By Hamza Usman

An inevitable question Pakistanis always ask me is, “what are you?” Often, I’ve wondered the same question. Besides ‘Pakistani,’ I don’t know what else to say.  I’m not Balochi or Sindhi. I can’t speak Punjabi. In my house, besides English, Urdu is the only other language spoken. When people ask me what language my parents speak, that’s what I tell them. Unlike many of my acquaintances, I don’t come from a town or village in interior Pakistan. Like millions in Pakistan, my family migrated from India. My grandparents’ families originate from Delhi, Lucknow and Aligarh, the bastions of Urdu-speaking peoples in India. In Pakistan, I am merely a ‘Muhajir;” an Urdu speaking migrant from India, now living in Karachi.

My family, like millions of others, came to Pakistan believing Jinnah’s ideal, searching for a homeland that was ours, for all Muslims, with freedom, tolerance and dignity. During those waning years of the British Empire, freedom across the Subcontinent was not a novel idea; it was a dream that had existed for decades. Students from the Aligarh Muslim University took up the cause of an independent homeland for Muslims; the university was known for the caliber and number of intellectuals it produced espousing the cause for an independent Muslim state to exist alongside a Hindu majority one in the Subcontinent. Thinkers like Mohammad Iqbal and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan were noted luminaries associated with the institution dubbed, ‘the Oxford of the East.’ Iqbal is largely celebrated in modern day Pakistan as the first ideologue championing a united Pakistan; today, his small rectangular tomb, a simple, stone structure in hues of dark crimson and burnt sienna, ensconced between the magnificent Badshahi Mosque and the grand Lahore Fort, welcomes visitors keen to learn about Pakistan’s past; a chapter of rich, Mughal heritage often obscured by the shame of Colonialism and the turbulence of Partition.

Other notable alumni of Aligarh Muslim University include Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, killed by an assassin’s bullet in 1951. In his place as Pakistan’s second Prime Minister came Khwaja Nazimuddin, another Aligarh alumnus who was Pakistan’s second, incumbent Governor General after Mr. Jinnah’s sudden death in 1948 less than a year after Pakistan’s creation. Ghulam Mohammad, Pakistan’s third and last Governor General was also an alumnus; Ghulam Mohammad’s legacy of unchecked corruption and senility  heralded the beginning of Pakistan’s trials by promoting vice-regal politics, weakening democracy and laying the seeds for President Iskander Mirza and Field Marshal Ayub Khan to set a notorious precedent and declare Martial Law in 1958.  Coincidentally, Ayub also attended Aligarh Muslim University briefly.

One lesser known alumnus was Abu Bakr Ahmad (A.B.A.) Haleem, a noted scholar and educationist. Professor Haleem began his career in the Department of Political Science and History at Aligarh in 1923. Ayub Khan was one of students. By 1934, he was Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University and played a pivotal role in Pakistan’s formation by serving with the All-India Muslim League until Partition. Writer Mukhtar Masood describes Professor Haleem’s welcome to Jinnah, stating, “Mr. Jinnah, we are teaching history and you are making it.” After the birth of Pakistan, Professor Haleem was appointed the first Vice-Chancellor of Sindh University at the behest of Jinnah and later, the first Vice-Chancellor of Karachi University thus filling the noble distinction of being the first Vice-Chancellor for both institutions. In addition, he served in a variety of different roles and positions for the purposes of propagating education and progress in Pakistan. I refer to Professor Haleem because he was a lesser-known luminary who contributed to forging Pakistan’s identity in its early years; he was also my Great-Grandfather.

Following in his footsteps, I too graduated in Political Science and History, and like him, moved to Paris. His association with the Sorbonne and the University of Paris inspired me as I strolled down the Boulevard St. Michel as he once would have decades before, deep in thought, stopping at the Jardins du Luxembourg to sit in silent contemplation amidst the babbling fountains and the verdant green grass. Like him, I spoke French almost fluently. Like him, I expressed a desire for multilingualism and learnt Italian. Professor Haleem spoke over five languages; he even spoke Mandarin. According to my grandfather, he was invited to China to give a speech to Chairman Mao-Zedong on Chinese history.

In the late Professor’s time, the concept of nationhood was being redefined and the notion of identity that still troubles Pakistanis surfaced.  Gandhi argued that religion could not imply a separate nation since language, customs and culture dictated that, not belief. Jinnah contended that religion defined values, customs, beliefs and ideals, thus characterizing Muslims as a separate nation. With neither side willing to budge from their respective positions, the outcome of this arduous conflict was the Partition of the Subcontinent in 1947.

Like me, Pakistan is still undergoing its identity crisis. Debate still looms whether the state is secular, as Jinnah envisioned, or Islamic, as his successors outlined. Its maturity and development into a cohesive nation has been hindered by weak democracy, military dominance in addition to poor governance, lack of resources and partisan politics. Like the former Yugoslavia, Pakistan is a federation of various ethnic groups, tribes, sects and peoples. The most poorly-defined of these groups are the so-called ‘Urdu-speaking’ Muslims that migrated to Pakistan after Partition from all over India. They are defined solely on the basis of language and stigmatized by the local, ethnic populations whose ancestors have pre-existed on Pakistani soil for centuries.

Urdu was a hybrid language growing in prominence under the Delhi Sultanate, but it wasn’t until the emergence of the Mughal Empire in 1527 that Urdu became a language of the regal court. It evolved from a derivative of Farsi to amalgamate Arabic, Sanskrit, Turkish and Hindi influences. As late as the siege of Delhi in 1857, Urdu remained a language of the elite and refined, lending much of its court-like stature to literature and poetry. Urdu speakers in places like Aligarh contributed greatly to Jinnah’s movement of an independent Muslim state in the Subcontinent. As a result, at Pakistan’s birth, Urdu was to be its lingua franca. Ostensibly, this would not only curtail any one ethnic group from dominating national affairs, it would also reinforce national identity through the use and extension of a common language, keeping the federation united.[1]

Naturally, this created tensions that still exist today. Pakistan at Partition was divided into East and West with only Urdu as its national language, however strong opposition and campaigning from Bengalis in East Pakistan made Bengali a national language during the 1950s. Pakistan’s Post-Colonial legacy ensured that English was not only its official language but lent its presence to its law courts, bureaucracy and military.  After its brutal Civil War in 1971, East Pakistan became Bangladesh and Pakistan was left with Urdu as its only national language. English remains the language of the elite, the powerful and the source of high-paying jobs. Prominent families send their children to English or American schools in the hope that acquiring this language will be a passport to success. As Zubeida Mustafa describes in The Guardian, “people believe that English is the magic wand that can open the door of prosperity. Policy-makers, the wielders of economic power and the social elites have also perpetuated this myth.[2]”

And this myth affects the language spoken in my home. Today, the Urdu around me is not the Urdu spoken during Partition. At that time, Urdu’s poetic language structure, its rich vocabulary and literature was common to most speakers. My generation has been fed a bastardized version of Urdu; an Urdu with informal tenses, new verbiage, interspersed with English to create what some call “minglish,” influenced by the melting pot of Karachi’s different cultures. The Urdu I speak can barely be called Urdu; it is Urdu to get by. I can order a cup of tea but I cannot wax eloquent on anything. When I watch television, news anchors speak a strange language and I struggle to read the ticker because I was never formally taught to read Urdu and I don’t know anyone who speaks the pure Urdu that once characterized my homeland.

Pakistan was envisioned as a poly-ethnic state where religion bound peoples together. The effect of nation-building has backfired since inception because ethnic identities remain prominent. Urdu has not achieved the massive national trickle-down effect it was intended to. Urdu is the first language of only 8% of Pakistanis whereas Punjabi, is spoken by almost 50% of the population.[3] In addition, over 70 smaller provincial languages and dialects exist in Pakistan.  Today, whilst much of the mainstream media as well as state-run public schools communicate in Urdu, it is not a first-language for Pakistanis by far. Those homes with access to English find a diminished impetus for learning Urdu as pragmatism and practical exigencies dictate the study of English, primarily because all higher examinations with the exception of Islamic studies in Pakistan are based on the Western models of education.

In my case, Urdu’s oral traditions and rich cultural legacy is lost to me. In Nehru’s words, “I have become a queer mixture of the East and the West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere.”  I cannot read Ghalib unless it’s an English translation. I cannot even read the Urdu newspaper. I read Saadat Hassan Manto, revered as one of Pakistan’s greatest writers, in English. Often I wonder what richness of language is lost to me, what word play and complex grammatical structures I shall never understand, nor the depth of connotation that one Urdu word conveys but none in English compare.

Upon my return to Pakistan in 2009, I was faced with a quandary. I wanted to document the richness of this country and its cultural heritage; I wanted to highlight its history and its crumbling monuments, preserving those stories and retelling them for a new generation that doesn’t understand what Pakistan is, or what it once was. This new generation, fed on misinterpreted views of Islam accounts for much of the radicalization of the past few decades. I realized that if I needed to undo General Zia’s legacy of Islamization, I needed to show that the people living here weren’t always militant; that before there was a homeland for Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Hindus, Parsis to name a few lived side by side in peace with Muslims.

Working for a television station, I was making a documentary film but realized my shortcomings when my co-producer handed me a script to OK. The script was written in Urdu. Like a toddler struggling with an elementary primer, I held my finger over each word trying to decipher the script, until I gave up a few lines after and told him it seemed OK to me. What else could I do? When a colleague amazingly remarked that I could speak French and Italian, I turned to her and in my broken Urdu, asked what use was it if I couldn’t speak the language of my own people?

After a few months of struggle, I left the documentary film-making world because of my language handicap and ventured toward Communications. I struggled with the bitter taste of irony, that I, privileged, educated, capable of helping this country through the miasma of failure, extremism, violence and stagnation, was powerless because I couldn’t speak the language properly.  Unlike Professor Haleem who made a difference to change Pakistan for the better, I was restricted and hindered by the same hopeful language that gave this country a voice. Today, my Urdu is mish-mashed with English incorporating more colloquial slang than literal Urdu. Like my Urdu, I find myself a mix of different peoples and personalities, Pakistani at heart, but at home nowhere.

Raza Habib Raja
Professor Philip Oldenburg is a professor of political science in Columbia University and author of the book titled India, Pakistan, and democracy: solving the puzzle of divergent paths. As an academic, Subcontinent has been his prime area of political research. A few months ago, he was invited to Cornell University where I was privileged to hear his views on a very interesting topic which was why India and Pakistan despite being apparently similar in history and culture have taken divergent paths as far as democracy and role of military are concerned.

First of all Professor Philip made an interesting statement that India’s successful evolution as a democracy is not a “normal” phenomenon but rather an exception whereas Pakistan has evolved the way most of the third world countries with similar characteristics are likely to evolve. Now this contradicts with most of the stuff I hear about the reasons as to why India and Pakistan have taken different trajectories. I have mostly heard that democracy has not evolved simply for the sole reason because military has not allowed it to evolve. Explanation for the difference in India and Pakistan has always been pinned down to only deep conspiracies of the “deep state” against political class.
Now this analysis at least partially disagrees with the overwhelmingly prevalent and rather simplistic explanation according to which democracy does not function solely because Pakistan’s army has always been conspiring against it whereas in India the armed forces have decided to respect the political template of the government.

According to Professor Philip, a country with low literacy rate, weak industrial base and with a colonial legacy is often expected to take the similar trajectory as of Pakistan. He then cited many examples of the countries where military coups have taken place and the institution enjoys great power and privileges.
However, he made an interesting remark that Pakistan in many ways had performed worse and while many other countries (like Bangladesh and Turkey) are gradually shaping towards the ascendency of political class and strengthening of democracy, in Pakistan the political developments are pointing towards the other direction.

So what makes Pakistan a similar and yet in the longer run a “different” case as far as the role of military is concerned? Why the neighbouring India is an exception and why could not Pakistan follow the same trajectory despite the fact that it was carved out of the same British Empire?
Well the reasons are complicated and cannot be solely just attributed to the conspiracies of the military. Besides trying to understand as to why military intervenes, it should be worthwhile to also dwell as to how it is actually able to intervene. In Pakistan’s case the reasons are rooted in:
1) its general cultural and political traits such as low literacy, rural dominance and lack of developed stabilizing as well as independent institutions like Judiciary,
2) the history of Pakistan movement and its early years after coming into being
3) chaos when civilians are in power and their inability to take a decisive action when opportunity presented
4) Urban middleclass impatience and excessive emphasis on “order” which has provided armed interventions a semblance of support
5) Manipulations by the army and the intelligence apparatus

Firstly, one has to understand that military in weak third world country is often the only well-disciplined, centralized and sophisticated institution. It has sophisticated instruments of violence and has a top down chain of command which is seldom if ever broken. Particularly in countries where democratic institution are either nascent or democracy after its introduction leads to chaos, military due to its ability to bring “stability” and restore order often intervenes. Third world has thus witnessed a number of coups and Pakistan by no stretch of imagination is an exception. However, military interventions by no stretch of imagination are good developments, though in the context of tremulous political cultures, understandable .

Military once it intervenes to overthrow the political government becomes a political stakeholder and from that point onwards, takes steps particularly in the constitutional and legal realm, which solidify its acquired political status, powers and privileges. Of course the military is not accountable to the electorate and therefore in the longer run is quite insulated from the normal pressures which a political government has to go through. Military rule seriously undermines the democratic evolution and does not allow the political culture to deepen. It depoliticizes the populace and also creates a state which is not responsive to its people.

In Pakistan unfortunately the genesis of the military rule is actually in the way the Pakistan movement shaped up and the complex interplay of the dynamics of the movement with cultural and political characteristics of the region which eventually became Pakistan.

Compared to Indian freedom movement, Pakistan’s independence movement became a mass movement at a very late stage. Whereas Congress’s birth was in 1885 and it became a mass movement particularly due Gandhi’s efforts by 1920s, Muslim League even in early 1940s had not been successful to garner the same kind of mass support. Ironically the areas where it was actually popular were areas which subsequently became part of India.

It was only in the second half of the decade of 1940s that the Muslim League started to make real appeal to the people of the areas which subsequently became Pakistan.

Muslim League did not attain the political maturity the way Congress did which had gone through several generations of leaders and the political culture was institutionalized in the party as well as the movement headed by it.

This is an important distinction which shaped the respective roles of the military in both the countries. In India the political class was dominant from the beginning and moreover the public perception of the army was not of a saviour as the Indian army had served loyally under the British empire . The entrenched political culture ensured that Indian political landscape made a smooth transition from a movement into a functioning democracy from the word go. Moreover, Nehru remained at the political helm in the initial years providing the much needed political stability under democratic umbrella. Military was never in a position to stage a coup both because the chaos-which often precedes the military coup and at least is the justification the first time- was never there and secondly the army did have an “image” issue due to its close association with the colonial rule. Nehru’s revered and towering status also prevented the development of any militaristic bonapartism.

Pakistan on the other hand was founded in an area where had already been militarized as most of the recruitment was taking place from so called “Martial Races” of Punjab and what is now Khyber Pukhtunkhawa. Moreover the state apparatus was stronger in Punjab and local politicians had to rely a lot on the civil bureaucracy in order to get things “done”. The reliance of political class on the state apparatus in areas falling under West Pakistan was much greater than in areas which later became India.

So when Pakistan came into being, the local politicians, particularly in the rural areas, had already become too entrenched in the practice of looking towards state apparatus to gain privileges and powers rather than rather than through political mechanism consisting of parties, manifestoes and ideology. In rural Punjab, this practice with varying degrees continues to this date.

When Pakistan came into being the Muslim League despite having gained support in the last two years was still not a deeply rooted political party in the area which was West Pakistan. The main leaders of the League actually belonged to the areas which were in India and when they came to Pakistan, they were without the same kind of support. The nationalist movement actually brought leaders in West Pakistan whose roots had been left behind. In addition, Jinnah through charismatic did not live long and during his one year at the helm also did not do much in line with democratic norms. His one year rule was as a Governor General and was highly personalized.

In the initials years army was needed again and again both at the external front (Kashmir front) as well as the internal front (riots of 1953) to restore order. During these times while army’s role strengthened, the political landscape was fraught with chaos and repeated change of governments. The political class in the absence of a stabilizing political leader (Liaquat Ali Khan was shot dead in1951) and a political infrastructure underpinned by proper political culture, could not gain strength.

While government heads kept on changing, the Chief of Army Staff continued to gain power and moreover whereas in India the Chief of Army staff position witnessed at least five different individuals, Pakistan persisted with Ayub Khan. Repeated changes of governments and chaotic situation provided the impetus for the military intervention and when finally military intervened; there was actually a sigh of relief.

The military intervention of 1958 is extremely important as it initiated several things. First, military’s image among the urban middle class (at that time small in number but powerful due to its monopoly over education, and white collared job market) as a saviour was created. From that point onwards, the middleclass, particularly the urban middleclass has seen army in that light particularly when during short stings of democracy the situation gets chaotic. It actually expects army to intervene. Secondly, army’s self-image also enhanced to include itself as the ultimate custodian of the political stability as well. Third, it gave the loudest signal that army was a definite stakeholder and in fact more powerful than all others. So from that point onwards, political class had to factor in army more than any other stakeholder for its own survival.

Although Ayub was personally perhaps a secular but increasingly the army was tutored in Islam in order to provide it with an ideological fabric to bolster its combative zeal. Increasingly the army also started to see itself as the ultimate custodian of the ideological frontier also. It was in fact during the Ayub tenure that army also started to make overtures to the religious outfits for both external and a domestic objectives, a trend which over time has only increased .

The ascendency of army given the unique circumstances of Independence, earlier turmoil, the “expectations” of the urban middleclass, and the work done during Ayub era to solidify its status as political power, was difficult to check but nevertheless there were several opportunities which could have been availed.

Given army’s “respect” as a saviour, the best time to curtail army’s role as a political force is at the time when it has been dishonoured or humiliated. However, for that the political class besides removing the head of the armed forces also needs to exercise maturity in its own conduct. This is essential in order to dispel army’s potential role as the “saviour” of the last resort, a role which is largely perceived by the urban middleclass.

Unfortunately Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto due to his personal conduct and “I am above the law “ attitude squandered the chance. Bhutto ruled in a capricious manner, and used security forces to terrorize his rivals. Moreover, he alienated the urban middleclass too much due to his personal conduct and dictatorial traits. He rigged the elections and once again it was urban middleclass which was in complete resentment as ZAB had taken several steps to displease them and supplanted those with his style of rule. The “movement” against the election rigging was primarily an urban bourgeoisie movement and during those times there was a resurgence of army’s image also. The leaders of the movement were in fact giving overtures to the armed forces to intervene and “rescue” Pakistan. Army, at that time while apparently supporting Bhutto, was at the same time also in contact with the opposition and was cleverly plotting a coup. When army finally intervened on that fateful night, it was not only in accordance with its own institutional interests but also the interests of the urban middleclass.

This point is essential here because the urban middleclass actually has historically provided the armed interventions a semblance of popular support. Although urban middleclass is not monolithic and it would incorrect to assume that it can actually think like a unified orgasm but by and large this class is anti-democratic and apolitical in its orientation. This class is upwardly mobile, prefers stability over chaos and has been successfully tutored in a nationalist brand of civic nationalism. In Pakistan’s case the brand of civic nationalism has Islam as an important ingredient coupled with inherent negation towards plurality. Civic nationalism here tries to promote a strong centre and homogeneity or oneness. This brand of civic nationalism is strongest in the urban middle class as it is cultivated chiefly through education and then further reinforced by mass media. Further on this brand of nationalism also places strong emphasis on Pakistan’s place in the Islamic world and also in the global context.

Army, particularly the officer cadre is chiefly drawn from the middleclass and its ideological thrust is quite identical to that of the urban middleclass. So besides the deep suspicion about “corrupt” politicians and “chaotic” democracy, another major reason that urban middleclass likes army is its own ideological thrust resonates closely with that of army. Consequently despite major blunders army’s respect remains high. Even when it has suffered a blow it has buoyed again.

In some ways, it is the expectations of the urban middleclass and the pedestal on which it by and large holds the army that the latter finds additional incentives to keep a “check” on politicians.

And then there is the case of almost complete ownership of foreign policy by the army which was taken over during Zia’s time. Of course Zia was the head of the government also but the espionage activities of the army and ISI during the Afghan war made it the most important stakeholder. Once Benazir came into power she quickly had to resign to the fact that foreign policy was not an area where a civilian government could have much leeway.

Over the years, even under the façade of civilian governments, army has been running the show. Foreign policy particularly its terms of engagement with “foes” like India and “friends” like USA has become the sole domain of the army. It is from here that army draws its most strength and even its reason for existence and it won’t allow any sort of “interference” from the civilian government.

Over the years, army has ensured that Pakistan double deals with the United States, constantly adopts a hostile posture towards India and pursues the policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan. For these objectives, military and its intelligence apparatus has constantly courted militant organizations which at times have gone out of control like a Frankenstein monster only to at times turn against itself.

It is here that military simply does not listen to the concerns of the civilian governments and in fact won’t hesitate to pressurize it through back door means and even mount a coup. In 1999, it deeply embarrassed Nawaz Sharif government by initiating Kargil war while he was trying to make peace initiatives towards India. And it is agitated against Zardari led government for being too cosy with Washington (though these charges are hardly credible).

Unfortunately USA has also more or less accepted the dominance of military and has adopted the tactic of directly dealing with the military at times bypassing the civilian governments. And of course all the military dictatorships have been supported by the US which found it easier and convenient to deal with them and were ready to ignore “trivialities” like democracy.
In fact Hussain Haqqani’s masterpiece ( one of the most extraordinary books I have ever read) also makes the same point that USA in its desire of convenience found it easier to deal with military.

Turning a blind eye policy adopted by the USA has eventually resulted in military being the party they have to negotiate with even when it is not cooperating and indulging in double games. Civilian governments virtually are irrelevant.

It is hold over foreign policy and terms of engagement with critical countries like India, United States and Afghanistan which military guards even more than its finances. The entire intelligence apparatus is dedicated towards this end and if a civilian government tries to assert its authority in this domain, it pays the price.

Can we break this hold? Yes, it can be broken but for that politicians too have to show maturity and respect rule of law. They also need to show unity instead of cheap opportunism when the opportunity to weaken military presents itself. My mind immediately goes back to what happened when Osama Bin Laden was killed. Instead of having a united front, Mr. Zardari was keen on creating a rift between army and Nawaz Sharif for short sighted political gains. That opportunity was lost. And subsequently Mr. Sharif actually went to Supreme Court in Memo scandal despite the fact that the military establishment was targeting him also and if democracy were to be derailed, he too will be a loser. However, in Mr. Nawaz sharif’s head nothing mattered more than Zardari’s scalp.

We cannot wrestle away the power unless we show unity and an unshakable belief in democracy. However that belief in democracy is also underpinned by the way major political actors govern when in power and also engage with each other. Urban middleclass does not love army just for the sake of loving it. It likes army (rightly or wrongly is a separate issue) because it restores order and since it is politically insulated therefore gives an impression of merit. Army needs chaos as a reason to intervene. It needs political governments to fail to ensure its hegemony. It wants political class to be riddled with internal rifts.

What the political parties (the two main parties) can do is to at least ensure that they govern properly and ensure rule of law. They need to be united on the fact that they would not conspire against each other and will not try to seek army’s help for derailing the other.

Remember that it is no longer feasible for the army to directly rule the country and therefore the chances of an old fashioned coup are very rare. The chances of a complete roll back of the system are slim and therefore the political parties can take decisive steps provided they are united and get their act together.

By Harry Pasha:

According to an apocryphal story, immediately after General Pervez Musharraf launched his infamous Kargil offensive, the Indian Prime Minister contacted Mr. Nawaz Sharif, then Prime Minister of Pakistan.

“Mian Sahib” asked the Indian PM, “What are you doing to us? Why has your army launched an offensive in Kargil?”

“Let me ask my generals and then I will get back to you,” replied Nawaz Sharif

“That is the difference between you and us, Mian sahib; we don’t ask our generals, they ask us before they do anything” is said to have been the Indian PM’s reply.

This story, often repeated in the streets of Pakistan, is also a sort of popular self-awareness of how things stand in Pakistan when it comes to civil-military relationships.

In the military circles, of which I was a part for fourteen years of my life, the civilian administration is always seen as corrupt and inefficient. This view is, of course, partially true especially if one compares the two systems without incorporating their attendant peculiarities. It is easy to be professional and efficient in the military: everyone is trained to do their job and there is an established hierarchy of rank structure buttressed by an uninterrupted history of functionality as an institution. Furthermore, the military leaders only have to deal with highly indoctrinated troops who, being soldiers, have no right to any kind of free will or civic rights. It is easy to command and manage a captive audience.

Our civilian systems, however, neither have a continuous history of functionality nor do they comprise a system in which the hierarchy is clearly established and articulated. Because of various martial laws and other military interventions neither the people nor the so-called leaders have truly learned the ethics and politics of public political life. Resultantly, most of our politicians see their offices as a path to self-agrrandization and have no qualms about using their influence to enrich themselves. Since the system is unstable, the politicians’ psyche is connected to short-term goals. So, instead of refining their message and streamlining a long-term, people-oriented politics, our politicians are more focused on the short-term goals. If the threat of military take-overs had been eliminated, just like the Indians did, then over the last sixty years we would have also developed a more responsive and transparent system of politics and governance.

Pakistan is also still burdened with a medieval system of production in which the large landholders still rely on captive labor to continue reproducing the inequalities that we inherited at the time of the partition. How is the army to blame for this? Quite simply, one look at who did the military mobilize during their regimes will be a good answer: Ayub Khan relied on some heavy weights of Pakistani feudality and Zia-ul-Haq, despite his pseudo-Islamic policies, also worked through the same ”notables” in all regions of Pakistan. Mr. Musharraf, notwithstanding his pronounced liberalism, also worked with cahudries of Gujraat and other such parasites to keep his regime functional. In the entire thirty or so years of the aggregated military rule, not even one of them even hinted at land reforms or tried to disrupt this unjust, unequal system of wealth distribution. In fact, by supporting the zamindars and the waderas, the military has provided them new inroads into the nation’s politics: pretty much all major parties now field feudal candidates from the rural heart of Pakistan, candidates who are basically there to safeguard their own interests and to maintain the status quo.

It is often declared that without the army, Pakistan will disintegrate as a nation. Maybe, that is partially true as a functional national government does need a strong and established armed force to maintain order within its borders, to provide emergency relief, and to also safeguard against foreign aggression. But a deeper look at our system suggests that military itself has become the main cause of Pakistan’s instability and bleak future. This isn’t something new; one look at human history is enough to prove that eventually it is always the high military expenditure that brings nations and empires down. At the height of its power, the Roman Empire relied heavily on the Roman legions for the expansion of empire. But in the end the legions themselves became too expansive to maintain and thus became the cause of the failure of empire. Same happed to the Soviet Union. We are headed the same way. We all know that we cannot afford to spend so much on the military but we must, as our politicians neither have the courage nor the popular support to reign in the military elite.

The civil military relationships in Pakistan, therefore, are a symptom of a nation gone wrong, a nation in which people are still living in squalor while their leaders and their generals live like kings.

It is quite obvious that our politicians are mostly corrupt and probably do not care about the people, but part of this apathy is systemic: if the politicians are in it for the short term and do not have to worry about their long term obligations to their constituents, then the system does not force them to become more receptive to popular demands. The generals, on the other hand, have no reason to pander to the people especially if they can continuously rely on popular distrust of the politicians and a constant invocation of outside threats. The result of this military civilian symbiotic relationship is that Pakistan has increasingly become a dysfunctional state in which might is right and the only way to make ourselves look better is to keep deriding other nations.

Rise of Islamic fundamentalism is a direct result of, among other things, the unequal and unjust society that the army and the politicians have constructed over the years. Think of it this way: if you feel powerless and silenced with no recourse to a functional justice system or a vibrant social system, then you will sign up with anyone who promises to literally restructure the entire socio-economic edifice. The left in Pakistan has never been able to promise such an upheaval: in fact, the Pakistani left, whatever is left of it, has itself become an elitist pursuit by some real and mostly pseudo intellectuals whose political alignment is mostly with the feudal or industrial bourgeoisie. In such a scenario, only the most fundamentalist mullahs can mobilize the people as they can, at the end of the day, at least promise revolutionary change.

In wake of the recent Memogate scandal and other national debacles, it has become evident that the interest of the army and those of our politically elected leaders are on a divergent course. Yes, we need the armed forces: at least, they provide employment for hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis directly and indirectly. But we need an army that knows that it is one tool in the hands of popularly elected governments, an army that enables Pakistan to become a viable, pluralistic democracy.

Our politicians also need to learn that they are servants of their people and unless they internalize this core principle, they will continue the inane and self-serving politics that has now made them a joke in the region as well as in the world.

If the present government finishes its term, ineffective as it maybe as a government, it will be the first popularly elected government to do so in my entire lifetime. So, yes, their corruption and failure notwithstanding, let us aid and help this government so that we can have another and yet another popularly elected government. A functioning system of politics is the only way for Pakistan to become a viable nation and for that to happen, the Pakistan army will have to learn to think of itself as an instrument of Pakistani state and the generals will have to learn to be servants of their people: Yes, the very people whose poverty and suffering underwrites the privileges that our generals enjoy as their rights.

(Also published by Viewpoint Online)

Related articles

• Pakistan Should Re-evaluate its Relationship with the US and NATO (pakistaniaat.net)
• What does the Pakistan Army want now? (pakistaniaat.net)
• Pakistan Army: The Fog of War Argument Won’t Do (pakistaniaat.net)
• Ex-Pakistani envoy fears for his life amid probe (cbsnews.com)

© 2012, Masood Ashraf Raja. This article may not be reproduced in any form without providing an active attribution link/ reference to The Pakistan Forum. All attribution links within the article must also be retained.

January 4: Salmaan Taseer, the governor of Punjab, is shot by one of his bodyguards near his home. Taseer dies of his wounds soon afterwards.His killer, Malik Mumtaz Qadri  disagreed with Taseer’s opposition to Pakistan’s blasphemy law. Salmaan Taseer wasbusinessman and politician who served as the 26th governor of the province of Punjab from 2008 until his assassination in early 2011. He was member of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Taseer was also the chairman and CEO of the First Capital and Worldcall Group.

January 18: Earthquake of magnitude 7.2 hit Karachi. The epicenter 45 kilometers west of Dalbandin in Balochistan.  The epicenter is located in a sparsely populated area.

January 27: A US diplomat, Raymond Davis, kills two men on a motorbike in Lahore allegedly in self defence while a companion of the diplomat, who is also an American citizen, crushed to death a bike rider in a hit-and-run incident, following the shooting. He works for US private security firm and contractor with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  Later on March 16, 2011, Davis was released after the families of the two killed men were paid $2.4 million  as blood money and departed Pakistan.

30 March: The 2nd semifinal of the ICC Cricket World Cup 2011 was played between India and Pakistan at  Mohali (India). India won the match by 29 runs and qualified for the 2011 Cricket World Cup Final. This match has been perceived by Pakistani former cricketers and fans as a great let down from Pakistan due to their weak fielding and batting despite good talent shown previously from the Pakistani captain and players in the 2011 ICC cup^. The match drew 67.3 million viewers in India alone, and an estimated 150 million viewers worldwide. Three Pakistan citizens, including an actor Liaquat Soldier died out of shock after Pakistan lost the match. Another person was killed and 50 others were injured in aerial firings during the match in Karachi.

May 2: The head of the Islamist militant group al-Qaeda “Osama bin Laden” was killed in (Abbotabad) Pakistan by a United States special forces military unit. The raid on bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan was launched from Afghanistan.After the raid, U.S. forces took bin Laden’s body to Afghanistan for identification, then buried it at sea within 24 hours of his death.

22 May: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan attacked the Pakistan Naval Station Mehran in karachi.  Aircraft stationed in the base were destroyed using rocket propelled grenades, including a helicopter and two, out of the Pakistan Navy’s four aircrafts. The Zarrar Battalion of the Special Service Group responded to the attack, with the military killing four of a claimed force of 8-20 attackers at a cost of ten of their own men in an operation that lasted 15 hours. The remaining assailants are believed to have been captured or escaped and an unexploded suicide jacket and live grenades were recovered after the operations

May 24: Hakim Ali Zardari, father of President Asif Ali Zardari died at the age of 81 years at a private ward in the Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences Hospital in Islamabad. He was a member of the Pakistan Peoples Party, the country’s largest political party. He entered politics in 1965, helping in the campaign of Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the founder of Pakistan, against the then military dictator Gen Ayub Khan. He was member parliament thrice and also served as a federal minister twice.

November 22: Husain Haqqani resigned as Pakistan Ambassador to the United States following claims of his alleged affiliation with the Memogate  (controversy about an alleged Pakistani memo seeking the help of the US Government)

November 26: A NATO attack on two Pakistani border checkposts in Salala in the Baizai subdivision of Mohmand Agency in FATA kill 24 soldiers of the Pakistan Army. This attack resulted in a deterioration of relations between Pakistan and the United States. The Pakistani public reacted with protests all over the country and the government took measures adversely affecting the US exit strategic from Afghanistan including the evacuation of Shamsi Airfield and closure of the NATO supply line.

Is there any taker of Land Reforms any more?By Akhtar Ali(akhtarali1949@gmail.com)Elections are approaching and political parties are preparing their manifestoes. All are unanimous that people got a raw deal both under dictatorship and democracy. Some leaders argue that corruption is the central issue which if solved would automatically improve the lot of the poor. This may be true but only partly .Some argues that more democracy and unthrottled democracy would, in the long run, eliminate poverty, as happened in the West. While this may be true, democratic societies are also doing some soul searching whether democracy has performed efficiently towards maximizing people’s welfare. There are strong anti-capitalist under currents bringing forth movements like Occupy the Stock-Exchanges .Democracy and a corruption free administration would certainly improve the lot of the poor in the long run. More than one-third of Pakistan’s populace is abject poor and the rest are only slightly better except for a tiny minority. The task of ameliorating if not eliminating poverty is too big. Trickling down effect may take too long, a time span that will endanger the integrity and solidarity of this country.What to do. There is worldwide recession. Economy has performed awfully badly for both domestic and international reasons. There is a misplaced even dangerous perception that things work out themselves and that no major initiatives are necessary, as has been the case with most military dictatorships. The entire cushion, unfortunately, has been eaten up. In our region, our adversary has been progressing faster than ever before. Economic disparity between India and Pakistan cannot be sustained for along time and would lead to the same kind of fissure that led to the dissolution of the Soviet system ; disparity and failure in economic and social performance .We will have to apply some direct tools and policy initiatives to improve the lot of the poor. But the government does not have money; it does have resources and the only transferable resource is Land. We will see in this space as to what can be done in this respect.There is a general thinking that the days of Land redistribution or reforms are over. It is outmoded or out of tune with times. Land redistribution leads to fragmentation which results in lower agricultural productivity. And that land redistribution may result in loss of agricultural production because the poor would not have the working capital to buy the inputs. Many religious scholars have also opposed land redistribution arguing that Islam respects private property. It is also true that most of these arguments have roots in the opposition to Communist ideology in the days of Cold war. There are equally convincing arguments to the contrary ;the Land belongs to Allah; private property rights only pertain to the cultivated land ;land gifted by infidel colonialists to their supporters has no moral or religious sanction or support ;hunger and poverty are enemies of Islam and Allah; feeding the hungry is the state’s responsibility in Islam; smaller tracts in Pakistan are more productive than the large tracts ;mechanization is easy, cheap and readily available even to the small farmer in the form of rentals; large tract s of lands leads to feudalism which militates against liberty, freedom and development and conspires with the forces of status-quo and militarism as has been demonstrated by the history of Japan and even here in Pakistan. And the biggest falsehood is that all land has been distributed under previous land reforms and there is nothing more left; all farms ownerships are less than 500 acres. It has been acknowledged that there are hundreds if not thousands of landlords who own tens of thousands of acres of land, violating the existing relevant laws. The biggest argument against the land reform is ; who will bell the cat ? The situation on ground is that the landlords are not prepared to even pay income tax on their huge incomes; and the majority of civil and military elite is feudal. Military middle classes are transformed into landed elites through awards and rewards and many other routes. It is argued that one has to either wait for a near catastrophe of the dimensions of 16th December 1971 and the emergence of a Marde-Khuda. Marde Khuda came in 1971, but he conspired with the feudal and launched an anti-industrialist agenda and even strengthened feudalism. And then several Mard or Namarde Khuda came in the form of military dictatorships who probably had the power and wherewithal l to take some drastic land reforms programme, but acted to the contrary finding ready friends among the land lords. However, short of catastrophe and civil war, and without the Marde-Khuda , there are some solutions that we are going to take up in the following. Among political parties, MQM does have anti-feudal agenda, but lacks a land reform commitment and suffers from narrow geographical support. It is possible that in future a political coalition may emerge that may be ready to act on some kind of land reforms programme and taxing the large agricultural incomes.Agriculture and PovertyAgriculture has a share of 26% in Pakistan’s GDP and employs % of the work-force. The sector has a potential of growing at rate of 5% p.a., as it did in 1960s earlier. Low growth rates in the economy in general and in agriculture has significantly contributed to poverty and unemployment. Poverty in Pakistan, as measured in 2007-08, was at 26%, which should have increased in the wake of floods and the economic crisis, and has reportedly returned to the previous high levels of 33-38 % of 2001-2002. Rural poverty has always been high in Pakistan at 40% plus. A major reason for it has been the landlessness and low employment. A good 10.36 % of the rural house-holds are landless peasants and another 57% (35.1 % of total population) are under-employed and under-paid non-farm laborers. Both of these groups could benefit from higher agricultural growth rates, land reforms and land redistribution.Higher growth rates would create employment in farm and non-farm sector and would increase wages and incomes. Both growth and equity policies can be mutually reinforcing. Our argument is that the Livestock sector in Pakistan has a contribution of 47 % in the agricultural output, which has been mostly contributed by small holders or the landless, having 2-5 Buffaloes. If 1-1.5 Acre plots are distributed to this group of the landless and the non-farm workers, under a land reforms scheme, it would contribute to both, output and equity. Similarly, the proposed beneficiary group could also participate in high value horticultural sector, which has been shown to have a growth potential of 5.0% p.a. A reasonable land reform component along with the distribution of state land to the rural and possibly urban poor could go a long way in reducing the endemic poverty in this country. Many recent writings have indicated the destabilizing potential of the rural and urban poverty and disparities. Even the Taliban issue is interpreted as having linkage to poverty and deprivation. This creates a new logic and rationale for land reforms which may not only be restricted to land distribution but should go well beyond towards improving upon the tenure issues. The author would strongly argue against the so-called market efficiency and growth-sans-equity policies for example as in Egypt which have worsened the poverty and inequity conditions.Land Ownership and Utilization in Pakistan__________________________________________________________1) Number of households / population increased by 25% during the two censuses (1990-2000).2) Number of farms increased from 5.071 million to 6.6 million: 1.549 million farms added: an increase of 30.54%; total Farm area increased by only 6.15 %; 0.6% increase p.a.3) Number of farms under 1 hectare (ha) remained almost the same; however, farm area under this category increased by 68.47 %, an addition of 483,000 ha. Percentage of these farms in the total number of farms increased from 27 % to 36%.4) Number of largest farms, 60 ha and more, decreased from 15000 to 14000, a decrease of 1000 farms; area under these farms also decreased from 1.936 million ha to 1.683 million ha a decrease of 15% in area.5) In 1990, 27% farms had 4% of total farm area, while the largest farms (60 ha and more and, less than 0.5 % of the total number of farms) had 10% of the total farm area .In 2000, 36% farms (under 1 ha) had 6% of the total farm area, while large farms had 8% of the total farm area. Has the skewed distribution decreased? In 1990, the large farms’ total area was 2.75 times higher than the total area of small farms( under 1 ha) area, the same ratio decreased to 1.42 times only ; skewed distribution and disparity still quite high ,but appears to have been reduced by almost 100%, under this indicator.6) In Pakistan about, 6.6 Million farming families own 6.6 million farms, over a farm area of 50 million Acres (average size 8 Acres), of which 20% farm area remains uncultivated. 58% Farms or farm house- holds have only 10% of the total farm area, call them very small farmers( under 5 acres); 37% small farmers (5-25 acres) own 47% of the farm area; 5% larger farmers (25-100 acres) own 26% and 0.5% (30,000 families) of super land lords (100 acres plus) own 11% of the total farm areas.7) Some 19% of the total farm area remains uncultivated. In small farms up to 93% of farm land remains cultivated. This percentage goes down with the increase in farm size. At 100 acres plus, roughly one-half (50%) of the land area remains uncultivated and unutilized.8) About 2.6 million acres of farm area in large farm size category remains unutilized, which is under the control of 30,000 super land lord families. Another 1.5 million acres remain uncultivated in 50-100 Acres plot size. Potentially about 2.6-4 million acres (50%) of unutilized farm lands is “distributable”. Two million landless could benefit.Our Land Reforms experience; a reviewAlthough Muslim League Leadership was ‘mostly feudal the latter felt and recognized the popular pressure for land and tenancy reform. Hari Report, Daultana Commission, MLR-54 and MLR-115 have been the major milestones in the land and tenancy reform history in Pakistan. The last move in this respect dates back to 1977, when PM Bhutto announced a new package of reforms including lower ceilings on land and allotment of government land to the poor tenants. Freedom movement and the ideological conflict between the East and the West created and sustained pressures for land reforms in the developing world. Ideological period having gone, the futility of the earlier reforms and the en-trenchment of feudal interest in Pakistan’s body politic are possibly the reasons, why any such move does not get even mentioned these days. There is substantial postwar evidence that the societies which implemented meaningful land reforms, and put an end to feudalism, could transform themselves into the new dynamism required for scientific and industrial growth and development. Taiwan, Korea and Japan are classic exam¬ples. Taiwan and Korea utilized the opportunity created by the exit of Japanese landlords to launch deep and effective land reforms. Pakistan lost this opportunity which was available to it after independence, as many non-Muslim land owners fled the country.The economic rationale for earlier land reforms was based more on optimal considerations and hither-to under-utilization of the lands available with the big land lord. It appears that redistribution impact was much less of a consideration in the view of the planners and decision makers. The political objectives included acquisition of political legitimacy, and shaking and controlling the feudal class through carrot and stick approach and enhancing the political clientele and image among the masses. Ayub Khan’s reforms (MLR 64) put the upper ceiling of irrigated land at 500 acres per family and un-irrigated at 1000 acres per family. Compensation is to be paid through inheritable bond which earned 4% p.a. interest and land was to be redistributed at a price. Bhutto’s reforms (MLR 115) put the upper ceiling at 150 acres irrigated and 300 acres un-irrigated per member of a family. No compensation was to be paid to owners and the land was to be distributed free. Put together, the two land reforms affected about 4% of the land, only half of which was actually transferred to landless. Only about 100,000 farming households 8% of the total (and even much less if landlessness was included) benefitted.A New Land Reform PackageIn Pakistan, 28% of the total landmass is being under cultivation, and huge chunks of land remain unutilized. About 6.6 million households own 6.6 million farms over a total farm area of 50 million acres. Only some 80% of this farm area is actually cultivated. The remaining 20% of the farm area remains uncultivated. Small farms utilize up to 95% of the available farm land, while large farms owned by big and powerful landlords remain uncultivated to the extent of almost 50%.A total of 2.66 million acres of farm area remains uncultivated in the large farm category(100 acres plus). Some 30,000 landlord families could benefit one million plus landless families, if uncultivated land is given away to the latter under some Land Distribution Scheme, if not land reforms exactly. In Land Reforms, usually land is forcibly taken away under legislation or revolution without any compensation.There is also a case for bringing more land under agriculture. Perhaps ten million more acres could be added by new land expansion and development activity probably in the next ten years. This would mean one million acres per year of new land to be transferred to the landless. One would argue, where would the water come from? We are already short of water. We are currently wasting water under existing flood irrigation practices. The new land under the landless families would be from the very beginning on more efficient Drip Irrigation (D.I.), which may be cheap as well as efficient. The landless poor beneficiary would be more inclined and capable to introduce bucket and pipe drip irrigation. He would not have much choice. He does not have many choices in life either.Thus about 14 million acres of land (10 million new and 4 million existing unutilized) could be distributed among the landless over a period of some ten years, benefitting 5-6 million families, with a farm of 2.5 acres each, practically solving the issue of landlessness, if not of poverty totally. Even after getting 2.5 acres, he would not be totally out of the clutch of the grinding poverty. But he would get hope and the tools, to handle the economic problems of his family.Pakistan would need more land under cultivation to feed its ever increasing population, as productivity increases are too far and few in between. The diseconomy of scale, if any, of the small farms should be taken care of by an organized Cooperative movement that could take care of the credit and inputs. Land is the only thing that governments can afford to give free, may be charge some development cost in the long run under a concessionary credit scheme. Land remains on earth. It does not evaporate and does not disappear. It is excellent collateral for the poor. After all if a country belongs to its people, they should all own some piece of land, however, small it may be.Land has been distributed in Pakistan among the rich and powerful and literally given away at dirt prices. Some effort would have to be made to include the poor in this largesse. There is a mass appeal and appetite for land confiscation by the state without compensation. Hence the two attempts at land reforms, even though unsuccessful. Any new land distribution scheme should be careful and respect the federalism requirements and the local and regional rights. It should not import people from the outside, unless in special cases, where demand and supply gaps may exist.On the other hand the big landlords may be induced by the State to do away with their excess unutilized land by imposing a variety of taxes including the much dreaded and opposed Income Tax .Excess land can be acquired by provincial governments under a land bond scheme carrying a reasonable interest rate. The poor land allotee may also be required to pay off a part of the land price under a concessionary credit scheme. Similar schemes have been implemented in Japan, Korea and Germany immediately after the Second World War of 1945.Landless peasants can be given a 1-2 Acre farm each, at 50% of the purchase cost under 4% p.a. and 20 yrs repayment. Alternatively GOP and provincial governments could develop 2-4 million acres over a period of 7-10 yrs, possibly under budgetary outlay than the procurement of private land. Government of Sindh is already implementing such a programme at a modest scale by converting kutcha forest land but without forest, to agricultural land and distributing among landless. This can be done with much ease in Balochistan, where large tracts of land remain unutilized. For political and possibly good reasons, land in Balochistan can only go to Baloch and hence only 1.0 million families could benefit .Almost all the house holds in Balochistan could get a reasonably sized farm. In Punjab, the problem is difficult due to large population and in NWFP the land is limited, although in both the cases there are less populated areas tribal belt in NWFP and southern Punjab. Instead of giving lands to reward generals and bureaucrats and large real state investors, the scarce land should go to the landless poor.Land is the only thing governments, mostly provincial, have. Budgetary resources are limited and cannot almost always be enough, be it BISP or Zakat fund.The cultivable waste landThere was a total of 8.22 million ha of cultivable waste land available to be cultivated, perhaps all of it government land, almost half of it (3.97 Million ha) is in Balochistan. There are only 1.163 million households in Balochistan. If this land is distributed, every house-hold in Balochistan gets 3.41 ha (8.5 acres), much more land than most of the household in Punjab. One doesn’t have to take it away from some one; The Government and the province of Balochistan have this with themselves. Likewise, KP has 1.21 million ha of cultivable waste land, and only 2.77 million house-holds. KP has a land area problem, and about 0.5 ha (1.25 acres) could be distributed to every family in KP. Some 1.29 million farms in the country are under 0.5 ha. It is better than being totally landless. Some of the allotted lands would be sold, because every one cannot enter into agriculture. Ultimately, if 50% of the house-holds end up selling the allotted land, the average farm size increases to 1 ha, which should be quite sufficient to produce food for a family or produce products of an equivalent value. Alternatively, GoKP could allot the available wasteland to 50% of the families, to get the same result. In Sindh and Punjab, landless are high in number and the available cultivable wasteland much less. Nevertheless, 1.6 million ha of this land available in Punjab could be distributed among 3 million households. Similarly, in Sindh, 1.44 million ha could go to another 2 million house holds. A total of 6 million households, out of a total of 14 million rural households can thus get land, without resorting to redistribution. There is a big if in it. The land may not have been grabbed already by the powerful. It has come to public light only after the floods that in Sindh; most of the sailabi land had been grabbed by the powerful landlords, and had been put to share-cropping.Times have changed. Today’s reports of World Bank and IMF and other western agencies read like communist manifesto. The kind of poverty and hunger eradication literature that is coming out now for more than two decades would have sent the writers and publishers of those writings to jail or severe marginalization, in 1950s, 60s and even 70s.Today the biggest enemy or adversary of the World powers is religious fundamentalism and extremism and has replaced the erstwhile Communism. Let me quote here from a report compiled under the aegis of USAID. Ironically, USAID and the World Bank have supported land reforms in the past in many strife prone regions. Taliban issue seems to have created a new rationale for land reforms among the donor agencies. It is being argued that Talibans may exploit the issue and would most probably be successful in drawing support from the landless poor farmers and enhance their appeal and domain. There is significant evidence that most of the Talibans and their supporters come from the landless class.There are other options and components of reform programme as well that extend to water rights and urban housing schemes. Under new irrigation schemes, whenever these come up, trade-able water rights could be awarded to the landless, which he could sell to the willing customer or use it as his collateral or share in the distribution of agricultural output and profits. In this way he becomes partner in place of surf.In urban land laws, provisions for high -rise building societies could be introduced, where virtual plots in the third dimensions are allot-able. Real state developers could be encouraged to develop multi-purpose projects, where in lieu of subsidized land or free land use conversion, a certain percentage of 3-D plots are allotted to the poor. Currently a lot of money changes hands on conversion of agricultural or residential land to the commercial one. Some fee does go to the local or provincial government but most of the surplus is siphoned away by the builders, landowners and the social and political elite. So the name of the game is to create policy or innovation surplus and divert it to the poor.There is a lot of government land that is available on the periphery of Karachi near Sohrab Goth (outside Karachi limits) and in district Thatta that could be allotted to the flood victims especially from the inundated towns of Jacobabad, Larkana and Thatta. If Sindh has to develop regional economies are to be established, as has happened around Lahore. Karachi itself would benefit from the regional economic development as Lahore has. Karachi’s’ economy has been stagnating for many years now. One of the reasons is lack of close geographical interactions and resource reservoirs. Every body would benefit. However the idea would fail if it is used for political and ethnic manipulation and advantage.I would like to add a caveat here. Last PML (N) government headed by Mr. Nawaz Sharif introduced an innovative housing policy and strategy for urban areas by transferring surplus government land and plots for low-cost public housing projects. A good innovative project was, however, reportedly marred by construction scams. There was no need of involving government in construction by a party which believes so much in private sector. That project perhaps is revived in one form or the other. Some residual land or assets may still be there. Musharraf government quietly put a lid on it. No NAB case has been filed with respect to this project apparently. May be, there is one or a few. I am not sure.These are excepts from the writers forthcoming book; Pakistan’s development :economy, resources and technology

By Engr. Syed Ghulam Mustafa

The nation I am talking about has  sixty four years experience in different forms of government, from civil to military, parliamentary to presidential, Union council to municipal, but is still in search of a system that could satisfy their need of progress, prosperity and peace. Yes, I am definitely talking about my own nation, Pakistan. The only missing point in our whole struggle and analysis of searching a flawless political system is that, there are no man made systems which could provide us a comprehensive solution for blood sucking problems unless we have the honest, loyal and will to resolve our issues, power and its attainment by the individuals who run them.

However, since there is no tool available to measure the internal traits of the persons who exercise powers, we cannot ensure the presence of good persons/leaders on the power center. It means that we have to bring a form of government in which power concentrate in institutions rather than individuals. Nowadays democracy in which all the institutions serving the country within their specified boundaries ,is considered the most practical and functional system.

Unfortunately, every system we experienced, it worked for few weeks or at most for few months and after that nation suffered the horrible side effects of the underlying system. Neither it was surprising nor was it our bad lack, but only the contradiction of our national thoughts. Many of us praise the Marshal Law of Gen. Ayub Khan but dislike the continuation of Gen. Yahya Khan, a huge number people love the democracy under the ruling of Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, but rejects it when it brings Mr. Nawaz Sharif and Muhtarma Benazir Bhutto in power. if the dictatorship of Gen. Ayub was acceptable, what went wrong with Gen. Yahya , if the democracy was lovable with ZA Bhutto, why it become unacceptable with Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto,? In my opinion, in all form of government we focused people instead of systems, and when the power exercisers made the abusive use of their, for-granted powers, nation start hating the system, considering it incapable of solving their problems. What happened in times of Gen. Ayub, we didn’t bother to think even for a single minute about the consequences of having some corrupt General, while Gen. Ayub was blindly concentrating all the powers. Same happened in the tenure of Mr. ZA Bhutto, who honored the prime minister with all the available strength, and we gladly accepted his constitution without realizing the consequences of having some incompetent person in power. The similar pattern followed from Gen. Musharraf emergency to Mr. Asif Ali Zardari’s presidency. As the result we are still thinking, which is best form of government, democracy or dictatorship. History should not only be used to give the references in books and article, but we must extract its precious lesson. How rubbish is is that we are not ready to learn anything from our “precious history”. Yes, it is precious because we incurred heavy damages and incurable losses in making it. This nation ran through appreciable moments to restore judiciary and protect its freedom, but how unfortunate is that we are ready to put all the powers in basket of supreme court without realizing that what would be our way out if supreme court start exercising its power in a way it used in ZA Bhutto case. The meaning is simple and straight forward, do not trust the abilities of the system just because of the person running, but we must have complete insight of all the bad and good we come across in future. No matter who is the president, who is prime minister, whoever is Chief Justice and whoever is army chief, neither we should support nor we should ask any of them to exercise their unconstitutional powers. On the other hand if any of them try to concentrate the powers within his or her personality; we must immediately oppose this act of damaging system. In the end I just want to say that, we should struggle to protect system rather than Individuals.

By Ghazala Akbar:

‘The past is a foreign country…they do things differently there’

Remember December 16, anyone? It is that time of the year when the Pakistani High Commissioner in Bangladesh is inexplicably indisposed, takes a mini-break from official duties or heads out of the Capital city Dhaka for some urgent business! Still clueless? Here’s another hint: 1971. Forty years ago, on this date, the Pakistan that came into existence on August 14, 1947 died a slow and agonizing death. It was a particularly violent finale to a nine-month war marked by extreme brutality. In the closing days and its aftermath, the savagery intensified into bestiality. War is hell.

In this War of Liberation or Secession (of the majority from the minority), human life and suffering were the biggest and most tragic casualties. Overnight, people turned stateless, homeless—even limbless. Families became divided, friends turned into foes and loyalties were suspect. Businesses, careers, properties, livelihoods, carefully nurtured over the years were lost. Nearly 97,000 West Pakistanis ended up as POWs in India, 28,000 Bengalis in the Army and Public Services interned in Pakistan. ‘Shielded’by the Geneva Conventions, they were the luckier ones. For civilians that had backed the losing side – ‘Loyalists’ or ‘Quislings’ – depending on how you view them – the consequences were catastrophic.

The death of united Pakistan and the bloody birth of Bangladesh was a painful experience then – and still painful to recount for those unfortunate to be caught in its maelstrom. I had hoped that with the passage of time and distance one could be objective, rational, dispassionate and detached. I was wrong. It still haunts. Type in a few key words on cyberspace –  East Pakistan , West Pakistan, Secession, Liberation War, Bangladesh, Bengali, Bihari, Mukti Bahini, Razakar, al Badar, al Shams,Yahya, Bhutto, Mujib, Indira, Tikka Khan, Niazi, Aurora, Maneckshaw, Indo- Soviet Friendship Treaty, Nixon, Kissinger, China, Seventh Fleet, Surrender… the ghosts return and are difficult to exorcise.

There are numerous books, personal accounts, fictional works, diaries, newspaper articles, official documents, de-classified documents, official cables, photos, films, video clips, interviews, paintings and poems — yellowed and bloodstained. It is a catalogue of horror. Three million, three hundred thousand or thirty thousand – the body count is disputed but it is still one too many. As the Hamoodur Rahman Comission observed: ‘No amount of provocation by the militants of the Awami League or other miscreants could justify retaliation by a disciplined army against its own people’.

To the victors, go the spoils and the exclusive rights to history, the loser can opt to remember or forget. After an initial public outcry, Pakistanis chose a form of selective amnesia. The conclusions of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report in 1974 were a political hot potato and quickly buried. Resurfacing 35 years later when most of the protagonists had died, there was conveniently, no one left to blame or hang. In the enterprise of nation – building and the craft of a new Islamic identity, official narratives air – brushed the misdeeds, the debacle became a footnote, relegated to ancient history.  Bangladesh was accepted, the ‘excesses’ regretted — but – the meddling role of India  and it’s Intelligence Agency RAW as– agent provocateur has lingered. It was neither forgiven nor forgotten.

Significantly, it is the recollection of that bitter memory that has shaped Pakistan’s attitudes and policies towards its Eastern neighbour for the past 40 years. It is why Pakistan ‘eats grass’ to maintain a nuclear arsenal, why it aids proxies, why it sought the KargiI heights, seeks strategic depth and will ‘fight for a thousand years.’ Martin Woollcott of the UK Guardian sums it up pithily: ‘much that is both wrong and dangerous in the sub – continent today– from Pakistan’s paranoia to India’s extreme self-righteousness and Bangladesh’s sense that it is neglected and ignored can be traced to the 1971 conflict, even if the roots go back further still.’

‘The roots’ do go back further– all the way to 1947 and the Partition of India. Take the case of the Biharis or ‘Stranded Pakistanis’ in Bangladesh, still a festering sore after forty years. Who are they, why are they stranded? How did they come to be there in the first place? This quote from Mr. Jinnah after communal violence had engulfed Bihar in February 1947 is self- explanatory: ‘The sufferings Moslems underwent in Bihar and elsewhere clearly showed we should have a separate State of Pakistan. I am really proud of the Bihar Moslems… their sacrifices will not go in vain. They have brought the Pakistan goal nearer and have shown readiness to make any sacrifice for its attainment.’

It was the ‘suffering’ and ‘sacrifice’, that caused a million or so to uproot to East Pakistan from Bihar in 1947. Sharing a linguistic affinity with West Pakistanis, they identified readily with the concept of a Unitary State with a strong Centre. This was at odds with creeping Bengali nationalist sentiment that wanted maximum autonomy. When push came to shove, it was time to take sides to save Pakistan — at any cost. It cost them dear. After the fall of Dhaka, their position became tenebrous. Viewed as collaborators or remnants of the ancien regime they became the targets of summary justice and reprisals.  Ultimately offered the choice of becoming citizens of Bangladesh or Pakistan, many opted to go — relocating to 66 Camps — awaiting repatriation.

After the Simla Accords, around 120 to170, 000 came to Pakistan between 1972 and1974. Thereafter, repatriation halted. The issue became contentious, acquiring an ethnic and linguistic hue in the internal politics of Sindh where they had mostly settled. What began as a humanitarian and national concern assumed an unfortunate parochial dimension. Occasionally their plight found a voice in international forums — eliciting a few token responses from Pakistan – but excuses were readily available– to delay and deny.

Procrastination and deliberate indecision over the years has further compounded the original problem.  Successive generations have grown up in squalid camps vacillating between hope and despair. Their legal status is a Catch 22: If they are ‘Stranded Pakistanis’, they cannot be classed as ‘Refugees’ or an official ‘Minority’ with rights and privileges in Bangladesh. If they leave of their accord, and enter Pakistan through surreptitious means – – they are illegal in Pakistan, subject to deportation! But where are they to be deported to exactly…the Indian State of Bihar?

To the credit of the current Government in Bangladesh, it has ended the legal limbo for some. Children born after 1971, or who were minors at the time have been enfranchised and are eligible for citizenship. Yet there are still many that are stateless, eking out an existence — waiting for the Promised Land. Once East Pakistanis, then Stranded Pakistanis –they are now Abandoned Pakistanis!

This abdication of responsibility remains a shameful stain on Pakistan’s collective national conscience. It exposes our hypocritical, oft-proclaimed love for the ummah and concern for the Palestinian cause. Consider too, that there are hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens living and working in Pakistan of all hues and nationalities yet its own citizens are denied legal entry. There can be no formal closure — no ghosts laid to rest of the events of 1971 until this issue is resolved.

Commendably, on many other fronts, the two countries have let bygones be bygones and buried the hatchet. Barring a few minor irritants, relations are friendly and fraternal. There is trade and commerce. There are cricket matches, cultural exchanges. The recently- observed 47th^th Anniversary of PTV invoked nostalgic memories of much – loved Bengali singers and dancers. Music was always a binding force, a shared heritage – then and now.  Recently I was fortunate to attend a concert in a Gulf Arab country. The performers were Indians — a Sikh husband and a Hindu wife of Bangladeshi origin. They sang primarily in Urdu in which both were fluent, often stopping to explain the poetic nuances of couplets by Qateel Shifai, a Pakistani poet. The grand finale was the soulful ‘Allah hi Allah kiya karo.’

I was elated …yet saddened …conscious of the irony: it was the language issue in 1952 that had triggered the initial divide between East and West.  A grand vision of a unitary, uniform Ideological State was force – fed on people who already had their own proud Bengali culture. It was to be purged of all ‘non – Islamic’ influences. The minority were imposing their language on the majority. Urdu was somehow considered Islamic! Blinkered minds — could not – or would not see an alternative picture.  Could we not have opted for unity in diversity? Was it necessary to have only One identity? Was the cultural gap between east and west really that pronounced? Given time, it would have narrowed — surely.

If only politicians could sing…!

Paradoxically, forty years on, the existence of Bangladesh as an independent state is trumpeted by many in Pakistan as a logical progression, proof and vindication of the Two-Nation theory. The original Pakistan Resolution of 1940, it is pointed out had called for the creation of two states – not one! The vision of hindsight is always 20/20 …or is it? Some had seen the writing on the wall and the futility of holding on forcibly. Asked for his views, ex- President Ayub Khan records in his diary on 23 February 1971: ‘I told Mohd. Ali  (brother of Gen Yahya Khan)…it now seems very difficult to hold the country as a Federation and the best situation would be to withdraw the army from East Pakistan, in the best manner that is possible and to think about a Confederation, as this seems to be a way in which the country will not be further put through a trauma. Agha Mohammed Ali said ‘sir is this is your considered opinion?’ and I said ‘yes I think so; we have gone beyond the stage of a Federation’.

If only General Yahya had heeded the advice of his superiors…!

The name Bangladesh often crops up today on animated discussions on Pakistan TV Channels. Hoping for a quick – fix, back- door solution to current problems, there are some that advocate the ‘Bangladesh Model’, a reference to a civil – military partnership that was partially successful in tackling political and financial corruption in Bangladesh. They would also be well – advised to consider the other Bangladesh example: of a liberal, pluralistic society, of syncretism and tolerance, co-existence of mosques, mandirs and churches. As some Pakistanis have admitted wistfully — and with some justification – Bangladesh 2011 is a truer manifestation of Mr. Jinnah’s vision than the Pakistan we have today.  If only such wisdom and insight had been available earlier — there might have been no ghosts of 1971 to exorcise. If only…!

One of the things I like best about studying political science is reading the opinions and insights of people from another age (whether they be through archives or biographies or whatever). It’s really interesting to chart various developments over time in the way we think about certain things. Obviously humans as a biological species don’t change much in a matter of a hundred years, but as social animals, the transformation can be pretty intense.

For example, this is an excerpt from Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, an account of what the American ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, saw during World War I, especially when it came to genocide and ethnic cleansing.

This particular excerpt is drawn from the section where Morgenthau reflects on the Allies’ withdrawal from the Dardanelles. The chapter, incidentally, is titled “The Turk Reverts to the Ancestral Type”.

Essentially the Turk is a bully and a coward; he is brave as a lion when things are going his way, but cringing, abject, and nerveless when reverses are overwhelming him. And now that the fortunes of war were apparently favouring the empire, I began to see an entirely new Turk unfolding before my eyes. The hesitating and fearful Ottoman, feeling his way cautiously amid the mazes of European diplomacy, and seeking opportunities to find an advantage for himself in the divided counsels of the European powers, gave place to an understanding, almost dashing figure, proud and assertive, determined to live in his own life and absolutely contemptuous of his Christian foes. I was really witnessing a remarkable development in race psychology — an almost classical instance of reversion to type…we must realize that the basic fact underlying the Turkish mentality is its utter contempt for all other races. A fairly insane pride is the element that largely explains this strange human species.

I don’t think an ambassador today could get away with saying things like this on the record. But a hundred years ago, it was perfectly normal.

Now, I am not claiming that racism has disappeared off the face of this planet, obviously. My claim is more limited: I’m simply saying that norms against racism and race-based “theories” have meant that leaders and decision-makers are increasingly unlikely to attach their name to sentiments such as the ones expressed above.

Another example, for the Pakistan-based crowd out there, is this excerpt from Ayub Khan on Bengalis.

East Bengalis, who constitute the bulk of the population, probably belong to the very original Indian races. It would be no exaggeration to that up to the creation of Pakistan, they had not known any real freedom or sovereignty. They have been in turn ruled either by the caste Hindus, Moghuls, Pathans or the British. In addition, they have been and still are under considerable Hindu cultural and linguistic influence. As such they have all the inhibitions of down-trodden races and have not found it possible to adjust psychologically to the requirements of the new-born freedom.

I just love the assuredness and self-confidence in these statements. Pure gold.