S&P finally downgraded France’s credit rating several weeks ago along with some other EU Member States. Such decision by S&P could undeniably cost Sarkozy’s reelection in May 2012. Many see the downgrade of France’s credit rating as Sarkozy’s sole responsibility. But May 2012 is still very far away from a political standpoint. Since his election in 2007 Sarkozy has been a very polarizing political figure in France as proven by the large variety of nicknames given by the media such as President Bling-Bling, Sarko l’Américain, and so on. This blog will put into perspective Sarkozy’s first and maybe last mandate as French President by assessing his contribution to the construction/safeguard of the EU (in defense and security questions), advancing French foreign policy, and the buildup of the transatlantic relations.

Sarkozy, son of a Hungarian immigrant, rose to the highest political sphere quite quickly and unconventionally in French standard. He started his political life in the mid-1970s in the Municipal Council of Neuilly-sur-Seine, one of the richest suburbs of Paris, wherein a large segment of France’s political, economic, industrial and financial elites live. The fact that Mr. Sarkozy’s political life started surrounded by the French elite was considerable for his political career. The creation of an intellectual and support base traditionally takes place in the famous Grandes Ecoles, such as Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), as it has been the case for previous French presidents and ministers, and certainly is the case of François Hollande, the Socialist Candidate. Sarkozy was able to compensate this lack with its Neuilly connections. The latest scandal connecting Sarkozy with the L’Oreal heiress, Liliane de Bettencourt, is one example of his powerful network. A paper produced by the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute counts some interesting facts on the rise of Sarkozy and his understanding of politics.

Following his election in May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy appeared to have changed radically the direction of France’s foreign policy, especially towards the US. Sarkozy’s decision to re-establish ‘cordial’ relations with the US, still under the presidency of Bush, was in direct rupture with his predecessor, Jacques Chirac. The latter opposed his American counterpart, President Bush, in 2003 on the hot topic of the invasion of Iraq. The 2003 transatlantic and European split was real and substantial. The European unity was only reinstituted with the approval of the 2003 European Security Strategy, which symbolizes the agreement between EU Member States of a common agenda and united security vision. As per Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense at the time, Europe was then divided between Old and New Europe; France being one of the old members considering its opposition to the Iraq war. The tensions between the US and France remained high until the election of Sarkozy. Some talked at the time of ‘Sarko l’Américain,’ as he expressed at many occasion during and after the presidential race his admiration for the American model. However, Justin Vaïsse of the Brookings, argued that in fact the Americanism of Sarkozy is much more embedded into Hollywood and Elvis Presley rather than the admiration for the American political system.

The transatlantic relations between France and the US can be divided into three periods. First, from 2007 to 2008, the last part of the Bush administration, which I often refer as the ‘good Bush period,’ was favorable for a rapprochement between the two sides of the pond. Second, after the election of Obama, the honeymoon was extremely short. Very early in his presidency, Obama reoriented the attention of the US foreign policy from Europe to Asia. Such strategic move by Obama has affected the relations with his European counterparts. And the third period was since the G8 summit in Pittsburgh, following the collapse of the financial system in 2008, with closer relations on dealing at the international level with the financial crisis and with Iran. However, in general, the rupture with Chirac was over-emphasized, as Sarkozy did not change that much the direction of the French foreign policy. Sarkozy’s decision to fully reintegrate France within the military structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a moderate signal of his Atlanticism considering that France was always an active and core member of the alliance. The debate in France about such move was certainly excessive.

France was also a key actor during the summer 2008 crisis in Georgia. Following the invasion of Georgia by Russia, Sarkozy played an important role in monitoring Russia-West relations and in limiting a major split between the former Cold War enemies. Sarkozy did play a central role, but made some costly decisions and compromises for not only Georgia, but also the field of international law and human right. At that time France held the EU Presidency and was the voice of the EU, undermining Javier Solana’s role. Russian-French relations have historically been good since the late 19th century and remain quite stable. The latest part of this love story was the sale by France of a French Mistral class amphibious assault ship, creating criticism on both sides of the Atlantic.

One of the highest points of his presidency will remain the gamble on the Libyan campaign. Following a disastrous beginning of the year 2011 with total miscalculations and evaluations of the importance and reality of the Arab spring in Tunisia and then Egypt, Sarkozy decided to be proactive in the support of the rebels in Libya fighting Colonel Qaddafi. The miscalculation by the prestigious French diplomatic corps and intelligence services will remain as a stain and most likely become a cas d’école of diplomatic failure for future generations. Sarkozy did play a crucial role in getting the UN Security Council to agree on the UNSC Resolution 1973 allowing the implementation of a no-fly zone over Libya. Sarkozy was then able to bring the Americans on board and get NATO involved in the war in Libya. The use of NATO was critical for the success of the mission as French and British armies, navies and air forces have been considerably affected by budget cuts. For example, as of today Britain does not have an aircraft carrier, which seems quite contradictory to its historical strategic culture and heritage as a maritime power. The Libyan mission was a success and will become a template for future military interventions: short, precise, highly technologized, multilateral, and quite cheap. However, Sarkozy’s decision to use NATO was a major setback for the EU, which was completely bypassed by London and Paris, as well as discredited. The best example of the CSDP weakness is the fact that EUFOR Libya was created, but never deployed. Thus, HR Ashton remained quiet and irrelevant throughout the different steps of the Libyan campaign.

What next for 2012? Sarkozy does have a busy schedule until the first round of the presidential election. The year starts quite well for France and ultimately Sarkozy considering the fact that India decided to buy for $20bn of France fighter jet, Rafale, at the expense of the EADS’ Eurofighter Typhoon. Such contract is a true illustration of Sarkozy’s understanding and mastery of politics. The Financial Times published an outstanding article on the dogfight taking place backstage in order to sale the fighter jet. In addition to his reelection campaign, several topics need to be addressed, or at least discussed: first, Iran. What should France do about it? Is it the time to empower the EEAS led-by Lady Ashton and use the similar approach of 2003 EU3+1 implemented during Solana’s mandate? Or is it the time to discuss military operation within NATO? What is certain is that Sarkozy will not get a UNSC Resolution as China and Russia will definitely oppose it. Second, the mission in Afghanistan. France has been progressively removing its troops from Afghanistan, but has actively contributed to the European Gendarmerie Force (EFG) in charge of training the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army. With the announcement by the US to remove the troops by 2014, the Europeans will soon be following this trend. Will the EGF remain or should it come back home as well? Third, Syria. The violations of international law by the Syrian government are undeniable and some members of the Arab League monitoring team have even expressed their anger and opposition to the Assad regime. Avoiding and sidelining Syria could haunt Sarkozy in the future, the same way the Rwanda genocide has been haunting French political elites for over 15 years, but for different reasons. Sarkozy understands that the UNSC will not agree on a Resolution, but decision needs to be taken on the matter. Unfortunately until today China and Russia have favored sovereignty over humanity. Could it be done outside the laws with a NATO-led operation as it was done in 1999 in Kosovo? It would be ethically a right mission embodying the R2P concept, but wrong as it would violate international law. Fourth, Turkey. Franco-Turk relations have been at their lowest since the adoption by the French Assembly of the recent law criminalizing the denial of the Armenian genocide. Poor bilateral relations with Turkey will ultimately hurt and affect the overall EU and NATO relations. Turkey could block, as it has done in the past, Berlin Plus type NATO operations. Sarkozy must address the matter with Turkey and find new common ground. Fifth, the economic crisis has been painful for the Euro-Atlantic community. The Eurozone is still not safe and saved, as the financial and economic situations of Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal remain volatile. Sarkozy with his German counterpart, Ms Merkel, have a lot of work in readjusting and agreeing on the rules of the game and reforming the Eurozone. Sixth, the British headache. Since the gamble of Prime Minister Cameron back in November, the relations between Britain and France have not been of the most pleasant. The Franco-Anglo relations are central for the construction of the common EU defense polict as it was the case in the 1998 Saint-Malo Treaty creating the ESDP, and in the 2010 Defense Treaty. Both actors need one another in order to maintain their active foreign policies and keep the construction of the CSDP going. 2012 will be interesting to see how France and Britain readjust their relations either with the reelection of Sarkozy; or with the election of Mr. Hollande.

Even though, I have not been a supporter of Mr. Sarkozy’s domestic and social policies as well as fundamentally disagree with his leadership and governing style, I have to admit that he has been an interesting international leader. His approach to foreign policy is quite in the continuity of French Gaullist heritage. However, the case of the French operation in Ivory Coast, last April, has been completely under-studied and under-covered by global media. Some have argued that the Libyan mission was a simple cover-up for the real mission and French interests, Ivory Coast. I would also criticize his lack of commitment to the construction and strengthening of the EEAS. It is true that Ms. Ashton has not been the best representative as well as has been unable to establish a common EU vision, however she was appointed by the 27 Heads of State and Government. Sarkozy was part of the appointing committee, and privileged at that time the securing of the DG Internal Market to Michel Barnier rather than getting a French HR. Sarkozy’s priorities were set: French’s influence over the common market, even though the Directors are theoretically not supposed to represent their national government; l’Europe de la defense after.

Until then there is one thing that I can’t wait to see: who will be representing France at the NATO summit in May in Chicago?

By Carlos Harrison for The Huffington Post

It’s been a troubled – some might say, tragic – 10 years for the detention camps at the Guantánamo Naval Base in Cuba. And as they slouch into their 11th year on January 11, there’s no end in sight.

“We say to ourselves, in sort of gallows humor: Guantánamo will close when the last detainee there dies of natural causes,” Jeremy Varon, an organizer with Witness Against Torture, told the Huffington Post on Wednesday.

Franz Kafka himself would have been hard-pressed to concoct a more bewildering and brutal contradictory reality. Allegations over the years have included sexual humiliation, waterboarding, and the use of dogs to scare detainees. Released detainees reported being locked in in sensory deprivation cells, beaten repeatedly, and forced to race while wearing leg shackles. If they fell, they were punished.

If it sounds like Abu Ghraib, it should. The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee found that intelligence teams transported the “aggressive” interrogation techniques perfected at Guantánamo to Afghanistan and Iraq.

The link between Cuba and the war zones, the New York Times reported, was Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, then the head of detention operations at Guantánamo. At his insistence, the Times wrote, the Defense Department sent training teams on 90-day tours in Iraq, showing the soldiers there the techniques utilized on the island. The timing, Amnesty International points out, happened to coincide with when the worst abuses occurred at Abu Ghraib.

Thanks to reports like those, the detention camps have become an international symbol of what democracy and justice are not. They’ve been plagued by suicide attempts by desperate detainees and condemned by the United Nations, human rights groups, even former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who called for the immediate closing of the camps in 2006.
“The value of holding prisoners there was unclear, but the price we were paying around the world for doing so was obvious,” Powell said.

The camps were created in 2002 as a deliberately “extraterritorial” place to extract information from captives in the “War on Terror.” By putting them at Guantanamo, the United States, meant to be beyond the jurisdiction of both the Geneva Conventions and U.S. courts.

That didn’t put them outside the range of public opinion. The camps sparked outrage on day one. Pictures flew around the world of shackled and handcuffed detainees on their knees on the ground with black hoods over their heads and mittens on their hands.

The indignation grew as the first 20 captives went into wire cages at Camp X-Ray, described by critics as “kennels.” Soon, though, the detainees were transferred to permanent cells, and Camp X-Ray was closed.

But the human rights complaints continued, even from some of America’s closest allies.
In 2006, speaking on BBC radio, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said:

“I am absolutely clear that the U.S. has no intention of maintaining a Gulag in Guantanamo Bay. They want to see the situation resolved and they would like it other than it is. However, that is the situation that they have.”

In all 779 detainees have been held in the camps. Eight have died there, including six suicides. One man died of colon cancer, another after an apparent heart attack.

And, in the 10 years since it opened, only six detainees have been convicted of war crimes.
The last 171 still there are caught at the conflicting conjunction where bureaucracy, politics, and military regulations collide – offering little chance, at least for the foreseeable future, of gaining their release.

Forty-six are classified as “indefinite detainees,” held without charges, but considered too dangerous to be released; 89 are eligible for release or transfer but in perpetual custody because there is no place to send them. Five more have been convicted of war crimes; and six face trial – perhaps this year – for the 9/11 attacks and the October 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing.
That makes Guantanamo, as Carol Rosenberg of the Miami Herald described it in a piece for Foreign Affairs, “arguably the most expensive prison camp on earth, with a staff of 1,850 U.S. troops and civilians managing a compound that contains 171 captives, at a cost of $800,000 a year per detainee.”

But even the budget conscious Congress resists closing the base. In fact, it has used its spending oversight powers to thwart the president’s efforts to do just that. It has used that authority to prevent the trial of detainees on U.S. soil and to block the purchase of a dedicated prison facility in Illinois to house transferred detainees.
And no one wants to risk having a released captive later become involved in an act of terrorism or insurgency, which happened with at least one-fourth of the 500 detainees set free under President George W. Bush.

So, the captives remain in Guantanamo. Until when no one knows.
As Marc Thiessen, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, told CNN:

“We have the right to continue to hold them as long as al Qaeda is at war with us.”

Having the right, though, doesn’t make it right, said Geneve Mantri, government relations director for national security, Amnesty International.

Speaking to The Huffington Post on Wednesday, he said the 89 cleared for release by both the Bush administration and a review ordered by President Obama, “represent little or no threat.”

“This has always been sold as a question of the worst of the worst and the reality is that a large number of the people that have been picked up, I hate to say it are in the insignificant and rather pathetically sad story category,” he said.

“There is a minority of people (in the camps) that no one doubts are truly dangerous. That minority of people should be placed in front of a US court. Because we have the most efficient system, the fastest and cheapest and best system for looking at all the evidence. You produce it all in a court of law. Have a real defense — an internationally recognized defense. And then put them away forever.”

Filed under: Afghanistan, Democracy, Freedoms, Hate Crime, homegrown terror, Middle East, Pakistan, Pakistani Taliban, President Obama, United States Tagged: Civil Rights, Constitutional Rights, Cuba, GITMO, Guantanamo, Guantanamo Bay, Gulag, Human rights, NDAA, President Obama, United Nations