

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 galvanised the tribes and people of the country against the occupiers. This time Russian had helicopters and tanks but in this asymmetrical war the Afghans had the terrain on their side and supplies of manpower and ammunition from America, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Al Qaeda was born out of this triple marriage. The supply of Stringer missiles by the Americans negated Russian air power. The American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 united the Fata tribes once again into military opposition. People of Pakistan are also opposed to American intervention. They are supplying manpower and funds to Taliban as seen in 1860s. The ‘Hindustani fanatics’ are now ‘foreign fighters’ or called ‘Punjabi Taliban’. The Pakhtun ‘raiders’ of 1863 were transformed into Mujahedeen during Russian occupation and then into Taliban when the Americans came in. AK47, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and suicide bombers now affectively replace the Stringer missiles. The Pakhtuns are innovative. Pakistan became an enemy of the Taliban fighting the American and Nato armies because of Pakistan government support to Americans in the form of supplies and drone attacks. We saw spate of suicide and IED blasts in major cities of Pakistan.

The incidence of Lal Masjid in Islamabad and attack of the Pakistani army into South Waziristan in 2004 was the last straw for peace. Most of the students who died in Lal Masjid in the army assault were from Fata and KP. Then came the incidence of US troops killing 24 FC soldiers in cold blood in North Waziristan followed by freeze of Nato supplies through Pakistan and returning of Shamsi Air Base used for drone strikes in Fata. Earlier CIA agent Raymond Davis was held for shooting two motorcyclists in Lahore and then released. This was followed by the killing of Osama in an American raid in Abbottabad, which produced bad blood between the two countries. The people of Pakistan were told of thousands of visas issued by Pakistan to dubious people considered as CIA agents.

America is bleeding like its predecessor the Russians in Afghanistan. The 1st World armies require expensive services, which are not appropriate for war in the 3rd World. With killing of Osama the main reason for invasion of Afghanistan has been removed. The motivational force for the American troops in the field was to make ‘America safe’ by removing Al Qaeda leadership has been achieved. The Americans have killed enough Afghans to settle revenge for 9/11. The US soldiers in the field are now fighting a war where it is ‘them or us’. It is time they got out without giving an impression that they have their tail between the legs. Americans do not need troops on the ground in Afghanistan to ward off any untoward incidence. They have 50 bases in the Middle East and Qatar and Bahrain bases are not far from Afghanistan. For surveillance the Americans have ample supply of drones and settilites. Their troops can be moved into Afghanistan at short notice. I do not see how the Americans can maintain Karzai as the leader of Afghans once they leave.

The other player in Afghan scene is Pakistan. Afghans never had soft corner for the Pakistan. The bone of contention between the two is the 2,640 km 1893 Durand Line Agreement inherited from the British for fixing ‘spheres of influence’ between the two countries. Thus the British claimed Fata and what is now most of KP. Today neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can dictate to the Fata tribes. Both keep Durand Line as a porous border and bone of contention. The attacks into Pakistan by Taliban or its splinter groups have been worrying. Like the Americans Pakistani leadership has made agreements with the various groups of Pakistani Taliban, which each side claim were broken by the other.

The ‘hull’ for Fata is not war but economics. Fata is heavily dependent on food, electricity, infrastructure, petrol and some places gas from Pakistan and survive on smuggling and jobs in rest of Pakistan. We are not sure of mineral wealth of Fata since no survey has been carried out. We should use the carrot rather than the stick to solve Fata problem. Gun shall make the situation worse. Above all we need professional research of the area and a ten years planned strategy with the consent of the Fata tribes. Before we plan for a long-term policy for Fata it has to be taken off the hands of the Pakistan Army.

Selected Bibliography
Elliott, JG. The Frontier 1839-1947: the story of the North-West Frontier of India. Cassell, London. 1968.

Wylly, HC. From the Black Mountain to Waziristan. Macmillan and Co., Ltd. London. 1912.

Steven, Coll. Ghost Wars. Penguin Books. 2004.

Barthorp, Michael. Afghan wars and the North-West Frontier 1839-1947. Cassell & Co, London. 2002.

Jan, Abid Ullah. Afghanistan: the genesis of the final crusade. Pragmatic Publication. Ottawa. 2006.

Ridedel, Milton A. In search for Al Qaeda: its leadership and future. Vanguard Books, Lahore. 2009.

Razvi, Mujtaba. The frontiers of Pakistan: a study of Frontier problems in Pakistan’s foreign policy. National Publishing House Ltd., Karachi. 1971.

The Second Afghan War: 1878-80. Complied by Charles Metcalfe MacGregor and India Army Intelligence Branch. Army Education Press. 1975.

Caroe, Olaf. The Pathans. Reprint by Oxford University Press, Karachi. 1975.

Pakistan: the militant jihadi challenge. Asia Report No. 164. March 13, 2009.

Fata- a most dangerous place. Principle Author Shuja Nawaz. Centre for Strategic & International Studies. 2009.

Obhrai, Divan Chand. The evolution of North-West Frontier Province. First published 1938. Reprint Saeed Book Bank, Peshawar, 1983.

Saleem, Shahzad. Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: beyond bin Laden and 9/11. Pluto Press, London. 2011.

Hussain, Mujahid. Punjabi Taliban: driving extremism in Pakistan. 2012.

The discussion of Aksai Chin is lengthy–and it depends on how far you want to go back. Britain as the preeminent power wanted to encroach upon Chinese territory, and every few years expanded the definition of “India”. First they took over Leh and Ladakh, then they defined the McMohan Line. But that did not satiate their appetite. They then took over Aksai Chin–but never exercised control over it—the Chinese a weak and weakened power were powerless to halt the march of the British. However when the conquered Eastern Turkistan–they became a bit more assertive. Aksai Chin was left as “territory undemarcated” (and on many Pakistani maps it is shown as such).

The current Bharati claims on Aksai China are based on the arbitrary McMahon line which the British tried to impose on them. The Chinese Government claims that it never signed any agreement which the McMohan Line an unfair demarcation. The British officials designed such the McMohan line and then had taken 9 million sq.km.land from China to their other great colony–India . The old India maps of India did not show the parts as part of “India”.

One of the earliest treaties regarding the boundaries in the western sector was signed in 1842. At the instigation of the British, the Sikh Confederacy of the Punjab annexed Ladakh into the state of Jammu in 1834.

This period saw naked expansion of Britain–which was forcing China on all fronts. The First Anglo-Chinese War (1839–42), known popularly as the First Opium War pressured the Chinese to grant them more rights.

To continue this pressure in 1841, they invaded Tibet with an army but were defeated by the Chinese forces. The Chinese and the Sikhs signed a treaty in September 1842, which stipulated no transgressions or interference in the other country’s frontiers.[The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan., 1960), pp. 96-125.]

 

The British defeated the Sikhs in 1846 and took over sovereignty over Ladakh. The British commissioners and the Chinese officials were apparently sufficiently satisfied that a traditional border was recognized and defined by natural elements, and the border was not demarcated. The boundaries at the two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were well-defined, but the Aksai Chin area in between lay undefined.

The Second Opium War from 1856 to 1860 and China lost it too forcing China to import Opium into China. At the same time other stuff was happening on the Western front

W. H. Johnson, a civil servant with the Survey of India proposed the “Johnson Line” in 1865, which put Aksai Chin in Kashmir.[4] This was the time of the Dungan revolt, when China did not control Turkestan, so this line was never presented to the Chinese[4]. Johnson presented this line to the Maharaja of Kashmir, who then claimed the 18,000 square kilometres contained within,[Mohan Guruswamy, Mohan, "The Great India-China Game", Rediff, June 23, 2003.], and by some accounts territory further north as far as the Sanju Pass in the Kun Lun Mountains. The British government had some doubts on the validity of the Johnson Line[Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Retrieved 2006-06-14.] and Johnson was censured

That would have been the end of it–but other events happened.

In 1878 the Chinese had reconquered Turkestan, and by 1890 they already had Shahidulla before the issue was decided(Mohan Guruswamy, Mohan, “The Great India-China Game”, Rediff, June 23, 2003.). By 1892, China had erected boundary markets at Karakoram Pass (Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). “The China-India Border War”. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Retrieved 2006-06-14).

By 1865 Yakub Beg, the Commander-in-Chief of the army of Kokand too advantage of the Hui uprising in Xinjiang Province, and captured Kashgar and Yarkand from the Chinese and gradually took control of most of the region of Eastern Turkestan, including Khotan, Aksu, Kucha, and other cities in 1867. After Begs death his state of Kashgaria rapidly fell apart, and Kashgar was reconquered by the Qing Dynasty.

In 1890s Britain was principally concerned that Aksai Chin not fall into Russian hands. In 1899, when China showed an interest in Aksai Chin, Britain proposed a revised boundary, initially suggested by George Macartney, which put most of Aksai Chin in Chinese territory. This border, along the Karakoram Mountains, was proposed and supported by British officials for a number of reasons:

1) The Karakoram Mountains formed a natural boundary, which would set the British borders up to the Indus River watershed while leaving the Tarim River watershed in Chinese control,
2) Chinese control of this tract would present a further obstacle to Russian advance in Central Asia.
3) The British presented this line to the Chinese in a Note by Sir Claude MacDonald.
4) The Chinese did not respond to the Note, and the British took that as Chinese acquiescence.
5) This line, known as the Macartney-MacDonald line, is approximately the same as the current Line of Actual Control
6) Both the Johnson-Ardagh and the Macartney-MacDonald lines were used on British maps of India until at least 1908, the British took the Macdonald line to be the boundary

 

In July 1, 1954 Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo directing that the maps of India be revised to show definite boundaries on all frontiers. Up to this point, the boundary in the Aksai Chin sector, based on the Johnson Line, had been described as “undemarcated.”

Bharat historiography would have drawn the border of Bharat half into China (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tibet-claims.jpg) and reduced China to the size of Sikkim. If Pakistan had no assisted China in the fifties, China had no land link to Tibet.

It was a matter of political survival for Pakistan to settle the boundary with China–in fact Pakistan got all the territory which was under its control and also got hundreds of square miles of additional territory from China. The boundary of Kashmir conjured by Bharat is an attempt to divide China into many parts. If Bharati “historians” are to be believed half of Afghanistan and all of KP also belongs to Bharat—from Kabul to Bali (Indonesia). Bharat’s dispute over Aksai Chin was really due to India’s unilateral interpretation of a previously undefined border.

A.G. Noorani writes in the Hindustan Times:

The McMahon Line is clearly shown as India’s boundary in the east. But for the entire western sector, right from the Sino-Indo-Afghan trijunction to the Sino-Indo-Nepalese trijunction, the legend reads: ‘Boundary Undefined’.

This legend was used for this sector in all the three maps attached to the two white papers on Indian States published by Patel’s ministry in 1948 and 1950 also. The Aksai Chin belonged to nobody. This was the position when the Panchsheel Agreement was signed on April 29, 1954. But on July 1, 1954, Nehru ordered: “All old maps dealing with the frontier should be… withdrawn… new maps should also not state there is any un-demarcated territory… this frontier should be considered a firm and definite one which is not open to discussion with anybody.” Unilateral changes are legally ineffective. [A G Noorani/Hindustan Times]

Aksai China connects to Nepal. “Eastern Turkistan” and Aksai China are Muslim areas of China and the world accepts them as such. We should work with the Chinese to ensure that Pakistan gets integrated with Kashgar, and Central Asia.

It was a rough but lucky landing (both “rough and “lucky” are strong understatements here) when a Soviet-built Tupolev (Tu-134) crash landed in dense fog in the city of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan. According to The Washington Post 82 passengers and 6 crew members were evacuated, 31 of them were injured and 17 hospitalized. Miraculously everyone on board survived. No doubt, the local emergency services deserve some major kudos for reacting quickly, killing the fire and safely evacuating everybody from the scene.

RT reports there were about a dozen of children among the passengers. One of them, a seven-month-old girl, was diagnosed with a head injury and concussion. The Ministry of Transportation of Kyrgyzstan said that the crashed vehicle was working its last days, with its airworthiness due to expire on 19 January. It was also reported that the aircraft had been manufactured in 1979 and was not equipped with modern navigation systems such as GPS. Reports say one of the likely causes is a mistake made by the pilot operating the aircraft, but the accident is still to be investigated.

Here’s the description of the crash from The Aviation Herald. Note that this report on the number of passengers and crew on board of the aircraft differs from other sources. “An Altyn Air (alias Kyrgyzstan Altyn) Tupolev TU-134A, registration EX-020 performing flight QH-3 from Bishkek to Osh (Kyrgyzstan) with 73 passengers and 6 crew, suffered a hard landing resulting in the right main gear collapse, right main wing separation and the airplane rolling on its back while landing on Osh’s runway 12 in fog and low visibility around 12:15L (06:15Z), official times of landing varying from 12:05L to 12:48L. The aircraft came to a stop on soft ground about 10 meters off the right runway edge. A fire fed by a fuel leak off the left wing erupted which was quickly extinguished by airport emergency services. One passenger received serious injuries, 24 people received minor injuries (concussions, bruises), 16 of which were taken to local hospitals.”

We know that the bird involved in the crash is a Tupolev-134. Here’s a little blurb about the Tu-134s from the Associated Press: The twin-engined Tu-134, along with its larger sibling the Tu-154, has been the workhorse of Soviet and Russian civil aviation since the 1960s, with more than 800 planes built. It also has remained in service with many post-Soviet carriers. In recent years, Russia and other former Soviet nations have had some of the world’s worst air traffic safety records. Experts blame poor maintenance of the aging aircraft, weak government controls, insufficient pilot training and a cost-cutting mentality.

This type of Soviet-built aircraft was infamously involved in several deadly crashes. Here’s more info on Tupolev crashes. More recently, this past June a Tu-134 crashed in northern Russia killing 43 passengers, but it appears that a drunken pilot was at fault. Earlier in 2011 at least 43 were injured when a Tu-154B carrying 124 people, burst into flames before take-off from Surgut, Russia. And of course another painful reminder of Soviet-era aviation was the crash of a Tu-154 plane near Smolensk that killed Polish President Lech Kaczynski and 95 other people in April of 2010. Pilot error was clearly at fault here – both captain and first officer ignored numerous instrumentation warnings including verbal commands from the plane’s terrain awareness warning system (TAWS) warning the pilots to “PULL UP.” Procedure requires any pilot who receives that warning from the TAWS to immediate pull up and throttle to maximum to avoid an imminent collision with the ground. Clearly both pilots heavily deviated from standard safety protocols.

Back to our Kygryztan Air crash. Until the final findings of the commission are published it’s too early to draw any conclusions, although bad weather conditions had something to do with it. The Tupolevs are aging and even though in the past they might have been sound and well engineered planes, they have become outdated compared to modern aircraft. Not to mention they are not being properly maintained as they are mostly employed in cash-strapped countries. Modern day aircraft are sophisticated enough to be able to land automatically without human intervention more akin to a tram with a stop-and-go button. No Cold War-era planes can compete with that. In an initiative to keep its skies safe,  the E.U. banned airlines it deems unsafe from operating in European airspace and according to its website this includes the airline that was involved in the Kyrgyz crash.

There’s a lot of chatter and opinions on aviation websites debating the airworthiness of Soviet-built planes and the skill of Soviet/post-Soviet pilots. I found one post on The Aviation Herald board about the Osh accident particularly interesting. “There has been a lot of pressure on the pilot to fly (as the only road linking the northern and southern parts of the country has been often closed recently because of snow and avalanches. Flying is the only way to get to Bishkek in a reasonable time (road 14 to 16 hours now for a flight that takes 40 minutes). A TU 134 with its navigation equipment should not have been clear on that day. That the pilot was able to bring down the plane speaks for his skills and the robustness of the plane. A similar crash with one of the old Boeing 737 they use here had been fatal for sure.”

One of my colleague here at the Foreign Policy Blogs recently wrote a post in a similar vein about the safety of Soviet-made planes.

Here are more photos of the crash.

 

 

Farewells are inevitable in relationships based only on temporary convergence of material interests. Even then the pain of separation is there, driven by the thought of possibilities which never materialized into a permanent relationship. The best manner to deal with this moment is to make the farewell as short as possible. In this way the immediate pain and embarrassment is relatively bearable. Some semblance of dignity is maintained and the poignancy of the moment retains the decorum that it deserves.

However the very visible parting of ways between Pakistan and USA is crawling along as both do not seem to want to admit that the marriage of convenience is over and done with. Both can take the counseling route but it’s unlikely to save the relationship.

The relationship had survived previous periods of tense relations only because Pakistan was aligned too closely to USA, overtly threatened regionally and was generally being ruled by dictators who were disinclined to part way with their ever reliable benefactor. Add to that the generous aid packages on offer and the obvious choice was made.

But the key and often overlooked reason for the relationship remaining viable was the close ties the two militaries maintained. Pakistan Army had a major input into the regional USA security policy and was therefore generally able to exert an influence far above its operational capabilities. Colin Powell, for example, was directly responsible for shielding Pakistan during the Dr. Abdus Salam episode.

Things started heading in the wrong direction post 9/11. United States’ open hostility towards Islamic movements, extreme or not, led to a very visible disconnect with Pakistan Army’s perceptions of regional threats. The fact of the matter is that the Pakistan Army perceives itself first and foremost as an Islamic force; that is its base ethos and genuine belief. The threat posed by extreme regional Islamists, is viewed as being of temporary nature. The real strategic threat has always been perceived to arise from the eastern border.

Musharraf tried to survive this policy tussle between his power base and his benefactors by following a rather devious route of publicly avowing full support to the US policy of isolating the Taliban, while privately maintaining links with those groups which were allies with the Pakistan Army. One of the main reasons of his subsequent downfall was in fact the growing perception in the Army that he was giving in to US pressure beyond a tolerable point. Having lost the support of the Pakistan armed forces, he became history shortly after being forced to remove his uniform.

Things unraveled pretty quickly from thereon. The OBL episode was the proverbial last nail in the coffin. Having military aid blocked is one thing, having gung-ho marines acting out mission impossible IV in the army’s backyard is totally another. Even more dangerously, it led to a situation where there was a very real danger of mutiny by the younger officers. It was at this point of time that the decision to start pursuing an independent security policy was taken.

What we are now witnessing is the slow but sure extrication of the relationship. Each and every unsavory incident is being leveraged by the Pakistan Army to the fullest in furthering the agenda of publicly conveying the message that the separation is on and divorce is imminent. And this is not empty bravado but the result of cold strategic calculations…

USA is no longer the only big boy on the block. Russia, China and Iran are all now pursuing policies which sooner or later are going to result in a new military alliance under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The first two are full members of this organization while Iran has an observer status, quite the same as Pakistan and India. Interestingly enough, Russia has sponsored Pakistan’s bid for full membership! Seems like having prime real estate and the A bomb carry a lot of weight in international politics.

Pakistan’s hand has been further strengthened by its growing economic ties with Iran and rapidly improving relations with India. Both are again driven by strategic compulsions, and have the blessings of the armed forces. The energy requirements, oil and gas, will gradually be sourced from Iran thereby eliminating long supply routes and cost. The looming water scarcity can be more easily managed with India’s cooperation. In return, India will be granted the most favored nation status by Pakistan, which will allow it access to Central Asia through road and rail.

The recent almost immediate return of Indian officers who crossed over Kargil border by mistake is a clear indication that Pakistan Army understands the strategic need to have only one hot border. In old days they would have been ISI’s guests for a considerable period of time.

The US has clearly lost the previously overwhelming leverage it had over Pakistan by a combination of imperial hubris and failing to understand the country’s base compulsion: its Islamic identity. The sentiments of an overwhelming majority of the population, conservative or liberal, dictate that Pakistan will always be sympathetic to Islamic causes all over the world. This policy now makes even more sense given the effects of the Arab Spring.

All said and done, it was a tumultuous but passionate journey together, but now the end beckons. One wonders why it takes a minute to say hello and forever to say goodbye…

Recent riots in Zhanaozen and Shetpe in the Mangystau province in western Kazakhstan have resulted in at least 16 deaths and over 100 injured. This information is according to the Kazakh authorities although unverified eye witness accounts and human rights groups put the death toll at more than 50. The number of those wounded in the clashes is most likely much higher than reported.

The violence that took place between the police and protesting oil workers and their sympathizers last week is the most bloodshed the country has seen since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Ironically (or intentionally) these events coincided with the 20th anniversary festivities held across Kazakhstan to mark the occasion that included the unveiling of a replica of Paris’s Arc de Triomphe in the capital of Astana.

The violence started on Friday, December 16. Since last May, disgruntled oil workers were occupying the central square in Zhanaozen, a nondescript industrial city of some 90,000 residents in western Mangystau province, citing disputes over wages and job losses. Some of the thousands of initial strikers were dismissed, prompting many of their colleagues to return to work.

The New York Times writes that the protesters shifted their focus to political demands including the right to form independence parties. “In response, the authorities announced plans to hold a state-sponsored New Year’s holiday party for children on the site, apparently in a ruse aimed at providing an excuse to clear out the workers. In an online video said to be shot at the scene, protesters are shown pushing past police lines to dismantle a stage for the party, then overturning a tree decorated for the holiday. It also showed police officers firing into the air.”

The Moscow Times reports a slight variation on the theme: “fired oil workers and sympathetic citizens stormed a stage erected for an Independence Day party and smashed sound equipment in central Zhanaozen. They later set fire to the city hall, the headquarters of a local oil company, a hotel and dozens of other buildings, including trade centers and houses, burned cars and buses and plundered ATMs.”

Police opened fire and according to the officials 14 protesters were killed in the clashes in Zhanaozen alone. An article from the Telegraph has a short video of the storming of the stage.

The following day the unrest spread to the neighborhood village of Shetpe, 60 miles north of Zhanaozen, where a crowd blocked a train coming from the port of Aktau. According to the authorities, one person was killed and 12 were wounded.

On Sunday morning, December 18, about 500 protesters gathered near the main square in Aktau facing a large force of riot police.

The city is the capital of the Mangystau region and is one of Kazakhstan’s most important oil producing centers. Aktau is a key transportation hub for the Northern Distribution Network, which provides transit of non-lethal supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. It has a population of around 180,000 people and is home to hundreds of Western expats.

The government declared a state of emergency in Zhanaozen with a 20 day curfew in effect and a ban on public gatherings until January 5, 2012. President Nursultan Nazarbayev was quick to dismiss the clashes as provocations by the “hooligans.”

Protests in pictures from the BBC.

From the Economist on the Kazakh clashes.

The Jamestown Foundation Blog has a good overview of the recent violence and events in Kazakhstan.

Amateur video of the clashes making rounds on the internet: